From the front-line conversations of Prince Obolensky, August 1915
In the spring of 1915, Nicholas II went on an inspection trip to the front. Obviously, in a simple visit to the Russian troops in combat positions, their supreme head, the All-Russian Emperor, could not meet any special obstacles, except for concern for the personal safety of the monarch. But some circles had in mind to give the visit of Nicholas II to the conquered region (Galicia) the character of a much more impressive act, which could morally consolidate Russia's desire for the future annexation of the Slavic lands of Transcarpathia. It is clear that a trip of this kind could already raise doubts of a political nature (1).
How unpredictable the foreign policy resonance could be on the trip of Nicholas II to Galicia is not difficult to judge at least from the letter of the Ambassador to London A. K. Benckendorff to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 12/25 May 1915
“I know from a serious source that the harsh measures of our administration in Lviv are getting worse and threatening to provoke discontent on the part of the Poles, which may spread and dispel the sympathy with which our occupation was initially met. This criticism concerns mainly officials sent from Russia, whose activities are becoming more intolerant and picky. Even if these warnings are exaggerated, they are still so frequent and reflect such concern over general political implications that I cannot finally bring them to your attention. It seems obvious that even a seeming contradiction between the proclaimed political principles and their application on the spot can only entail providing the Polish elements sympathetic to Austria and German politics with the most effective weapon and preparing unnecessary difficulties that will have to be regretted in the future”(2).
Nevertheless, the emperor's trip to Galicia took place - immediately after the capture of Przemysl. Hardly anyone then could have assumed that the Russians would soon have to leave Galicia. It is characteristic that the emperor himself was perhaps the most ardent "Russifier" these days - he harshly demanded that the supreme commander-in-chief curtail all initiatives to form Polish units and formations in the Russian army. The formation of the legions was immediately stopped, they began to distribute the recruits from the Polish provinces evenly among the combat units. The same units that had already been formed were renamed: banners into hundreds, legions into brigades and squads with direct subordination to the new Warsaw Governor-General Prince L. D. Engalychev.
But the military fate, as you know, is changeable: the time of victories of Russian weapons was replaced by the time of heavy defeats. The Gorlitsky breakthrough in the spring of 1915 completely changed the agenda, and the Russian military command, unlike the politicians, for a while completely forgot about the Poles. However, the very real prospect of the loss of the entire territory of the Kingdom of Poland practically forced the tsarist bureaucracy to return to the consideration of the Polish question.
Untimely initiative
It was discussed already in the midst of the great retreat - first in the Council of Ministers, where for the first time they invited Prince Velepolsky, Dmowsky and Grabsky, then at a meeting at headquarters on June 14, 1915. At the same time, it was decided to create a special commission to develop the foundations of Poland's autonomy … (3) The very word "autonomy" at that time sounds only in the memoirs of Yu. N. Danilov, as well as other participants in the meeting at the rate. But the researchers did not manage to find such a clear term in the documents of the meeting.
On June 17, it was announced “about the formation of a special meeting chaired by I. L. Goremykin for a preliminary discussion of questions about the implementation of the principles announced in the appeal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of August 1, 1914 . The composition of the special meeting was determined at 12 people, and - Polish and Russian public figures in an equal number. In the absence of Goremykin, Secretary of State S. E. Kryzhanovsky.
The announcement of the beginning of the meeting from June 20 was published in the newspapers the next day. On June 22, 1915, the first full meeting was held. The Russian side was represented as members by Prince D. N. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, P. N. Balashov, N. P. Shubinsky and members of the State Council Professor D. I. Bogaley, A. D. Samarin and A. A. Khvostov, Polish - members of the State Council A. E. Meishtovich, K. G. Skirmunt, S. I. Lopatsinsky and others.
With the opening of the meeting, the Polish representatives sent a loyal telegram to the emperor, where the well-known motive about "the unity of fraternal peoples under the scepter of the Romanovs" sounded again. A telegram similar in content was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. On June 27, Samarin, who did not participate in the first days of the meeting, was replaced by a member of the State Council A. P. Nikolsky. In addition, Deputy Minister of Public Education Rachinsky was involved in the work of the meeting. Then Balashov was absent from the meeting. In addition to six Russian participants, I. L. Goremykin and S. E. Kryzhanovsky.
