Some time ago, the domestic media issued a sensation: "The Americans stole the Doctrine of Marshal Ogarkov." It turns out that, having borrowed ideas from our chief of the General Staff (in 1977-1984), they made a revolution in military affairs. It was after this that the Pentagon re-evaluated the role of control and automation systems and the concept of network-centric warfare was born. Revolutionary changes reached the Russian army with a delay of almost 30 years, but even now a number of Russian experts reject such a path of development, sometimes even speaking about large-scale disinformation on the part of the United States.
100 years after the invention of the radio, which was almost immediately adopted by the armies of the leading countries of the world, the next stage of introducing information technologies into military affairs began. Currently, a transition is underway to the combined use of advanced achievements in combat command and control systems, communications, computing technology, reconnaissance and surveillance (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance - C4ISR), high-precision long-range weapons (WTO DB), unmanned and robotic weapons of warfare. The only difference is the scale of what is happening. In fact, another revolution in military affairs is taking place, the main goal of which has become the widespread informatization and automation of the processes of armed struggle, under the name - "network centrism".
PROSPECTS FOR THE US ARMED FORCES
As you know, the term "network centrism" first appeared in the American computer industry and was the result of a breakthrough in information technology, which made it possible to organize interaction between computers, even though they used different operating systems. It is quite natural that the Americans also became the ideologists of the military application of this term. As applied to military affairs, network centrism means the informatization of armed warfare, which provides for a purposeful process of systemic integration of computer facilities, information and communication technologies in order to obtain new system-wide properties that make it possible to more effectively plan, organize and conduct operations (combat actions).
The main feature of network centrism as a revolution in military affairs is that, first of all, it is associated not with new models of weapons and military equipment, but with their software, that is, with information technologies. Nevertheless, as the American political scientist Richerson emphasized, "technology alone does not make a revolution in military affairs: the latter needs to be effectively nourished by a new doctrine." It is the absence of an official network-centric doctrine in the US Armed Forces that sometimes gives the opponents of this direction in the development of the RF Armed Forces reason to speak of network-centrism only as another expensive horror story of the Cold War.
Indeed, there is no official doctrine. Nevertheless, approaches to network-centric warfare (operations) were proposed at the end of the last century by US Navy Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and Defense Department expert John Garstkoy, and later were legislatively formalized in the form of a number of official concepts. They provide guidelines for the creation and use of future armed forces, while doctrines are a set of rules for existing combat formations. Therefore, we can confidently say that the American concept of network-centric war (NCW) or network-centric operation (SCO) exists and reflects innovative views on the formation of a promising network space for armed warfare, the introduction of modern information technologies in military affairs, as well as their influence on the implementation of combat tasks in fundamentally new and more effective ways.
Moreover, one should not expect the appearance of a separate official document called "The Doctrine of Network-Centric Warfare". Unlike, for example, the evolution of the concept of an air-ground operation, which grew at the end of the 80s into an official doctrinal document with the same name, the concept of SCW (SCO) primarily defines new principles that will be implemented in the implementation of operational (combat) the functions of the troops. Already, this process is reflected in the current doctrinal documents of the US Armed Forces, for example, in the charter of the Air Force AFDD 2-0 "Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Operations", published on January 6, 2012 … One of the main tasks spelled out in the charter is the formation of a network-centric intelligence system in the interests of effective intelligence support of the US Armed Forces in modern and future wars and armed conflicts.
Thus, to say that the concept of a network-centric operation (war), which is military operations that use modern information and network technologies to integrate geographically dispersed command and control bodies, reconnaissance, surveillance and target designation, as well as groupings of troops and weapons in highly adaptive, global system, died without becoming a doctrine, not only prematurely, but also anti-scientific. Moreover, this is the misfortune of technophobes, who, in principle, cannot see all the preferences from the introduction of new information technologies and the process of informatization itself. Meanwhile, informatization makes it possible to move to a unified planning system, form a unified picture of situational awareness, and develop modern control and management measures for weapons of war, including unmanned and robotic systems. In addition, it makes it possible to increase the transparency and efficiency of the rear services and reduce the level of forward presence through the formation of virtual remote headquarters and other command and control bodies.
