69 years ago, on December 5, 1941, the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow. This was the beginning of the first strategic offensive of our army in the Great Patriotic War, its first major victory. For the invading enemy, the Germans and their allies, the battle of Moscow was more than just the first major defeat. It actually meant frustrating their hopes of winning in a fleeting campaign - and therefore leading them to the inevitable loss of the war as a whole.
Therefore, the Day of the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow is deservedly considered in Russia as one of the Days of its military glory.
It should be noted, however, that this victory went to our army and people at a very heavy price. And the battle for Moscow began with the hardest defeat of our troops, in fact, a complete catastrophe that befell the Soviet armies of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts.
The German high command was well prepared for the start of a decisive offensive aimed at the capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow. In the preceding weeks, the troops of their Army Groups South (commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt) and Center (commanded by Field Marshal Fyodor von Bock) surrounded and defeated most of the Soviet troops in the South-West direction (commanded by Marshal Timoshenko) … And the troops of Army Group North (commander of the Ritter Wilhelm von Leeb) not only reached the near approaches to Leningrad, but also continued to push further to the east in order to join up with the allied Finnish army of Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim across Lake Ladoga.
Even during the battle at Kiev, when the success of the German troops was indicated, the High Command of the Wehrmacht developed a plan for an offensive against Moscow. This plan, codenamed Typhoon, approved by Hitler, was fully approved by the generals and field marshals at a meeting held in September 1941 near Smolensk. (This is after the war, in their memoirs, they will tell that Hitler all the time imposed "fatal decisions" on them, and the generals themselves were always against in their hearts).
The honor of conquering the capital of the Bolsheviks and other "Untermines" Hitler entrusted to von Bock and his army group "Center", to which, however, part of the troops from the "South" and "North" groups were transferred. Army Group Center now included 2nd, 4th, 9th field armies, 2nd, 4th and 3rd tank groups. This group consisted of 77 divisions, including 14 armored and 8 motorized. This accounted for 38% of the enemy's infantry and 64% of the enemy's tank and motorized divisions operating on the Soviet-German front. On October 1, the enemy grouping aimed at Moscow numbered 1.8 million people, more than 14 thousand guns and mortars, 1700 tanks and 1390 aircraft.
The entire mass of the forces of the "Center" group deployed for an offensive on the front from Andriapol to Glukhov in a zone bounded from the south by the Kursk direction, from the north - by the Kalinin direction. In the area of Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka, three shock groups were concentrated, the basis of which were tank groups.
Before his troops, von Bock set the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops in the region of Bryansk and Vyazma, then with tank groups to capture Moscow from the north and south and simultaneous strikes of tank forces from the flanks and infantry in the center to capture Moscow.
The offensive was also provided logistically. Time will pass, and German generals will cite the unpreparedness of the rear, difficulties in supply, extended communications and bad roads. And in September 1941, the German General Staff believed that the supply situation was satisfactory everywhere. The work of the railways was recognized as good, and there were so many vehicles that part of it was withdrawn to the reserve.
Already in the course of the actually started Operation Typhoon, on October 2, Adolf Hitler announced to his soldiers: “In three and a half months, the preconditions have finally been created to crush the enemy by means of a powerful blow even before the onset of winter. All preparation, as far as humanly possible, has been completed. The last decisive battle of this year begins today."
The first operation "Typhoon" was launched by the enemy's southern strike group, led by the famous tanker Heinz Guderian. On September 30, Guderian struck at the troops of the Bryansk Front from the Shostka, Glukhov area in the direction of Orel and bypassing Bryansk from the southeast. On October 2, the remaining two groups from the Dukhovshchina and Roslavl regions went on the offensive. Their strikes were directed in converging directions to Vyazma in order to cover the main forces of the Western and Reserve Fronts. In the first days, the enemy offensive developed successfully. He managed to reach the rear of the 3rd and 13th armies of the Bryansk Front, and west of Vyazma - to encircle the 19th and 20th armies of the Western and 24th and 32nd armies of the Reserve fronts.
As a result, most of our troops, which covered the western and southwestern approaches to the capital, were defeated by the enemy in the very first days or were surrounded. Of the approximately 1,250,000 soldiers and officers of the Western and Reserve Fronts, by the beginning of the German offensive, Georgy Zhukov, who took command of the front on October 10, managed to collect hardly more than 250,000 under his command.
