General Nikolai Mikhnevich, a prominent Russian military theorist at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, who made a significant contribution, among other things, to the theory of coalition wars, wrote: “These wars are characterized by mistrust, envy, intrigue … sometimes one has to abandon a too bold enterprise so as not to recoil an ally, or to rush into action to keep him behind. These patterns, including those deduced by the Russian military theorist at the end of the 19th century, fully manifested themselves during the formation of the Entente - a military-political union of three European powers - Great Britain, France and Russia, and, more importantly, during the conduct of coalition operations by this bloc against the union of the Central Powers within Germany, Austria-Hungary and initially Italy during the First World War, the centenary of the end of which we will celebrate this year.
A TRUE INSPIRER
An immutable regularity in the formation of any coalition, and first of all, a military one, is the obligatory presence of its main open or “behind-the-scenes” inspirer. An analysis of the events in the European arena preceding the outbreak of World War I unequivocally indicates that Great Britain was such an inspirer of the creation of the anti-German coalition, if not the upcoming war in general, according to the leading Russian researcher Andrei Zayonchkovsky and whose opinion is now shared by many experts.
Adhering at the end of the 19th century to the formally declared policy of refusing to join any European blocs (the so-called policy of brilliant isolation), London finally faced a choice: either to be an outside observer of the expanding German trade and economic and, as a result, military expansion and as a result, to be drawn into the inevitable armed showdown on the sidelines, or to lead European forces that do not agree with such a course of Berlin. The pragmatic British chose the latter and did not lose.
While London had a number of unresolved international contradictions with France and especially with Russia, it could not take the lead in the war with Germany. But since 1904, having settled all its "misunderstandings" with France, Great Britain entered into an unofficial alliance with her, objectively directed against Germany, and in 1907 Russia, which was defeated in the war with Japan, became compliant and went to rapprochement with London on the issue of delimitation of "influence" in Central Asia. St. Petersburg, having transferred the center of its foreign policy from the Far East to the Balkan Peninsula, inevitably had to collide with Austro-Hungarian, and, therefore, with German interests. In September 1912, British Foreign Secretary Edward Gray, in a personal conversation, assured his Russian counterpart Sergei Sazonov that if war broke out between Russia and Germany, "Britain will use every effort to strike the most sensitive blow to German power." In the same conversation, the head of the British Foreign Office informed Sazonov that a secret agreement had been reached between London and Paris, “by virtue of which, in the event of a war with Germany, Great Britain pledged to provide France with assistance not only at sea, but also on land, by landing troops on the mainland. ".
Thus, no matter how the crisis situation developed in Europe, be it in the Balkans or around the issue of the entry of German troops into the territory of Belgium, according to the secret conventions of the Entente, its members, bound by London with corresponding obligations, inevitably found themselves drawn into the war.
WHEN QUANTITY MATTERS
One of the regularities in the development of a military-political coalition is the almost automatic desire of its member states to expand quantitatively, including, which is desirable, at the expense of the members of the opposing alliance. All this was clearly demonstrated on the eve and already during the unfolding war.
However, the involvement of new members in their coalition often runs into initially diametrically opposed positions of the countries that are already part of the coalition. This was the case, for example, with Turkey, whose central place in the then Muslim world caused an acute desire in London to entangle it with various agreements and post-war promises.
The position of St. Petersburg was exactly the opposite. He needed Turkey not at all as an ally, even if only the most meek and obedient. The Russian leadership needed Constantinople and the Straits, and the best excuse to occupy them would be a war with Turkey. Russia's position on this issue prevailed. Perhaps this was the only "victory", if you can call it that, of Russian diplomacy during the entire war in the confrontation of interests within the Entente. Not without the active work of German agents in October 1914, Turkey officially sided with the central or "middle powers", as by this time the German-Austro-Hungarian military alliance was dubbed. Another significant failure of the Entente was the transition in the fall of 1915 to the side of Germany and its allies Bulgaria, which, at first, significantly changed the configuration of the general position of the parties not in favor of Russia and its allies.
