The year 1812 will forever remain a very special date in the eventful centuries-old history of Russia. The grandiose fiasco of the campaign to Russia organized by the seemingly invincible Napoleon, the death of the "Great Army" during the retreat and the victorious march of Russian troops across the territory of astonished Europe made a huge impression on contemporaries. It is quite natural that already in 1813 the first works were published, the authors of which tried to understand the reasons for this turn of events. In a patriotic impulse, historians and writers of those years unanimously proclaimed Kutuzov "the greatest commander of all times and peoples", "the lightning-fast Perun of the North", "who committed in a short time the famous deeds of Caesar, Hannibal and Scipio" (FM Sinelnikov). In their poems, Kutuzov was glorified by G. R. Derzhavin, V. A. Zhukovsky and other less famous poets. IA Krylov responded to the events of 1812 with 7 fables, the most famous of which was "The Wolf in the Kennel" dedicated to Kutuzov. Later, in 1831, A. S. Pushkin dedicated the following lines to the memory of Kutuzov:
When the popular faith voice
He called out to your holy gray hair:
"Go save!" You got up and saved.
("Before the tomb of the saint")
This work was very favorably received in society, but for the poem "General" ("1835) dedicated to Barclay de Tolly, the poet was criticized both by the" patriotic "public and by Kutuzov's relatives. he even had to "apologize" to the public in the 4th book of the Sovremennik magazine for 1836, repeating, as a "symbol of faith", the "sacred formula": "His (Kutuzov's) titlo is the savior of Russia."
In the 60s of the XIX century, Leo Tolstoy wrote the famous novel "War and Peace" in which Mikhail I. Kutuzov was partially deprived of his aura of the most brilliant and great commander of our time, but he acquired a new one: Mikhail Illarionovich became the only person, who understands the essence of the Patriotic War of 1812. But in the official Russian historiography, a completely different trend prevailed, according to which the cause of Russia's victory in the war of 1812 was considered "the unity of the estates around the throne", and the Emperor Alexander I was declared the main hero of the Patriotic War. concept was D. P. Buturlin (participant in the war of 1812, adjutant wing of Alexander I). Later, a number of loyal historians joined this point of view. Even such a recognized apologist for Kutuzov, as his former adjutant AI Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, wrote in his writings about the emperor as "a radiant light that warmed and revived everything." Mikhail Bogdanovich, professor of the military academy, called Alexander I the "chief leader of the Patriotic War." This researcher, generally maintaining a respectful tone in relation to Kutuzov, was one of the first to dare to reproach the field marshal for mistakes at Borodino, Tarutino, near Krasnoye and on Berezina, as well as for sending deliberately incorrect reports to Petersburg about the results of the battles at Borodino and Maloyaroslavets. Subsequent researchers, recognizing Kutuzov as an outstanding commander, did not call him "the savior of the fatherland". S. M. Solovyov wrote about Kutuzov in a very restrained manner, and V. O. Klyuchevsky generally passed over the field marshal's personality in silence. In a 7-volume work dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the war of 1812, the merits of Kutuzov were given due, but at the same time it was recognized that he "was not a commander equal to Napoleon" and that "the caution of the old leader combined with some senile immobility, morbidity and fatigue affected our army and from the negative side. " The official concept declaring Alexander I the "organizer of victory" was no longer popular among historians of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
As for the works of foreign researchers of the war of 1812, most of them recognize cunning and patience as the main positive qualities of Kutuzov the commander. At the same time, it is noted that as a strategist, the Russian commander-in-chief was clearly inferior not only to Napoleon, but also to some of his subordinates (for example, Barclay de Tolly). Without denying Kutuzov certain military abilities, Western historians, nevertheless, believe that, due to decrepitude and illness, his role in the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia was minimal. Practically generally recognized in Western historiography is the position according to which in the battles near Krasnoye and Berezina Napoleon managed to avoid the complete death of the army and captivity mainly due to the slowness and indecision of Kutuzov.
The historiography of the first years of Soviet power was characterized by a balanced, "moderately laudatory" attitude towards Kutuzov. The exception was the works of M. N. Pokrovsky, who did not consider the renowned field marshal an outstanding commander and sharply criticized him for the loss of command and control and numerous mistakes made during the pursuit of the enemy. At the end of the 30s, views on Kutuzov and the assessment of his role in the Patriotic War of 1812 began to gradually change, the views of the late Academician Pokrovsky were subjected to devastating criticism. And after November 7, 1941, from the rostrum of the mausoleum, J. V. Stalin named Kutuzov among "our great ancestors" and, especially, after the establishment of the Order of Kutuzov in 1942, criticism of this commander became not only "ideologically wrong", but and an unsafe act. In 1945, when the 200th anniversary of the birth of MI Kutuzov was celebrated, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution in which, after a long break, the thesis was again put forward that "Kutuzov's military leadership surpassed Napoleon's military leadership." In 1947, the Bolshevik magazine published an article by Stalin, which stated: “Kutuzov … ruined Napoleon and his army with the help of a well-prepared counteroffensive … the only commander worthy of attention. Engels, of course, was mistaken, for Kutuzov was, undoubtedly, two heads higher than Barclay de Tolly."
