The year 2020 has ended. And it makes sense to take stock of the Navy's activities. How are you doing with our military shipbuilding? And how is the fleet preparing to fight?
January event with the Supreme Command on the prospects of the Navy
On January 9, 2020, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (VGK) President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin held a meeting in Sevastopol on the prospects for the development of the Navy. A number of topics that are significant for the Navy have been publicly voiced.
The main intrigue of the event was, of course, the held
"The phenomenon of the UDC to the people" (universal amphibious ships), laid six months later in Kerch.
It should be noted here that these UDCs have actually fallen out of the fog of obscurity. And even in mid-2019, there was no question about them.
And other issues were considered. Much more modest amphibious ships were being built. And there was logic in this.
Amphibious capabilities of UDC scale require two prerequisites for effective use:
1. Reliable aviation cover. (And we have practically zero with this). The only aircraft carrier in permanent repair - the prospects for getting out of it are unclear. The air group is no better. It was assumed that after the Syrian fiasco, steps will be taken to bring the naval air regiments (100 and 279) into an operational state. But it really got worse.
2. Providing a powerful "floating rear". (In reality, this extremely important issue turned out to be under the jurisdiction not even of the Navy, but of the rear of the Ministry of Defense - the Department of Transport Support, ATO). And the attitude towards it there clearly demonstrates the fact of the catastrophic knocking out of the resource of military transport aviation in Syria. Where 90% of cargoes could be carried cheaply and easily by sea.
Given the complete blockage along these two pillars, there is no need to talk about serious amphibious operations of the Navy. In this situation, the UDCs turn out to be nothing more than white bishops for parades.
And this is fully confirmed by the disastrous situation with our shipborne helicopters. What was supposed to be an analogue of the mistral air group? Capitalized from scrap Soviet Ka-29! For, as you do not advertise the Ka-52, it will still not be able to carry troops.
The problem is that there are not enough helicopters available for the center of combat use (two built large landing craft "Ivan Gren", two "large" large landing craft under the new "edition" of project 11711) and for new UDCs. And new ones are not only not produced, but not even planned.
The promising Lamprey requires a separate discussion. But, alas, very harsh and sad.
And with all this, in the face of a severe shortage of funds and sequestration of many expenses, did we find extra money for two such "white elephants"? Moreover, "In the process of the way the dog was able to grow up", and at the end of this year, it was already officially announced that their total displacement would be increased to 40 thousand tons (that is, close to the size of an aircraft carrier, which we have really provided with the capabilities of the industry).
There are good reasons to believe that the real purpose of the UDC scam is to strangle our aircraft carrier direction. The aircraft carrier was on display. In the form of a model. Moreover, one that we now have nowhere to build. (There are also questions about the new Zvezda superyard. Not to mention the loading of civil orders).
And the best attitude towards him is shown here is this photo of the latest naval MiGs of the Navy.
Another trend that sounded was modularity. (It is necessary to understand that there are very serious questions for those who prepared the text of the speech for the VGK). Fleet and here
"I didn't hit the dirt."
Introducing a new promising ocean-going ship (based on project 20386) equipped with the Kalibr missile system, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, made the following comment:
The project of a promising ship, also equipped with "Caliber". Launchers 16 and 16 more. Total: 32 launchers.
At the same time, for "another 16 Caliber" the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy issued the Redoubt air defense missile system to the Supreme Commander. Such is
"Cunning naval arithmetic".
Although here another word asks for, much more harsh. As they say, "No comments".
As well as about the fact that a number of swindlers, for the sake of their own selfish interests, stubbornly pushed extremely weak and very expensive (but modular!) 20386s into the fleet. And not only instead of corvettes, but also instead of objectively our best ship project of our time - the frigate of project 22350.
It is worth again focusing on the following. The 6RP gearbox, which is planned to be installed on the miracle ship, was designed using the technical solutions of the P055 gearbox used in the power plant of project 22350 frigates. parts and assemblies for P055, and for the same from 6РП. That is, you have to choose: either 22350, or 20386 and its variants. Accordingly, the equipment that is used for reverse gear transmissions used on corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 will be unclaimed when switching to 20386, which may also have consequences.
The "20386 on steroids" presented to the President was exactly the size of the frigate 22350. And it was he who was announced in January 2020 by Evmenov as
"Promising ship of the oceanic zone."
