"The strong falcon hides its claws"
The union did not boast about what it does not have. The union did not talk about what it has. And this silence, interrupted by a chorus of children's voices singing "May there always be sunshine," made the West numb with horror. Stronger than Hitchcock's thrillers.
Lacking reliable information, Western experts themselves drew "cartoons about Soviet superweapons" and then they themselves were amazed at their own creativity. The scientific and industrial potential of the USSR did not allow doubting: much of what was drawn could turn out to be true.
The material presented below is just devoted to one of such "horror stories" of the Cold War period. The project of the missile and artillery battleship "Sovetskaya Byelorossia", better known under the designation K-1000.
The primary source of information about the K-1000 project is the Jane's Fighting Ships reference book of naval weapons (a periodically published catalog with ordered information about all ships in the world). No further confirmation of the existence of such a project has been found.
Were there similar domestic developments or was it exclusively the fantasies of Western experts? I think it's the last thing. The "Stalinist" program for the construction of "large ships" was curtailed, and any talk about battleships was stopped immediately after the death of the leader, several years before the appearance of the first ship-based anti-ship missile complexes. In other words, the components of the K-1000 project have no connection in time.
The version with deliberate misinformation with the "drain" of the secret development to the West, in the author's opinion, looks the least realistic. The union was not seen in cheap productions.
The superlinker Sovetskaya Byelorossia was entirely designed overseas.
"Designed" - it says loudly. On the basis of American projects of a similar purpose and taking into account the Soviet ideas about the beautiful, a sketch was made of a ship with a total displacement of 65-70 thousand tons with a mixed rocket and artillery weapon. Its main dimensions are presented and possible characteristics are deduced.
Taking into account the development of technologies of that era, the following turned out.
It was assumed that the ship will be armed with two rotary launchers with rail guides, whose appearance resembled the installation for launching missiles "KSShch". The launchers were covered with armored domes. In terms of the level of protection, the missile weapons were not inferior to the artillery towers of the main caliber.
The main artillery caliber itself was represented by six 406 or even 457 mm guns in two towers - one each, in the bow and stern of the battleship.
Auxiliary armament consisted of 130-mm universal guns, paired and quad anti-aircraft guns of 45 and 25 mm calibers.
Like the real-life battleships, the vertical armor protection of the K-1000 project could be in a wide range of 280-470 mm (belt), the total thickness of the horizontal protection (upper and main armor decks) was estimated at ≈ 250 mm. Differentiated protection of the main battery towers and missile launchers was estimated in the range of 190-410 mm.
Based on the characteristics of battle cruisers and high-speed battleships of the later period, the speed of the ship could be in the range of 28-33 knots.
Scholars from among Western analysts, the forerunners of the National Interest, came up with suitable Soviet names for all representatives of the series: Sovetskaya Byelorossia, Strana Sovetov, Krasnaya Bessarabiya, Krasnaya Sibir, Sovietskaya Konstitutsia, Lenin and Sovetsky Soyuz.
The construction of missile battleships was supposed to be carried out (just don't laugh now) at Siberian shipyards.
What was the meaning of these assumptions? Was there even a drop of truth in that surrealism?
Joking aside, all elements of the K-1000 project, in one interpretation or another, existed in practice.
In the Soviet Union in the early 50s.serial construction of heavy cruisers was carried out - in fact, battle cruisers of the Stalingrad type (project 82), with a total displacement of 42 thousand tons. At the head "Stalingrad" by the time of the suspension of construction, a corps and a citadel had already been formed.
The design of domestic artillery systems of caliber 406 and 457 mm was carried out throughout the 1930-40s. By the time of the events described, there was sufficient experience and working samples of all the necessary elements of the "tsar cannons". From turrets of thousand-ton towers to the experimental artillery system B-37 (406 mm), which proved to be effective in the defense of Leningrad.
The most interesting moment has to do with the battleship's missile weapons. In the presented form, the launchers resembled in design the SM-59 for KSShch anti-ship missiles (the ship's projectile "Pike", one name could shock the enemy).
KSShch missiles were in service with 13 destroyers pr. 56-EM, 56-M and 57-bis. The modernized destroyers of the project 56, originally designed for artillery and mine-torpedo weapons, received one SM-59 each with an ammunition load of 8 missiles. Project 57-bis was created immediately as a missile carrier. Its armament included two SM-59 installations with an ammunition load of one and a half dozen anti-ship missiles.