It was from this time that Kutuzov again, as in 1813, became the central figure of the Patriotic War of 1812 and the only savior of the Fatherland for all historians and writers of our country. At that time even the world-renowned work of E. V. Tarle "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia" was criticized at that time. In the face of strong administrative pressure and the threat of reprisals, the 77-year-old academician was forced to give in and write two articles in the "necessary" direction ("MI Kutuzov - commander and diplomat" and "Borodino"). At present, a wide range of readers are once again becoming available materials that make it possible to draw objective conclusions about the role of M. I. Kutuzov in the grandiose events of 1812.., dedicated to the Patriotic War of 1812, and No. 9 for 1995 - a round table "Savior of the Fatherland. Kutuzov - without textbook gloss".
The works of N. A. Troitsky. At the same time, the positions of the supporters of the traditional point of view, which in most cases are shared by the authors of school textbooks and anthologies, also remain strong. For example, in 1999A biography of Kutuzov with the eloquent title "Savior of the Fatherland: Biography of MI Golenishchev-Kutuzov" (IA Adrianova) was published.
Let's try to objectively consider the main facts of the biography of Kutuzov in the immortal name of 1812.
In June 1812 M. I. Kutuzov was in his Volyn estate Goroshki. Less than a month has passed since he concluded the Bucharest peace treaty with Turkey, for which he was elevated to princely dignity with the title of lordship. The merits of Kutuzov at the final stage of the war with the Turks were indisputable and did not raise doubts even among the enemies. The international situation of Russia, which got involved in the coalition wars with Napoleonic France, was extremely difficult: in addition to the wars in Europe, our country at the beginning of the 19th century was forced to fight Persia (from 1804) and Turkey (from 1806). But after Kutuzov's victories over the superior enemy forces at Ruschuk and Slobodzeya (in 1811), peace with Turkey was concluded and now the 52,000-strong Moldavian army could be used for a war in the western direction. France, as before, was forced to keep about 200 thousand soldiers in Spain, engulfed in a guerrilla war, so that Napoleon could fight with Russia "with only one hand." On the eve of the Napoleonic invasion, Kutuzov was almost 67 years old (a very respectable age at that time) and it was already difficult for him to hope for a new appointment to the active army. But the war confused all the plans of the Russian General Staff. On June 26, 1812, Kutuzov arrived in the capital and already on July 15 was appointed commander of the Narva corps (intended to defend St. Petersburg), and on July 17, he was elected head of the St. Petersburg people's militia. In this position, he was for 4 weeks, bringing the number of militias to 29,420 people. Meanwhile, events were taking place on the main front of the war that soon led to an unprecedented rise in the career of our hero. But before proceeding to describe the most important months of his life, let's find out who MI Kutuzov was in 1812. What did his contemporaries know and what did they think of him?
The answer to this question, it seems, lies on the surface: Kutuzov is the best commander in Russia, dismissed from the command of the troops because of the conflict with Emperor Alexander I. However, not everything is so simple. Until 1805, Kutuzov was considered a talented and brave military general, a brilliant performer, an irreplaceable assistant who, over time, himself could become a major commander - but nothing more. Let us illustrate the above, briefly tracing the combat path of our hero:
1764-65 - Captain Kutuzov, as a volunteer, fights against the supporters of Stanislav Ponyatovsky, elected king.
1769 - in the same rank, Kutuzov under the command of Major General Weimarn fights in Poland against the troops of the Bar Confederation.
1770 - under the leadership of P. A. Rumyantsev participates in the battles with the Turks at the Ryaba Mogila, Larga and Cahul. Receives the rank of prime-major and under the command of General-in-Chief P. I. Panin participates in the assault on Bender.
1774 - under the command of V. M. Dolgoruky takes part in repelling the landing of the Turks near Alushta (receives the first wound in the head).
1777 - promoted to colonel (peacetime).
1782 - promoted to brigadier (peacetime).
1784 - receives the rank of major general (peacetime).
1787-1788 - "Suvorov" period of Kutuzov's career: the battle of Kinburn and the siege of Ochakov (second wound to the head).
In 1789 - again under the command of Suvorov: the famous storming of Izmail, received the rank of lieutenant general.
In 1791 - Kutuzov was subordinated to N. V. Repnin and for the first time, from beginning to end, led a significant battle independently: at Babadag, the 22,000th corps of the Turkish army was defeated. In the same year, he commanded the left wing of Repnin's army at the Battle of Machin.
1792 - Kutuzov commanded the vanguard of Russian troops in Poland, commander-in-chief - General-in-Chief M. V. Kakhovsky).
After that, Mikhail Illarionovich saw a long break in his military career, connected with the fulfillment of the posts of the Russian ambassador to Constantinople (1793-1794) and director of the Land Gentry Cadet Corps. Under Paul I, Kutuzov continues to carry out diplomatic assignments and commands the land forces in Finland. And Alexander I, who came to power as a result of a palace coup, appoints Kutuzov as the military governor of St. Petersburg. According to many contemporaries, Mikhail Illarionovich did not cope with this position: gambling and duel fights flourished among the nobles, and on the streets of the capital, passers-by were robbed literally in broad daylight. As a result, on August 20, 1802, Kutuzov was dismissed and sent on a year's leave.
