It was assumed that this article will continue the cycle "The Russian Navy. A Sad Look into the Future". But when it became clear that the only domestic aircraft carrier - "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" (hereinafter - "Kuznetsov") is so huge that he categorically does not want to fit into one article, the author decided to highlight the history of the emergence of the first domestic aircraft carrier - the carrier of horizontal take-off aviation and planting - in a separate material.
In this article we will try to understand the reasons that prompted the USSR to start building an aircraft carrier fleet.
The history of the creation of "Kuznetsov" began when, for the first time in the history of the USSR, the development of a draft design of a nuclear aircraft carrier with catapult takeoff was included in the plan of military shipbuilding for 1971-1980. However, 1968 can also be taken as a starting point, when the Nevskoe Design Bureau (PKB) of the Ministry of the Industry, in parallel with the creation of an aircraft-carrying cruiser of Project 1143, began to develop a promising nuclear aircraft carrier of Project 1160.
How did it happen that the Russian Navy suddenly became intently interested in the "weapon of aggression"? The fact is that in the 60s the complex research work "Order" was launched, dedicated to the prospects for the development of ships with aircraft weapons. Its main conclusions were formulated in 1972 and boiled down to the following:
1) Air support of the Navy is a primary, urgent task, since it affects the development of naval strategic nuclear forces; without air cover in the conditions of the domination of anti-submarine aviation of a potential enemy, we will not be able to ensure not only combat stability, but also the deployment of our submarines with both ballistic missiles and multipurpose, which are the main striking force of the Navy;
2) Without fighter cover, it is impossible to successfully operate the coastal-based naval missile-carrying, reconnaissance and anti-submarine aviation - the second most important strike component of the Navy;
3) Without fighter cover, more or less acceptable combat stability of large ships is impossible.
As an alternative, the deployment of a powerful land-based fighter naval aviation was considered, but it turned out that to provide cover for the air area even in the coastal zone, to a depth of 200-300 km, it would require such an increase in the aircraft fleet and its base structure, in addition to the existing one, that their cost will exceed all conceivable limits. Most likely, the land-based aviation "let down" the reaction time - an aircraft carrier accompanying a ship group does not have to constantly keep an air group in the air, since it can limit itself to one or two patrols and quickly raise the necessary reinforcement into the air. At the same time, airplanes from land airfields simply do not have time to take part in repelling an air attack and therefore can only rely on those forces that are in the patrolling area by the time it starts. However, the author of this article did not read the "Order" in the original and does not know for sure.
The "Order" scrupulously took into account the experience of the Second World War. The conclusions of Grand Admiral K. Doenitz, who called the main reason for the defeat of the German submarine fleet "lack of air cover, reconnaissance, target designation, etc." were fully confirmed during the research "Order".
According to the results of the "Order", a TTZ was prepared for an aircraft carrier - it was supposed to have a displacement of 75,000 - 80,000 tons, be atomic, have four steam catapults and provide the basing of an air group of no less than 70 aircraft and helicopters, including fighters, attack and anti-submarine aircraft, as well as airplanes RTR, REB, AWACS. Interestingly, the developers did not intend to place 1160 anti-ship missiles on the project; they were added there later, at the request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov. The TK was transferred to the Nevsky PKB for further work.
In 1973, the preliminary project 1160 was approved by the commander-in-chief of the Navy and the Navy, the ministers of the shipbuilding and aircraft industries, but then the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU D. F. Ustinov. He demanded to consider the possibility of building another heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (the third in a row, after the "Kiev" and "Minsk") under the project 1143, but with the placement of catapults and MiG-23A fighters on it. It turned out to be impossible, so D. F. Ustinov demanded:
"Make a new project for 36 aircraft, but in the dimensions of" Kiev"
It also turned out to be impossible, in the end we "agreed" on a new project for 36 aircraft, but in increased dimensions. He was assigned the code 1153, and in June 1974 the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy approved the TTZ for the new ship. But in early 1975 D. F. Ustinov intervenes again with the demand to decide what exactly to develop - catapult aircraft carriers or aircraft-carrying cruisers with VTOL aircraft. Naturally, D. F. Ustinov believed that we needed a aircraft carrier with a VTOL aircraft. Nevertheless, the sailors still managed to insist on their own, and in 1976 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree on the creation of "large cruisers with aircraft weapons": two ships of Project 1153 were to be built in 1978-1985.
