In the spring of 1942, a Soviet military transport aircraft heading for Yelets landed in Mtsensk, occupied by the Nazis. On board was the newly appointed commander of the 48th Army, Major General A. G. Samokhin, who was heading to a new place of service. The pilots and passengers of the plane were captured. During the war years, this was by no means uncommon - such cases occurred among ours, and among the Nazis, and among the allies of both sides. And therefore it would be possible not to focus on this case, if not for one "but": Major General Alexander Georgievich Samokhin before the war was a Soviet military attaché in Yugoslavia and under the pseudonym Sophocles headed the "legal" GRU residency in Belgrade. Moreover, after a short - from July to December 1941 - command of the 29th Rifle Corps and his tenure as deputy commander of the 16th Army for the rear, in December 1941, Alexander Georgievich Samokhin was again transferred to the GRU. At first he was assistant chief, and then - until April 20, 1942 - chief of the 2nd Directorate of the GRU. Thus, in the past, a high-ranking Soviet military intelligence officer fell into Nazi captivity. This is the real fact, the already obviously distorted rumors about which, by the evil will of the forgers, were distorted a second time, and this time almost completely unrecognizable! Well, attaching to it additional components that supposedly set off its reliability is quite simple as shelling pears. Something was subtracted, something was added and - on you, who does not want to know or find out anything, but an allegedly enlightened "democratic opinion" is a new fake about Stalin! That, in fact, is the answer, in particular, to the question why / 480 / the alleged Soviet-German secret negotiations between representatives of the intelligence services of both sides and "took place" at the beginning of 1942 and precisely in the city of Mtsensk!
At the same time, it should be noted that the story of the capture of Major General Samokhin leaves a distinctly ambiguous impression. Firstly, due to the fact that the versions of the history of his capture differ in details. For example, as stated by the military historian Viktor Alexandrovich Mirkiskin, it sounds like this: "On the way to a new duty station, his plane landed in Mtsensk, occupied by the Germans, instead of Yelets." That is, understand as you wish, whether it was really by mistake of the pilots that it landed there, or deliberately, including maliciously, or something else. In turn, the authors of the extensive reference book "Russia in the Faces. GRU. Deeds and People" followed a strange path altogether. On one page, they indicate that Samokhin "… due to a pilot error was captured by the Germans." It would seem an unambiguous version … However, two hundred pages after this statement, the same authors, apparently without batting an eye, reported that Samokhin "… flew to Yelets, but the pilot lost his bearings, and the plane was shot down over the location of the Germans. Samokhin was captured." … And during the preparation of this volume for publication, I had a chance to partially familiarize myself with the materials of the interrogation of Samokhin in SMERSH on June 26, 1946, during which he said: “About three hours after departure from Moscow, I noticed that the plane flew over the front edge of our defense. pilot to fly back, he turned around, but the Germans fired at us and knocked out ".
The presence of several versions hardly contributes to the establishment of the truth. And, frankly, it is hard to believe that when landing, for example, during the day, the pilots did not notice that they were landing on a German airfield: at least a couple of planes were at the airfield, and the Luftwaffe crosses painted on them were clearly visible from afar. By the spring of 1942, our pilots had taken a good look at them. So, with regard to the first versions, the question immediately arises: why did the pilot, who could not help noticing that he was landing on the Hitler airfield, did not try to turn around and fly away from the Germans ?! And now do not take the trouble to agree, naturally, out of common sense, that just landing in the wrong place is one thing, by mistake of the pilot to land in the wrong place, another, but completely different - to make a forced, emergency landing due to for the fact / 481 / that the plane was shot down, as the pilot lost his course. And what Samokhin showed during interrogation is completely different. Indeed, during interrogation in SMERSH, Samokhin showed at all that they did not sit down in Mtsensk, but on some gentle slope of some hill.