In 1804 - a new take-off in his career: after successful participation in the maneuvers, Kutuzov was appointed commander of the 1st Podolsk Army, which was going to war with Napoleon in Austria. It was this campaign that became the first truly serious test of our hero as the commander-in-chief of a large army. For Kutuzov, it was also a unique chance to prove himself: in his subordination were the elite troops of the empire (including the guards) and the best generals of the country: P. I. Bagration, D. S. Dokhturov, M. A. Mildoradovich, F. P.. Uvarov, N. M. and S. M. Kamenskiy. The result of the military campaign of 1805 was the defeat at Austerlitz, which made a terrible impression on Russian society. J. de Maistre, who was in St. Petersburg in 1805, reported to London: "Here the effect of the Austerlitz battle on public opinion is like magic. All the generals are asking for resignation, and it seems that defeat in one battle paralyzed the whole empire."
Thus, after 1805, Kutuzov acquired the reputation of a general who showed himself very well under the leadership of Rumyantsev and Suvorov, but did not have the talents of a commander-in-chief. Many people would have signed the description of AF Langeron at that time: “He (Kutuzov) fought a lot … qualities were neutralized by no less laziness of mind and strength, did not allow him to really prove anything and really do anything himself. The best illustration of the latter position is Kutuzov's behavior in front of Austerlitz: the commander-in-chief of the allied army assumes an unfortunate outcome of the battle, but does not even try to interfere with the war council and meekly sends the troops entrusted to him to the slaughter.
In 1812, the disgrace of Austerlitz has not yet been forgotten, many remember that in this unfortunate battle Kutuzov lost control of the troops, and only Bagration's column (the only of five) retreated without panic. Therefore, among the professional military, Kutuzov does not enjoy special authority. Moreover, none other than PI Bagration wrote to the War Ministry in 1811 that Mikhail Illarionovich "has a special talent for fighting unsuccessfully." Kutuzov was appointed to the Moldavian army only after cavalry general I. I. Mikhelson, Field Marshal A. A. Prozorovsky, P. I. Bagration and N. M. Kamensky.
It was N. Kamensky (not to be confused with his father, who became the prototype of the old prince Bolkonsky - "War and Peace") who was the hope and rising star of the Russian army and it was he, not Kutuzov, who was considered at that time the best and beloved student of Suvorov. N. M. Kamensky received the rank of general for the capture of the famous Devil's Bridge during the Swiss campaign. In society, this commander was highly valued and pinned great hopes on him. Researchers suggest that if not for his early death in 1811, it was N. M. Kamensky, not Kutuzov, who would have become the main candidate for the post of "people's" commander of the Russian army during the Patriotic War of 1812.
Kutuzov had another, even more dubious "fame": in society he had a reputation as a man prone to intrigue, slavishly adoring his superiors, depraved and not entirely honest in financial matters.
"Kutuzov, being very smart, was at the same time terribly weak in character and combined dexterity, cunning and talents with amazing immorality," wrote A. F. Lanzheron.
“Because of the favor of the higher ones, he endured everything, sacrificed everything,” testifies F. V. Rostopchin.
"Kutuzov, a skillful and brave commander in front of the enemy, was timid and weak in front of the tsar," states Secretary of State A. S. Shishkov, who is very disposed to Mikhail Illarionovich.
Both in St. Petersburg and in the army, many knew that the honored and gray in battles 50-year-old general cooked with his own hands in the morning and served coffee in bed to the 27-year-old favorite of Catherine II, Platon Zubov. In Notes on Russian History of the 18th Century, Alexander Pushkin named "Kutuzov's coffee pot" among the most revealing symbols of the humiliation of the noble spirit. It is interesting that Count J. de Maistre believed that Alexander I "disliked him (Kutuzov), perhaps because he was too obsequious." PI Bagration and AP Ermolov called Kutuzov an intriguer, DS Dokhturov - cowardly, MA Miloradovich - "a man of a mean disposition" and "a low courtier". They also recalled the words of Suvorov: "I do not bow to Kutuzov; he will bow once, but deceive ten times." Nevertheless, the situation in the army in the field was developing in such a way that Kutuzov was soon to be sent to "save Russia".
