There are "fashionable" trends that are frankly idiotic in nature, but to which adults still succumb and voluntarily harm themselves. You can see this on the example of a girl who plucked her "native" real eyebrows, so that later for money to fill tattooed in the same place, on the example of a young man who pumped his biceps and looks like a mutant from a Japanese cartoon for teenagers. In the thirties in the United States, women massively amputated their little toes for fashionable narrow shoes. Now tattoos on the whole body are in vogue. It would seem that you can just use common sense and not create problems for yourself, but people still do such things. They look at others, see by someone else's example that it is bad, harmful, painful and ugly, but they still put themselves on a stupid and painful experiment. With a logical result. The understanding that an error has occurred comes rather quickly, but it is always late.
In the world of military shipbuilding, modular warships are such a fashion trend. The peculiarity of this trend is that they did not work for anyone, not even for the Navy, who performed such experiments on themselves. But as soon as one calculate the losses and get out of the failed project of a modular warship, others immediately started such a project after them. And they began by studying someone else's negative experience, but deciding that they would do it right. Unfortunately, Russia is also in this club. We do not learn anything good, but bad - no problem, immediately and quickly. It makes sense to look at this modular concept in detail.
First, there are different "modularities". In one case, we are talking about the fact that weapons or equipment are simply placed on the ship in a block and mounted on bolts, but at the same time it can only be replaced with an analogue and only during construction or repair. This is how the first ships of the MEKO series were built - thanks to the simplified installation, it was possible to put there, for example, any cannon, without redesigning anything or changing the design. This approach has a plus, and it consists in the ability to adapt the ship under construction to the needs of the customer, and then it is easier and easier to upgrade it, there is also a minus - a separate module with weapons or equipment does not give the ship's hull additional strength, and therefore, the ship has to be somewhat overweight to maintain strength, compared to the same, but not modular. Usually we are talking about 200-350 tons of additional displacement for every 1000 tons that a non-modular ship would have. In the presence of a compact and powerful power plant, this is tolerable.
We are interested in analyzing the approach that the Russian Navy has gotten himself into - when, instead of built-in weapons or equipment, the ship receives a compartment in which modules for various purposes can be installed - weapons, for example, or equipment. The most popular version of such a module in our country is a container launcher for cruise missiles of the Caliber family.
In the early 80s of the twentieth century, in the Royal Danish Navy, someone came up with a brilliant idea - instead of building specialized, or vice versa, multifunctional ships, it is necessary to build ships - carriers of modular weapons and equipment. The impetus for this innovation was that the Danes, due to budgetary constraints, could not afford to replace all the warships that they needed to replace. There were twenty two such ships. Rough estimates showed that if it was possible to reconfigure the ship "for the task", then sixteen would be enough to replace these ships. By the end of 1984, the solution had already been implemented in the form of prototypes - standard container modules measuring 3x3, 5x2, 5 meters, with the same connection interface, dimensions and shape. The contents of the containers could be different - from a cannon to mine-action systems.
Typical modules were to be installed in slots and connected to the ship in a matter of hours, and the ship's full combat readiness had to be restored within forty-eight hours.
The system of modular equipment and weapons was named "Standard Flex", or simply Stanflex.
The first ships equipped with slots for containers were the Flyvefisken patrol boats.
The nuances immediately emerged. On the one hand - the boat, as they say, "turned out" - to have a 76-mm cannon on 450 tons of displacement, eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 12 missiles, and, for example, a high-speed boat and a crane for launching it is worth a lot. In total, there were many more options for modular loading.