As for the submarines, there was also “everything is fine” (in quotation marks). The promising "Laika", after hard research and development, ended up with an outdated propeller (propeller) and old torpedoes (USET-80 and "Physicist-1").
The event took place … True, real life forced us to lay down additional frigates of Project 22350 within six months, and to return to the construction of Project 20380 and 20385 corvettes previously rejected by the Navy (as allegedly outdated).
But this does not mean at all that another attempt
"Go to the astral"
will not be done again. You just have to wait until Zvezda-Reductor has mastered the 6RP.
Shipbuilding: the arrival of ships in the Navy in 2020
According to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S. K. Shoigu:
"The navy received two modern submarines, 7 surface ships, 10 combat boats, 10 ships and support boats."
Here again questions arise for those persons who prepare reports to the management. For the numbers, to put it mildly, do not beat. For example, the fleet actually received three Raptors and one BK-16 for combat boats. Or have we already started counting RIBs as combat boats?
On warships of the Navy in 2020, it adopted:
- APKR "Prince Vladimir" of the new project 955A
- diesel submarine "Volkhov" project 06363
- large landing ship (BDK) "Pyotr Morgunov" project 11711
- the first serial frigate "Admiral Kasatonov" of project 22350
- corvette "Thundering" project 20385
- corvette "Hero of the Russian Federation Aldar Tsydenzhapov" project 20380
- patrol ship (PC) "Pavel Derzhavin" project 22160
- small missile ship (MRK) "Odintsovo" project 22800
- base minesweeper (BTShch) "Yakov Balyaev" project 12700.
At the same time (according to data from open sources) GPV-2020 provided for the delivery of the Navy by the end of 2020:
- 8 strategic APCR (in reality 4)
- 8 PLA of project 885 (M) (in reality 1)
- 20 diesel submarines (in reality 9)
- 35 corvettes (in reality 7)
- 14 frigates, incl. 6 projects 11356 and 9 projects 22350, (in reality 5)
- 6 MRK project 21630 "Buyan-M", (in reality, taking into account the "Karakurt" 12)
- 6 BDK project 11711 (in reality 2).
- 4 DVKD "Mistral" (in reality …).
As they say, the facts are there. And the grounds for the brave reports that took place in the media of the Navy and the defense industry are somehow not observed.
Until recently, the most shameful page in the domestic shipbuilding was the signing by the then Chief Commander of the Navy (and now the chief adviser to the President of the USC) V. V. Chirkov of the acceptance certificate for the agro-industrial complex "Severodvinsk". He withdrew his signature on this document a day later. Nevertheless, six months later, the fleet still accepted an absolutely incapacitated submarine. And this is precisely the fact, confirmed by the multitude of subsequent arbitrations between the RF Ministry of Defense and the defense industry complex (just for the 885 project complexes).
This issue was partially considered in the article "Military Review" "APKR "Severodvinsk" handed over to the Navy with critical deficiencies for combat capability ", where (along with the hard facts of their analysis) there were also the following lines:
“Finally, the main thing: will we find an admiral who can objectively reveal the existing problems, toughly raise questions and achieve their solution before the defense industry complex and the structures of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy?”
In 2020, we received an exhaustive answer to this question - it was not found!
For an even more shameful page appeared - the method of the AICR "Prince Vladimir". Without carrying out the entire volume of necessary tests. And in fact, without anti-torpedo protection. (In view of the extremely low efficiency of the established means. And the refusal of the Navy to conduct their objective tests).
Yes, probably, "The fleet was tasked with accepting."
(And here it is appropriate to recall the statements about Mr. Evmenov's readiness to do this at the beginning of 2019, that is, even before the appointment of his Navy Commander-in-Chief!)
By whom? It's clear.
But the duty of an officer is to report to the Supreme Commander real and objective information, including hard information. (And a smart officer can do it competently).
What and how is reported to the Supreme Commander, everyone was able to see at a meeting in Sevastopol, when Redut was passed off as Caliber, without being ashamed of cameras …
Here it is necessary to especially note the failed (but officially announced in December 2020) transfer to the fleet of "Kazan" (the head AICR project 885M, order 161). Just here's a dialogue on one of the special forums:
Kazan (order 161)
- The confident postponement of the 885M commissioning raises concerns that the problems are serious. Otherwise, like the 2038s, they would have been commissioned and finished "on the fly."
- Or they understand that it is not worth risking the lives of sailors.