However, these failures were partially compensated for by the transfer in the same year to the side of the Entente of Italy and the opening of a new front, which diverted significant forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany, as well as by the action on the side of the Entente powers of Romania, although somewhat belated, but significantly complicating the situation of the Austro-Hungarian troops.
Ultimately, the quantitative advantage turned out to be on the side of the Entente. If during the first week the war covered only eight European states - Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro - on the other, then later the German bloc grew in fact only by two countries (Turkey and Bulgaria), and on the side of the Entente, declaring war on Berlin and Vienna, in addition to the aforementioned Italy and Romania, Japan, Egypt, Portugal, Cuba, Panama, Siam, Greece, Liberia, China, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras officially stood up, Haiti and, most importantly, the United States, with its already impressive industrial potential in those years. The role of the United States as a member of the coalition in question deserves special attention.
ROLE OF AMERICA
At the turn of 1915-1916, Russia's European allies became evidently unstable, formed not without their own help, the internal situation in the country, fraught with its early withdrawal from the war. Only the United States could objectively compensate for such a giant. Even before the war, and especially with its outbreak, the British leadership directed incredible efforts to drag Washington into the "European meat grinder." Germany also contributed indirectly to this: with its "unlimited submarine war", accompanied by numerous casualties, including among American citizens, it finally persuaded Congress to decide to enter the war on the side of the Entente.
On April 5, 1917, Washington declared war on Germany, on May 18, the law on universal conscription was promulgated, and on June 13 of the same year, the landing of American troops in France began. By the day of the armistice in the fall of 1918, out of the total number of drafted 3750 thousand, 2087 thousand Americans were transported to France. They were included in 41 divisions, of which 30 were combat-ready by the end of the war. And yet, as the representatives of the allied command themselves noted, the role of the US army in the war was auxiliary, especially at the beginning. American units and formations were simply poorly trained, therefore, even despite the presence of so-called technical advisers from among British and French officers, the role of the US Armed Forces was only to replace British and French divisions in the calm sectors of the Western Front. As Ferdinand Foch wrote, at the end of the war, the supreme commander-in-chief of the allies, - "controlled by generals who did not have experience, the US army could not cope with the tasks set." And yet, the involvement of the United States in the war on its side was a great success for the Entente powers.
As we can see, the number of coalition members is an important factor in armed confrontation. And here the direct contribution of each of the coalition members to the confrontation on the battlefield is not at all necessary, since the building up of the political and diplomatic capital of the coalition also plays a significant role, which directly negatively affects the morale of the opposing side. Not to mention the real and potential contribution to the common cause of the coalition members, who have significant military-economic and military capabilities proper.
COALITION WITHOUT ACTION COORDINATION
The most important regularity that determines the success of the coalition on the battlefields is the presence of the so-called allied war plan, covering all the elements of preparation for it, ensuring the achievement of its goals through the use of armed forces (AF), backed up by all favorable economic and political measures. In this sense, a war plan for 1914 did not exist in any country. However, both in France and in Russia, and especially in Great Britain, preparations for war on a national scale were nevertheless carried out, but without due coordination with the allies. Indeed, between Russia and France there was a written convention of 1892, which resembled a plan for war, which was gradually refined as an armed resolution approached during a meeting of the chiefs of both general staffs. In essence, it turned out that due to Russia's close dependence on French financial assistance, serious obligations were simply imposed on St. Petersburg to the allies, which virtually ruled out any creativity in developing a joint action plan. The "military secret", which, in theory, was supposed to surround collective work, in fact allowed St. Petersburg to be compliant in all directions, which, with the outbreak of war, turned out to be harmful to Russian interests.