Project 1153 was a "step back" in relation to the concept of a full-fledged aircraft carrier of Project 1160 (both of them had the code "Eagle"). The new ship was smaller (about 60,000 tons), carried a more modest air group (50 aircraft), fewer catapults - 2 units. Yet it at least remained atomic. Nevertheless, when in 1976 the preliminary design of the 1153 project is completed, the verdict follows:
“To approve the draft project. Discontinue further ship design"
By this time, the "Kiev" was already in the fleet, the "Minsk" was being completed, a year ago, the "Novorossiysk" was laid, and the design work on the "Baku" was at such a stage that it was clear: if the return to catapults and horizontal takeoff aviation would take place at all, then it will only be on the fifth domestic aircraft carrier, which now again had to be designed from scratch. In the next TTZ, the number of aircraft was reduced to 42, the nuclear installation was abandoned, but at least the catapults were retained. The aircraft carrier was supposed to carry 18-28 aircraft and 14 helicopters, and it was assumed that the "aircraft" component would include 18 Su-27K, or 28 MiG-29K, or 12 MiG-29K and 16 Yak-141. The helicopter squadron was supposed to be composed of Ka-27 helicopters in anti-submarine and search and rescue versions, as well as in a modification of the radar patrol.
But then another enemy of the carrier fleet arose - Deputy General Staff of the Armed Forces N. N. Amelko. He considered aircraft carriers unnecessary, and suggested building anti-submarine helicopter carriers instead of them on the basis of a civilian container ship. However, the project of N. N. Amelko's "Halzan" proved to be completely unusable and was eventually rejected by D. F. Ustinov (at that time - the Minister of Defense), however, an end was also put on the project 1153.
Now the sailors were asked to develop an aircraft carrier "with the necessary improvements", but with a displacement of no more than 45,000 tons, and most importantly, the catapults were anathema. There is an opinion that this is the fault of the OKB im. Sukhoi - its chief designer M. P. Simonov said that a catapult was not needed for his planes, but a springboard would be enough. But it is most likely that M. P. Simonov made his statement after a springboard was chosen for the fifth heavy aircraft carrier so that the Su-27 would not be "overboard" of the aircraft carrier.
The sailors still managed to "beg" another 10,000 tons of displacement, when D. F. Ustinov arrived at the Kiev aircraft carrier for the West-81 exercise. After stories about the real combat effectiveness of the Kiev air wing, D. F. Ustinov "got emotional" and allowed to increase the displacement of the fifth aircraft carrier to 55,000 tons. As a matter of fact, this is how the first and only domestic aircraft carrier appeared.
There is no doubt that the United States was extremely concerned about the program of building aircraft carriers in the USSR and diligently "dissuaded" us from doing so. As V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky:
“Foreign publications of those years, dealing with the development of aircraft carriers," almost synchronously "accompanied our studies, as if pushing us away from the general course that they themselves followed. So, with the advent of VTOL aircraft in our country, the naval and aviation magazines of the West almost immediately "choked with enthusiasm" about the exciting prospects for the development of this direction, which almost all military aviation should supposedly follow. We began to increase the displacement of aircraft carrier ships - they immediately have publications and the inexpediency of the development of such supergiants as Nimitz, and that it is preferable to build aircraft carriers "smaller", and besides, not with nuclear, but with conventional energy. We took up the catapult - they began to praise the trampolines. Often there was information about the cessation of the construction of aircraft carriers in general."
It must be said that the author of this article himself came across such publications (translated articles by American authors in the Foreign Military Review of the 1980s).