The head of the 1st Russian army M. B. Barclay de Tolly had his own views on the tactics of the war with Napoleon. Back in 1807, he developed a plan for a "Scythian war", which he shared with the German historian B. G. Nieburg: "In the event of his (Napoleon's) invasion of Russia, a skillful retreat should force the enemy to move away from the operational base, tire him out with small enterprises and lure deep into the country, and then, with the saved troops and with the help of the climate, prepare for him, at least beyond Moscow, a new Poltava. " However, in addition to the "Scythian" plan of Barclay, in Russia there were plans for an offensive war, the authors of which were P. I. Bagration, L. L. Bennigsen, A. P. Ermolov, E. F. Saint-Prix, Prince A. of Württemberg. But the most promising was the plan of the main military adviser to Emperor Alexander, the Prussian general Karl von Ful, which consisted in the following: in the event of a war with Napoleon, one Russian army had to retreat to the fortified camp in Drissy, and the second - to strike the enemy's rear. Fortunately, Barclay de Tolly was able to convince Alexander I to withdraw the army from the trap of the Drissa camp and found the courage to ask him to leave for Petersburg. After the emperor's departure, Barclay began to implement his plan, evading a general battle with superior enemy forces, he withdrew his army towards regular and militia reserves and "on his way did not leave behind not only a single cannon, but not even a single cart" (Butenev) and "not a single wounded" (Caulaincourt).
If Barclay de Tolly withdrew his troops deliberately, then Bagration, whose army was three times less (about 49 thousand people), was forced to retreat. This circumstance infuriated the ardent descendant of the Georgian tsars from himself: "Come on! By God, we will fill them with hats!" He also complained to St. Petersburg that the Russian people did not live from the Germans, wrote that Barclay de Tolly "the general is not just bad, but trashy", "the minister is indecisive, coward, stupid, slow and has all the bad qualities", along the way calling him "a scoundrel, a scoundrel and a creature." Soldiers of both armies were also dissatisfied with Barclay de Tolly, and, according to A. P. Ermolov, "the main blame was put on him (Barclay) for the fact that he was not Russian."
Discontent with Barclay was growing, the high society of St. Petersburg demanded the removal of the "German", and Alexander I was forced to reckon with public opinion. I must say that this monarch had a very low opinion of the business qualities of his generals, in 1805 and 1811 he even tried to invite the well-known republican general Zh-V to the post of commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Moreau, then - the Duke of Wellington, and already in August 1812 - JB Bernadotte, the former Napoleonic marshal, who became the crown prince of Sweden. All these attempts were unsuccessful, as a result, both in 1805 and in 1812, Kutuzov was nevertheless appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army.
"The circumstances of Kutuzov's appearance as commander-in-chief are usually presented as follows: the people, including the nobility, demanded this, and Alexander I finally agreed. Documentary evidence supporting this version has not yet been revealed: this is reflected only in some memoirs of a later time … The real reason was that on August 5, 1812, P. M. Volkonsky returned to St. Petersburg from the army and brought with him a terrible letter from Shuvalov, which reflected the anti-Barclay sentiments of the generals. Shuvalov … Shuvalov did not ask the emperor to appoint Kutuzov at all, he only demanded the immediate removal of Barclay "(A. Tartakovsky). In order not to take responsibility, on August 5, 1812, Alexander instructed a specially created Extraordinary Committee to make a decision on the candidacy of a new commander-in-chief, which included the chairman of the State Council, Field Marshal N. I. Saltykov, Prince P. V. Lopukhin, Count V.. P. Kochubei, Governor-General of St. Petersburg S. K. Vyazmitinov, Minister of Police A. D. Balashov and Count A. A. Arakcheev. The committee considered 6 candidates: L. L. Bennigsen, D. S. Dokhturov, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Tormasov, P. A. Palen and M. I. Kutuzov. Preference was given to Kutuzov. Some historians argue that the reason for this choice was the fact that most of the members of this committee and Kutuzov were members of the same Masonic lodge, but this version cannot be recognized as the main and only correct one. Alexander I was dissatisfied with this course of events, but on August 8, he nevertheless approved Kutuzov in office: “I could not do otherwise than choose from three generals equally incapable of being commanders-in-chief (meaning Barclay de Tolly, Bagration, Kutuzov), the one that the general voice pointed to, '' he said to his sister Ekaterina Pavlovna.
Contrary to popular belief, the appointment of Kutuzov did not at all delight the high command of the Russian army: General N. N. Raevsky considered the new commander-in-chief "neither in spirit nor in talents higher than nothing" and openly said that "having changed Barclay, who is not a great commander, we have lost here too. " PI Bagration, having learned about the arrival of His Serene Highness Prince, said: "Now gossip and intrigue from the leader of our leader." In addition to everything to the active army, Kutuzov appeared accompanied by two mistresses disguised as Cossacks, so the English historian Alan Palmer had reason to write that by 1812 this commander had already gone "from a romantic military hero to a scandalous lecher". But this was not embarrassing for the generals: Kutuzov was old and did not deny it himself: “I confess that in my years service in the field was hard and I don’t know what to do,” he wrote from Bucharest in March 1812. “Sly as a Greek, clever by nature, like an Asian, but at the same time European educated, he (Kutuzov) to achieve success relied more on diplomacy than on military prowess, to which, due to age and health, he was no longer capable of ", - recalled the Russian commander-in-chief English military commissar R. Wilson."I saw a completely different person in Kutuzov (in 1812), who was surprised at his famous retreat from Bavaria (in 1805). The summer, the severe wound and the insults suffered significantly weakened his mental strength. gave place to timid caution ", - complained A. P. Ermolov. The patriarch of the Soviet school of historians M. N. Pokrovsky believed that "Kutuzov was too old for any decisive action … With the appointment of Kutuzov - and until the end of the campaign, in fact, - the army lost any central leadership: events developed in a completely spontaneous way ".
