Rethinking the old
In the fifties of the last century, when the memory of the recent World War was still fresh, the Soviet military leaders had a very original idea. Snipers worked with great efficiency on all fronts of the Second World War throughout the war. One such fighter, having the appropriate training, could greatly confuse the cards of a much larger number of opponents. So they decided in the Soviet Union to start training a huge number of snipers, who, according to the idea of the authors of the idea, should have been in every unit, starting with a platoon or even a squad. Perhaps the birth of this idea was facilitated by the experience of machine guns - in the First World War they were exclusively easel, but already during the Interbellum period it became possible to include light machine guns in the infantry divisions. So snipers, who were previously "piece" fighters, decided to make a mass phenomenon to strengthen small units. Abroad, in turn, they began to move the sniper business towards the maximum professionalization of this specialty. As a result, sniper pairs and other signs of a "real" sniper will finally take hold in the troops.
Let's go back to the Soviet innovation. The logic of the Soviet military leadership was simple: a specially prepared weapon allows a sniper to destroy targets with great success at those distances at which the "standard" infantry weapons become ineffective or even powerless. In addition, the duties of the sniper during the detachment included the rapid and relatively covert destruction of important targets, such as the crews of machine guns, anti-tank missiles, grenade launchers, etc. In other words, the new "type" of snipers was supposed to perform the same functions as the rest of the unit's fighters, but with some adjustment for different weapons. Finally, the sniper, "removing" his targets, must bring confusion into the enemy ranks and provoke panic. In addition to direct fire missions, the sniper of a motorized rifle or airborne unit was also obliged to monitor the battlefield and help his comrades in detecting especially important targets, as well as, if necessary, adjust the fire of other types of troops. There was some controversy about the required number of snipers in small units. As a result, we settled on one sniper in each squad.
A special term for the updated specialty of a sniper was not initially envisaged, but after a certain time, the development of sniping and access to foreign experience demanded that its own designation be allocated for the Soviet innovation. As a result, snipers, who are full-fledged members of motorized rifle or airborne units, began to be called infantry, military or army. A few years after the Soviet rethinking of sniper art, similar views began to appear abroad. For example, in the United States, infantry snipers are referred to as designated marksman. It is noteworthy that the American name originally reflects the essence of recruiting fighters for such a job. This is often the reason for offensive jokes, they say, there are real snipers, and there are designated ones.
In working out the appearance of a new military specialty, Soviet military minds were faced with several difficult problems. Firstly, equipping relatively small units with snipers required a large number of them, and secondly, new weapons were needed. The first question is relatively easy to deal with - it is enough to select future snipers from the soldiers called up and send them for training. As before, future snipers were recommended to choose from those who, before serving in the army, were engaged in sports shooting or had hunting skills. It was also necessary to take into account the results shown by the fighters in the shooting practice. Interestingly, the last moment later gave rise to the opinion about the "inferiority" of the Soviet-style army sniper. Say, they took the one who coped the best with the Kalashnikov and gave him a sniper rifle. However, this statement is true only for those "fathers-commanders" who paid insufficient attention to the correct choice of future snipers.
There were great difficulties with weapons for the old new specialty of a fighter. Throughout the Great Patriotic War and several years after it, the main weapon of Soviet snipers was the Mosin rifle of the 1891/30 model, equipped with an optical sight. However, she no longer suited the military. After analyzing the current views on combined arms combat, the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the USSR General Staff in 1958 announced a competition to create a new sniper weapon. The modern requirements at that time were somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the new rifle had to have an effective range of fire of at least 700 meters, and on the other hand, it was required to make a reliable and unpretentious design. In addition, a self-loading scheme was considered the most promising way for the development of a sniper rifle. The cartridge 7, 62x54R was chosen as ammunition for the new rifle. The intermediate 7, 62-mm model of 1943 was not suitable for shooting at the distances for which the weapon was created. Finally, unprecedented demands were made on the accuracy of the battle for the new weapon.
From the terms of reference from the 58th year, we can conclude that the designers faced a very difficult task. Nevertheless, three groups of engineers immediately got down to work. Two of them were headed by the famous designers A. S. Konstantinov and S. G. Simonov. The third was led by the lesser-known designer of sporting weapons E. F. Dragunov. According to the results of five years of work, tests and numerous sleepless nights, the Dragunov Sniper Rifle, named SVD and adopted in 1963, was recognized as the winner of the competition. There were many interesting stories associated with the weapons competition, but they are not the subject of our story. Simultaneously with the new rifle, a special cartridge was also created. However, by the 63rd year it was not completed and the development of the ammunition was continued. It all ended with the adoption of the 7N1 cartridge in 1967, which differed from the old versions 7, 62x54R with a new bullet and a more accurate design. Even later, in the early 90s, a new cartridge with improved penetration was created, called 7N14.