But there were also disadvantages. Firstly, the module with the cannon turned out to be "eternal" - there was no point in ever touching it at all. As a result, the cannon was removed only before the ship was sold to Lithuania or Portugal. Secondly - quite rightly, most of the previously built ships of the Danish Navy got rid of by "sending" them to Portugal and Lithuania. Modularity was not that much in demand. At the moment, Denmark itself has only three units left. Thirdly, with three aft slots, the story turned out to be similar to the situation with the cannon - there was no point in changing them, the ship went on patrol with the usual set of weapons, and all the additional displacement, which turned out to be necessary with the modular architecture, had to be “transported” in vain. However, the aft modules were sometimes rearranged, but not very often. It also turned out that if the modules with anti-ship missiles can be simply installed, and the main crew will use them, then for other modules, for example, for the lowered GAS, special training is needed, or additional crew members. Also, although the replacement of twenty-two ships with sixteen was successful, it did not work out to save much - the modules required infrastructure for storage on the shore, which also cost money.
All this did not become clear immediately, and at first the enthusiastic Danes equipped all their new ships with slots for installing modules - the already mentioned patrol boats, corvettes "Nils Huel", patrol ships "Tethys". True, even there the containers did not take off - the installed container weapons simply remained on the ships once and for all. And if the Danes later got rid of most of the Fluvefisken boats, then on corvettes modularity is used for quick modernization, for example, the module with the Sea Sparrow missile defense system was replaced with a new module with the American UVP Mk. 48 for the same missiles. The rest of the modular weapons remained on the ships in the same way as stationary ones. A modern example - on patrol boats of the "Diana" class, produced in the 2000s, there is room for only one module, and the possibility of installing a module with a weapon is absent, which limits the possibility of using the modules only by the laboratory module for environmental monitoring.
The Tethys has three places for modules, but this is understandable for a ship with a displacement of 3500 tons, which is armed with a cannon and four machine guns. The Danes simply saved on weapons, judging that since they had stacks of modules with anti-ship missiles and missiles, then budget savings for the sake of new ships can simply be left without weapons, and in a threatened period, take modules from warehouses and equip ships with at least something.
On the Absalon-class ships, which in a sense are the "calling card" of the Danish Navy, there are only two modules for missile weapons, they are used solely so that in the future it would be possible to simply update missile weapons without design work.
The newest class of frigates "Iver Huitfeldt" has six modular cells, and they are pre-installed with his standard weapon, two cannons, the "Harpoon" anti-ship missile launcher and the Mk.56 UVP. There are no free slots, modularity is used to accelerate modernization and in order to balance the number of missiles and anti-ship missiles on the ship, increasing the number of some and decreasing the number of others.
Currently, the epic with modules in the Danish Navy is over - now the StanFlex system is used not to give the ship versatility, changing the rocket module to a diving container, but to accelerate the modernization, in which the cannon is changed to a cannon, missiles to missiles, etc. … The price for this was a serious increase in the displacement of Danish warships - they are really big for the set of weapons they carry. You have to pay for everything.
In a funny way, it was in those years in which the Danish approach to modularity changed and took on modern, finished forms that the United States tried to repeat the Danish idea in itself, on a fundamentally new class of ships - the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
The story of this American-style gigantic cut of budget money is very interesting, confusing and very instructive.
It all started in the 90s, when the United States realized that the oceans had turned into their lake, and that no one could stop them from doing what they saw fit. Since they considered it necessary to “build” all the “unbuilt” humanity up to this point, the prospects were unambiguous - the United States would need to invade one country after another, and bring the locals “to a common denominator” by force. Since Russia at that moment almost killed itself, and China did not yet have a significant fleet (and there were no signs that it would have one), it could be safely assumed that no one would supply military products to non-Western and unfriendly US countries. especially since the Americans could always push through sanctions against anyone. This means that the enemy will be low-tech and weak.
As the first potential victim in those years, the Americans saw Iran, with its hordes of motor boats armed with missiles, aircraft dying without spare parts, an abundance of sea mines, and an almost complete absence (then) of significant coastal defense and fleet.