There were no written documents at all about the military participation in the future war of the third member of the Entente - Great Britain. Always very careful in binding itself to specific obligations, London was in no hurry to develop a plan for its army's operations on the mainland, and even more so to coordinate it with anyone else. When General John French was appointed Chief of the British General Staff in March 1912, he took some steps to ensure the transport of the British Expeditionary Force in the event of war, as well as the dispatch of his assistant to France to reconnoiter the area and consult with representatives of the French and Belgian military leaders. however, all these measures were in the nature of the initiative of the British military, the government did not want to bind itself before the start of the war with any external obligations. It is noteworthy that only a year and a half after the start of the war, in December 1915, at the initiative of Russia, its representative in France, General Yakov Zhilinsky, sharply demanded coordination of the actions of the allied armies. Despite the fact that the French in the first place and even the British supported the Russian general, a specific plan of coordinated military actions was never developed. We limited ourselves to wishes. Moreover, the complete lack of coordination in the actions of the allies related not only to the European Theater of War. Attempts by the Russian command in the Middle East to coordinate their actions with the British also failed. The interaction of the Russian expeditionary corps in Persia and the British - in Mesopotamia was limited only to the establishment of radio communication between them and nothing more.
The only example of the coordinated actions of the Entente powers can serve as two secret documents signed in 1912 by the British and the French regarding the distribution of the naval forces (Navy) of both powers in case of war: the French Navy was assigned the Mediterranean Sea, and the protection of the English Channel and the Atlantic coast of France assigned to the British fleet. On the eve of the war, in May-June 1914, all three governments of the Entente countries intended to conclude a common naval convention on the distribution of areas of responsibility and the operational tasks arising from this, but the negotiations were interrupted by the outbreak of the war.
As for the "middle powers", in their partnership relations had the fact of the absence of a military convention as such, with all the ensuing consequences, up to the creation of a single command. Although, on the basis of Article 1 of the union treaty between Germany and Austria-Hungary, it was envisaged to help each other with all their armed forces. There were several reasons for the lack of more specific operational commitments between the two armies. But the main one was that the German General Staff did not want to open their cards in advance to an ally, whose military value he regarded as low. And the question of Italy's membership in the coalition by the time the war began was already raising serious doubts. In general, as the leadership of both Germany and Austria-Hungary believed, both chiefs of general staffs by constant personal communication eliminated the need for a written document, which supposedly could adversely affect the freedom of action of both armies in a real war.
Thus, instead of a clear plan of coordinated actions between the main participants of both coalitions, there were only mutual military commitments, which outlined only in general terms the size of the deployed forces and the guiding idea of their operational use during the war. The only justification for this could be completely inexplicable dreams of the transience of the upcoming war, as the Germans said, "before the autumn leaves." And already in the course of the unfolding confrontation, especially in its second half, the Entente members began to conclude agreements formally necessary for any military coalition (for example, such as the declaration of the three powers on the obligation not to conclude a separate peace during the war).
Of course, no war proceeds exactly according to plans drawn up in peacetime, but in a modern, extremely complex "economy" of war, the presence of a clear, coordinated initial plan is the most important pattern of coalition actions, and for the first operations it may be the most important.
UNDER A UNIFIED COMMAND
Central to the military coalition at all times has been, is and will be the question of a single command. During the preparation and during the First World War within the framework of the Entente, it acquired a peculiar sound.
The armed forces of all countries - members of the coalition had commanders-in-chief at the head of their armed forces, who were responsible to their country and were not tied into a single organism by a single common will. Nobody, and especially the British, and then the Americans, did not want to obey the general of another army, and governments and parliaments feared losing control over the armed forces of their country. The attempts of Russia (as a whole within the coalition) and France (within the framework of the Western Front) to establish autocracy, which did not stop from the very first days of the war, were unsuccessful. The semblance of coordination was achieved by the communications apparatus and periodically convened conferences that discussed strategic assumptions and supply issues associated with the intended operations.
For the first time, the question of the immediate formation of a unified command was raised by Russia at the end of 1914 as a result of unjustified significant losses of the Russian army due to the lack of coordination with it by the actions of the allies. But in 1915, operations in both European theaters of war (theater of operations) developed in the same way independently. Ideological unity of actions of the Armed Forces of the Entente countries did not exist here, not to mention operations in other parts of the world.