The diesel submarine Volkhov, adopted by the fleet, does not even have a GPBA, and there is no talk of anti-torpedoes (as well as the elimination of a number of other serious shortcomings).
It should be noted, undoubtedly, a positive development - in the summer the Navy added the first production frigate of project 22350 "Admiral Kasatonov". We need a good series of these frigates (with enhanced armament). But there are still scams with the "over-under-frigate" 20386.
Finally, a series of normal Project 22350 frigates has gone? How to say. The bottleneck was (and is) the power plant, or rather the gearboxes. Yes, the domestic gearbox as part of the power plant was handed over and delivered to order. However, if you think that Zvezda-Reduktor is currently working on the next gearboxes for frigates 22350, then you are wrong. There is now a mouse fuss with the gearbox for 20386. And 22350 - they will wait.
For the ships of the auxiliary fleet (again, this is the DTO of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation). It should be noted that the Akademik Pashin sea tanker entered the Northern Fleet. And especially, the statements about the construction of 5 more such tankers.
It will be a mistake worse than a crime.
The tanker "Akademik Pashin" turned out to be one of the most scandalous sea orders of the Ministry of Defense. In short: very expensive and too low deadweight.
And this is not just the amount of fuel. These are, in fact, the strategic capabilities of the fleet and the country for the projection of force in the distant and operational zone. And in this project they are deliberately stabbed to death. For a specific order and plant.
Who managed to pull this off? A modest official of the Department of State Defense Order of the Ministry of Defense, in whose hands for almost ten years there was funding and all our surface shipbuilding?
When 2014 burst out, he left (leaving the Augean stables to his successors) for the position of boss of the company, through which he quickly implemented this project (actually purchased by the Ukrainian IIB).
In December, the fleet was handed over the Petr Morgunov large landing craft, the Yakov Balyaev battleship and virtually non-combatant corvettes of Project 20385 Thundering and Project 20380 Aldar Tsydenzhapov. corresponds to reality). According to the situation with the air defense of corvettes - “The Leaky Umbrella of the Fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing.
The most accurate assessment of the shipbuilding results of the Navy in 2020 will be: the fleet actually fell under the industry.
And from the outside it looks like an auction. In which these or those industrial structures are struggling to tear for themselves certain shares of the shipbuilding budget. They push through truly crazy projects just to snatch money. And the customer, instead of rigidly defending his interests, is only concerned that no one is left without a share.
And what they will build there for the fleet is the tenth thing.
Combat training
From an interview with the Chief Commander of the Navy Evmenov "Krasnaya Zvezda":
- As for the combat training events themselves, which of them would you single out as significant, significantly characterizing the outgoing year for the fleet?
- These include practicing practical actions in the course of an operational exercise with the Ocean Shield 2020 inter-naval grouping of diverse forces of the Navy, preparation and conduct of a comprehensive exercise on special types of support for the Navy, and, of course, participation in the strategic command and staff exercises "Caucasus-2020".
The main naval parade, which this year once again took place in the water area of the Neva, became a landmark event for us.
It has already been written about the GVMP, - “Ceremonial splendor and combat effectiveness. About the Main Naval Parade and not only .
If the parade is a giant bluff, and if it is followed by what followed the ceremonial parades of the beginning of the last century (Port Arthur and Tsushima), then the effect of the parades turns into disaster, and allies and opponents completely lose faith and fear. But the most important thing is … the people are losing faith in power.
From the interview further:
Special mention should be made of the bilateral tactical brigade exercise of the formations stationed in the Primorsky Territory and Kamchatka. In preparation for it, the transfer of personnel was carried out in a combined way - by sea and air transport.
It is noteworthy that as part of practical actions, the landing ships passed 116,000 nautical miles in the exercise. For the first time, the Pacific Fleet's marines fought during a landing on an unequipped coast near Provideniya Bay in Chukotka. Aircraft An-26, An-12 delivered troops to the rear of the defending enemy.
In total, about 700 marines, up to 80 pieces of equipment, 10 warships and support vessels, as well as 10 aircraft of naval aviation were involved in this episode of the exercise.
When landing at a naval exercise, it is worth pointing out one characteristic moment (the photo below is the official photos of the Ministry of Defense): a systematic landing from a helicopter (s) is carried out on … the water's edge!
As a matter of fact, this is already a real assessment of all this window dressing. What is "vertical reach"? What is the "capture of the dominant heights"? On the edge! After all, it is just so beautiful and pleasant to the "commanding gaze".