Thinking about how to deal with Iran gave rise to the concept of the "Streetfighter" - a street fighter in Russian, a small, about 600 tons, warship, specially designed for fighting in the enemy's coastal zone. According to the conception of the authors of the concept - Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the author of the "network-centric war" so brilliantly demonstrated by Russia in Syria, and the retired US Navy captain Wayne Hughes, this warship was supposed to be cheap, simple, massive and "expendable" - so that instead of fighting for survivability when defeated by the enemy, the crews had to abandon these ships and evacuate. To make the ship more versatile, Cebrowski and Hughes decided to use a Danish trick - a modular weapon that can be replaced, forming the appearance of the ship "for the task."
The idea of a consumable ship did not find support, but in general, the Navy and the Pentagon were interested in the possibility of creating a special ship for battles in the coastal zone. The idea was especially strongly inspired by the commander of naval operations, Admiral Vernon Clark. Cebrowski in 2001 received from Donald Rumsfeld the post of head of the Office for the Transformation of the Armed Forces, and as soon as this happened, Clark closed the then-developed DD-21 missile cruiser project (in a simplified and reduced version of this project ideas were implemented in the Zumwalt-class destroyers), and opened a program for updating the Navy with ships of new classes, among which there was a new name - "Littoral combat ship". From 2005 to 2008, the fleet chased an ugly catamaran with a helipad on the roof, the Sea Fighter, on which the concept of using modular weapons and equipment was tested, while at the same time approving the requirements for a future new class of ships. Then corporations entered the business.
Typically, the lead ship in a series was built by the winner of the tender for the supply of the ship, whose proposal was the best. But there was a war in Iraq, the American military-industrial complex, the military and politicians got a taste of the development of military budgets, and this time all competitors - "Lockheed Martin" and "General Dynamics" received orders for experimental ships of their projects. Lockheed propelled a Freedom-class single-hull ship, while General Dynamics propelled an Independence-class trimaran. The Navy played out the "game" as if by notes - at first it was announced that the prototypes would be compared with each other after construction, then, the experimental series was slightly cut down to two ships, and then they announced that both classes would be built, since both have irreplaceable capabilities, and it is impossible to choose the best one.
It makes no sense to list the course of events further, it is described in a huge number of articles, on English Wikipedia, in Russian you can read article by A. Mozgovoy, in the journal "National Defense" … Let us limit ourselves to the fact that the struggle of this project against the Pentagon and the American military-industrial complex was conducted by many respected people in the United States, for example, John Lehman, Cold War hero Admiral James "Ace" Lyons, John McCain and many others.
Congress fought for every cent that this program promised to master, the US Audit Office repeatedly checked this project both from a financial point of view and from the point of view of its feasibility - nothing helped. The only thing that the opponents of the project managed to kill was twelve ships in the series, and still achieve contracts with fixed prices for some of the ships (it was planned to build fifty-two units, but in the end they were able to shrink to forty, currently thirty-six have been contracted and the fight continues). But the skating rink of the monsters of the military-industrial complex and the politicians and the military that he bought was unstoppable. In 2008, the first "Freedom" was admitted to the combat strength, and in 2010 - the first "Independence".
Concerned about the fate of the sawing project, the Navy shoves these ships wherever they go, declaring them to be a solution to the problem with pirates or promoting them as a tool to hack into "access prevention" zones, the industry helps them, it has come to the point that Lockheed's partner in the Freedom series, Northrop Grumman "circulated a" study "according to which, when fighting pirates, LCS replaces twenty (!) Ordinary ships. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the OKNSH, praised the amphibious capabilities of these ships, which are never actually amphibious. According to the report of the US Audit OfficeThe Navy is regularly rewriting the CONOPS - the operational concept - of using these ships, canceling old requirements and tasks that they cannot fulfill, and coming up with new ones, simpler.
To justify the huge investment in these ships, the Navy decided to make it so that they could at least perform some real combat missions, and after two years of tests, in May 2018, decided to equip them with NSM (Naval Strike Missile) anti-ship missiles, developed by the Norwegian company Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace. The missiles will be installed in quad launchers, on the bow, between the cannon and the superstructure, eight each per ship. This is a coup, the rocket is very serious and difficult to destroy. After installing these missiles, ships will acquire the ability to attack surface targets at a significant distance, that is, from that moment, they will become of limited combat capability. True, they will never become full-fledged combat units.