It was a little better on the Bryansk front - his armies managed to break out of the encirclement, but lost from half to two-thirds of the personnel.
Field Marshal von Bock, of course, boasted, announcing that at Vyazma he took 670 thousand Red Army soldiers prisoner, and destroyed 330 thousand, thus obtaining a round and beautiful figure of 1 million. But our losses, captured and killed, really numbered in the hundreds of thousands.
About 80 thousand of our fighters managed to break out of the encirclement, much more (but there is no exact figure here) fled to the villages, and in both directions from the front. Subsequently, tens of thousands of them will join the partisans, or join the cavalry corps of General Belov and the paratroopers of General Kazankin operating in the German rear. Still later, in 1943, after the final liberation of these areas, over 100 thousand more Red Army soldiers were “re-mobilized” into the Red Army, mainly from the “Vyazma encirclement”. But this will be later - and in October 1941 a number of directions leading to Moscow were blocked only by police squads.
The encircled units, commanded by General Mikhail Lukin, fought for almost 10 more days, and for this time fettered 28 German divisions. Now we have "historians" who claim that, they say, those surrounded have shown themselves to be unimportant, they have lasted nothing at all. But Paulus, they say, lasted more than three months in the boiler! I will not go into details, I will only say that I consider such statements to be swinish. People have fulfilled their duty to the Motherland as best they could. And they played their role in the defense of Moscow. And the German tank units did not dare to make a dash on barely covered Moscow without the support of the infantry.
As the well-known military historian Viktor Anfilov writes, “mainly Moscow militias, extermination battalions, cadets of military schools and other parts of the Moscow garrison, NKVD troops and militia fought against the vanguard units of the enemy on the Mozhaisk defensive line. They withstood the battle test with honor and ensured the concentration and deployment of the headquarters reserve units. Under the cover of the Mozhaisk line, the troops of the Western Front that had escaped from the encirclement were able to put themselves in order and reorganize."
And in the second half of October, when the armies of the "Center" group, having broken the resistance of the units encircled near Vyazma, moved to Moscow, they again met an organized defense front and were forced to break through it again. From October 13, fierce battles unfolded on the borders of Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets, and from October 16, Volokolamsk fortified areas.
For five days and nights, the troops of the 5th Army repelled the onslaught of the motorized and infantry army corps. Only on October 18, enemy tanks broke into Mozhaisk. On the same day, Maloyaroslavets fell. The situation near Moscow has deteriorated. It was then, on October 16, that this shameful day of the “great Moscow panic” took place, about which our liberalizing historians so voluptuously love to grovel. By the way, contrary to their assertions, no one concealed this shameful episode even in Soviet times, although, of course, they did not emphasize it. Konstantin Simonov in his story "The Living and the Dead" (written back in the 1950s) said about it this way: "when all this was in the past and when someone in his presence spoke with poison and bitterness about October 16, Sintsov stubbornly kept silent: it was unbearable for him to remember Moscow of that day, as it is unbearable to see a face dear to you, distorted by fear.
Of course, not only in front of Moscow, where the troops fought and died that day, but in Moscow itself there were enough people who did everything in their power not to surrender it. And that is why it was not handed over. But the situation at the front near Moscow really seemed to be developing in the most fatal way during the entire war, and many in Moscow that day were desperate to believe that the Germans would enter it tomorrow.
As always in such tragic moments, the firm faith and imperceptible work of the former was not yet obvious to everyone, it only promised to bear fruit, and the confusion, grief, horror, and despair of the latter struck in the eyes. This was, and could not but be, on the surface. Tens and hundreds of thousands of people, fleeing the Germans, rose and rushed out of Moscow that day, flooded its streets and squares with a continuous stream, rushing to the stations and leaving the highway to the east; although, in all fairness, not so many people from these tens and hundreds of thousands were later condemned by history for their flight."
Indeed, many then thought that Moscow was on the verge of falling, and the war was lost. It was then that the decision was made to evacuate from Moscow to Kuibyshev (then the name of Samara) the government and all the most important institutions, factories, valuables, diplomatic missions and even the General Staff. Stalin himself, however, remained in Moscow - and this is undoubtedly his contribution to history. Although he was not sure of the success of the defense of Moscow.
As Georgy Zhukov recalled, in one of the especially difficult days of the enemy offensive, Stalin asked him: “Are you sure that we will hold Moscow? I ask you this with pain in my soul. Speak honestly like a communist."
