Over the past few years, one of the most pressing topics in the field of military construction in Russia has been the deal with France on the purchase of Mistral-class helicopter-assault landing ships (DVKD). In fact, according to the generally accepted western classification, these ships are universal amphibious assault ships (UDC), but for not entirely clear reasons, the term DVKD is used in relation to Mistral-class ships in Russia.
But regardless of the terminology issues, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of these specific ships, the main problem is the lack of a modern naval strategy, as well as subordinate strategies and concepts for conducting expeditionary operations in general and the use of the marines as a kind of troops in particular.
The evolution of US Marine Corps (ILC) strategy since the end of the Cold War should be considered as a good illustration of current views of Marine strategy and its impact on military development programs. It should be immediately noted that due to quantitative and qualitative differences, as well as the specific weight in the national security strategy, the experience of developing the ILC strategy cannot and should not be blindly copied in the development of strategic and conceptual documents of the Russian marines. At the same time, an analysis of the American experience is a prerequisite for understanding the essence of modern expeditionary operations and will help to avoid mistakes made by the ILC.
US MARINE FORCES
Unlike most countries where the marines are a branch of the military subordinate to the Navy, the ILC is one of the five branches of the US Armed Forces and is organizationally part of the Department of the Navy. According to public opinion polls, which were conducted annually in 2001-2010. in the USA, it is the ILC that is the most prestigious type of the Armed Forces and enjoys the greatest prestige in American society.
The key doctrinal function of the ILC is to ensure unhindered access to coastal regions (littoral access) and participation in local armed conflicts and wars (small wars). In 1952, after the Korean War, for which the United States was unprepared, Congress declared that "a nation's shock troops should be most alert when the nation is least prepared." Since then, the ILC has been in constant combat readiness and performs the function of a rapid reaction force.
United States Marine Corps Chief of Staff, General James F. Amos.
Unlike the three "main" types of the US Armed Forces, each of which focuses on actions mainly in a specific space, the ILC is adapted to actions on land, in the air and on water. The specifics of the ILC's activities dictate their organizational structure, which is built around air-ground operational formations (MAGTF, Marine Air-Ground Task Force), which imply the inextricable integration of ground, aviation, logistic and command-staff elements.
The heart of any operational formation of the ILC is its ground element, which is expressed in the classic principle - “every Marine is a rifleman” (Every Marine a Rifleman). This principle implies that any recruit of the ILC, in any case, undergoes a basic course of combat training for infantry units - even if his future military specialty is in no way connected with the conduct of combined arms combat. This helps all ILC personnel to understand the characteristics and needs of the infantry element, and, in case of emergency, to perform its functions.
The main type of operational formation of the ILC is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU, 2,200 troops). Larger operational formations are the expeditionary brigade (MEB, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 4-16 thousand people) and the expeditionary division of the marine corps (MEF, Marine Expeditionary Force, 46-90 thousand people). In total, the ILC includes three expeditionary divisions.
The MEU includes a reinforced infantry battalion (1,200 people), a mixed aviation squadron (500 people), a battalion rear group (300 people) and a headquarters element (200 people). The battalions maintain a permanent presence in the oceans aboard the amphibious groups (ARG, Amphibious Ready Group) of the fleet, consisting of UDC, DVKD and landing dock ship (DKD). As part of the ILC, there are seven permanent MEUs - three each in the 1st and 2nd divisions on the west and east coast of the United States, respectively, and one more in the 3rd division in Japan.
The ILC's budget is about 6.5% of the total basic US military budget. The ILC accounts for about 17% of the total number of American infantry units, 12% of tactical aircraft and 19% of combat helicopters.
CMP STRATEGY AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
The foundations of the modern species strategy of the ILC were laid in the 1990s. Three key factors that influenced its formation were the changing international environment, the emergence of new technologies, and the cooperation and rivalry of the ILC with the Navy and other types of the US Armed Forces.
In the ILC, the principle "every marine is a gunner" is in force, so all recruits undergo a basic course in infantry combat training.