But in this case we are interested in modularity.
At base, the ships look almost unarmed - the Freedom was originally armed with a 57-mm Mk.110 cannon, a RAM launcher with a 21 RIM-116 missile defense system, and four 12, 7-mm machine guns. There is a hangar for one MH-60 helicopter and one MQ-8 UAV helicopter. There are jamming complexes.
The Independence was (and remains) armed as well, but its SeaRAM missile launcher is equipped with a radar from the Falanx artillery mount, and there are two helicopters on board.
All other weapons, according to the authors of the program, should be replaceable and modular.
The main options were the following.
1. Module for fighting enemy boats and boats (Anti-Surface warfare module). It included two modular 30-mm automatic cannons "Bushmaster", a modular installation for vertical launch of NLOS-LC missiles with a range of 25 kilometers, an MH-60 helicopter with Hellfire missiles and onboard machine guns, and an armed UAV. The same "module" included rigid inflatable boats (RHIB), located in the under-deck compartment of combat missions (Mission Bay). A little later, the NLOS-LC program was closed along with the "parent" program Future Combat Systems, the Navy tried to push a small-sized Griffin missile with a range of only 3.5 km onto the ship, but due to the obvious absurdity of this step, instead of Griffin they received as a result, a vertically starting "Hellfire" with a modified seeker. Currently, the "module" of combat readiness minus weapons on board the MQ-8.
We look at the photo - this is a modular gun.
And in the video below, the Hellfire modular missile launcher, 24 pieces. The maximum firing range is about 8000 meters, targets in the video are hit at a distance of 7200 meters.
2. Anti-Submarine warfare module. Includes a lowered GAS, towed GAS Thales CAPTAS-4, towed hydroacoustic countermeasures system AN / SLQ-61 / Light Weight Tow Torpedo Defense (LWT), MH-60S helicopter armed with a light Mk.54 torpedo. It is also included in the "module" as a UAV weapon. At present, ten years after the flag was raised on the lead ship Freedom, the module is not ready. Presumably, the Navy should compose and test it in 2021.
3. Mine clearance module. Laser detection systems for mines from a helicopter, data exchange with the "shore", GAS for searching for mines, an unmanned boat for searching for mines with its GAS, NPBA for searching for mines under water, disposable mine destroyers and the helicopter itself for placing a laser system, a helicopter sweep, and much more. The "module" is not ready, individual components have been tested.
4. The outfit of forces for the landing and "irregular" hostilities (Irregular warfare and landing module). The typical outfit of the forces includes storage containers with clothing and weapons of the Marine Corps, one landing helicopter, one fire support helicopter, landing boats for high-speed delivery of soldiers to the coast and the Marines themselves. It is planned to use such forces for special operations, mainly from ships of the Independence class, carrying two helicopters and having a large flight deck.
The navy slid down the Danish track almost instantly. With a ship with a displacement of over three thousand tons, and a cost of two-thirds of the new destroyer Arleigh Burke, it would be foolish to continue to keep it unarmed. As soon as the modules with thirty-millimeter cannons were ready for use, they were immediately installed on ships of the Freedom class, and were never removed again. Nowadays, even a photo of the ship in its original configuration, without guns, with covers over the slots is a rarity.
The modular weapon was suddenly permanently installed. Until a certain moment, it was unclear whether the same fate awaited other modules, because the ship provides for the simultaneous placement of some components included in different modules.
The Americans remained silent about this for a long time, but in 2016 they finally recognized - those modules that will be completed will not be used as removable - they will be permanently installed on ships.
In early September 2016, the commander of the naval surface forces, Vice Admiral Tom Rowden, stated the following.