At the same time, it should be noted that, being at the moment a real tool for increasing combat capabilities, network centrism from this does not become a panacea for solving all problems. This is confirmed by the state of the community of military experts in the United States, which is divided into supporters, seriously doubting and opponents of such a concept. The latter believe that technology occupies too much place in American military strategy, illegally imposing their logic on it. Moreover, as noted in his work "On the weaknesses of the American concept of" network-centric wars (operations) "Doctor of Political Science, Professor Alexander Kopylov, the Pentagon's hopes that innovations will bring victory on the battlefield in the same way as they make profit in business are untenable. The dominance of technocratism in the form of the concept of network-centric warfare leads to a number of mistakes. Among them: overestimation of a person's ability to adequately process a large amount of conflicting information; a simplified vision of the enemy through reducing his strategy to asymmetric actions; unjustified bureaucratization of the management process and insufficient consideration of the volatile nature of combat; and finally, the explicit or implicit premise that military victory is the self-sufficient goal of the entire campaign.
Indeed, there are enough problems at the present stage, and one of the burning questions discussed by experts is what will happen if the enemy uses electronic countermeasures to disable lines, communication networks and data transmission. The article "Network-centric Front" gave an example of network-centrism in the civil sphere and its subsequent effect, when the heads of two families were faced with the task of paying for utilities. To do this, each of them had the same potential in the amount of 5,000 rubles. He performed one task the old fashioned way, filling out receipts, going to the bank and standing in line. Another, an advanced user of information technologies, put his potential (5,000 rubles) on a bank card and made a payment at any convenient time without leaving home and, most importantly, quickly. It turns out that both subjects with the same potentials and, all other things being equal, ideal conditions performed the same task, but with different efficiency, that is, with a different degree of realization of potential opportunities. At the same time, the second subject also saved on commission percentages.
So what can happen if the power user loses their IT advantages? Strictly speaking, nothing, since he will simply switch to performing tasks using the old, old-fashioned methods, comparing his capabilities with his non-advanced opponent. This was confirmed by the incident that occurred in August 2011 during the development of the issues of repelling aggression from North Korea at the joint US-Korean command and staff exercises. During the exercise, problems arose in the operation of the equipment of the promising DCGS information collection, processing and distribution system. The cause was a software glitch. The officers participating in the exercises lost contact with the battlefield, lost control of their troops and were unable to see the enemy. The computer screens went blank. Tragedy? Definitely not!
Americans are pragmatists and understand all the advantages of this approach. This incident became for them only an additional opportunity to practice emergency actions of personnel in a difficult electronic situation. This means that our military specialists should not make tragedies out of the possible opposition of the enemy, rejecting real preferences in the process of informatization of the armed struggle.
PROSPECTS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF RUSSIA
Despite the fact that the chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov, was the author of the idea of another revolution in military affairs, the large-scale introduction of information technologies into the military sphere began in the United States. New regulations, equipment and weapons have already been repeatedly tested by the Americans in various wars and armed conflicts. But after more than 25 years, we have not many changes. For example, according to foreign analysts, during the war with the Georgian aggressors in the RF Armed Forces, "good old" shortcomings were once again revealed.
Technically and morally outdated complexes or difficult-to-target reconnaissance means without the ability to quickly transfer the collected information. Problems with communication and data transmission systems, which led to the impossibility of effective management of subordinate formations. It is a well-known fact that Russian officers had to resort to the help of correspondents who had cell and satellite phones. The lack of any coordination and interaction between the air force and ground forces, which did not allow the formation of a truly united group of forces. Lack of high-precision weapons, which were hardly used in that war, since there were only a few copies. Another problem was the insufficient number of carriers capable of using such weapons. On airplanes, helicopters, tanks, sometimes there were no infrared cameras, no night vision devices, no friend or foe recognition systems, no navigation equipment. Inconsistency with the modern realities of the theory of operational art, which is still based on the old views of traditional large-scale ground operations, and not on modern concepts that provide for the massive use of high-precision weapons of warfare.
Similar problems were also highlighted in the works of domestic experts, who pointed out that the effectiveness of the actions of units of the RF Armed Forces was sometimes reduced to zero due to the lack of covert stable communications, and in some cases - communications in general.
Currently, the first movements in the form of an attempt to "digitalize" the control system are already taking place. But this is only the beginning of the journey. An integral condition for the implementation of the new concept is the deployment of computer networks and the introduction of information technologies, that is, modern hardware and software systems, means of automating the processes of preparing and making decisions, storing, processing and communicating information, and much more. But the most important thing is to understand what we generally expect from network centrism.
Perhaps we are waiting for new ways of using forces and means of armed struggle, which, it seems, have not yet been developed, and the reason lies in the fact that not only understanding of the essence of the phenomenon, but also of its necessity and importance is often lacking. Nevertheless, practical proposals that require the closest attention and study are already being received. For example, specialists from one of the RAS institutes have developed a model for "Network-centric control of group motion of objects through the configuration of quasi-force fields." The model substantiates the possibility of transition from remote control to automatic mission execution by means of network-centric self-organization of all vehicles in a complex and rapidly changing environment (taking into account active opposition from both traditional air defense systems and enemy UAV groups).
