We all remember well the degree of hysteria that arose in the Western media in April 2014, immediately after the observation flight of the Russian tactical reconnaissance aircraft Su-24MR of the Black Sea Fleet naval aviation in the immediate vicinity of the American destroyer URO DDG-75 USS "Donald Cook". As you know, this action became a worthy demonstration of the Russian presence in the strategically important southwestern VN at a rather crucial moment in the transition of the Republic of Crimea to the control of the Russian Federation. Twelve attacks of the "Drying" attacking character was quite enough for later 27 sailors-members of the crew of the "trump" Aegis destroyer to file their resignation reports. Our military-analytical and news resources immediately began to assert that the KS-418E containers of the Khibiny electronic warfare complex placed on the Sushka hangers had successfully "blinded" the AN / SPY-1D (V) radar, paralyzing the operation of the anti-aircraft circuit terminals of the combat information -control system "Aegis". Later, it turned out that the "Khibin" on the suspensions of the Guards "Fencer" that had taken off from the Aviation Base did not exist at all: the hurray-patriotic surge dropped sharply. Why, then, did this situation demoralize the Donald Cook crew?
Firstly, the mere appearance of the Su-24MR link quite alarmed the crew of the American destroyer, who was well aware of the complex military-political situation around Crimea (no one except the "independent" could expect a US aggressor here, for sure). Secondly, "Donald Cook" was probably taken to be escorted by the M-101 "Bayonet" airborne side-looking radar, the radiation of which forced the radiation warning system integrated into the AN / SLQ-32 electronic warfare system to respond appropriately. Naturally, this could not but cause even more commotion at the operator's places in the control room of the Aegis BIUS. In short, the task of intimidating American sailors on the ultra-modern anti-missile destroyer of the US Navy in the Black Sea Fleet's area of responsibility was accomplished on "5+". Moreover, let's not forget that the K-300P Bastion-P coastal anti-ship batteries have been assigned at least one active-passive long-range over-the-horizon detection and targeting radar system Monolit-B, developed by JSC Scientific Production Enterprise Typhoon”And deployed on the heights of the southern part of the Crimean coast. In passive mode "Monolit-B" is capable of detecting radio-emitting objects at a distance of about 250 km and accompanying 10 of them. Consequently, together with the Su-24MR onboard RER, Monolit-B has fully determined the Donald Cook's radar profile, which in the future will make it possible to create new frequency algorithms for it for the operation of Russian air-based electronic warfare systems.
With regard to the classic Aegis system with operating radar facilities, these algorithms will be valid for several more years, because the former boasts a lot of technological flaws. The most significant of them is the use of single-channel parabolic radars for illumination and guidance (also called RL-"searchlights" of continuous radiation) AN / SPG-62 with an antenna array diameter of 2.3 m. These 10 kW stations operate in the X-, Ku- and J-bands of waves (from 8 to 20 GHz) and are intended for direct illumination of targets for anti-aircraft guided missiles with semi-active radar homing heads of the RIM-67D type (SM-2ER Block III), RIM-156A (SM-2ER Block IV), as well as RIM-162 ESSM, designed to intercept highly maneuverable anti-ship missiles and an approaching WTO. The problem is that the number of AN / SPG-62 on-load tap-changers placed on Aegis ships of different types varies from 2 to 4 units. Consequently, at the moment of direct reflection of a massive "star raid" of anti-ship missiles and other air attack weapons, only 2, 3 or 4 target channels of simultaneous illumination are activated, despite the fact that the computing facilities of the Mk 99 fire control subsystem (main air defense / missile defense circuit) are capable of simultaneously correct the flight of 22 missiles of various types.
At the moment when one of the targets is destroyed, the Mk 99 transmits target designation for a new target to the “released” AN / SPG-62 radar (and so on for each of the 2, 3 or 4 RPNs). In the case when the enemy anti-ship missiles move to the ship in a dense "swarm" of 16, 20 or more units, three radar "searchlights" of the Arley Burke-class destroyers are simply not enough to illuminate all enemy missiles and the "semi-active Standards" will simply "go away into milk”, because the AN / SPY-1D MRLS operate in the decimeter S-band, which does not realize such high precision qualities for illumination of targets that are subject to the centimeter X-band. The massive use of X-41 Mosquito, 3M55 Onyx, or 3M54E Caliber missiles allows you to quickly load and exceed all permissible AN / SPG-62 throughput qualities, which will result in multiple hits and incapacitation of the ship.
To eliminate this flaw, the American company "Raytheon" has developed an ultra-long-range anti-aircraft guided missile RIM-174 ERAM (SM-6), which has a range of 300-350 km. Its main trump card, unlike the SM-2, is the presence of an active radar homing head, developed on the basis of the ARGSN air-to-air missile AIM-120C / D AMRAAM. Active radar guidance eliminates the need for constant illumination from the AN / SPG-62. "Sixth Standards" on the cruising section of the trajectory can receive target designation both from the SPG-62 and from the AN / SPY-1D multifunctional radar complex, in the final section the missiles will be guided exclusively according to the data of its own ARGSN. But it is worth noting that with the help of only new types of RIM-174 ERAM missiles, it is extremely difficult to comprehensively solve the problem of protecting the Arley Burks from modern, stealthy air attack weapons. The snag here lies both in the technical features of the interceptor missiles and in the outdated Aegis radar architecture. And now for more details.