In the course of a major program to cut military spending after the end of the Cold War, the ILC underwent only a slight (especially against the background of other types of armed forces) reduction. This, as well as the increasing role of local conflicts and ensuring regional security, became one of the key reasons that determined the growth of the influence of the ILC as a type of armed forces.
Throughout the 1990s. relations between the Navy and the ILC were quite tense. The ILC strove for greater autonomy and feared competition from the fleet. From the point of view of the ILC leadership, after the end of the Cold War, the fleet remained primarily focused on operations in the World Ocean, while the changed international situation required a real, rather than declarative, reorientation to operations in coastal areas.
The leadership of the ILC noted that after the end of the Cold War, the United States faced the threat of local and regional instability in coastal regions caused by the actions of aggressive states, terrorists, organized crime, as well as socio-economic problems. According to the leadership of the ILC, the main instrument of Washington to counter these threats was to become the Marine Corps forces deployed on a permanent basis in the oceans.
The ILC's desire for autonomy was expressed in the desire to develop an independent, separate from the Navy, conceptual and strategic base. In 1997, the leadership of the ILC refused to sign a joint operational concept with the fleet and adopted its own concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea. This concept remains relevant today. Its main idea was to use the World Ocean as a space for maneuver, which was supposed to provide the US Armed Forces with a qualitative operational and tactical advantage over any potential enemy.
The ILC was supposed to conduct effective amphibious operations of various scales, relying on its superiority in mobility, intelligence, communications and control systems. The main burden of providing fire support to the ILC forces during amphibious operations should have been borne not by armored vehicles, but by the forces of the fleet and the aviation element of the ILC.
The concept of "operational maneuver from the sea" was supplemented by a number of conceptual documents, the key of which was the tactical concept of the "ship-to-target" maneuver (STOM, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver), which implied an over-the-horizon landing (at a distance of 45-90 km from the coast) forces of the marines from the landing ships of the fleet by means of a "mobile triad" - landing and landing boats (DVK), amphibious armored vehicles and aircraft (helicopters and promising converters). The key idea of this concept was the rejection of the need to capture a bridgehead on the enemy's coast as a necessary condition for achieving the goal of the operation. The ILC planned, as far as possible, to avoid collisions with the enemy's coastal defense forces and to strike at the most vulnerable and critical enemy targets deep in its territory.
The ILC concept "maneuver-target" implies over-the-horizon landing of troops by means of a "mobile triad", one of the elements of which is helicopters.
Conceptual and strategic installations of the ILC in the 1990s. were focused almost exclusively on conducting military operations of varying intensity in coastal areas in close connection with the Navy. Even operations deep in enemy territory were supposed to be carried out with the support of the fleet, which was supposed to provide the marines with supplies and fire support. This idea was embodied in the concept of Sustained Operations Ashore.
These installations clearly show one of the key differences between the ILC and the US Army, which focuses on the creation of its own long-term rear supply and support bases, the massive use of armored vehicles and artillery, but does not have its own fighter-assault aircraft.
KMP IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
At the beginning of the new millennium, the ILC continued to develop the conceptual and strategic guidelines laid down in the 1990s. In 2000, the Marine Corps Strategy 21 was adopted, and in 2001, the cornerstone concept of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare - Marine Corps Capstone Concept. These documents supplemented the concept of "operational maneuver from the sea" and accompanying documents and summarized them at a higher operational-strategic level.
After the adoption in 2003 by the leadership of the Navy of the Global Concept of Operations, the formation of new operational formations of the fleet began. Due to the reduction in the number of ships in the old-style aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG, Carrier Battle Group) and the strengthening of amphibious groups by surface ships and submarines, carrier and expeditionary strike groups (AUG and EUG, respectively) were formed, and planning of expeditionary strike forces (Expeditionary Strike Forces), which were supposed to integrate AUG and EUG.
The second element of the "mobile triad" is amphibious armored vehicles.