According to the information that became known to the author recently, the flight was carried out on a PR-5 aircraft. This is a passenger modification of the famous P-5 reconnaissance aircraft. This modification has a four-seater passenger cabin. The maximum speed at the ground is 246 - 276 km / h, at an altitude of 3000 m - from 235 to 316 km / h. Cruising speed - 200 km / h. According to Samokhin's testimony, it turns out that after three hours of flight, they covered a distance of 600 km. But the pilot of the air group of the General Staff was at the helm of the plane. And very experienced pilots were selected for this air group. They already knew the situation well and where the front line was. How could it happen that an experienced pilot did not notice that he had flown over the front line ?! Tea, we weren't flying at the speed of a fighter! And it was not the pilot who noticed the error, but Samokhin himself.
The only thing that could remove questions on this score is the fact of the night flight. But in this case, another circumstance will certainly intervene. The fact is that during the war years, the flights of the commanders of armies and fronts were carried out, as a rule, accompanied by at least a link of fighters, that is, three fighter planes. Especially if this flight was carried out from Moscow, and even with the documents of the Headquarters (if you believe these versions). The measure, as it is understandable, is far from superfluous, especially in a war.
Then the question is, how did the fighters allow this? This question becomes even more acute when you run into the following question: how could it happen that our fighters, and these are combat pilots, allowed the pilot of the aircraft to fly to, who knows where he flew, besides, he was also shot down over the territory occupied by the Germans ?! No, something is wrong with these versions. Secondly, as after the war - in 1964 - the former chief of staff of the 48th Army, later Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Semyonovich Biryuzov asserted, “the Germans then seized, in addition to Samokhin himself, documents of Soviet planning for the summer (1942) offensive campaign which allowed them to take timely countermeasures. " In the same year, Biryuzov died in a strange plane crash during his / 482 / visit to Yugoslavia. The authors of the above-mentioned reference book about the GRU assert approximately the same thing - "the enemy has taken possession of the operational map and directive of the SVGK". If we take these two versions on faith, then, having excluded the more or less justified finding of an operational map at Samokhin, we will immediately run into a depressing question. Why did the newly appointed commander only have the army in his hands, by definition, especially secret documents - the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters and documents of Soviet military planning for the summer campaign of 1942 ?! After all, in principle, the Stavka directives were addressed to the commanders of directions and fronts. But not armies! And Samokhin has not just a directive of the Headquarters, but "documents of Soviet planning for the summer (1942) campaign"! To put it mildly, this is not his level to, as the famous song says, "to know for all of Odessa" ?! And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin was by no means so simple as to convey his directives in this way. During the war years, the rules of secret correspondence were extremely strictly observed, especially between the SVGK and the fronts, armies, etc. And without that, the secret courier service has always transported secret documents between the Headquarters and the fronts under the special armed protection of the NKVD (since 1943 - SMERSH).
Nevertheless, according to information that has been established recently, Samokhin had to introduce himself to the commander of the Bryansk front in Yelets, give him a package of special importance from Headquarters and receive appropriate instructions from the front commander. This is strange, because it does not fit at all with the cruel regime of secrecy that reigned during the war. And it doesn't look like Stalin. And here's what's interesting. During interrogation in SMERSH, Samokhin claimed that he burned all the documents, and trampled the remains into the mud. Then, on what basis did the tragically deceased Marshal Biryuzov and the authors of the handbook about the GRU make their statements ?! Moreover. It follows from Samokhin's testimony that the Germans seized his party card, an order to appoint an army commander, an ID card of a GRU employee and an order book. Most interesting is the fact that he has a certificate of a GRU employee. Why on earth did he not pass it, having received an appointment to the post of army commander ?! Why wasn’t this important document destroyed by him ?! There are no answers. / 483 /
But depending on the version of the capture of Samokhin, the most depressing begins. From the inevitable suspicions that some kind of military intelligence operation was carried out (by whom and for what purpose?) games for it, which, unfortunately, was by no means uncommon even then. Let's assume the most harmless option. Let us assume that the pilot really lost his course and got into the range of the German air defense systems. But what were the cover fighters doing at this time? The plane was shot down and, for example, under the compulsion of Luftwaffe fighters, which naturally sharply exacerbates the above issue with regard to our "falcons", as a result, it was forced to make an emergency landing at an enemy airfield. But in this case, it is appropriate to pose the following question. Why did the professional intelligence officer and army commander not destroy the highly secret documents of the Headquarters ?! Well, it wasn't a suitcase with documents in his hands, was it? Just a package and a map. Under what category of negligence, and indeed negligence in general, would you like to attribute this option ?!