How will it look against a serious opponent? For example, against the Japanese in the Kuril Islands? Obviously.
Or the Navy hopes to be worked for
"Uncle Vasya's troops?"
How was it already in the "888" war?
The only major plus was that
Corvettes "Loud" and "Perfect" for the first time conducted joint artillery fire in the Chukchi Sea to suppress an invisible coastal target hidden by the terrain. A complex target position imitated long-term firing points, military equipment and fortifications of a conditional enemy.
Yes, they fired rockets like a good idea.
During the exercise, the flagship of the Pacific Fleet, the missile cruiser Varyag and the nuclear-powered submarine Omsk, performed joint missile firing at a sea target in the Bering Sea. The Varyag guards missile cruiser launched an anti-ship cruise missile of the Vulcan complex, and the Omsk crew attacked the target from under the water with the Granit anti-ship missile.
According to objective control data, both missiles successfully hit targets at distances of more than 450 and more than 320 kilometers, respectively. Fifteen warships and vessels of the Pacific Fleet, as well as naval aircraft, were involved in ensuring the execution of the combat exercise. All in all, more than fifty ships and support vessels are involved in these exercises.
Also, during the Ocean Shield-2020 naval maneuvers, under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the Bastion coastal mobile systems were fired at a complex target in the waters of the Anadyr Bay.
Earlier, the complexes, delivered to Chukotka by large landing ships, made a 50-kilometer march to the positional area over rough terrain on the coast of the Anadyr Bay.
“The preliminary analysis of the actions according to the plan of the exercises showed the high skill and professionalism of the Pacific sailors,” noted the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Evmenov.
Only the question is: "Where is the aviation?"
From the time of the Great Patriotic War up to the "Serdyukov pogrom" of the fleet, was it its striking force? MRA was sent to long-range aviation, where they all
"Have already been upgraded and have X-32 super missiles?"
Probably, if not a regimental sortie for the Navy, then at least a squadron of long-range aviation provided for these exercises? For example, to shoot X-32 super missiles at real sea targets?
Yes, long-range aviation gave: one Tu-95. (In general, it does not have an anti-ship missile system and is in no way capable of acting against surface targets. It looks like a mockery. But such things have long become the norm with us).
- And how did the sailors show themselves in the Caucasus exercise?
- The participation of the Navy in it has become a serious and responsible exam for sailors. The tasks assigned to the forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla during this exercise were performed professionally.
In total, about 90 ships and support vessels, 36 aircraft, about 900 pieces of equipment and more than 14 thousand servicemen were involved. Over 430 different combat training events were held, including more than 170 combat exercises with the practical use of weapons.
A feature of the Caspian Flotilla's participation in the Kavkaz-2020 command and control squadron was the holding of the first Russian-Iranian naval exercise. It made it possible to implement the order of the President of the Russian Federation in 2019 to conduct naval exercises with the involvement of representatives of the states parties to the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea.
"SKSHU" Kavkaz-2020 ", or the Black Sea defeat of the Russian fleet"
Alas, almost everything that the Navy conducted in the Kavkaz-2020 command and control squad was not just a show, but, in fact, discredited the very concept of “combat training”.
If the army and the Air Force (albeit with serious problems), but are really fighting and preparing to fight in new conditions, then the Navy is in a state
"Maybe there will be no war."
With such an attitude to the matter, in the event of real combat operations against a somewhat prepared and technically equipped enemy, defeat awaits him. Let me emphasize that it was written on the basis of an analysis of the official information of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
From an interview with the commander of the Pacific Fleet "Krasnaya Zvezda":
For the fourth year in a row, the Pacific ranks first in the Russian Navy in terms of combat training. In particular, we won the competition between multipurpose submarines to destroy target positions with rocket firing. The prize was awarded to the Omsk nuclear missile cruiser, and the Ryazan cruiser was recognized as the best in the execution of a training torpedo attack.
Submariners of the Primorsk Flotilla of diverse forces received a prize for the successful search, tracking and training destruction of an enemy submarine with the execution of a torpedo attack.
The best among the ships carrying out combat service was the Pacific Fleet's search strike group.
Three prizes on the account of naval aviation. The skill shown in the air combat by the crews of the MiG-31 fighters was highly appreciated. The prizes were awarded to the execution of training mine laying by Il-38 aircraft and anti-submarine training of Tu-142 pilots from a separate anti-submarine aviation squadron.