Previously, amphibious groups were dependent on the presence of an aircraft carrier battle group. With the formation of the EUG, the amphibious operational formations of the fleet and the ILC were able to conduct independent shock and amphibious operations. It was originally planned to create 12 ECGs by analogy with 12 AUGs. The basis of each ECG was to be one of the amphibious groups. By the end of the 2000s. The EUG has become a larger operational formation, designed to transfer not a battalion, but an expeditionary brigade.
All these concepts turned out to be of little demand in the conditions that began in the early 2000s. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In them, the Marines operated mainly in isolation from the fleet and in conjunction with the Army. Since 2006to intensify the operation in Afghanistan, an increase in the number of military personnel of the ILC began from 176 thousand to 202 thousand by 2011.
The interaction and integration of the Navy and the ILC at the operational-tactical level has not been given sufficient attention. Many high-ranking representatives of the corps and outside observers began to note that a generation of marines had actually grown up who either were not at all familiar with the conduct of amphibious operations, or perceived the landing ships only as transport for delivering marines to the theater of operations. The specifics of combat training and the use of ILC forces during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan led not only to a loss of skills in conducting operations "from the sea", but also to a "heavier" ILC, that is, an increase in its dependence on heavier weapons systems and military equipment, and also, most importantly, long-term ground-based logistics bases located within or in the immediate vicinity of the theater of operations. All this had a negative impact on the ILC's ability to respond quickly to emerging crises. A number of experts began to accuse the corps of becoming a "second ground army."
The global economic crisis, the rapidly growing national debt and the rejection of the unilateralist policy that determined Washington's foreign policy during the first half of the 2000s, raised the question of the need to optimize and reduce military spending. The United States was fatigued by years of involvement in two major regional military operations. The withdrawal of troops from Iraq and the gradual curtailment of the operation in Afghanistan made the ILC and the Army the main victims of measures to reduce military spending. In particular, it was again decided to change the number of the ILC - this time downward. The total corps is planned to be reduced by 10% in the period from 2013 to 2017 financial year: from 202 thousand to 182 thousand military personnel.
At the US Naval League exhibition in May 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that the ILC had overlapped the Army's missions over the years. In August of the same year, in another speech, Gates questioned the feasibility of a large amphibious assault operation in modern conditions: high-precision anti-ship missiles (ASMs), which are becoming cheaper and more affordable, threaten American landing ships, which may require a remote landing of marines " 25, 40, 60 miles offshore or even further. " Gates instructed the leadership of the Department of the Navy and the ILC to conduct a thorough assessment of the structure of forces, as well as determine what the look of the American Marines should be in the 21st century.
The main amphibious vehicle of the KMP is the AAV-7 armored personnel carrier.
The ILC began work in this direction back in the late 2000s. His leadership had two key tasks. First, it was necessary to rethink the existing strategic guidelines, taking into account the changed international situation, the nature of the threats facing the United States, and new technologies. Secondly, it was necessary to re-justify the role and importance of the ILC as an independent type of the armed forces in the context of a deteriorating economic situation, a reduction in military spending and intense competition between various types of armed forces for the distribution of the military budget.
In contrast to the period of the 1990s. this time, the development of the conceptual and strategic base of the ILC was in close cooperation with the Navy. The leadership of the ILC realized that the new stage of cutting military spending would not be as painless for the ILC as the previous one. Under these conditions, close cooperation can provide the naval services of the Armed Forces with an advantage in defending their interests in Congress, the White House and in the eyes of the American public, as well as somewhat weaken the positions of the Air Force and the Army.
Moreover, in the early 2000s. relations between the Navy and the Marine Corps began to gradually improve, which was achieved largely thanks to a productive dialogue between the leadership of the Navy and the ILC. Within the framework of the Ministry of the Navy, the ILC achieved de facto equality in relation to the fleet and became less afraid of competition from its side. Representatives of the ILC were given the opportunity to command the naval formations. In 2004, Brigadier General Joseph Medina was in charge of the Third EMG. In 2005, for the first time in history, ILC General Peter Pace became Chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (CSH). Also in the 2000s. For the first time, representatives of the ILC held the position of deputy chairman of the KNSH. In 2006, a representative of the ILC aviation for the first time commanded an air wing of an aircraft carrier, and in 2007 a representative of the naval aviation for the first time commanded an air group of the ILC.