New specialty in battle
It is the adoption of the SVD rifle for service that is often considered the beginning of modern infantry sniping. Since then, our country has managed to take part in several wars, where infantry snipers took an active part. Their combat work was generally monotonous: searching and destroying those targets that other shooters could not cope with. Therefore, for example, in Afghanistan, the main actions of snipers almost did not change during the war. Thus, in offensive operations, snipers took position and supported their unit with fire. In defensive battles, respectively, snipers worked the same way, but taking into account the specifics of the defense. It was the same with ambushes. If the convoy of the Limited Contingent came under fire, then the snipers took the most convenient position, depending on the situation, and helped their unit, destroying machine gunners and grenade launchers. If it was required to set up an ambush, then Soviet snipers were engaged in targeted shooting of opponents.
As already mentioned, the work of an infantry sniper, due to its concept, is rather monotonous. The war in Chechnya demanded much more "originality". The fact is that with the outbreak of the war more than five hundred SVD rifles were in the hands of the militants, not counting the sniper weapons of other models "imported" from third countries. Therefore, the Chechen separatists began to actively use the tactics of sabotage sniping. As a result, the snipers of the federal forces also had to master the counter-sniper business. Emergency training in complex skills in combat is not an easy task in and of itself. In addition, the tactics used by the Chechens greatly interfered. Already by the storming of Grozny in 1995, they came up with a new way of working for saboteur snipers. A fighter with a sniper rifle moved into position not alone, but accompanied by a submachine gunner and a grenade launcher. The submachine gunner began to fire indirectly at the federal troops, causing return fire. The sniper, in turn, determined where our soldiers were shooting from and opened fire on them. Finally, the grenade launcher, under the noise of the battle, tried to hit the equipment. Soon after this tactic was revealed, Russian snipers came up with and applied a method of counteraction. It was simple: when a submachine gunner starts shooting, our sniper tries to find him, but is in no hurry to eliminate him. On the contrary, he is waiting for a Chechen sniper or grenade launcher to open fire and reveal himself. Further actions were a matter of technique.
In the course of both wars in Chechnya, the shortcomings of the existing system became acute. The events of the late eighties and early nineties seriously spoiled the state of the domestic armed forces, as a result of which not only supply, but also training deteriorated. In addition, the need for the training of specially trained snipers, who, in their skills, would surpass ordinary children from the infantry with SVD, was clearly manifested - it was the professionals who could solve the tasks with which the infantry snipers could not cope. However, it took time to create a new system for training snipers, and therefore especially difficult tasks were most often entrusted to snipers of the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. So, in September 1999, an incident characteristic of the work of such fighters occurred. The command decided to take the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi. Three special forces detachments were sent to storm them, and the fourth - the Moscow "Rus" - was sent to take the nearby Mount Chaban in order to support the actions of other groups from there. Detachment "Rus" did an excellent job of capturing and clearing the peaks of Mount Chaban, after which it dug in thoroughly and began to support other units. The positions were very convenient, because from them the village of Chabanmakhi was viewed in the most beautiful way. The second special forces detachment began the assault on the settlement. The progress along it was slow, but methodical and confident. However, on one of the approaches to the village, the militants managed to prepare a full-fledged stronghold protected by concrete structures. In addition to submachine gunners and machine gunners, there was also a sniper at this point. As it turns out later, he had a foreign-made rifle. The spetsnaz offensive stalled. Several times the fighters called in artillery and several times the shelling did not give almost any sense - the fighters waited for it in a concrete basement, after which they went upstairs again and continued to defend themselves. The commanders of the special forces decided to suspend the offensive and turn to "Rus" for help. On the part of the latter, the main work was done by a certain warrant officer N.(for obvious reasons, his name was never mentioned in open sources). He found the most suitable place on the mountain, from where it would be more convenient to fire at the militants' stronghold. Nevertheless, he had to choose from bad and very bad: the fact is that Ensign N. was armed with an SVD rifle, and there was a fairly long distance from his prone to the Chechen positions - almost a kilometer. This is almost the maximum distance for a Dragunov sniper rifle, and in addition to the range, there were also difficult mountain conditions with a changeable wind and an inconvenient relative position of the stronghold and the sniper's position: ensign N. would have to shoot "for himself." The task was not easy, so the operation to eliminate the militants lasted for two days.