All the planned twenty-four (here, apparently, they mean the unfinished and not built ships), will be distributed among six divisions. Three divisions for the Independence class and the same for the Freedom class. Each division will be equipped with “its own” types of modules - mine, anti-submarine and anti-boat and boat module. Each division will work out only its tasks - the fight against boats and boats, the fight against mines and anti-submarine defense. There will be no replacement crew, whose task is to work on modular armament - the crews will be formed as permanent ones. At the same time, two crews will be formed for each ship, which will serve on it in turn. This will maximize the participation of ships in combat services.
Etc.
This is the end of the project in its original form. Modularity has again failed to justify itself. Indeed, the Americans immediately had to listen to Admiral Lyons, and make LCS at the base Legend-class patrol ship, on which all modular subsystems "tortured" for LCS would stand up "like native", and all at the same time and without any modularity, faster, better quality and cheaper than it turned out in reality. But we must understand that the priorities of the authors of the LCS program were not cheapness and not a benefit for American taxpayers, but completely different things.
It's hard to say what will happen next. The modules for the LCS are not ready, the ships are standing still. In 2018, there was not a single military service in which they would have participated. Perhaps Rowden's assertions will be realized when the anti-submarine and anti-mine modules are ready.
The Americans joke that when the anti-mine and anti-submarine modules are ready, the lead ships will have to be written off by age.
And there is some truth in this joke. The same Rowden did not say in vain that two crews would be formed for each littoral warship to increase the operational stress coefficient (KOH). The presence of two crews will naturally "drive" these ships to a non-repairable condition, in order to get grounds to write them off for wear and tear, and finally close this shameful page in the history of the US Navy. This was done at one time with the frigates "Oliver Perry" to open the way for this very LCS. When the money is spent, it will be the turn of the LCS themselves and new projects, new budgets.
I must say that the US Navy has no other options - according to the already mentioned report of the US Audit Office, the Navy deceived the public, claiming that replacing modules and changing the "profile" of ships is a matter of a couple of days. According to the latest data, if necessary, replace the module, the ship, taking into account the time to go to the base and back, change the crew, deliver the module and install it, is out of action for a period of 12 to 29 days. With such modularity, you can't do much, which led to the "freezing" of the configuration of all existing and under construction ships in one version.
True, the main battle lies ahead. In the coming years, the US Navy plans to acquire frigates. Lockheed LCS lobbyists are already claiming that the LCS is practically a frigate, they show export options for Saudi Arabia and Israel, which have air defense systems, and declare that nothing needs to be invented for the US Navy, LCS, if it is slightly changed constructively, this is a frigate. You just need to … remove the modules! And install weapons permanently. And not to remember modularity in vain, not to publicly discuss why what was done was done before.
Their opponents are already preparing to finish off the program, not even laying the contracted ships, shifting the focus of shipbuilding in the United States to future frigates. Normal, not based on LCS.
But this is, of course, a completely different story.
Naturally, after such a circus, the Americans should have formed a certain opinion about what modular ships are worth, and what they should (and should) be. And it was formed.
In April 2018, the already mentioned Admiral John Richardson in an interview he spoke about his vision of the future warship of the US Navy … In his words, the hull and the main power plant are something that cannot be changed on a ship (for a power plant, it is possible, but incredibly difficult), so they must meet the requirements of the future from the very beginning. This is especially true of electric generation, which should produce the maximum possible power so that in the future it will be enough for any consumer, up to electromagnetic guns and combat lasers, if they appear.
But everything else should be, according to Richardson, quickly replaceable. They removed the outdated radar station, quickly screwed a new one in its place, plugged it in - it works. No difference in connection sizes, electrical voltage, communication protocol with the ship's digital buses, and so on - everything should work right away.
In fact, we are talking about a repetition of the Danish version - the modular cannon, if it is replaced, then with another modular cannon. No replacing missiles with a diving container, empty slots - modularity, this is a means to quickly upgrade a ship, update radar, radio-technical weapons and weapons, without putting it at the factory for a couple of years. This is how they see it now, this is how they talk about it, when they don't have to lie to Congress and the journalists.