Already during the conference, the Cadet "Rech" noted with obvious hope: "Disagreements came to light only on issues related to the big program for the organization of the Kingdom of Poland." In general, during the meeting, two categories of issues were identified - 1) the structure of Poland in the event of unification; 2) arrangement in case of non-unification and urgent reforms.
The participants of the meeting began their work immediately by discussing issues of the second category, as more relevant, and mainly on language, religion and regional governance. Regarding the problems with the language, it was practically immediately agreed that the Polish language would be restored for teaching in schools, for use in office work, etc. The need for reforms in the religious sphere and in the administrative part, mainly in local self-government, was also unanimously recognized. With regard to urgent measures, there was complete unanimity among all the participants in the meeting (4). A break, as he explained during a cup of tea with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Prince N. B. Shcherbatov Kryzhanovsky, was caused by the need for the Russian participants to be in the theater of operations.
It was planned to resume the work of the meeting with the opening of the session of the State Duma. However, on July 19, in a speech at the opening of the Duma session, Chairman of the Council of Ministers I. L. Goremykin, in parallel with the obligatory reference to the Proclamation of the Grand Duke, once again postponed the solution of the Polish question to the post-war period. Although at the same time he emphasized the readiness of Nicholas II "to develop bills on granting Poland, after the end of the war, the right to freely build its national, cultural and economic life on the basis of autonomy, under the scepter of Russian sovereigns and while maintaining a single statehood."
However, this speech by I. L. It is more honest to regard Goremykin as actually forced, in connection with the prospect of losing all hope of restoring Russian influence in the lost Polish territories, as well as among the authoritative representatives of the Polish public who remained in Russia. Nevertheless, the very word "autonomy", so forbidden, which is not even in the "Appeal", sounded from the lips of a representative of the highest power for the first time, to which the leader of the cadets P. N. Milyukov.
Despite the fact that German regiments were already marching rapidly across Polish lands, the Polish press also managed to greet the prime minister's speech. Kurjer Warszawski wrote on August 12 (July 29) 1915:
“For more than 80 years, there has not been such a significant moment in the history of Poland as the present one. You cannot compare the day of July 19 with what happened nine years ago. True, then most of the Russian people spoke out for the autonomy of Poland, but then there was so little faith in the possibility of a long-term Russian-Polish modus vivendi that when the Polish deputies presented in the second Duma their final draft of the political and legal structure of Poland, they met even from the side of principled proponents of autonomy criticism and reproaches that they make things difficult.
The present situation appears to be quite different. Now, at the meeting of the Duma on July 19, the words concerning the Polish question were listened to with particular attention and were received with such sympathy as the one expressed to the representatives of the allied powers.
In his declaration, the chairman of the council of ministers speaks of granting autonomy to Poland only after the end of the war, which, of course, is quite understandable in view of the fact that hostilities are being played out on Polish territory.
In any case, the autonomy of Poland is not made dependent on one or another outcome of the war. Thus, we received an assurance of great importance that if we were not even given now the opportunity to achieve our main goal - the reunification of the Polish lands - then, in any case, Polish-Russian relations, according to the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, will undergo an unconditional change (5).
Proszę bardzo, Polish Army …
It seems that Nicholas II, until the spring of 1915, seriously counted on a quick victory over the Germans, or, for starters, over the Austrians. Let the campaign to Berlin fell through, but the valiant Southwestern Front was already preparing to throw itself across the Carpathians - into the Hungarian Valley, and there it was just a stone's throw from Vienna. And even though half of Russian Poland by that time was in the German occupation (for strategic reasons) - the solution of the Polish question was seen by the Russian emperor as quite unambiguous. But it was not possible to overcome the Carpathians, and the Gorlitsky breakthrough of the Germans radically changed the state of affairs on the Russian front.