However, the soldiers and junior officers Kutuzov was greeted with glee. Clausewitz, who himself served in the Russian army in 1812, wrote: “There was no unanimous opinion about Kutuzov’s military reputation in the Russian army: along with the party that considered him an outstanding commander, there was another party that denied his military talents; everyone, however, agreed on the fact that a sensible Russian person, a student of Suvorov, is better than a foreigner "(ie Barclay de Tolly). "The offspring and history recognized Napoleon as grand, and foreigners recognized Kutuzov as a cunning, depraved, weak court old man; Russians as something indefinite, as some kind of doll useful only in its Russian name," stated in his famous novel "War and the world "Leo Tolstoy.
Kutuzov arrived in the active army after Barclay de Tolly withdrew the Russian troops from Smolensk, destroyed in three-day battles, where Napoleon tried to "involve the Russians in a general battle for Smolensk, as one of the holy cities of Russia and crush both of their armies at once" (N. A. Troitsky).
“What to do, friends!” Said the Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich to the Smolensk inhabitants who had left their homes at that time, “We are not to blame..
Demonstrating his patriotism to the public, Konstantin left the 1st Army, declaring that he was going to Petersburg to force his brother to make peace with Bonaparte. And Barclay de Tolly, who safely led the Russian armies out of the trap set by Napoleon, began to prepare for a general battle at the position he had chosen near Tsarev-Zaymishch, but all his plans were confused by the appearance of Kutuzov. A. P. Ermolov, A. N. Muravyov, M. A. Fonvizin considered the place chosen by Barclay favorable for the upcoming battle, initially the new commander-in-chief also considered it as such, but soon he unexpectedly gave an order to retreat.
On August 22 (September 2), Russian troops approached the village of Borodino, where a few days later one of the most famous battles in world history took place.
Borodino's new position was criticized by P. Bagration and A. Ermolov, K. Marx and F. Engels, V. V. Vereshchagin and L. N. Tolstoy. The latter, however, believed that neither the weakness of the Russian position, nor the general genius of Napoleon had any significance for the outcome of the battle.
“We keep choosing places and finding everything worse,” complained Bagration in a letter to F. Rostopchin. MN Pokrovsky also supported this point of view, who considered the position at Borodino "extremely poorly chosen and even worse fortified", so that "Napoleon took our batteries with cavalry attacks."
But within the framework of the "new look" on the outstanding tactics of MI Kutuzov (who wrote before the battle that "the position in which I stopped at the village of Borodino … one of the best, which can only be found on flat places … It is desirable that the enemy attack us in this position … "), many Soviet historians began to assess the positions of the Russian troops in a completely different way:" The Russian troops were located at a low altitude, and the French had to climb the mountain, overcoming ravines and artificial engineering structures … the enemy had to advance on all narrowing areas front, as if in a "funnel", and then overcoming deep ravines, then climbing the hills "(VG Sirotkin). Let's look at the strengths and weaknesses of the position of the Russian army at Borodino.
The main strongholds of the Russian position were with. Borodino on the right, Kurgan height in the center and the village of Semenovskaya on the left. The disadvantage of the chosen position was the vulnerability of the left flank to strike from the front: “Our commander-in-chief made a serious mistake, considering Borodino as the center of his defense, having well fortified the terrain near the high road and especially the right flank, but not strong enough near Semyonovsky and very badly near Utitsa, that is,. on the left flank , - wrote V. Vereshchagin.
Indeed, Kutuzov considered the right flank to be the main one (since he covered the shortest route to Moscow - the New Smolensk road). The battle at the village of Shevardino, which preceded the Battle of Borodino, made it possible with a high degree of probability to determine the direction of the main attack of the French, and Bagration, Bennigsen and Barclay de Tolly, who hated each other, came to a common opinion, proposing to regroup the troops from left to right, but Kutuzov limited himself to transferring to the left flank of the corps of Lieutenant General N. A. Tuchkov. The commander-in-chief nevertheless ordered to strengthen the left flank with flushes at the village of Semenovskoye and "bend it" to the flushes. Thus, the flank was reinforced, but the shells of the French batteries operating against it, during the flight, fell into the rear of the center and the right flank of the Russian army.
Many readers of the famous novel by Leo Tolstoy probably remember this description of the senseless death of Andrei Bolkonsky's soldiers: “Prince Andrei's regiment was in reserves, which until 2 o'clock stood behind Semenovskii in inaction, under heavy artillery fire., who had already lost more than 200 people, was moved forward to a worn-out oat field, to the interval between Semenovsky and the Kurgan battery, on which thousands of people were beaten that day … Without leaving this place and not firing a single charge, the regiment lost here still a third of their people."