What are the advantages of such an application of UAVs or other robotic means of warfare in a single network-centric control space? According to the developers, they are as follows:
- distributed deployment of a much larger number and variety of means of multichannel collection of information, counteraction and defeat on the means of warfare;
- a significant increase in the accuracy of determining the coordinates of moving targets (due to their multiple determination by aircraft distant from each other (robotic means) and subsequent processing of information in a single algorithmic space (sounding effect with a large base);
- the possibility of concentration of distributed multichannel detection means, high-precision guidance and destruction by means of their dynamically self-organizing accumulation in a certain place and moment of time;
- a dramatic increase in the likelihood of successful mission accomplishment while minimizing the consumption of ammunition, own losses, which is achieved due to the high quality of control and maximum coordination of the combat capabilities of weapons of warfare.
In addition, the specialists of the institute have solutions related to the development of a new element base and its architecture, which provides qualitatively new possibilities for a full-scale solution of network-centric control problems in the resources of globally connected networks. Moreover, such solutions, according to the assurances of scientists, do not require new technologies for the design and manufacture of very large integrated circuits (VLSI). According to them, an experimental batch of a prototype of an element base with a fundamentally new architecture "control computer on a chip" supporting a single network-centric control space can be implemented using available technologies for the design and manufacture of VLSI with design standards of 65-45 nm within two to three years at relatively low cost.
CATCHING OTHERS IS DIFFICULT, BUT IT IS NECESSARY
In order to create opportunities, and the very prerequisites for the implementation of the network-centric concept in the Russian army, it is necessary to solve a complex task within the framework of both the Armed Forces and the country as a whole. This is the search for new technological solutions, the transfer of the military-industrial complex to an innovative path of development, the clarification of charters and manuals, the development of new forms and methods of using force groupings, training of personnel to work with modern hardware and software.
First of all, it is advisable to intensify work on the creation of truly united command and control bodies, the development of modern algorithms for their work in solving various combat missions, the formation of a list of means that we plan to link into a network, understanding why and, most importantly, what it is for. Otherwise, we will spend a lot of money on the fashionable direction and, in the end, will step on the American rake when "unexpectedly" an insoluble problem of uniting these disparate, independent networks and grids arises. Unfortunately, the fears are already coming true. This was reflected in the report of the Commander of the Western Military District, Colonel-General Arkady Bakhin "Organization of command and control of the troops (forces) of the military district of the new organization", announced at the general meeting of the Academy on January 28, 2012. According to the speaker, at the command post of the United Strategic Command, the equipment of 17 automated control systems is deployed, which are in no way interconnected.
In addition, it is necessary to understand that for the informatization of armed struggle it is not enough to supply equipment, you still need to learn how to use it correctly. That is why it is advisable to continue the active introduction of information technologies into the daily activities of the Armed Forces. Forcibly introduce an electronic document management system so that commanders and the entire personnel receive the necessary knowledge and experience in working with modern information systems. Their actions must be worked out to automatism - as with a TV, cell phone, computer. Only in this case information systems and means will turn from unknown expensive equipment into a real assistant in solving assigned combat missions.
There is a lot of work in this direction, since there is an obvious lag in the level of informatization of our Armed Forces from similar processes in the American army. There is not even a full-fledged military scientific library. At the same time, not only is the work of military scientists not digitized for previous years, but new materials are not introduced, which only aggravates the situation. For example, it was not possible to find a single work of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov on numerous domestic military resources (including the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation). At the same time, translations of most of the works of our marshal are posted on the websites of military scientific institutions of foreign countries. Use, American military scientists, advance your science, ensure the development of innovative your Armed Forces!
In the interests of accelerating the processes of informatization and the implementation of network-centric principles in the RF Armed Forces, it is advisable to intensify work in the following key areas:
- clarification of the essence of the phenomena under study and the formation of a unified terminological base;
- search for ways of practical implementation of network-centric principles, development of new methods of using force groupings, as well as the development of modern tools to increase the efficiency of information and analytical activities;
- development and approval of a family of conceptual documents on informatization of types and arms of troops;
- transition to an electronic document management system, as well as popularization of informatization in the Armed Forces;
- attracting specialists from the industry and research organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who themselves come up with practical proposals;
- the creation of modern discussion platforms, as well as the formation of permanent working groups from representatives of the Ministry of Defense, science and industry on promising areas of research.
Undoubtedly, we will not get a ready-made instant solution. Nevertheless, the forward movement will finally begin.