The Polish question was clearly fading into the background again. This was facilitated by both the changed situation on the fronts, since no help was expected from the exhausted French, and the not very favorable internal political background. The war was obviously dragging on, and much more pressing problems rolled over the country like a snowball. A complete collapse of military supplies and the loss of the best cadres of the regular army, spy mania and German pogroms in Moscow, ministerial leapfrog and, as a result of all this, the resignation of the Supreme Commander. In August 1915, Nikolai decided to replace the formidable uncle Nikolai Nikolaevich in this post. Very few approved of this step, but it was clearly easier for the tsar to move to headquarters than to remain in restless Petersburg.
However, the Poles did not stop craving for freedom, and this thirst sometimes took on the most unexpected forms. Among the most active there were also those who were ready to immediately begin the reconstruction of the Polish army. And by no means in opposition to the arrows of Pilsudski, few people knew about them at all. Director of the Department of the Diplomatic Chancellery at headquarters N. A. Kudashev:
“… General Yanushkevich yesterday confidentially told me about a conversation he had with a certain Matushinsky, a small Polish landowner, who arrived here the day before yesterday with a recommendation from the gendarme general pr. Mikeladze. This Matuszinski appeared on behalf of a group of Poles from three empires: Russia, Austria and Germany. His proposal was to grant them (ie, the Polish population without distinction of citizenship) [the right] to deploy their army to fight the Germans. At the same time, he only asked that Russian generals and officers be given to command this army, as well as weapons that they, the Poles, do not have (ie cannons); he declared that he could easily recruit up to 500,000 such an army, who supposedly had everything else necessary, i.e. clothes, guns, cartridges, etc. and - and this is the main thing, burning with the desire to beat the Germans. Matushinsky said that in return for such a service, the Poles do not demand anything special (neither their own army in the future, nor banners, etc.), but only promises of reunification of all three parts of Poland, so that the Austrian and Prussian Poles enjoy the same regime as the Russians. their fellow tribesmen; they will not require special troops in the future; however, they ask that the troops now assembled be used exclusively on the territory of the Kingdom of Poland.
General Yanushkevich did not want to bind himself with any formal promises and left himself to let Matushinsky know by telegraph if he wanted to continue this conversation … Until now, the negotiations between the general and Matushinsky have not been resumed, but here are the decisions taken by the Grand Duke and his chief of staff: they did not have a great desire not to resort to Polish help and to carry out all military tasks on their own, they realize that it is not so easy now, and, in addition, that the use of the Poles can be a very big help for the army, even if we assume that there is enough far fewer than 500,000. Therefore, it was decided to accept the proposal, but on the condition that the formation of this Polish army will be given the character of a militia.
Thus, if from further conversations the gene. Yanushkevich and Matushinsky, it will become clear that the proposal of the Poles comes from a serious one and represents real guarantees of military assistance, then the militia of the provinces that are part of the Vistula region will be announced by the highest manifesto. The entire male population will enter the militia (according to, of course, the rules); if it includes Poles from Krakow or Poznan, then our superiors will turn a blind eye to this … Russian generals, officers, cannons will be attached to the militia. The rest of the weapons (rifles, checkers, revolvers), it turns out, are already available, almost prepared for the fight against us …
I did not object to everything that General Yanushkevich told me, limiting myself to the remark that it is important to be convinced of the authority of Matushinsky, the degree of real assistance that can be expected from such an army of militias, and that it is necessary that, in any case, this army was completely legal; the general fully agreed with me and promised to keep me informed of his further meetings with the Poles”(6).
Notes (edit)
1. Danilov Yu. N. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Paris, 1930, p. 170.
2. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments 1878-1917 M.1935, series III, volume VIII, part 1, p. 11.
3. Danilov Yu. N. On the way to the crash, M., 2000, pp. 137-138.
4. "Rech", July 4 (June 22) 1915
5. Kurjer Warszawski, August 12 (July 29) 1915
6. International relations in the era of imperialism. Documents from the archives of the tsarist and provisional governments 1878-1917 Moscow, 1935, series III, volume VI, part 1, pp. 270-271.