Let's summarize what conclusions can be reached by analyzing the experience of the Americans and Danes and their experiments with modularity:
1. Replacing a module with a module with different weapons or equipment is not a working idea. The modules must be stored correctly, there must be crews or calculations for them, they must be trained somehow while ships are at sea with other modules, it costs money.
2. The enemy will not allow changing modules in battle and operations. The ship will fight with what is installed on it, it will not be possible to replay.
3. Ultimately, the modules will be permanently installed on the ship.
4. The point of modularity in the right way is not to vary the weapons and equipment on the ship, but to make it easier to upgrade when the time comes.
5. A modular ship on which weapons and equipment, conceived as modular, are permanently installed, worse than the same, but not modular - removable modules that do not participate in ensuring the strength of the hull require an increase in the mass and size of the hull structures, which leads to irrational growth displacement, which, in turn, requires a more powerful and expensive power plant.
6. Modules are late - ships are ready for them earlier than they are. For the Danes, this was expressed to a small extent, but for the Americans it is the number one problem in their project.
Did they understand all this in Russia when the scam with the project 20386 and the "patrol" "ships" of the project 22160 began? And how. The link is available for the article “Modular principles of building warships. Some problems and ways to solve them " (on page 19), authored by L. P. Gavrilyuk and A. I. Lump.
It meticulously and in detail analyzed all the problems of modular ships, which were fully manifested in American projects, and to a certain extent may also occur in our country. In the end, the authors draw the following conclusion:
“The concept developed by TsNIITS (now OJSC TsTSS) in the 90s can be used as a prototype for the concept of modular shipbuilding … and, relying on the achievements of modern measuring technology, provides for the zonal design and construction of ships with modular principles of assembling weapons complexes welding. Zonal weapons units are unified by type, each of which has its own assemblies and welding attachment technologies that ensure the required mounting accuracy. The joints of the zone blocks and modules are supplied with positioning systems of increased accuracy."
We would venture to suggest that Richardson had something in mind, he simply did not finish it or did not think it through. So, according to the views of domestic specialists - naturally honest, not biased, modularity is a means of quickly replacing the old filling of the ship with a new one, and in order not to increase the displacement because of it, the modules must be part of the power set of the hull and superstructure, and therefore, must be welded …Naturally, under such conditions, we cannot talk about any replacement of missiles with pressure chambers - we can only talk about ensuring the ability to quickly modernize the ship.
This article was published in 2011, in May. The analysis of foreign experience is made quite at the "level", the trends of the future are determined objectively and honestly, there is nothing to complain about.
The subsequent events became all the more surprising.
In 2011-2013, as you know, there was a turn in the views of the Navy command for the future of surface ships. It was then that the Navy refused to improve the 20380 corvettes, from the further development of the 20385 line, and decided to build patrol ships of project 22160 - modular, unarmed and inadequate for warships, and "Corvettes" of the project 20386 - inferior in weapons to the previous project 20385, inferior in anti-submarine capabilities to the old corvette of project 20380 and MPK 1124, overcomplicated, unnecessarily expensive and too large for a BMZ ship.
In order to assess what kind of rake the Navy will step on (having before our eyes the negative experience of two not the last states in the maritime business), let's take a closer look at the ship of project 20386 precisely from the point of view of ensuring its modularity and indiscriminately of other flaws in its design (of which there are many, its whole design is one continuous flaw, but more on that another time).
First, it is foolish to choose a form factor for modular weapons. What was the point of packing everything in standard shipping containers? It would be "to the place" if it was a question of the rapid arming of civilian ships and their use in the Navy for mobilization. Then containers are a big plus. For a battleship, this is a minus, a battleship counts every kilogram, and speed remains an extremely important quality. Containers, due to their large volume, require "inflate" the ship to a huge size. This applies to the project 20386 to the maximum extent.