Here the writer did not sin against the truth: the length of the Russian position was 8 km, infantry corps stood in two lines at intervals of no more than 200 m, behind them - cavalry, then - reserves. The excessive overcrowding and shallow depth of the battle formation of the Russian troops allowed Napoleon's artillery to hit all Russian lines, up to the reserves.
The location of the Russian troops was as follows: on the right flank and in the center of the Russian positions was the 1st army of Barclay de Tolly, the center was commanded by D. S. Dokhturov, the right wing - M. A. Miloradovich. The left flank was occupied by the 2nd army of Bagration.
What were the forces of the opponents? According to the latest data, the numerical superiority was on the side of the Russian army: regular troops - more than 115 thousand people, Cossacks - 11 thousand, militias - 28, 5 thousand, in total - about 154 thousand people. There were 3952 officers and generals in the Russian army. Interestingly, only 150 of them were landowners and had serfs (3.79%). About 700 more hoped to inherit a very modest estate someday. On that day, Russian peasants and representatives of the serving nobility came out to fight for Russia and for Moscow. And the representatives of the highest tribal aristocracy of Russia in that difficult year found more interesting and important things to do: "Russian balls" and "patriotic dinners", endless speeches in the nobility assemblies. And the harems of courtyard girls (which some, especially refined natures, disguised as serf theaters) demanded constant attention. For 10% of officers, the Battle of Borodino was the first (and for many - the last) in their life. The French army numbered about 133 thousand people. In artillery, the numerical superiority was also on the side of the Russian army (640 guns against 587 French ones), but at the same time during the battle, according to N. Pavlenko's calculations, it fired only 60 thousand shells against 90 thousand French ones (P. Grabbe cites other figures: 20 thousand Russian shots against 60 thousand French). In addition, speaking about the balance of forces, it should be borne in mind that Napoleon's guard (about 20 thousand people) did not participate in the battle, while Kutuzov used all the reserves.
Napoleon's plan was as follows: while on the right flank of the Russian army, the troops of Beauharnais were undertaking diversionary attacks, Ney and Davout had to take possession of the Semyonov flushes and, turning left, throw Kutuzov with reserves into the Kolocha River. Poniatowski's corps was instructed to bypass the flushes on the right.
The battle of Borodino began at 6 o'clock in the morning on August 26, when a regiment from the division of General Delzon burst into Borodino. Then the troops under the command of Ney, Davout (who was shell-shocked at the very beginning of the battle) and Murat attacked the left flank of the Russians, and Poniatovsky's corps began a roundabout movement to the right of the flashes. Two divisions under the command of General Junot tried to strike at Bagration's troops from the flank - between the flushes and the village of Utitsa, but met with the corps of K. Baggovut, which at the beginning of the battle was on the right flank, but was sent by Barclay de Tolly to help Bagration: "Most of Barclay's army and, by the way, the whole corps of Baggovut ran from the extreme flank to Bagration, who was already beginning to faint with his small forces under the fierce onslaught of Ney … Start Napoleon's attack earlier, before dawn, and most importantly, he himself does not suffer this day with his old illness (dysurie) and do things more energetically, this running of almost half of the army under shots would hardly have ended this way, "VV Vereshchagin wrote about this. PI Bagration himself was mortally wounded by a shell fragment during an attack by the grenadiers of the 57th French regiment - according to some sources at about 9 am, according to others - at about 12 pm. Realizing the tragedy of the situation and no longer hoping for the commander-in-chief, Bagration persistently asked: "Tell General Barclay that the fate of the army and its salvation depend on him." Bagration's injury resulted in the 2nd Army "being overturned in the greatest disorder" (Barclay de Tolly).
"One common feeling is despair. At about noon, the 2nd Army was in such a state that some of its parts, only distanced by a shot, could have been put in order," - this is the testimony of A. P. Ermolov.
Under the command of General P. P. Konovnitsin, the troops of the left flank withdrew to the village of Semenovskoye. DS Dokhturov, who replaced Bagration, sat down on the drum and declared: "Moscow is behind us! Everyone should die, but not a step back." Still, they had to retreat: General Friant's division from Davout's corps captured Semenovskaya, but the Russians, having retreated 1 km, managed to gain a foothold in a new position. Inspired by the success, the marshals turned to Napoleon for reinforcements, but he decided that the enemy's left wing was irreparably upset and gave the order to attack Kurgan Hill in order to break through the center of the Russians.