Only at the end of 1915 did the Allies take concrete steps towards a unified command and control of hostilities. The French general Joseph Joffre, who received "the supreme command of all French armies," is persistently beginning to implant his unified operational plan for 1916 in the minds of the Allies; he proposes it on behalf of France to all the commanders-in-chief of the allied armies or their representatives at the Allied conference at Chantilly, near Paris, and seeks the acceptance of some of its provisions.
Of course, this conference could not replace the unified firm leadership of the armed forces of the Entente. The common grounds for joint action worked out at its meetings were nevertheless vague. They clearly show only the desire to provide mutual support in order to avoid individual defeats. And yet it was a step in the right direction.
However, the joint actions of the allies during the 1916 campaigns in different theaters were expressed only in the form of sporadic attempts, not united either in time or in duration. Although all experts, without exception, noted clear progress in combining the operations of the armies of various Entente powers, in their own opinion, the unified administration in the form of conferences in Chantilly did not pass the exam.
As a result, the general direction of operations remained in the hands of periodically convened conferences. Formally, the Entente's plan for 1917 boiled down to the earliest use of its superiority in forces and means to give the campaign the most decisive character. In Russia, at a meeting of the commanders-in-chief of the fronts at headquarters in mid-December 1916, an action plan for 1917 was also adopted, in which, in pursuance of the general plan of the Entente, it was planned to strictly coordinate the actions of the Russian armies with the Western allies, both in winter and in summer. … But it turned out as in previous years: when by the middle of summer the Russian front stopped and the Germans were free, on July 31 the British launched an offensive near Ypres; when the British made a month-long break in their offensive (from August 16 to September 20), the French launched attacks at Verdun (August 20-26), and the Italians attacked the Isonzo (August 19-September 1). In other words, almost all operations, perhaps with the exception of those conducted near Verdun and Isonzo, for one reason or another, could not be implemented as planned - in time and according to a single plan with the general command.
SUPREME COMMANDER
And only the actual defeat of Italy in October 1917 forced the leadership of Great Britain, France and Italy to create the so-called Supreme Military Council. It includes the heads of state or government. In the intervals between the plenary sessions of this body with the participation of the highest officials of the member states, military representatives from four allied armed forces - British, American, Italian and French (by this time Russia had withdrawn from the war) sat on the council. However, each of these representatives was endowed with the powers of a "technical adviser", responsible only to his own government, and had no right to decide any important issues himself. Thus, the council was a consultative body without any command and executive functions, although the development of the situation demanded something else.
Finally, in the course of developing an action plan for 1918, it was decided to create an Executive Military Council chaired by French General Ferdinand Foch, which was to coordinate the actions of the commanders-in-chief of the allied armies and create its own reserve. However, in reality, the members of this council defended only the interests of their own country, and the commanders-in-chief remained responsible only to their governments. As a result, mainly because of the position of Great Britain, which categorically refused to send its troops there, no general reserve was created. Thus, the Allies were unable to put the common interests of the Entente above the interests of their states.
However, the powerful offensive of the Germans, which began in the early spring of 1918, threatening the capture of Paris, prompted the urgent convocation of a Franco-British conference, at which everyone unanimously spoke in favor of the creation of a "real unified command" of the allied forces in France and Belgium with its transfer to Foch. But even at this conference, the rights of the commander-in-chief were not formulated clearly enough. The situation at the front did not improve. The Allies again urgently convened a conference in Beauvais (April 3) with the participation of both prime ministers and the US representative, General John Pershing, where it was decided to transfer "strategic direction of operations" to the French general Ferdinand Foch while maintaining "tactical" leadership in the hands of each of the commanders of the allied forces, and the latter were given the right in case of disagreement with Foch to appeal to their government. However, General Pershing on the same day said that the United States entered the war "not as allies, but as an independent state, so he will use his troops as he wants." And only after the next powerful blow by the Germans on the Lis River, General Foch was really assigned the powers of the supreme commander of all the allied forces in their entirety. This happened on May 14, 1918, and in the future, the comprehensive powers of the new commander-in-chief favorably affected the development of the Entente's operations.