Perhaps today "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" remains the most controversial ship of the Russian Navy, the assessments expressed in his address are as numerous as contradictory. And this is not to mention the fact that the need to build aircraft carriers for the Soviet Navy and the Russian Navy is constantly contested and is the subject of heated discussions, and the history of their development has overgrown with a mass of legends and conjectures. Before evaluating the potential of the first Soviet aircraft carrier, from the deck of which horizontal take-off and landing aircraft could take off, let's deal with at least some of them.
1. Aircraft carriers were not needed by the Navy, but their construction was lobbied by a group of surface admirals headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Gorshkov.
Contrary to popular belief, the need for full-fledged aircraft carriers in the USSR fleet was by no means a voluntaristic decision "from above" and not a "whim of admirals", but the result of serious research work that lasted several years. The R&D "Order" was started in the 60s, the author of this article could not find out the exact date of its beginning, but even if it was 1969, it was still not completed even in 1972. In addition, the history of the development of Soviet aircraft carriers clearly indicates that the most consistent opponent of S. G. Gorshkova - D. F. Ustinov, was not at all against the construction of aircraft carriers, as such. The need for large aircraft-carrying ocean-going ships was obvious to him. In essence, the contradiction between S. G. Gorshkov and D. F. Ustinov was not that one wanted to build aircraft carriers, and the other did not, but that S. G. Gorshkov considered it necessary to build classic aircraft carriers (in many respects comparable to the American "Nimitz"), while D. F. Ustinov hoped that their tasks could be performed by smaller ships - carriers of VTOL aircraft. Perhaps the only "pure" enemy of aircraft carriers, who completely denied the usefulness of carrier-based aviation, was Admiral Amelko, who promoted the construction of anti-submarine helicopter carriers instead of aircraft carriers, but it was he who did not leave behind what was not scientific, but generally somewhat intelligible justification of their position. But in his case, indeed, it is easy to suspect purely opportunistic, "undercover" actions, since he was considered an opponent of S. G. Gorshkov.
2. Supporters of the construction of aircraft carriers for the Soviet Navy did not take into account the experience of the Second World War, which demonstrated the superiority of the submarine over aircraft carrying ships.
In fact, in the course of the "Order" research and development work, the experience of the most effective submarine fleet - the German one - was thoroughly studied. And it was concluded that submarines can be successful in the face of strong enemy opposition only if their deployment and operations are supported by aviation.
3. Aircraft carriers are not needed for the defense of the near sea zone.
As R&D "Order" has shown, providing air cover for a ship group with land-based aircraft even at a distance of 200-300 km from the coastline is much more expensive than an aircraft carrier.
4. Aircraft carriers were needed, first of all, as a means of neutralizing the air wings of American aircraft carriers. With the advent of long-range anti-ship missiles "Basalt", "Granit" and their underwater carriers, the task of countering the US AUG was solved. Submarine missile cruisers and a space reconnaissance and target designation system nullified the power of the US AUG.
In order to understand the erroneousness of this statement, it is enough to recall that, according to the R&D "Order" without air cover, we are not the same as combat stability, we could not even guarantee the deployment of multipurpose nuclear submarines. And, importantly, this conclusion was made in 1972, when the flight design tests of the Basalt anti-ship missile system were underway, and the prototypes of the US-A - satellites, carriers of the Legend MKRTs radar station, were being tested in full in space. In other words, the conclusion about the need for aircraft carriers was formulated at a time when we were already very well aware of the potential capabilities of the Basalt anti-ship missile and the Legend MCRTs.
5. D. F. Ustinov was right, and we had to abandon the construction of ships that provide the basing of horizontal take-off and landing aircraft in favor of aircraft carrier with VTOL aircraft.
The debate about the advantages and disadvantages of VTOL aircraft is endless, but there is no doubt that aviation achieves the greatest effect when fighters, electronic warfare aircraft and AWACS are used together. But basing the latter on aircraft carrier not equipped with catapults turned out to be impossible. Thus, even taking on faith the thesis that "here's a little more time and money - and the Yakovlev Design Bureau would present to the world an analogue of the MiG-29, but with vertical takeoff and landing", we still understand that in terms of efficiency, VTOL aircraft TAKR-a will lose to the air wing of a classic aircraft carrier.