What was the role of Kutuzov in the Battle of Borodino? Many researchers come to the disappointing conclusion that the commander-in-chief, who was three miles from the battlefield, from the very first minutes lost control of the army and did not affect the course of the battle in any way. NN Raevsky stated: "Nobody commanded us". According to Karl Clausewitz, who personally observed the behavior of the commander-in-chief on August 26 (September 7), 1812, Kutuzov's role in the battle at Borodino "was almost zero." But it was at this moment that, for the only time in the entire battle, he intervened in the course of the battle and gave the order to organize a counterattack on the flank of the Napoleonic army by the forces of the Russian cavalry. Bypassing the left flank of the enemy, the cavalrymen F. P. Uvarov and the Cossacks of M. I. Platov. Soviet historians assessed this raid as "a brilliantly conceived and brilliantly executed operation." However, the actual results of this maneuver do not provide any basis for such conclusions. VG Sirotkin cautiously admits that "the real damage to Napoleon's troops from this raid was insignificant," but "the psychological effect was enormous."However, Kutuzov himself very coldly greeted the returning Uvarov ("I know everything - God will forgive you"), and after the battle, of all his generals, he did not present the "heroes" of this "brilliant operation" to the awards, directly telling the tsar that they did not deserve the awards: Having met the troops of General Ornano near the village of Bezzubovo, the Russian cavalry turned back. AI Popov noted that this "sabotage brought more benefit to the Russians than harm to the French," why? The fact is that this raid for some time distracted Napoleon's attention from the assault on Kurgan Heights, which fell in this way two hours later. For the first time, the French broke into the mound height at about 10 am, but were driven out of there by Russian troops under the leadership of Ermolov, who happened to be nearby. During this counterattack, the chief of the Russian artillery, A. I. Kutaisov, was killed and the French general Bonami was taken prisoner. The general assault on Kurgan Heights began at 14 o'clock. 300 French guns from three sides (from the front and from the side of Borodin and Semyonovskaya) fired at the Russian positions at the height and, as Barclay de Tolly wrote, "it seemed that Napoleon decided to destroy us with artillery." Count O. Kolencourt, at the head of the cuirassier ("gens de fer" - "iron men") division, burst into the Raevsky battery from the flank and died there. The divisions of Gerard, Brusier and Moran ascended from the front to the height. None of the Russians fled, they were all destroyed by the enemy, and General P. G. Likhachev was captured. The attack by the cuirassiers of Caulaincourt was recognized as the most brilliant maneuver of the Battle of Borodino, and the capture of Kurgan Heights was the greatest success of the French in this battle.
But Napoleon failed to break through the Russian front: two cavalry corps (Latour-Mobura and Grushi), trying to build on their success, faced the Russian cavalry of F. K. Korf and K. A. Kreutz. The situation was critical, Barclay de Tolly left his headquarters and fought like a simple hussar, many memoirists say that the commander of the 1st Army was looking for death in this battle. Latour-Mobourg and Pears were wounded, but the French could not overturn the Russians. At about 17.00 Davout, Ney and Murat asked Napoleon to throw the old guard into battle, but they were refused. Marshal Ney, whose red hair that day turned black with smoke, shouted in rage upon learning of this decision of the emperor: "S`il a desapris de faire, son affaire, qu`il aille se … a Tuilleri; nous ferons mieux sans lui "(" If he has forgotten how to do his business, then let him go with … to the Tuileries, we can do without him "). It was at this moment that Kutuzov, in response to the message of the adjutant wing L. A. Voltsogen about the fall of the Kurgan Heights, said: “As for the battle, I know its course as well as possible. Russian land "(a description of this episode can be found in Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace). After the fall of the Kurgan Heights, the position of the Russian troops on the Utitsky Kurgan, an important height above the Old Smolensk road, became sharply complicated. She had already been captured by the enemy once (about 11:00), but repulsed in a fierce battle, in which Lieutenant General N. A. Tuchkov-1 was killed. Until 16.00, the defenders of the mound under the command of K. Baggovut held their positions. However, after two divisions of General Junot entered the gap between the Semyonovsky ravine and the village of Utitsa, Baggovut decided to withdraw his troops 1.5 km back to the upper reaches of the Semyonovsky stream. After 17.00 the battle began to subside, only in some places did cavalry clashes take place and cannonade thundered until 20.00. "The battle on the Moskva River was one of those battles where the maximum merits were shown and the minimum results were achieved," Napoleon later admitted.
"If the army was not completely defeated in the Battle of Borodino, this is my merit," Barclay de Tolly said. Perhaps we can agree with this statement: correcting the mistakes of the commander-in-chief, he sent Baggovut and Osterman to the left flank of the corps, which made it possible to avoid the complete defeat of the 2nd army occupying this flank, and the corps of Korf, transferred from the right flank to the center, helped to repel the attacks of Grusha and Latour-Mobura. The famous battle painter VV Vereshchagin also called Barclay "the true savior of Russia".
The scale and great importance of the Battle of Borodino were fully appreciated by contemporaries, both French and Russians. Many participants in the battle left memories that allowed historians to trace the course of the battle literally minute by minute. The polarizing assessments of its results by domestic and foreign historians seem all the more strange. The French proudly speak of Napoleon's great victory at the Moscow River (in fact, at the Koloch), the Russians also declared Borodino a day of military glory. To emphasize the importance of the Battle of Borodino, some Russian historians went for a frank forgery, claiming that in this battle the myth of Napoleon's invincibility was dispelled (although until August 26, 1812, this commander did not win the battles at Saint-Jean d'Ancre and Preussisch-Eylau, and even lost the battle of Aspern on May 22, 1809) and that Borodino "was the last act of a defensive war" and the beginning of a counteroffensive (towards Moscow !?).