In 2007, after lengthy preparation, the first ever unified strategy for all three sea types of aircraft was signed (A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower). In 2010, a complementary Naval Operations Concept was adopted, also common to the Navy, the ILC and the Coast Guard. If for the Navy and the naval branches of the Armed Forces as a whole, these documents made drastic changes in the naval strategy, then directly for the ILC they served rather as a somewhat modified repetition of the existing documents. The central place in the operational concept and an important place in the strategy was taken by the idea of using the sea space as a single bridgehead for maneuver.
Following the adoption of the joint naval strategy in 2008, the Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025 and an updated version of the cornerstone operational concept were adopted, on the basis of which the third edition of the Marine Corps operational concepts was prepared in 2010. Operating Concepts).
ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
In January 2012, Barack Obama and Leon Panetta signed the Strategic Defense Guidelines. Among the key ideas of this document were the reorientation of the US military-political strategy to the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and the rejection of large-scale ground operations in the near future.
By the end of the 2000s. The United States has realized that, despite its continued superiority in conventional weapons, the American armed forces have become more vulnerable. The reason for this is the rapid proliferation of effective and affordable weapons systems, which have been collectively referred to as “Access Restriction Systems” (A2 / AD, Anti-Access, Area Denial). The United States finally realized that the idea of “absolute domination in all spheres,” so popular in the late 1990s and early 2000s, is utopian.
The development concepts of the ILC at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries turned out to be unclaimed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The idea of opposing access restriction systems (ODS) has taken one of the key places in American military strategy. In 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the JCS, signed the Joint Operation Access Concept. In this document, the official definition of ODS and the very concept of "online access" was fixed.
By "operational access" is meant the ability to ensure the projection of military power into the theater of operations with such a degree of freedom of action, which would be sufficient to carry out the assigned tasks. At the same time, the main strategic goal is to ensure unhindered guaranteed access for the United States both to the global common heritage of mankind - international waters, international airspace, space and cyberspace, and to a separate sovereign territory of any state.
SOD are subdivided into “distant” and “near”. The former include weapons systems that prevent the armed forces from entering the theater of operations. The second includes weapons systems that restrict the freedom of action of the Armed Forces directly in the theater of operations. SOD includes such weapons systems as submarines, air defense systems, ballistic and cruise anti-ship missiles, anti-satellite weapons, and mines. The SOD also included such means of warfare as terrorist attacks and computer viruses. It should be noted that many SOD, for example submarines, can be used both as "close" and as "distant", while others, such as mines, are mainly used in only one role.
One of the main projects to counter SOD was the joint program of the US Navy and the US Air Force, called the "Air-Sea Battle", the development of which began in 2009 on behalf of Robert Gates. Air-sea battle was the logical development of air-land battle - an operational concept for the integration of the Air Force and the Army, which was developed in the 1980s. to counter the USSR in Europe and was successfully used during Operation Desert Storm. For the first time, the idea of an air-sea battle was announced back in 1992 by the current Commander of the US European Command, Admiral James Stavridis. At the heart of the air-naval battle is the idea of deep integration of the power projection potentials of the Navy and Air Force to combat enemy SOD and ensure operational access for the US Armed Forces.
In 2011, within the framework of the Ministry of Defense, the Air-Naval Battle Division was created, in which representatives of the ILC and the Army were also involved, whose role, however, remained of secondary importance.