The characteristics of the Pike were not impressive - the firing range of 40 km was complicated by the laborious prelaunch preparation associated with filling the anti-ship missile system with liquid fuel.
But the very fact that ships with a displacement of 4,000 tons could fire a salvo comparable in power to a salvo of artillery battleships of the WWII era, aroused great optimism.
Just a few years before the appearance of the KSShch, for the delivery of ammunition of the specified mass to the target (warhead "Pike" - 620 kg, of which 300 are directly the mass of explosives), guns were required with a barrel mass of 70 tons (excluding the breech, aiming mechanisms and ammunition supply) … It was only possible to install such guns on very large ships.
Comparison of the KSShch with large-caliber naval artillery is not entirely correct, because each type of weapon had its own specific characteristics.
Surpassing the 13.5 '' high-explosive projectile by four times in the content of explosives (in this sense, the KSSh warhead is an analogue of a 500-kg high-explosive bomb), the rocket was 2 times inferior to the projectiles in speed. Even if the Pike's warhead were entirely cast from metal, it would still not be able to compete with armor-piercing 343-mm shells. Not to mention the more powerful calibers.
The armor-piercing abilities of the KSShch are greatly exaggerated in the era of the outbreak of "missile euphoria". Most often they mention firing at the unfinished citadel of the Stalingrad SRT with the formation of a hole … Well, how did a subsonic missile inflict such damage, if neither large-caliber bombs nor armor-piercing shells flying at supersonic speeds could repeat this? Nothing even remotely similar in the entire history of naval battles.
There are no less contradictions in the description of the KSSh firing at the decommissioned cruiser "Nakhimov". A rocket with an inert warhead pierced the ship through, so that the lower edge of the exit hole (8 sq. M) was 40 cm under water. This was recorded by the rescue team that reached the "Nakhimov", when the damaged ship had already received 1600 tons of water, received a roll and increased draft. That is, it turns out that its constructive waterline did not pass at all where the hole was later found! The hole was in the upper part of the side. It was only hours later that the sinking ship heeled and the bottom edge of the hole touched the water. The KSSH did not penetrate any armor, it passed above the belt and the main armored deck. No one doubted that a blank at a speed of 0.9M is capable of breaking through thin bulkheads.
(Link to the article, which provides a detailed analysis with diagrams and calculations.)
Artillery, as a rule, is not capable of hitting a target with the first salvo. However, the reliability of target acquisition and the noise immunity of the Shchuka lamp seeker also raise doubts about the ability to get somewhere with the first shot in combat conditions.
The KSShch complex required a long recharge between launches, which in theory took 10 minutes, but in practice an indefinite period. Unlike large-caliber artillery systems, which could immediately fire a second volley, and then again and again.
Nevertheless, the emergence of homing anti-ship weapons was perceived by everyone as a new emerging threat.
It will take several more years before the next generation of Soviet anti-ship missiles can be guaranteed to surpass large-caliber artillery systems in offensive power in naval combat.
But in the 1950s, the West knew only about KSSH. Realizing the potential of the new weapon, they expected to see similar installations on all the newest ships of the USSR Navy. Including on promising battle cruisers.
The fact that the construction of "big ships" of the Stalinist era would be stopped so abruptly and they would never see the sea again, the Americans did not immediately understand. The conclusions of overseas analysts did not keep pace with the logic of the Soviet leadership.
The K-1000 project was born as the quintessence of Soviet priorities in the early 50s. Armor and missiles.
In the battleship project itself, the absence of anti-aircraft missiles is surprising. When all overseas ships of that era were necessarily equipped with air defense systems. How did you not foresee the imminent appearance of such means at the USSR Navy?
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If you look at the situation in the most impartial form, then according to the state of the mid-50s. it was the only type of Soviet shipthat could be of value to the US Navy. The only enemy that posed a threat and would require significant efforts and resources to fight it.
The Anglo-Saxons, who sank the Bismarck, Musashi and Yamato, learned their lesson and understood what kind of ship it was.