Doubts that it was negligence at all, unfortunately, are reinforced by the following facts. In 2005, a very interesting book by V. Lot, "The Secret Front of the General Staff. Intelligence: Open Materials", was published. The 410th and 411th pages of this book are devoted to the fate of General A. G. Samokhin. I don’t know how this could have happened - after all, apparently, V. Lot is a very well-informed author in the history of military intelligence, but from the very first lines dedicated to the fate of A. G. Samokhin, a respected colleague, is straightforward to confuse. V. Lot points out that before his appointment in mid-April 1942 to the post of commander of the 42nd Army, Samokhin served as head of the GRU Information Department - assistant to the head of the GRU, and immediately adds that he was in military intelligence service for only about two months! But this is complete nonsense! Even before the war, Samokhin served in military intelligence and was a resident of the GRU in Belgrade. And newcomers were never appointed to such positions in the GRU: the central apparatus of such a respectable department as Soviet military intelligence is not an ice cream office, so that a newcomer could easily be appointed to the position of head of the GRU Information Department - / 484 / an assistant to the head of the GRU … Consequently, if we take into account the official biography of A. G. Samokhin in the first six months of the war, it was necessary to indicate that these same "about two months" Samokhin served in the central apparatus of military intelligence, and not in general in the GRU system. So, obviously, it would be more correct, although this is also inaccurate, because he was appointed to those posts in December 1941 and, therefore, by the time of his appointment to the post of army commander, he was already in the fifth month of his tenure as an assistant to the head of the GRU - chief of 2- the 1st Directorate (and not the Information Department) of the GRU.
Further. A. G. Samokhin was not appointed commander of the 42nd Army operating near Kharkov, i.e. on the South-Western Front, and the 48th Army of the Bryansk Front. There is still a difference, especially when you consider that there was no 42nd Army near Kharkov. And the names of the fronts are fundamentally different. V. Lot claims that at first A. G. Samokhin flew to the front headquarters, however, does not indicate which one. If we proceed from his statement about Kharkov, then it turns out to be an absurdity - what was he to do at the headquarters of the South-Western Front, if he was appointed commander of the army on the Bryansk front ?! If we take Lotha's words seriously, then something sinister will turn out altogether. Because, according to him, he received some instructions at the front headquarters, then he was transferred to another plane and after that he was taken prisoner …
However, in this case, it is inappropriate to take V. Lota's words seriously, because A. G. Samokhin flew all the same to the Bryansk front, and not to the South-Western Front. If you look at the map, then the question immediately arises of how it was possible to get to Mtsensk, with the goal of assigning Yelets ?! The distance between them is over 150 km! The flight to Yelets, especially from Moscow, is actually strictly to the south, the flight to Mtsensk is to the south-west, in the direction of Orel. By the way, it was there that he was delivered at first, to the headquarters of the 2nd tank group of the Wehrmacht. And only then was they sent by plane to the Letzen Fortress in East Prussia.