The feed has been selected to accommodate the modules. At the same time, the designers have chosen a truly insane way of loading the modules on board. First, you need to use a crane to put the module on the helicopter hoist, then lower it into the hangar, using lifting equipment, horizontally move it through the gate in the rear wall of the hangar into the compartment of removable modules and mount it there. Everything would be fine, but the location of the lifting equipment and the need to transport containers inside the ship require additional height in the aft compartments - otherwise the container cannot be lifted and dragged. And the height is additional volume. And it generates additional tons of displacement. As a result, corvettes 20380 of orders 1007 and 1008 possess not only the same weapons as 20386, but also almost the same multifunctional Zaslon radar system, simply mounted not on the superstructure, but on an integrated tower-mast structure. But their displacement is less than a thousand and a half tons, by a third!
This is where playing with container modules has led. It has been said more than once that for the sake of the Caliber missile module it is necessary to go to sea without a helicopter, and the absurdity of this decision is obvious to any normal person. For some reason, on a smaller, and about 900 tons lighter corvette 20385, there is a helicopter, eight cells in the vertical missile launcher, and the same sixteen anti-aircraft missiles, the same gun, the same radar system, and there is no need to choose - everything is installed at the same time. With the total, absolute superiority of old corvettes in hydroacoustics.
Next, let's try to think - what will happen with the applicability of the new modules? So, the towed hydroacoustic station at 20386 is removable. But given the primitive built-in GAS, which commander would agree to go to sea without being towed? The ship without her is like a "blind (although generally deaf, but oh well) kitten." In addition, the module is not provided in its place, there is nothing to replace it with. And there is additional space for transportation and installation of the GAS, there is no getting away from it. What does that mean? And this means that the GAS will be tormented in its place once and for all, and no one will remove it from there anymore, there are no suicides among the commanders of the ships and the commanders of the naval formations. What is modularity for then? Further - container PU.
At first glance, a helicopter can be sacrificed. Don't take it with you, that's all. But the ship does not have a long-range means of detecting submarines, even if a submarine is detected somewhere behind or from the side with the help of a towed GAS (it will not be spotted right on the course in time, there is nothing, the built-in GAS is "dead"), then how to attack it? Torpedoes from the "Package" complex? But their range is small, and it is unrealistic to reload the "Package" at sea - the launcher is made so poorly that it can only be reloaded in the base.
There would be a helicopter, there would be chances to urgently raise it with torpedoes to attack the detected submarine, or with a torpedo and buoys for additional search and attack … in fact, that's why it will be on board, and no container launchers. Again, because there are no suicide bombers.
The position remains in the center of the aft compartment, between the side hatches for boats. Some kind of module can be put there. Diving, for example, or mine. And this is the only "justification" for the super-expensive ship and the "killed" program for updating ships of the near sea zone, the loss of inter-ship unification, and the loss of time until at least 2025, but rather 2027, when the failure of this scam can no longer be hidden. And this is without taking into account the technical risks due to which this ship may simply not be built. Never.
Great price for one modular container with accessories. Or two.
But more importantly, in the example of 20386, all the problems with the modules that stood in the way of the Danes and Americans, apparently, are confirmed. And the fact that some of the modules will be installed on the ship forever, and the fact that because of them the ship has a much higher displacement and larger dimensions (and a more expensive power plant, as a result), and the fact that the modules will need to be stored in special conditions, provide calculations, and provide training for calculations …
And the "lateness" of the modules, it seems, is also "shining" for us. At least 20386 was laid down in October 2016, it actually began to be built in November 2018 (supporters of the project - you didn't know, did you?), And there is still no rocket module with Caliber. There is a mock launcher capable of providing a so-called "throw" test, that is, launching "nowhere", without guidance, without loading a flight task, and that's it. And in general, there are no modules yet, except for the final test of the removable GAS "Minotaur" and a diving container. It is quite possible that they will not exist in 2027 either. And the corvette 20386 already has a displacement of 3400 tons.