To stop the naval fortress, air armies and squadrons are required. But even a local conflict like the Korean War was no longer similar to the situation in the Philippine Sea in 1945, where 11 aircraft carriers stood idle, which were thrown into battle with the Yamato.
To monitor movements and ensure the ability to deal with the K-1000 in a short time, it would be necessary to divert forces from the entire theater of operations, "exposing" other directions. What would not fail to take advantage of the enemy. This is the main advantage and strategic importance of the "sea fortresses".
Leaving him alone was an even worse idea. First of all, the ship created threats as a possible carrier of nuclear weapons. He could shoot the nearest bases (for example, on the territory of Japan), the 406 mm caliber opened up broad prospects for creating ammunition from special. Warhead.
Unfinished building
The K-1000 project did not appear out of nowhere. Back in September 1946, the United States made the first proposal to convert the unfinished battle cruiser Hawaii and the battleship Kentucky into missile carriers.
The first project, designated Study CB-56A, was associated with the deployment of twelve ballistic missiles - captured German V-2s - on board the Hawaii (LKR Alaska-class). Subsequently, these plans were revised in favor of the Triton long-range supersonic cruise missiles. The rapid evolution of rocket weapons made this project old even at the sketching stage. The new proposal was related to the installation of 20 Polaris ballistic missile launchers in place of the third turret of the main caliber, combined with two Talos air defense systems and two Tartar short-range air defense systems. The latest proposal was to rebuild Hawaii into an amphibious command ship.
For the missile battleship Kentucky (of the Iowa class), several rearmament options were also discussed. Among them (1956) it was planned to create a strike ship with 16 Polaris. At the same time, a project was studied for an air defense squadron ship with 4 Talos long-range air defense systems (320 missiles) or 12 Tartar short-range air defense missile launchers (504 missiles).
A sharp reduction in the military budget of the Navy led to the curtailment of both projects by the end of the 50s. Only ships of lesser rank were able to successfully convert - heavy cruisers of the Baltimore class and light cruisers of the Cleveland class.
However, the resulting units had a very mediocre relationship to earlier projects of highly protected ships with missile and artillery weapons.
The combat stability of those cruisers was not ensured by anything. Their defense scheme, designed for action in artillery battles, did not respond to any of the threats of modern times. And due to the total overload, their armor belt finally went under water, having lost its meaning. The antenna posts and massive superstructures of Albany and Little Rock received no protection, and no such goal was set at all. Local anti-fragmentation protection (30 mm) had only their missile cellars.
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Who can know ahead of time the direction of technical progress?
The story develops in a spiral. According to another version, it is similar to the swing of a pendulum. From extreme positions - to the center, in search of the legendary "golden mean".
Is it possible to expect the emergence of large and tenacious ships that cannot be disabled in a short time with a limited outfit of powers?
The last known missile battleship project dates back to 2007. The project, which bore the designation CSW (Capital Surface Warship), was proposed by the Pentagon's military reform department. The total displacement of the ship is estimated at 57 thousand tons, and the cost is $ 10 billion. Weapons control is subordinated to the proven Aegis system. As for the operating costs, they, according to the authors, are.
The appointment is said directly - a scarecrow that can attract too much attention and force the enemy to divert significant forces to counter.
It will not work to ignore the neolinkor - in terms of the number of missiles on board, it is comparable to the formation of missile destroyers.
How much time and effort it will take to drive away such an attack, no one knows. The factor of uncertainty plays a role. The last time they fought with the sea fortresses was seven decades ago. And the results of all the battles testified that these were "difficult targets." They withstood such a number of hits, from which ships of other classes would have perished long ago, strewn with debris on the seabed.
"They are capable of withstanding any form of aggression like no other ship in the Navy."
These units are ideal for patrolling hot spots. CSW is not afraid of any provocations, and it is unlikely to receive significant damage from a surprise attack from several enemy aircraft.
At the same time, the author of the article is convinced that no one has ever conducted evaluative tests of modern missiles against such protected targets. And the vast majority of countries will never be able to create anything that would be able to withstand CSW.
As long as it is possible to launch Tomahawks with impunity, being hundreds of kilometers from the Syrian coast, there is no need for missile battleships. But everything can change when the fleet meets with an adversary capable of conducting retaliatory naval operations that pose a threat to ships.