Because of this strange flight of Samokhin, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was forced to cancel its decision of April 20, 1942 to conduct an operation in the Kursk-Lgovsk direction with the forces of two armies and a tank corps in early May of the same year in order to capture Kursk and cut the railway. … Kursk - Lgov (History of the Second World War. M., 1975. T. 5. S. 114). And, perhaps, this is one of those fatal prerequisites for the tragic / 485 / dii offensive near Kharkov, because one of the two armies that were supposed to attack Kursk was to be led by Samokhin. By the way, apparently, he had the SVGK Directive on the aforementioned attack on Kursk (and Kursk - Agov), and not at all the documents of Soviet military planning for the entire spring-summer campaign of 1942, as they usually write about it.
According to V. Aota, the fate of A. G. Samokhin became clear after the Battle of Stalingrad. However, if we proceed from his own words, then in a very strange way it cleared up. On the one hand, he points out that Samokhin was listed as missing since April 21, 1942, on the other hand, he reports that only on February 10, 1943, the Main Directorate of the Red Army personnel losses issued order N: 0194, according to which Samokhin was identified as missing lead that, you see, does not bring any clarity. Because if the order was issued only on February 10, 1943, then it turns out that since April 21, 1942, the fate of Samokhin was not known at all, even in order to include him in the list of missing persons. And this is already super weird. The disappearance of the army commander, especially the newly appointed one, is a state of emergency of the highest category! This is the same emergency, because of which the Special Departments and the front-line intelligence instantly became on their ears and at least daily reported to Moscow on the results of the search for the missing person. This is not a joke - the commander of the army, who was a very high-ranking officer of the GRU a few days ago, has disappeared! Naturally, this was immediately reported to Stalin and, believe me, the corresponding strict instruction to the state security agencies and all levels of military intelligence to immediately find out the fate of the army commander was immediately given by the Supreme Commander.
V. Lot also reports that during the Battle of Stalingrad, a certain senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht was captured, who, during interrogations, said that he took part in the interrogations of Major General Samokhin, emphasizing that "whose plane mistakenly landed at an airfield captured by the Germans ". And to him, what was the point of emphasizing this? According to this lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, Samokhin allegedly concealed his, as V. Lot points out, “a short service in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, pretended to be an army general who had served all his life in the army, and behaved with dignity in the additional / 486 / ros. he did not tell the Germans much, referring to the fact that he was appointed to the post in mid-March and had just arrived at the front. " It is difficult to say whether V. Lot noticed an obvious nonsense in his words or not, but it turns out that there were idiots in the Abwehr! Yes, like the Wehrmacht, the Abwehr suffered a crushing defeat - the Soviet state security organs (both intelligence and counterintelligence) and the GRU outright won that deadly duel on an invisible front. While deservedly proud of this indisputable fact, one should not nevertheless assume that the Abwehr consisted entirely of idiots. It was one of the strongest military intelligence services in the world during the Second World War. And if a Soviet general was captured, especially a newly appointed army commander, then the Abwehr also stood on his ears, trying to squeeze the maximum information out of such a prisoner. Moreover, the capture of the generals and even more so the commanders of the armies were immediately reported to Berlin. And if Samokhin could somehow cheat the Abwehr military men, putting noodles on their ears, and even then hardly, then the central apparatus of the Abwehr is a bald devil! All documents, including personal ones, were with him, and as soon as Berlin received a special message about the capture of the newly appointed commander of the 48th Army of the Bryansk Front, Major General A. G. Samokhin, there they immediately checked him according to their records of the Soviet generals, and the clumsy nonsense immediately got out. Samokhin was almost immediately identified as a former resident of the Soviet military intelligence in Belgrade! With identification by photo, since any military intelligence carefully collects photo albums for all military intelligence officers, especially those states that it considers their adversaries. And Samokhin was the official military attaché of the USSR in Belgrade and, of course, his photo was in the Abwehr. Moreover, he had the identity card of a GRU officer in his hands. By the way, when Samokhin was transported to the territory of Germany, then his old acquaintance from the German military aviation branch in Belgrade came into contact with him. So he, according to that lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, precisely because he did not tell the Germans anything special during the first or second interrogations, that he was immediately transported to Berlin (in fact, to East Prussia). This is a completely natural, normal practice of military intelligence operations. And not only the Abwehr - ours, by the way, did the same and such important prisoners were immediately sent to Moscow. Yes, in / 487 / in general, it was easy for the Abwehr to expose his lies also because Samokhin had all his personal documents with him. Including the order to appoint the commander of the 48th and the order of the Headquarters to arrive and take office on April 21, 1942. So he hardly held out with his lies for more than an hour - his own documents also caught him.