On the first day after the preparation of the position, N. fired several test shots. He was helped by his comrade in the squad, a certain K. Sniper collected all the necessary information on the deviations of the bullets and went to do the calculations. The Chechen fighters could not understand where they were shooting from, so they became nervous. This could threaten the disclosure of the position of the Russian sniper, but, fortunately for the federal troops and misfortune for the militants themselves, the Chechens did not find or notice anyone. The next day, at dawn, N. again moved into position, and as a spotter he took with him a platoon commander, a certain Z. The conditions for shooting were again far from the best: the high humidity of a mountain morning and a strong side wind were added to the long range. N. again fired several shots and understood exactly how to aim at the militants. In addition, N. watched the movements of the enemy inside the building. It turned out that they were running as if on rails - each fighter moved along the same "trajectory". It ended up costing them too much. The first shot at the gunman who appeared in the sight was inaccurate. The second also gave no results. Fortunately, the Chechens thought that these bullets were coming from the storming commandos, so they did not hide from the sniper. Finally, the third shot was accurate. Apparently, the losses of the militants from this strongpoint were extremely insignificant, so they were very frightened and began to move inside the building much more carefully. But they did not know that even so, Ensign N. saw them perfectly. A few minutes later, these two militants were gone. The whole story with that strongpoint ended with a shot from an SPG-9 grenade launcher. The special forces "to consolidate the effect" fired only one grenade at the concrete structure, which completed the job. According to the immediate commander of the sniper N., the latter did more for the operation than all the artillery. An illustrative case.
Abroad
The probable enemy of the Soviet Union - the United States - until a certain time did not pay attention to the old new military specialty. Therefore, for example, during the Vietnam War, to strengthen the infantry units, they were assigned professional snipers during the operation. However, over time, it became clear that the shooter of "special accuracy" could be included in the regular composition of the unit. As a result, the situation with infantry snipers in the American armed forces at the moment looks like this: each division has its own sniper school, which recruits new cadets from among the military several times a year. For 11 weeks, they are taught the necessary minimum of knowledge and skills that a designated marksman (DM) must possess. After completing their training and passing the exams, the newly minted "assigned snipers" return to their home units. The number of infantry snipers in different types of troops varies. So, in each battalion of the marines there should be eight people with sniper training, and in motorized infantry - two per company.
The combat work of American designatet marksmen differs little from the work of Soviet and Russian snipers. This is due to the fact that the "designated sniper" is entrusted with the task of supporting his unit and increasing the effective range of fire. Sometimes, however, the DM has to fight the enemy snipers, but more often they participate in the battle on a par and shoulder to shoulder with everyone. Perhaps this is why none of the American infantry snipers have yet achieved widespread fame like Carlos Hascock.
Like the United States, Israel for the time being did not pay due attention to the training of snipers for infantry units. But in the first half of the nineties, the need for changes was finally ripe. The rearing Palestinian terrorists have made life difficult for the IDF and have shown that the current Israeli doctrine of war is not well suited to the current situation. For this reason, a full-fledged structure of army snipers was quickly created. Based on the needs of the army, snipers were divided into two main groups:
- kalaim. These fighters are armed with sniper versions of the M16 family of weapons and are part of infantry platoons. Subordinate to the platoon commander. The tasks of the kalaim snipers completely coincide with the tasks of the Soviet-style infantry snipers;
- Tsalafim. They have more serious weapons that can destroy targets at ranges of up to one and a half kilometers. Tsalafim riflemen are part of assault units, as well as battalion fire support units. If necessary, the Tsalafim can be placed under the direct subordination of battalion commanders.
It is interesting that the training of snipers of both categories takes a few weeks: a fighter takes the main course in just a month, after which from time to time he undergoes two-week advanced training courses. Unfortunately, the military of the Promised Land are trying not to expand on the details of the combat work of their snipers. However, it is possible to draw certain conclusions and judgments from the "destinations" of the Kalayim shooters and the Tsalafim shooters, as well as from the peculiarities of military operations in the Middle East.
In addition to the United States and Israel, the Soviet idea was "adopted" and rethought in its own way in Great Britain, Australia and some other countries. Also, the experience of training and using infantry snipers after the collapse of the Soviet Union remained in the former Soviet republics.
Development prospects
Last year, the Russian Ministry of Defense came to the conclusion that the current approach to snipers of rifle units does not meet the requirements of the time. Therefore, in the summer of 2011, separate sniper companies were created at the brigades, and in December sniper schools were opened in all military districts. It is known that sniper companies will include two types of platoons, rifle and special. To some extent, this division resembles the Israeli approach: sniper rifle platoons are similar to kalaim, and special ones are similar to tsalafim. Whether snipers from individual companies will meet the definition of "infantry sniper" is still unclear. But compliance with modern conditions is still worth abandoning old developments. The main thing is that our units still have their own long arm.