In parallel with the fleet, the ILC was developing its own operational concepts, which were also largely focused on countering SOD. In July 2008, ILC Chief of Staff, General James Conway, initiated a series of command and staff activities under the Bold Alligator program aimed at restoring amphibious assault capability. The program culminated in the Bold Alligator 12 (BA12) exercise, conducted by the 2nd EAG, 1st AUG and 2nd Atlantic Expeditionary Brigade in January-February 2012, and became the largest US landing exercise in the past decade.
More than 14 thousand American servicemen, 25 ships and vessels, as well as servicemen and ships of eight other states took part in the exercises. The scenario of the BA12 exercise involved the development of joint actions of the ECG, AUG, ILC and ships of the Military Sealift Command to conduct amphibious assault in conditions of the use of anti-ship missiles and mines by the enemy.
In May 2011, the ILC adopted an updated version of the tactical concept of the ship-to-target maneuver. Differences from the original 1997 version consisted in a greater emphasis on SOD, irregular opponents (international terrorism, illegal armed bandit formations, etc.), as well as non-military operations and “soft power”. Even a decade and a half after the adoption of its initial version, the implementation of the "ship-to-target" maneuver concept requires solving a wide range of problems in the field of training the rank and file of the ILC and the Navy, providing logistical support and equipping with new weapons and military equipment.
UNITED NAVAL BATTLE
In September 2011, the Chief of Staff of the ILC, General James Amos, sent a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in which he argued the need to preserve the ILC as a necessary condition for ensuring the national security of the United States. He especially noted that the ILC "provides the US Armed Forces with a unique set of capabilities", does not duplicate the functions of other types of the Armed Forces, and its maintenance costs are less than 8% of the total US military expenditures.
To confirm this statement and fulfill the instructions given by the ILC earlier by Robert Gates, a working group was created to analyze the amphibious capabilities, which was engaged in the analysis of previously adopted strategic and conceptual documents and the development of a new operational concept of the corps. Based on the results of the group's work in 2012, the report "Naval amphibious capabilities in the 21st century" was published, in which the concept of "Single Naval Battle" was put forward, the idea of which had already been raised, including in a new versions of the "ship-to-target" maneuver concept.
Bold Alligator Exercises 12. Since 2008The ILC is intensively restoring the potential for carrying out amphibious assault operations.
A single naval battle implies the integration of all elements of American naval power (surface, submarine, ground, air, space and information forces and assets) into a single whole for conducting joint operations against a regular and irregular enemy that actively uses SOD. Previously, ensuring supremacy at sea and projecting power, including the conduct of amphibious assault and the delivery of missile and bomb strikes on enemy territory, were considered separate, little dependent on each other operations. A single naval battle assumes their unification and simultaneous conduct within the framework of a joint operation of the Navy, the ILC and other types of the Armed Forces. A separate task is the integration of ECG and AUG, which was planned back in the early 2000s. as part of the creation of an expeditionary strike force, as well as training senior and senior command personnel of the Navy and the ILC for large-scale joint amphibious assault and other operations under the leadership of joint headquarters.
The united naval battle is positioned as an addition to the air-naval battle and is an obvious application of the ILC to increase its role in countering SOD. This causes some concern on the part of the Army. The transformation of the Navy-Air Force tandem into the Navy-Air Force-KMP triangle could theoretically lead to the Army being most seriously affected by budget cuts.
The joint concept on providing access to and countering SOD (Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept), which the Army and the ILC adopted in March 2012, notes that the Army in certain situations can also operate from the sea. In December 2012, the Army adopted an updated version of its own cornerstone concept (The U. S. Army Capstone Concept), which emphasized the development of rapid response capabilities and expeditionary operations. A number of American experts drew attention to the fact that this indicates the growing competition between the two types of the Armed Forces and the desire of the Army to partially take over the functions of the ILC. High-ranking representatives of the Army tried to refute these assumptions, pointing out that the Army and the ILC do not compete, but cooperate to develop these types of armed forces as complementary and non-duplicating functions of each other.