But here it is also another matter. The Wehrmacht lieutenant who participated in the interrogations of Samokhin was interrogated after the Battle of Stalingrad. It ended on February 2, 1943. But why, then, since February 10, 1943, according to the above-mentioned order N: 0194, was he included in the lists of the missing ?! And why was this order canceled only on May 19, 1945, if immediately after the Battle of Stalingrad it became known what happened to it ?! With all that the terrible war was still going on, there was no longer any confusion in documents like the one that was happening in the first months of the war, at least on the scale that took place then. Not to mention the fact that it was still a major general, an army commander, and their records were kept (and are) separately. V. Lot explains the cancellation of this order (N: 0194 dated 1943-10-02 only on May 19, 1945 by the fact that only then it became clear what happened to Samokhin. In fact, a lot became known about the fate of Samokhin after the Battle of Stalingrad) …During the interrogations of Colonel Bernd von Petzold, the chief of staff of the 8th corps of the 6th army Friedrich Schildknecht and the chief of the intelligence department of the 29th mechanized division, Ober-Lieutenant Friedrich Mann, captured in Stalingrad, Colonel Bernd von Petzold, many questions related to the fate of Samokhin found out. And although they tried with might and main to prove that de Samokhin at all interrogations insisted that he knew nothing, did not remember, forgot due to the shock of capture, etc., nevertheless, in the hands of SMERSH was the order of the commander of the 2nd tank army of General Schmidt on April 22, 1942, which said: "… For the shooting down of the plane and the capture of General Samokhin, I express my gratitude to the personnel of the battalion. Thanks to this, the German command received valuable information that can favorably affect the further conduct of military operations." By the way, after Samokhin with all his documents was taken prisoner, our military intelligence and the army had such difficult problems that God forbid … The Kharkiv disaster alone in May / 488/1942, what is it worth ?! Or the failure of the intelligence network known as the Red Chapel ?! It should be borne in mind that it was in 1942 that massive failures of Soviet military intelligence agents in Europe, including Germany (first of all, Otto - Leopold Trepper, Kent - Anatoly Gurevich and others), as well as in the Balkans, fall. where he was a resident. It should not be forgotten that Samokhin also headed the 2nd Directorate of the GRU and therefore knew a great deal about many.
The fact that the order of 1943-10-02 was canceled already on May 19, 1945 is a fantastic phenomenon for the victorious May 1945: only 10 days after the Victory ?! Then millions of our compatriots were freed from captivity, and so that the gears of the creaky mechanism of personnel records in the army would turn so quickly ?! Yes, not in zhist! And not because there were villainous idols. And only because in order to cancel such an order, a number of preliminary actions were necessary. First of all, Samokhin had to first go through the filtration of the Soviet counterintelligence and be fully identified and identified as Samokhin. Then, to be delivered to Moscow, checked on all materials, and only then, according to the logic of personnel work of that time, and taking into account all its special specifics in wartime, such an order could be canceled. And ten days after the Victory - this is already too soon even for a general. Especially if we recall the facts that relate to the further fate of Samokhin in captivity and after his release from captivity. According to the authors of the above-mentioned reference book about the GRU, in captivity Samokhin behaved with dignity, in May 1945 he was liberated by Soviet troops. Upon arrival in Moscow, he was arrested, and on March 25, 1952. was sentenced to 25 years in labor camp. V. Lot even informs science fiction that on December 2, 1946, Samokhin was transferred to the reserve, and on August 28 - without specifying the year - the order of dismissal was canceled, Samokhin was enrolled as a student of the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff, which it really plunges into a "tailspin" of bewilderment. Historian Mirkiskin does indicate that after returning to his homeland, the fate of Samokhin is not known.