Without a doubt, one can argue about how necessary the aircraft carrier fleet is for the Russian Federation today, because almost 50 years have passed since the R&D "Order" and during this time the technology has stepped forward. The author of this article believes that it is necessary, but recognizes the presence of a field for discussion. At the same time, the need to create an aircraft carrier fleet in the USSR in the early 70s does not raise any doubts, and the USSR, albeit not immediately, began to build it.
This aspect is also interesting. Formed as a result of R&D, "Order" TZ and project 1160 "Eagle" represented themselves as a "tracing paper" from an American strike aircraft carrier - its air group should have included not only fighters (or dual-use fighters / bombers), but also purely strike aircraft, which should be created planned on the basis of the Su-24. In other words, Project 1160 was a multipurpose aircraft carrier. But in the future, and quite quickly, the air group of the promising TAKR lost its strike aircraft - starting, perhaps, from 1153, we should talk about the design not of a multipurpose aircraft carrier, in the image and likeness of the American ones, but about the air defense aircraft carrier, whose primary task was to provide air cover for the strike forces (surface ships, submarines, missile aircraft). Does this mean that the R&D "Order" has confirmed the effectiveness of the American development of naval power in defiance of ours? It is impossible to say for sure without reading the reports of the "Order". But we can state the fact that the USSR, while designing and creating aircraft carriers, did not copy the American fleet in its development.
The United States has established itself in the opinion of the priority of air power over naval - not counting strategic SSBNs, of course. As for the rest, almost the entire spectrum of "fleet against fleet" and "fleet against coast" missions was supposed to be solved by carrier-based aircraft. Thus, the US created its surface fleet "around" aircraft carriers, their destroyers and cruisers - these are, first of all, escort ships that were supposed to provide air defense / anti-aircraft defense of the aircraft carrier, and secondly - carriers of cruise missiles for action against the coast. But the task of destroying enemy surface ships was practically not set for destroyers and cruisers, the deck mounts of anti-ship "Harpoons" were for them a very situational weapon "just in case." If necessary to save "Harpoons" donated in the first place. For a long time, the new destroyers of the US Navy were not equipped with anti-ship weapons at all, and the Americans did not see anything wrong with this, although then they nevertheless preoccupied with the development of anti-ship missiles that could "fit" into the Arleigh Berkov and Ticonderoog UVPs. The American submarine fleet was quite numerous, but nevertheless, multipurpose nuclear submarines, rather, supplemented the capabilities of the AUG in terms of anti-submarine defense, and also solved the problem of destroying Soviet SSBNs in those areas where US carrier-based aircraft could not establish their dominance.
At the same time, in the Soviet Navy (not counting SSBNs), the main task was considered "fleet against fleet" and it was supposed to be solved by land-based missile aircraft, submarines, as well as large surface ships carrying heavy anti-ship missiles "Basalt" and "Granit". The aircraft carrier of the USSR was not the "backbone" around which the rest of the fleet was built, and whose carrier-based aircraft had to solve "all tasks." The Soviet aircraft carrier was considered only as a means of ensuring the stability of the strike forces of the fleet, the role of their air wings was reduced to neutralizing the air threat posed by the American carrier-based aviation.
And here we come to another very common misconception, which can be formulated as follows:
6. "Kuznetsov" is not an aircraft carrier, but an aircraft carrier. Unlike the classic aircraft carrier, which is a defenseless airfield, the Kuznetsov-class ship has a full range of weapons that allow it to operate independently, without resorting to the protection of numerous surface ships
Let's see the main characteristics of "Kuznetsov".
Displacement. I must say that data about him differ in different sources. For example, V. Kuzin and G. Nikolsky argue that the standard displacement of the TAKVR is 45,900 tons, and the full displacement is 58,500 tons, but S. A. Balakin and Zablotsky give, respectively, 46 540 and 59 100 tons. At the same time, they also mention the "largest" displacement of the ship - 61 390 tons.
The aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" is equipped with a four-shaft boiler-turbine power plant with a capacity of 200,000 hp, which was supposed to provide a speed of 29 knots. Steam was produced by eight boilers KVG-4, with increased steam capacity in comparison with boilers KVN 98/64, used at the previous TAKR "Baku" (where 8 boilers provided a power of 180,000 hp).
Armament: its basis, of course, was the air group. According to the project, Kuznetsov was supposed to provide the basing of 50 aircraft, including: up to 26 Su-27K or MiG-29K aircraft, 4 Ka-25RLD AWACS helicopters, 18 Ka-27 or Ka-29 anti-submarine helicopters and 2 search and rescue helicopter Ka-27PS. For the basing of the air group, a hangar was provided with a length of 153 m, a width of 26 m and a height of 7.2 m, but, of course, it could not accommodate the entire air group. It was assumed that up to 70% of the air group could be accommodated in the hangar, the rest of the machines were supposed to be on the flight deck.
An interesting attempt at basing on the aircraft carrier aircraft AWACS Yak-44RLD. Apparently, this was the case - in 1979, when the Yakovlev design bureau received an order for the design of this aircraft, no one ever intended to deprive our aircraft carrier of catapults and it was planned to develop an ejection aircraft, but after the decision to do with a springboard, we also had to "cut" and an air group - its basis was to be the Yak-141, and all other aircraft, including the MiG-29 and Su-27 - only if they can be adapted to a catapult-free takeoff from a springboard, and the same applies to the Yak-44. But if in the case of the 4th generation fighters with a high thrust-to-weight ratio, this turned out to be possible, then the creation of an AWACS aircraft capable of starting from a springboard faced certain difficulties, therefore its creation "stalled" and accelerated only after it became clear that on the seventh aircraft carrier of the USSR - "Ulyanovsk" there will still be catapults. It is also interesting that at some point the fleet put forward the requirement to base a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft on the future Kuznetsov! But in the end, they limited themselves to AWACS helicopters.
The aircraft carrier was equipped with shock armament - 12 underdeck launchers of the Granit anti-ship missiles. Anti-aircraft missile weapons are represented by the "Dagger" complex - 24 launchers with 8 mines each, for a total of 192 missiles. In addition, 8 "Kortik" air defense systems and the same amount of AK-630M were installed on Kuznetsov. Two RBU-12000 "Boa" are not so much an anti-submarine as an anti-torpedo system. The principle of its operation is the same as that of anti-submarine RBU, but the ammunition is different. So, in the boa volley, the first two shells carry false targets to distract homing torpedoes, and the rest form a "minefield" through which torpedoes will have to pass, "unwilling" to be distracted by traps. If it is overcome, then conventional ammunition is already used, representing rockets - depth charges.
Active countermeasures are complemented by passive ones, and here we are talking not only about electronic warfare systems and setting false targets, etc. The fact is that for the first time on the domestic aircraft carrier, the ship has implemented underwater constructive protection (PKZ), which is a modern analogue of the PTZ of the epochs of World War II. The depth of the PKZ is 4.5-5 m. However, even when overcoming it, the capabilities of the aircraft carrier are impressive - it must remain afloat when any five adjacent compartments are flooded, while the hangar deck must remain at least 1.8 m above the water surface. The ammunition and fuel depots have received a "box" booking, unfortunately, its thickness is unknown.
Thus, we see a large, heavy ship, equipped with a variety of weapons. Nevertheless, even the most cursory analysis shows that the armament of the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier is not at all self-sufficient, and can be fully "revealed" only when interacting with other warships.