Analyzing the information presented, we can conclude that in the process of forming a united military leadership of the members of a military alliance, it is a regularity that the question of a single allied command in a coalition of even such confessional, ethnically and mentally close powers as the Western members of the Entente cannot be resolved so as not to painfully affect the fundamental rights of the supreme power of each of the participating states. And although in the case of the Entente, such a command was formally created by the end of the war, but in essence it was the result of a delicate compromise that could be destroyed at any moment.
THERE WAS NO RESPECT FOR RUSSIA IN ANTANTA
The most important regularity of coalition military actions is the unrevealed mutual respect, embedded in the consciousness, first of all, of the political and military leadership of the alliance member states, the ability to combine and even subordinate their, often narrow, limited, national interests in the political sphere to the interests of the ally, especially if these interests are realized in specific situation on the battlefield. However, in the case of the Entente, the situation turned out to be very far from this.
A textbook example here is the peremptory, arrogant pressure exerted by France on Russia, moreover, openly, using elements of financial blackmail, in order to induce the latter to enter the war with only a third of the armed forces in combat readiness and with almost complete unpreparedness of the rear facilities. But even in the subsequent years of the war, the consumer attitude of the Western allies towards Russia did not undergo any changes. British Prime Minister Lloyd George on this matter, though after the war, admitted: “The military leaders of England and France, it would seem, did not understand the most important thing - that they participated together with Russia in a common enterprise and that in order to achieve a common goal it was necessary to unite them resources …”In the spring of 1915, the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief sent a telegram to his French colleague with a request to undertake an offensive to alleviate the situation of the Russian front. But it's useless. Only after repeated requests from Russia in mid-June did the Franco-British troops undertake a number of local attacks, but they could not mislead the German command about their significance only as distracting, demonstrative actions and did not become a reason for alleviating the situation of the Russian allies.
On the contrary, there are a great many examples of the self-sacrifice of the Russian troops to please the interests of the Western allies. It is a well-known fact when the decisive successes of the armies of the Southwestern Front ("Brusilov Breakthrough") in the spring of 1916 saved the Allies from a humiliating defeat at Verdun and Trentino. Less is known about the substantial assistance of the Russian troops to their western allies in Central and Asia Minor. But the British should be grateful to the Russian expeditionary corps, which actually saved the British from defeat in 1916, who fell into a difficult situation in Cult-el-Amar (Mesopotamia), and thereby, among other things, ensured Britain's strong positions in the Middle East for subsequent years.
In general, it must be admitted that by their boundless pressure on the Russian command, forcing it, often to its own detriment, to throw more and more new formations and units into the furnace of the war, the Western allies quite consciously, apparently already thinking about the post-war world order, pushed Russia to an internal explosion and ultimately to military collapse, but at the same time sought to squeeze out all the benefits for themselves as soon as possible, while the Russian army had not yet surrendered. Perhaps in the most cynical form, the attitude of the Western powers towards their ally was expressed by the French ambassador to Russia Maurice Palaeologus: “… when calculating the losses of the allies, the center of gravity is not in number, but in something completely different. In terms of culture and development, the French and Russians are not on the same level. Russia is one of the most backward countries in the world. Compare our army with this ignorant mass: all our soldiers are educated, in the forefront are young forces who have shown themselves in science, art, talented and sophisticated people, this is the color of humanity. From this point of view, our losses are much more sensitive than the Russian losses. As they say, no comment. A reasonable question arises: is it worth joining a coalition, where you are obviously prepared for the role of a vassal, whose interests will not be reckoned with either during the war, or even more so after? The answer is obvious.
The above some patterns in the formation and functioning of the military coalition of a number of European powers during the First World War - the Entente - are therefore "an objectively existing, recurring, essential connection of phenomena" numerous military campaigns of modern times. The vitality of existing and planned political and military alliances largely depends on scrupulous accounting and, most importantly, the skillful application of these patterns.