Meanwhile, the authors of the handbook on the GRU indicated that in May 1945 General Samokhin was taken from Paris (?) To Moscow. Soviet troops did not liberate France, and they were not on the territory of this beautiful country. There was only a Soviet / 489 / vet military mission. Consequently, if it was the Soviet troops who liberated him, then, presumably, if this happened in May 1945, this most joyful thing for the prisoner of the Nazi concentration camp Samokhin took place on the territory of Germany. It is here that one asks why he was brought to Moscow from Paris, where there was only a Soviet military mission ?! Our generals used to really spank outright nonsense, but after all, they were not so crazy in the euphoria of Victory that after the liberation of all of Europe from fascism, a compatriot general freed from Hitler's captivity was taken to Moscow through Paris ?! From Berlin to Moscow, whatever one may say, the path is shorter. But if indeed Samokhin was taken out of Paris, then it is really bad. After all, the Nazis brought all more or less significant prisoners of war there, especially from among the intelligence officers, to organize reconnaissance and disinformation games against Soviet intelligence and the Soviet military command. True, according to the latest data, it turns out that from the last camp - Moosburg, which was located 50 km from Munich, Samokhin was liberated by the Americans and it was they who sent him to Paris. It's also a rather strange story, because it was easier for the same Americans to hand it over to the Soviet command in Germany. By the way, the Americans took out to Paris almost all the Soviet generals they had freed from the said concentration camp. And there, in Paris, they tried to work with them in an intelligence spirit.
The group of generals that was brought from Paris numbered 36 people. Already on December 21, 1945, the Chief of the General Staff, General A. Antonov, and the Chief of SMERSH, V. Abakumov, presented a report to Stalin, which said: June 1945 at the Main Directorate of SMERSH, we came to the following conclusions:
1. To send 25 generals of the Red Army at the disposal of the GUK NKO.
* * *
A small comment. GUK NPO - Main department of personnel of NPO. Pay attention to the fact that six months later, check / 490 / ki 69, 5% of the generals of this group successfully passed the check and were returned to the People's Commissariat of Defense. This is to the fact that in our country they usually like to persuade the atrocities of SMERSH from nowhere, including those against the generals who were in captivity. And the real truth is that in six months, almost 70% of the generals were returned to the People's Commissariat. Is this atrocity ?!
* * *
Upon their arrival at the NPO, the aforementioned generals will be interviewed by Cde. Golikov, and with some of them Comrades. Antonov and Bulganin.
The generals will be provided with the necessary assistance in medical treatment and household arrangements through the GUK NKO. In relation to each, the issue of sending to military service will be considered, and some of them, due to severe injuries and poor health, may be dismissed. During their stay in Moscow, the generals will be accommodated in a hotel and provided with meals.
2. Arrest and try 11 generals of the Red Army, who turned out to be traitors and, being in captivity, entered the enemy organizations created by the Germans and were active anti-Soviet activities. A list of materials on persons scheduled for arrest is attached. We ask for your instructions. On December 27, 1945, Stalin approved this list.
General Samokhin was also included in the list (item 2). During the investigation, it was established that, while in captivity, Samokhin tried to support the recruitment of German military intelligence, pursuing, as he noted in his testimony, the goal of returning to his homeland in any way and avoiding interrogation by the Gestapo. Strongly insisting on this version of his behavior, Samokhin said at the trial: “I made a rash step and tried to expose myself to recruitment. This is my fault, but I did it in order to escape from captivity and avoid giving the enemy any information. I am guilty, but not of treason to the Motherland. I gave nothing into the hands of the enemy, and my conscience is clear … . On March 25, 1952, General Samokhin was sentenced to 25 years in a labor camp.