Zhukov replied: “We will definitely keep Moscow. But at least two more armies are needed. And at least 200 tanks."
Both Stalin and Zhukov perfectly understood what such forces meant and how difficult it was to get them from anywhere.
We like to talk about Siberians and Far Eastern divisions. Yes, they played an outstanding role, and it was in those days that the order was given to transfer three rifle and two tank divisions from the Far East to Moscow. And they really played an important role in the defense of Moscow - only later. Look at the map of the country. To just transfer one division from Chita, it will take at least a week, and at least fifty echelons. Moreover, they will need to be overtaken through the overloaded railway network - after all, the evacuation of factories and people to the East continues.
Even reinforcements from the relatively close Volga and Ural regions arrived with difficulty.
The 32nd Red Banner Saratov Division of Colonel Viktor Polosukhin, who arrived just in those October days to “defend the Borodino field”, was in place just in time only because it was redeployed from the Far East on September 11th. For the rest, the sprawling front had to be held back by the forces of cadets, militias (Moscow fielded 17 divisions), extermination battalions (only 25 of them were created in the city itself, not counting the region) and NKVD units - the very ones that we, thanks to stupid TV shows, are used to representing like snickering bastards in caps with a blue top and a crimson band that only knew how to shoot at their backs.
And for two months these forces were exhausting the Germans with defensive battles, suffering heavy losses. But the Germans, as their commanders recall, also carried them: by December, companies accounted for 15-20% of the required composition. In the tank division of General Routh, which broke out further than others, up to the Moscow Canal, only 5 tanks remained. And by November 20, it became clear that the breakthrough to Moscow had failed, and on November 30, the commander of Army Group Center concluded that his troops did not have the strength to attack. In early December 1941, the German troops actually went on the defensive, and it turned out that the German command had no plans for this case, since the opinion prevailed in Berlin that the enemy did not have forces either for a long-term defense or for a counterattack.
In part, by the way, Berlin was right. Although the Soviet Headquarters was drawing up reserves from all over the country, and even from other fronts, it was not possible to create either numerical superiority or superiority in technology by the beginning of the transition to the counteroffensive. The only advantage was moral. Our people saw that "the German is not the same", that the "German is running out of breath," and that there was nowhere to retreat. However, according to the German General Blumentritt (Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Field Marshal Kluge), “it was clear to every soldier of the German army that our life or death depended on the outcome of the battle for Moscow. If the Russians defeat us here, we will have no hope.” But, apparently, the intention of the Russians to defend Moscow turned out to be stronger than the Germans - to take it.
And, having repelled all the attacks of the Germans, in early December, the Soviet command planned a strategic offensive - the first in the entire Patriotic War. According to Zhukov's plan, the front had the task of smashing the 3rd and 4th tank groups threatening the capital in the Klin-Solnechnogorsk-Istra area and Guderian's 2nd tank group in the Tula-Kashira area with sudden sweeping strikes, and then enveloping and crushing the 4th army von Kluge, advancing on Moscow from the west. The Southwestern Front was ordered to defeat the enemy grouping in the Yelets area and assist the Western Front in defeating the enemy in the Tula direction. The unified planning and leadership of the Supreme Command Headquarters ensured the operational and strategic interaction of the three fronts. At the same time, the Soviet counteroffensive near Rostov and Tikhvin deprived the German command of the opportunity to transfer reinforcements to Moscow from Army Groups South and North.
A feature of the Soviet counteroffensive near Moscow was that the forces of the Red Army did not exceed the forces of the Wehrmacht, with the exception of the number of aircraft. The main striking force - tank troops - in the bulk consisted of T-26 and BT tanks; so frustrating Germans T-34 and KV were still few. One tank building center - Kharkov, was captured by the Germans. Another, Leningrad, was in a blockade, the evacuated capacities in the Urals and Siberia were just unfolding. And only the factories of Stalingrad remained the main supplier of new tanks. Thus, the German tank forces could fight the Soviet ones on an equal footing, without attributing the failure to the qualitative superiority of the T-34 and KV.
And since the Soviet command did not have a decisive advantage either in men or in equipment, in order to achieve superiority in the places of the main attacks within each of the fronts, it was necessary to carry out serious regroupings, leaving a minimum amount of forces in secondary sectors.