The Kuznetsov air group can provide air defense or anti-aircraft missile defense of the ship, but not both at the same time. The fact is that, according to the rules of the Russian Navy, refueling or arming aircraft in the hangar is strictly prohibited, and this is understandable - there is a danger of concentration of kerosene vapors in an enclosed space, and indeed - an enemy missile that landed in the hangar deck and forced the prepared air ammunition to detonate, will cause severe damage to the ship, and, possibly, will completely lead to its death. A similar incident on the flight deck, no doubt, will also be extremely unpleasant, but the ship will not be threatened with death.
Accordingly, the aircraft carrier can only use those aircraft that are located on its flight deck - those that are in the hangar still need to be raised, refueled and armed. And there is not too much space on the flight deck - fighters can be placed there, and then the ship will perform air defense functions, or helicopters, then the aircraft carrier will be able to implement the PLO functionality, but not both at the same time. That is, you can, of course, roll out a mixed air group, but at the same time the number of fighters and helicopters will be such that it will not be able to solve air defense and anti-aircraft defense missions with the required efficiency.
As a result, if we focus on air defense, then the ability to search for enemy nuclear submarines will not surpass those of a large anti-submarine ship of Project 1155 (SJSC Polynom and a couple of helicopters), and this is completely insufficient for such a huge ship with a rather large air group. The BOD of Project 1155 is, of course, a formidable adversary for a 3rd generation nuclear submarine, but in a battle with such a nuclear submarine it can, of course, perish itself. This is an acceptable risk for a ship with a displacement of 7,000 tons, but forcing with the same chances of success to withstand a nuclear submarine, a giant aircraft carrier, six times the displacement of a BOD, and even with dozens of aircraft and helicopters on board is an unthinkable waste. At the same time, if we focus on solving ASW problems and force the deck with helicopters, then the ship's air defense will be critically weakened. Yes, the aircraft carrier is equipped with quite numerous Kinzhal air defense systems, but it should be understood that this air defense system has a range of destruction of air targets of 12 kilometers, at an altitude of 6,000 m, that is, it is focused not so much on enemy aircraft as with the missiles and guided missiles used by them. aerial bombs. In fact, the Kinzhal air defense system, the Kortik air defense missile system, and the AK-630 installed on the Kuznetsov are weapons that have finished shooting a few missiles, the carriers of which have broken through the TAKR fighters. By themselves, they will not provide the ship's air defense.
Now - strike weapons. Yes, Kuznetsov is equipped with a dozen Granit anti-ship missiles, but … this is not enough. According to the calculations of the Russian Navy, in order to "break through" the air defense of the AUG, at least 20 missiles in a salvo were required, which is why our heavy nuclear missile cruisers carried 20 Granites, and the submarine SSGNs of Project 949A Antey - even 24 such missiles. to, so to speak, with a guarantee.
A completely different matter is the situation when the domestic aircraft carrier operates in conjunction with the project 1164 Atlant RRC and a pair of BODs. Together with the RRC, the aircraft carrier could provide a 30-rocket salvo, which would not have been to the taste of any AUG, while, when performing the tasks of the PLO "Daggers" and "Daggers" of the "Kuznetsov" Air defense. And vice versa, when performing air defense missions, a pair of BODs with helicopters based on them would complement the capabilities of the aircraft carrier and could well guarantee an anti-aircraft missile defense of such a connection.
All of the above indicates that, although the domestic aircraft carrier could be used independently, but only at the cost of a significant weakening of efficiency and being exposed to excessive risk. In general, as we said above, the Soviet aircraft carrier is not "one warrior in the field", but a support ship for surface, submarine and air strike groups equipped with guided missile weapons and designed to destroy large forces of the fleets of a potential enemy. But it would be wrong to see in the domestic aircraft carrier a kind of "written bag", to ensure the protection of which half of the fleet had to be diverted. The aircraft carrier supplemented the strike forces of the fleet, making it possible to ensure the fulfillment of tasks to defeat the enemy with a smaller detachment of forces and with a lower level of losses. That is, the creation of the aircraft carrier saved us funds that otherwise would have to be directed to the creation of additional SSGNs, missile cruisers, and missile carrier aircraft. And of course, the lives of sailors and pilots serving on them.