At present, all this is presented as an indescribable atrocity on the part of the Lubyanka and Stalin. And on what basis, may I ask ?! Are not the assertions of a professional military intelligence officer, re- / 491 / resident that he tried to substitute himself for recruitment in order to escape from captivity, but did not tell the enemy anything to the enemy, is it not indescribable naivety? On the Lubyanka, tea, not idiots sat! In the world of special services, especially intelligence services, an immutable law has reigned from time immemorial - the only pass to the enemy is the delivery of all known information about your intelligence! And what, the resident of the Soviet military intelligence did not know the basics of intelligence activities ?! And then what to do with the catastrophic failure of the entire intelligence network of the "Red Capella", the failure of the intelligence network in the Balkans ?! Even without trying to assert that there is a direct connection between Samokhin's stay in captivity and these failures, the Lubyanka could not help but pay attention to the temporal coincidences. That is why the investigation took so long. For seven whole years. And no matter how you relate to the state security bodies of that time, it is absolutely clear that the case with Samokhin was from the category of "difficult nuts". Obviously, a laborious, painstaking check was carried out, as a result of which something was established, but something was not. That is why the sentence, by the way, is not a firing squad.
But it would be okay for General Samokhin's dramatic odyssey to end there. They did not have time to put the sarcophagus with Stalin's body in the Mausoleum, as already in May 1953. the verdict against Samokhin was canceled! And then, in May 1953, General Samokhin was rehabilitated! By the way, V. Lot substantiates the fact of the rehabilitation of A. G. Samokhin with materials from the interrogation of the very senior lieutenant of the Wehrmacht who was captured by the Soviet during the Battle of Stalingrad. At that time, such a quick cancellation of the sentence, and even on such a shaky basis as the testimony of the captive Fritz, was simply an unprecedentedly amazing fact. What incredible speed of action was given to the law enforcement apparatus of the post-Stalin USSR ?! What tremendous credulity was shown to the testimony of one captive Fritz ?! This is what comes out? That idiots were everywhere?
But if not only the verdict against Samokhin was canceled, but the general was rehabilitated, which, as of May 1953, was an unheard-of thing, especially in relation to the military, then why was the general not reinstated in military service? ? After all, he was assigned to the position of only a senior teacher of combined arms training at the military department of Moscow State University! Yes, it can be assumed that such a decision was made / 492 / for medical reasons, but the fact is that Samokhin was then only fifty-one years old (born in 1902) and he, like other released from captivity and rehabilitated, it was possible to calmly heal, and then restore to active military service. According to the general's status, they would have been cured with an extra class! This was the case, for example, with Potapov. But no, they were dragged out of the slammer and into senior lecturers at the military department of Moscow State University! Do you understand what the whole "squiggle" is ?! On the one hand, the "reactive" speed of pulling Samokhin out of the Gulag and his rehabilitation - only 2 months and 25 days (!) Have passed since Stalin's funeral, and on the other - they immediately pushed him into civilian life.
It turns out that someone very closely followed the case of Samokhin, but under Stalin he could not do anything, but as soon as the leader was sent to the next world, Samokhin was immediately pulled out of the Gulag, the sentence was canceled, and even rehabilitated, but everyone was kicked out. still in civilian life. What did he know, who was watching his case so closely, why this "someone" was so influential that he could instantly pull him out of the Gulag, and even rehabilitate him less than three months after Stalin's funeral ?! True, Samokhin had only two years to breathe the air of freedom - on July 17, 1955, he died. Naturally, humanly sincerely it is a pity that General Samokhin at the age of 53 passed away. It is all the more a pity when you consider that many prisoners of Hitler's concentration camps, as well as those who served their sentences in the Soviet penitentiary system at that time, have survived to this day. But there’s something to be done. The next year, 1956, came the first explosion of the despicable anti-Stalinism of Khrushchev's "bottling" - a dirty wave of vile accusations of Stalin rolled, including for the tragedy of June 22, 1941, with a simultaneous, but no less sweeping and stupid whitewashing of the entire generals … Simultaneously, with the suggestion of Khrushchev, vile chatter began about some allegedly made by Stalin attempts to enter into separate negotiations with Hitler on the terms of colossal concessions. Worse than that. At the XX Congress, Khrushchev completely lied, trying to blame Stalin for the Kharkov catastrophe, to which, although not directly, Samokhin was also involved.