Long-range missile system RIM-174 ERAM, equipped with the Mk 72 starting solid propellant rocket and the Mk 104 sustainer solid propellant rocket, unified with the SM-3 anti-missile missile, easily reaches 270-300-kilometer boundaries due to the high specific impulse of 265 seconds and acceleration to a speed of 5M or more … Yes, it is great for intercepting remote air command posts, AWACS aircraft, tactical fighters "hung" with weapons and non-maneuvering cruise missiles and ballistic targets, but it is absolutely useless against modern supersonic and hypersonic anti-ship missiles such as "Onyx" or "Zircon". After capturing the same Onyx by means of the RIM-174 homing head, the former is capable of performing anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of more than 15G at medium and high altitudes. For a successful interception, "Standard-6" must "squeeze" about 45-50 units, which is not technically designed for, exactly like other missiles of the "Standard-2" family.
Another SAM, the RIM-162A ESSM, is perfect for such high-energy maneuvering. The product has a range of 50 km, a maximum flight speed of 4350 km / h and the ability to maneuver with overloads of 50 units. and more. This became possible due to the introduction of a gas-jet type thrust vector deflection system, represented by 4 aerodynamic planes in the nozzle channel. At the same time, the RIM-162A is equipped with a semi-active radar seeker that needs illumination from the SPG-62 side. The latter is a conventional parabolic antenna with an extremely narrow beam pattern. This provides extremely high selection capabilities for "capturing" individual targets in a group, but makes the station very vulnerable to directional radio-electronic interference emitted by modern air-based electronic warfare stations. Someone might argue that the more anti-jamming AN / SPY-1D will correct the breakdown of the AN / SPG-62's "capture" and the guidance process will be restored, but there are pitfalls here as well.
Firstly, the AN / SPY-1D complex is built on the basis of 4 passive phased antenna arrays of 4350 APMs in each. As you know, passive HEADLIGHTS, in contrast to active ones, have much lower noise immunity and the impossibility of forming "zero sectors" of the radiation pattern in the direction of the sources of interference. Such a flaw is observed in connection with the use of a single traveling wave microwave lamp in the PFAR, which is not capable of activating the required group of transmitting-receiving modules at the necessary time. In AFAR, the parameters of the "lobes" of the directional pattern are predominantly set by the amplifiers placed in each PPM. As you can see, all the shortcomings of the current CIUS "Aegis" are fixated mainly on the shortcomings of radar facilities. Nevertheless, over the next 5-7 years, everything can change dramatically.
As the military analytical resource "Military Parity" reports with reference to the portal www.defense-aerospace.com, on September 7, 2017, at the training ground of the Hawaiian Islands, successful field tests of the promising American shipborne multifunctional radar complex AN / SPY-6 (V) AMDR ("Air and Missile Defense Radar"), which should replace the aging AN / SPY-1D (V). The exercises consisted in the simultaneous detection and stable tracking on the passage of several air targets of various types at the same time - operational-tactical ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. The product coped well with the assigned tasks, but what are its features and how does it radically differ from the usual AN / SPY-1D (V).
All the best technological developments of the late XX - early XXI century are embodied in the advanced shipborne radar AMDR. In particular, the antenna canvases of this station are built on the AFAR technology, which will make it possible to achieve an order of magnitude higher noise immunity and reliability in the event of a failure of a certain number of transmitting and receiving modules. It is also known that the APM of AN / SPY-6 (V) antenna arrays will be made on the basis of gallium nitride, capable of operating at temperatures of 200 ° C, while for antenna arrays based on gallium arsenide, the normal temperature is considered to be 50 ° C. … As a consequence, each AMDR APM can operate with 3 or 4 times the power compared to standard GaAs MMIC modules.
According to the official website of the Raytheon company, this will increase the target detection range by about 2 times (standard targets with an RCS of about 5 m2 can be detected at a distance of 500 - 700 km; naturally, at a high flight altitude of 25 - 35 km) … Targets with RCS of 0.01 m2 can be tracked at a distance of 120 - 150 km. The number of aerospace attack assets accompanied by AN / SPY-6 can also increase 3-4 times in comparison with the standard PFAR-RLK AN / SPY-1D (V) and amount to 900 - 1200 units, catching up with the indicators of the British Sampson radar . To maintain long-range capabilities, AMDR will also operate in the S-wave band (at a frequency of 2-4 GHz), and therefore, for target designation to missiles with PARGSN, the use of centimeter OLTCs will be required.
Their role will be performed not by primitive 1-channel "spotlights" of continuous illumination AN / SPG-62, but by small AFAR cloths, "looking" in the same direction as the AMDR antenna arrays. It will be much more difficult to disrupt their work with the help of noise or directional interference, and each such canvas will be able to "capture" up to two or three dozen enemy ballistic or aerodynamic objects. Under the updated radar appearance of the AN / SPY-6 AMDR, the hardware and software structure of the Mk 99 FCS LMS will have to be redesigned, which should significantly reduce the reaction time to all known types of threats, especially against the background of the emergence of hypersonic anti-ship missiles such as the Zircon.
The first serial AN / SPY-6 multifunctional radars will begin to be installed on the American "Arleigh Burke Flight III" class EMUs in a few years, which will complicate our anti-ship capabilities in the ocean zone. Moreover, in accordance with last year's consultations between the command of the American fleet and the leadership of the shipbuilding giant Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), a 4-sided antenna post of the AMDR radar complex can be located on the main superstructure of the LPD-17 landing helicopter dock »Together with UVPU Mk 41 for several hundred transport and launch containers, within the framework of the project of a heavy surface ship missile defense. It would be extremely foolish to ignore such alarming "bells".