For example, the commander of the Kalinin Front, General Ivan Konev, reported to Headquarters that, due to a lack of forces and tanks, the front could not fulfill the task. Konev proposed to limit the actions of the front to a private operation to capture Kalinin (the then name of Tver). However, this contradicted the general plan of the counteroffensive, and the deputy chief of the General Staff, General Vasilevsky, was sent to the front. Together with Konev, they analyzed in detail the forces of the Kalinin Front, removing the divisions from secondary directions and reinforcing them with artillery from the front's reserves. All this and the surprise of the Soviet counterstrike subsequently determined the success of the offensive of the Kalinin Front.
The transition to the counteroffensive took place without an operational pause and came as a complete surprise to both the supreme leadership of the Wehrmacht and the front command. The first to go over to the offensive on December 5, 1942 was the Kalinin Front. On December 6, the offensive of the Western and Southwestern Fronts began.
The Kalinin Front broke through the enemy defenses on the Volga south of Kalinin and by the end of December 9 took control of the Kalinin-Moscow railway. On December 13, the formations of the armies of the Kalinin Front closed up south-west of Kalinin, cutting off the escape routes of the Kalinin enemy grouping. The German garrison was asked to surrender. After the ultimatum was rejected on December 15, battles for the city began. The next day, Kalinin was completely cleared of the enemy. The Germans lost only in killed over 10 thousand soldiers and officers.
On December 6, the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, in cooperation with the Kalinin Front, launched an offensive against the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups of Reinhard and Gepner. The army, which began the offensive on the morning of December 6, reinforced by 6 Siberian and Ural divisions, broke through the enemy defenses north of Klin. At the same time, the 1st Shock Army was directing a crossing through the Moscow-Volga canal in the Dmitrov area. The depth of the breakthrough was 17 km by the evening of December 6. On December 7, the breakthrough expanded to 35 km along the front and 25 km in depth.
On December 9, General Govorov's 5th Army crossed the river in battle and occupied several settlements on the northern bank. On December 11, on the right wing of the Western Front, the forward detachment entered the Leningradskoye Highway north-west of Solnechnogorsk. On the same day, Solnechnogorsk and Istra were cleared of the enemy.
Wedge was released on December 15. In the battles for the city, 2 motorized and 1 tank German divisions were defeated. During December 20-24, the armies of the right wing of the Western Front reached the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers, where the enemy had prepared a solid defense in advance. Here it was decided to suspend the offensive and gain a foothold on the achieved lines.
In the central sector, the troops of the Western Front pinned down the main forces of von Kluge's 4th Army. On December 11, the 5th Army managed to break through the German defenses in the Dorokhov area.
On December 18, the 33rd Army, after a short artillery preparation, launched an offensive in the direction of Borovsk. On December 25, the 175th SMR of the 33rd Army bypassed Naro-Fominsk from the south and reached its western outskirts, cutting off the Germans' retreat to Borovsk. On January 4, Borovsk, Naro-Fominsk and Maloyaroslavets were liberated.
On December 30, after heavy fighting, Kaluga was liberated by the forces of two armies of the left wing of the Western Front. Following Kaluga, the cities of Belev, Meshchovsk, Serpeysk, Mosalsk were taken. By January 7, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front reached the Detchino-Yukhnov-Kirov-Lyudinovo line.
The right wing of the Southwestern Front provided substantial assistance to the troops of the Western Front. Thanks to her actions, on December 10, the enemy grouping in the Yelets area was surrounded. On December 12, the cavalrymen of the 5th Cavalry Corps defeated the headquarters of the encircled corps (the corps commander managed to escape by plane). The encircled enemy forces tried to break through to the west, attacking the 3rd and 32nd cavalry divisions. On December 15, the commander of the German 134th Infantry Division, General Cohenhausen, personally led the breakthrough. The cavalrymen repulsed the attacks, General Cohenhausen was killed, the remaining Germans surrendered or fled through the forests. In the battles in the Yelets area, the 45th (General Materner), 95th (General von Armin) and 134th infantry divisions of the enemy were completely defeated. The enemy lost 12 thousand people on the battlefield.
In January 1942, the first stage of the counteroffensive near Moscow was completed. In different directions, the Germans were driven back 100–250 km. And although there were still years of heavy and bloody battles ahead, it became clear to everyone: we would not lose the war, and victory would be ours. This is perhaps the main significance of the Moscow battle.