We decipher what has been said.
The prize of the Commander-in-Chief for torpedo attack by surface ships was taken by Ryazan with ancient 53-65K torpedoes (firing distances for the practical version are less than 30 cab. Or less than 5.6 km).
The prize for the submarine torpedo attack was received by diesel operators with ancient SET-65 torpedoes. Although what kind of a prize can we talk about if they are not able to use their standard remote-controlled torpedoes TEST-71M (also very ancient)?
The Navy has actually thwarted the development of the new Fizik-1 torpedo. The fleet actually showed an inability to master torpedoes more difficult than the ancient USETs and 53-65K. (The latter is a constructor made of components, including a century ago).
Is there anything positive?
Yes there is.
First. The main event is the Bulava 4-rocket salvo. Which this time, it seems, worked properly and successfully. And it's not just luck. There was a lot of hard work for both the Navy and the defense industry.
At the same time, it is worth noting that a salvo of 4 missiles from one submarine was a luxury. And it was not necessary.
It would be much more interesting if the two submarines fired a pair of missiles each. But even so, in general, there is also something to be happy about. Finally, the Pacific Fleet can practice the use of these weapons.
Second. This is what the "Zircon" flew and began to hit.
However, it should be borne in mind that "Zircon" even more acutely raises the question of the need for accurate target designation (which has always been a problem for the Navy). More details: The appearance of "Zircon" to the people.
However, there is a problem with the number of media. They are frankly not enough. The solution near our borders and air bases abroad could be aviation armed with such missiles. But there is no such aircraft in the Navy. And it is not planned.
In addition, she also needs a control center. Satellite Liana? Once again, Zaslon's insider and lobbyist:
In 10 years … they will finish the "Liana" to a working state.
Fans of "knocking back" and "zirconizing" American AUG should think hard about this. And the Navy - to think about an alternative developer and supplier of these funds. Otherwise, "Zirconia" will have to be fired approximately the way this one looked in the war of 888 ("somewhere there at random").
Aviation of the Navy
Illustrative figures.
"Caucasus-2020". In total, about 90 ships and support vessels, 36 aircraft were involved.
Let's compare the statistics of "ships and aircraft" in the previous exercises of the USSR Navy.
"North 68". About 300 warships and vessels (of which 80 are submarines) and about 500 aircraft.
Ocean (1970). In the far zone alone, there were 80 submarines (15 of them nuclear-powered), 84 surface ships and 45 auxiliary ships, aviation - 8 regiments (14 regimental sorties), that is, at least 300-400 aircraft.
"Ocean 83". 53 ships, 27 submarines, 18 auxiliary ships, as well as 14 naval aviation regiments and 3 air defense fighter regiments, that is, more than 400 aircraft.
It was aviation in all tasks, except for strategic nuclear destruction, that was the main striking force of the fleet. However, in recent years, for the sake of its beloved daughter (submarine), the fleet actually strangled and let its stepdaughter MA …
In the report for 2020, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was very unpleasantly surprised by the small numbers of air raids.
Taking into account the fact that in the navy this is traditionally much worse. From Red Star:
The average flight time per crew exceeded 60 hours.
And this (the MA BF raid) is still presented (in an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda) as an achievement!
There are a lot of questions about the long-outdated naval aviation technology (including the supposedly newest and being at the development stage).
However, the ex-chief of aviation of the Navy leaves for a warm and long-prepared place in the defense industry complex. Maybe that will change for the better? One can only hope.
A fleet unprepared for war
Notthe readiness and inability of the fleet to solve missions as intended against any serious enemy is best demonstrated by the fact that in the composition of the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet there were only 11 strategic ones until very recently. no one not just a modern anti-mine ship, but even elementary anti-mine underwater vehicles!
Now there is one BTSH "Yakov Balyaev" (with a single apparatus). Something has changed? Nothing!
And not only because there is one "Balyaev" for all NSNF. And also because the concept of this supposedly newest secondary battery of the Navy was outdated a quarter of a century ago. And today it
"Ship to the first bottom mine with a modern fuse."
(Either he himself or his only apparatus will be blown up).
Is this not an example of the complete oblivion of the demands of the battle and the unrestrained use of budget funds for the submarine? With its extremely serious problems in stealth and combat stability against modern anti-submarine forces and assets? And ignorance of these threats by the command of the Navy? And the blatant poverty of the rest of the components of the combat potential of the Navy?