According to the ACWG report, in the medium term, the likelihood of numerous local crises, conflicts and wars is high. Moreover, most of them, despite their rather limited scope, are capable of significantly influencing the national interests of the United States. This is due to the need to ensure the protection of American citizens, allied states of the United States, the high dependence of the United States and developed countries on freedom of navigation, access to resources and markets. Even a small conflict in the Persian Gulf or Southeast Asia can threaten the lines of sea communications, which account for 90% of sea trade.
The ACWG has expanded the concept of ODS to include a range of non-military instruments to restrict American operational access, including the use of diplomatic pressure, civil protests, blocking various significant elements of infrastructure, economic sanctions, etc. The threat of "mutually assured economic weakening" as an instrument of deterring the United States and a kind of "distant" SOD, by analogy with "mutually assured destruction" in nuclear strategy, was especially noted.
This situation requires the United States to maintain the ILC as a force of constant readiness for a quick response to emerging crises. At the same time, the ILC is able to both quickly create a land force in the region and quickly withdraw it, which avoids unwanted political and financial costs. The use of the ILC in a single naval battle allows the United States not to get bogged down in the conflict, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to maintain strategic flexibility.
The ACWG report also noted that the current system of external presence and training, which relies almost exclusively on amphibious teams with expeditionary battalions on board, does not respond to the changed international environment.
To carry out many of the tasks facing the ILC and the Navy, it is required to use smaller units of the Marine Corps, which would be deployed not only on landing ships, but also on other ships of the fleet and guard. Small units of Marines can be effectively used to provide humanitarian assistance, ensure maritime security, fight piracy, drug trafficking and other irregular threats, as well as to more reliably protect the ships of the Navy and SOBR from terrorist attacks.
Since the early 2000s. The ILC is experimenting with the use of company-level operational formations (ECO, Enhanced Company Operations) as the main tactical unit within the framework of the concept of "distributed operations". Proposals were voiced to form independent "mini-amphibious groups", which may include, as one of the options, one DKVD and three littoral warships. It is assumed that the ILC formations of a company and even a lower level, adapted to independent actions, will be more effective in the fight against an irregular enemy, as well as in high-intensity combat operations (for example, in cities). This requires a redistribution of command, control, communications, reconnaissance, and fire support systems from the battalion to the company level.
A whole generation of Marines grew up in Iraq and Afghanistan who were not familiar with the conduct of amphibious operations.
At the same time, the battalion is insufficient to carry out more or less large-scale amphibious operations, and the ILC and the Navy must be trained to carry out brigade-level operations. Many high-ranking representatives of the ILC and the Navy noted that the conduct of a brigade-level amphibious assault is qualitatively different from the actions of standard expeditionary battalions and requires special training of servicemen.
One of the important elements in the preparation of the Navy and the ILC for brigade-level amphibious assault operations has become the regular Dawn Blitz (DB) exercises, which are conducted by the 3rd EAG and the 1st Expeditionary Brigade. These exercises differ from the Bold Alligator program in a smaller scale, which is explained by their focus on practicing actions at a tactical level.
The use of a combination of the Joint Concept for Operational Access, Air Maritime Combat and the ACWG report at the operational-strategic level was tested during the major Expeditionary Warrior 12 (EW12) command post exercise in March 2012. a state that invaded the territory of its neighbor and supported the insurgency on its territory. The aggressor state enjoys the support of a regional power, and the peace enforcement operation is carried out by the coalition in accordance with the mandate of the UN Security Council in the conditions of the active use of the SOD by the adversary and the absence of the bases of the US Armed Forces or their allies in the region. The EW12 results confirmed most of the conclusions of the ACWG report, and also focused on a number of specific problems, such as the need to involve special operations forces in the integration process, mine countermeasures, theater missile defense, as well as the creation of a system of coordinated management of aviation and other strike assets of various types of the Armed Forces and states within the coalition.
The totality of such exercises, as well as experiments within the ECO program, make it possible to work out various aspects of conducting expeditionary operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. These measures complement and influence each other, which ensures effective combat training and dynamic development of the strategic and conceptual base of the ILC.