In order to draw unbiased conclusions about the victory or defeat of Russia at Borodino, two questions should be answered: first, what goals and objectives were set for the Russian army before the start of the battle, and second, whether it was possible to achieve the fulfillment of these plans during the battle.
Various researchers usually name three possible targets of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino:
1. PROTECTION OF MOSCOW
This task was considered a priority, and Kutuzov himself wrote to the tsar before the Battle of Borodino began that "my real object is the salvation of Moscow," because "the loss of Russia is connected with the loss of Moscow." It is obvious that this task was not solved during the Battle of Borodino. "To win is to go forward, to retreat is to be defeated. Moscow is surrendered, that says it all," wrote J. de Maistre. If we look at the problem differently, we will have to quite seriously quote "World History, processed by" Satyricon ":" By the evening, having won a victory, Kutuzov retreated. The defeated French took Moscow out of grief. "However, we will not rush to repeat after MN Pokrovsky that in the Battle of Borodino Kutuzov" achieved only that which was completely defeated ", and we will look at the Battle of Borodino from a different angle.
2. DEALING WITH THE MAXIMUM DAMAGE TO THE NON-APPLICANT WITH THE MINIMUM LOSSES FROM THE RUSSIAN TROOPS
"The whole goal is aimed at the extermination of the French army," Kutuzov wrote to Alexander I before withdrawing from the Borodino positions. "The main goal of Kutuzov was to crush, possibly weakening, Napoleon's army, while at the same time preserving as fully as possible the combat capability and maneuverability of the Russian army … his army the Battle of Borodino, and Napoleon lost absolutely hopelessly and indisputably the offensive battle that he undertook to defeat the Russian army, "E. Tarle argued. Let's see what are the losses of the parties:
According to the records from the archives of the French Ministry of War, Napoleon lost 28,086 people in the Battle of Borodino, while FV Rostochin, referring to "documents left by the enemy," defines the losses of the French at 52,482. At the same time, the Great Army lost 49 generals (10 killed and 39 wounded). The losses of the Russian army, according to various sources, range from 50 to 60 thousand people. 6 generals were killed and 23 wounded. Trophies from both sides are about the same: the French captured 15 cannons and 1,000 prisoners, among whom was 1 general (P. G. Likhachev), the Russians - 13 cannons and 1,000 prisoners, including 1 general (Bonami). Thus, the losses of the Russian army were at least no less than the losses of the French. Therefore, from this point of view, the Battle of Borodino ended in a "draw".
3. THE BATTLE OF BORODINSK AS A "ATTEMPTIVE SACRIFICE" BEFORE LEAVING MOSCOW
Some researchers argue that from the very beginning Kutuzov did not believe in the possibility of victory, but since he could not surrender Moscow without a fight, the Battle of Borodino became an "expiatory sacrifice" before leaving the "second capital": "Kutuzov probably would not have given Borodinsky a battle in which, apparently, he did not expect to win, if it were not for the voice of the court, the army, all of Russia, he was not forced to do so. It must be assumed that he looked at this battle as an inevitable evil, "wrote Clausewitz. A. P. Ermolov, who wrote that the new commander-in-chief" only wanted to show a decisive intention to defend Moscow, was of a similar opinion about Ermolov also reports that when Barclay de Tolly on the evening of September 1 began to persuade Kutuzov of the need to leave Moscow, Mikhail Illarionovich “having listened carefully, could not hide his admiration that the thought of retreat would not be assigned to him, and, wishing to deflect reproaches from himself as much as possible, ordered Mr. Generals to be summoned to a council by 8 o'clock in the evening. ", then it should be admitted that this task was brilliantly completed. The French general Rapp recalled that he had never "seen such a massacre", and J. Pele affirmed aloud that “other troops would have been defeated, and perhaps destroyed before noon. The Russian army deserved the greatest praise. "But the French reasonably point out that their army did not use all the possibilities, and that in the Battle of Borodino, the Emperor Napoleon himself was not up to par:" Going through everything that I witnessed during this day and comparing this battle with Wagram, Eisling, Eylau and Friedland, I was struck by his (Napoleon's) lack of energy and activity, "wrote Baron Lejeune.
"Napoleon … at critical moments showed great indecision, and, missing a happy minute, turned out to be below his reputation," - says the Marquis de Chaombre.
E. Beauharnais admitted that "he does not understand the indecision shown by his adoptive father," Murat said that he "did not recognize the genius of Napoleon on this great day," and Ney - that "the emperor forgot his craft."
One way or another, after the end of the battle, the French troops were withdrawn from the battery of Raevsky and Bagration's flushes to their original positions, which most likely indicates Napoleon's desire to give his soldiers the opportunity to rest away from the corpses that densely littered the battlefield. The same circumstance gives grounds to speak of the "no man's" result of the Borodino battle - the battlefield turned out to be a territory free of the troops of each of the parties, and the Russian army, leaving the positions it occupied in the morning, took up another line of defense, to attack which, by introducing the guard, the emperor did not dare. On the island of St. Helena, Napoleon put forward a formula that largely reconciled the military historians of both countries: "The French showed themselves worthy to win, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible."