G. Chirkov, who signed the act on the incapacitated Severodvinsk, now feels great in a warm position at the USC, which supplies the fleet with incapacitated submarines and most of the ships.
For comparison.
Then the admirals had the courage to report the real situation and problems to the country's leadership. What's missing now?
On December 21, 2020, an expanded meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was held with the participation of President Vladimir Putin, where it was announced that the construction and arrangement of the Arctic Trefoil base on the Alexandra Land island of the Franz Josef Land archipelago was announced.
Consider the Northern Fleet as an interspecific strategic territorial formation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, performing the tasks of the military district, - stated in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 21, signed following the meeting.
This is, frankly, a dubious decision. Continuation of the wretched military reform of Serdyukov-Makarov, which has already cost the RF Armed Forces an adequate command system. Well, okay already with global issues … What do we have with local issues?
We are successfully firing missiles in the Arctic. But for whom? Polar bears? The real threats to Russia in Artik today come either from under ice and water (US and British submarines), or from the air (US Air Force).
And at least one torpedo firing under the ice with the homing systems turned on was carried out? No! The Navy has not been able to do this until now (despite "Ice torpedo scandal" a couple of years ago).
Quoting from the article at the link:
Torpedoes (and naval underwater weapons) are not "something not very important", they are the most critical and disastrous area of the RF AME, including extremely important for ensuring defense capability and strategic deterrence.
The basis of the latter is not "the flight range and the number of SLBM warheads", but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, the basis of which is the combat stability of the NSNF (the most important part of which is naval underwater weapons and torpedoes).
But what is the point of having submarines that are unable to defend themselves in the event of an enemy attack? What's the point in unarmed "submarine cruisers"?
We have funds for a salvo 4 missile launch of the Bulava (costing about 4 Su-35 fighters). But we have absolute poverty in terms of elementary air targets, at least minimally capable of imitating real air attack weapons (primarily anti-ship missiles).
More precisely, the fleet had all the possibilities and had to start doing it at last! It's just that these shootings will have such scandalous consequences that the Navy spares no effort to prevent them. I mean, the shooting itself. Not their consequences.
The navy's failure to conduct full-fledged ice torpedo firing is nothing more than cowardice. And the fear for their own seats of responsible officials of the Navy, incompatible with the interests of the country's defense and the requirements of the combat capability of the fleet.
The enemy conducts such operations almost every year (ICEX exercises), including with the group use of submarines. At the same time, the number of firings per submarine reaches two dozen (during ICEX).
And has the Navy conducted at least one test of the type of Western "shock trials"?
The fleet is afraid to conduct them, even for minesweepers! No - these are officials who are afraid for their seats. For they know perfectly well how it will end.
What is happening now has already been in our history.
Before the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1906), both ships were built and exercises were conducted. But so that it ended like this.
The chairman of the commission for describing the naval part of the Russo-Japanese War, His Serene Highness Prince Vice-Admiral Alexander Aleksandrovich Lieven, wrote in 1908:
Many people blame our technology. The shells were bad, the ships were slow-moving and poorly protected … If we take a closer look at the main shortcomings of our technology, we will make sure that they come not so much from unsatisfactory performance as from a wrong design. Why are our shells bad? Not because they do not know how to make them, but because the view was established among the artillerymen that it was precisely such shells that should be fired. They were considered good …
Battles are not being lost on purpose. Therefore, I consider it right to say that the poor condition and unsuccessful behavior of our fleet stemmed from the lack of familiarity with the needs of war of all our personnel. Why did this happen?
Because the thought of war has always been relegated to the background, as unpleasant … Who has not seen that our reviews and maneuvers are fake, that shooting is too rare. But all this was tolerated, everything was justified by a lack of funds. After all, time endured, no war was foreseen …
That is why we lied in theory and surprised the world with our orders.
And all this has one root reason - we did not recognize ourselves as military
Let me emphasize: what is given above is very tough, but the facts. Even one of them would be enough to dramatically collapse the combat capability of the fleet.
In our case, we just have a pile of them. And almost no effort is made to actually solve these problems …
And if we do not take the necessary tough measures on the fleet, then tomorrow we will face a new Tsushima disaster.
The Navy is the weakest point of the RF Armed Forces. And the enemy, having the initiative, will strive to strike at the weakest points.
And what will the court media tell us after that?