But maybe the modules on the patrol ship of Project 22160 will be better "registered"? Here we have to admit that yes, it is better. On this ship, the location and method of mounting the modules is much more successful. There, the modules are placed in the "slots" by a crane, through large hatches in the deck, and are combined with a helicopter. This is not to say that it made the ship much more useful. But, at least, its zero efficiency does not turn into a negative value when trying to install some kind of container there. This makes me happy.
But again, should these ships get a meaningful task, the containers will be "registered" there forever. Should this "patrolman" take on the task of non-nuclear deterrence of NATO, and receive (well, suddenly!) Containers with "Caliber", it is unlikely that someone will ever take them off these ships. The tension in relations with the West is not decreasing, and, apparently, will never decrease, which means that the missiles must always be ready for use. Should it happen, as suggested by some, to use these ships to protect the Nord Stream pipeline from terrorists and saboteurs, to shuffle the modular load, while this task is relevant, no one will either. And, like the Danes and the Americans, modularity will be simply superfluous. The modules will not be replaced, they will always be on the ship.
We have stepped on the same rake that others have followed before us. We saw how this rake hit them on the forehead. But they took this step anyway. The result will be logical - it will be the same as that of the Americans, and worse than that of the Danes, who got off with "little blood" with their invention, and at Absalons, due to the rational and extremely limited use of modular technologies, they even turned modularity for the benefit, in theory, at least.
And it is very disappointing that all this was done when our specialists had already outlined the correct ways to use a modular approach in the future, having disseminated this information in specialized publications of the shipbuilding industry.
But, like the Americans, the authors of our modular ships have priorities somewhat different from the growth of the Navy's combat capability and, especially, saving public money. Alas, in the case of modular ships, we repeat not only other people's mistakes, but also other people's crimes.
So does this mean modularity is an absolute evil? Not really.
As you know, poison differs from medicine in dosage. For a full-fledged battleship, the ability to quickly upgrade is very important. And modular samples of weapons and equipment installed on warships can accelerate this upgrade. But these modules must meet the following conditions:
1. Fastening by welding and "participation" in ensuring the rigidity and strength of the body. This will prevent the growth of the ship's displacement.
2. Abandoning the idea of having a standard form factor. Use your own attachment dimensions for the guns, your own for the radar, and so on. This will allow you to upgrade weapons and various equipment without costly alteration of the ship, and if the displacement grows, then not by a third, as in "ordinary" modular ships, but by a few percent.
Naturally, there will be no talk of any quick replacement of a module with a module. Modules will be replaced only during modernization, and only with similar ones (cannon to cannon, radar to radar). Naturally, as the American Commander-in-Chief Richardson said, electric power should be installed with an eye to the future, so that later, in the future, to support more energy-intensive equipment.
And container modules can find their purpose. First of all, when arming non-military ships, or outdated and not subject to "normal" modernization of ships. So, on a small bulk carrier, it is quite possible to install four or six container PU missiles "Caliber", right "in the trough", on the floor of the cargo compartment, throw power cables across the floor, and over a part of the cargo compartment, install a flooring on which it is already at a height to put, for example, a module with a radar, a mobile monoblock version of "Pantsir" or an autonomous module "Tora", container launchers of the "Uranus" complex, and so on.
For example, the Finns put on a boat a container mortar of 120 mm caliber. For such purposes, modularity is quite useful.
And, most likely, common sense will prevail. No fall is eternal; there is always a blow at the end. Whether it will be a war at sea, shamefully lost to some third-rate country, or just all the secret will become clear, we are not given to know. But the fact that there will be a final is absolutely certain. And then, perhaps, common sense and honesty will again be in demand. And we will stop walking on the rake - strangers and ours, catching "fashionable" viruses from abroad and repeating other people's crimes for the enrichment of a bunch of crooks.
In the meantime, we can only observe.