You will look at this chronology and involuntarily you will wonder - is it not too "timely", so to speak in a preventive manner, that a former high-ranking military intelligence officer has left (or "left"), but who never took office as commander / 493 / mandarma 48- Major General Samokhin ?! And this thought will be all the more sadly depressing if it is imposed both on the chronology of the war and on some of the events of the summer of 1953.
If we return to the fact of the capture of Samokhin, then you will be surprised to learn that soon after, under strange circumstances, he was captured by the Germans, Soviet pilots intercepted a German plane, whose passengers were seized with documents about the plans for the summer (1942) campaign German army. It is believed that "Moscow either drew the wrong conclusions from them, or ignored them altogether, which led to the defeat of the Soviet troops near Kharkov." It turns out something like that there was an exchange of messages about plans for the summer campaign of 1942! In this case, the following fact acquires an ominous significance.
After the war, when interrogated by the Americans, the ex-head of Nazi foreign policy intelligence Walter Schellenberg showed the following. In his words, "in the spring of 1942, one of the Japanese naval officers, in a conversation with the German WAT in Tokyo, raised the question of whether Germany would not have gone to an honorable peace with the USSR, in which Japan could have helped her. This was reported to Hitler." The ominous significance of this fact is manifested primarily in the time of its accomplishment - in the spring of 1942.
Why did such an essentially unique parallel-sequential coincidence of events have to happen? In the spring of 1942, the plane with Samokhin for some reason flies to the Nazis, and he has in his hands the documents of Soviet military planning for the summer campaign of 1942, including the directive of the SVGK, as well as the operational map. A little later, it is not known why the Nazis fly to us with their documentation about the plans for the summer 1942 campaign of the Wehrmacht. At the same time, a catastrophe occurs near Kharkov, and then in the Crimea, there are tragic failures of the intelligence networks of the "Red Capella" and in the Balkans. And at the same time, a strange sounding by the Japanese naval officer of his German colleague in Tokyo was superimposed on these events of the possibility of the Reich's consent to conclude a secret separate peace with the USSR on honorable terms ?!
On the one hand, inevitably, one gets the impression that this was a serious provocation, calculated to drive a wedge between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition (the Japanese, by the way, / 494 / t said the same thing started in the spring of 1943), in primarily between the USSR and the USA. But, on the other hand, why should it, firstly, coincide in time with both strange flights of our and Hitler's high-ranking officers with the most important documents in their hands. And why did it turn out to be connected with the catastrophes of our troops near Kharkov and in the Crimea, with the failures of the most valuable agents? Secondly, why is the scenario of a triple military-geopolitical conspiracy with the participation of German, Soviet (headed by Tukhachevsky) and Japanese high-ranking military personnel almost automatically revived in this regard ?! After all, the conspiracy of Soviet generals, liquidated back in 1937, provided for a separate truce and a coup in the country in conditions of military defeat! Who would explain what is behind all this?
* * *
Especially when you consider how persistently the USSR sought after the war the opportunity to interrogate the same V. Schellenberg. And the former allies not only interfered with this, but in the end they arranged a "hurricane cancer" for the former Reich ob-espion, as a result of which he very quickly "gave an oak", without waiting for the well-deserved meeting with the Soviet Chekists, which in the first place frightened the allies.
* * *
Finally, here's what. As evidenced by the facts, Samokhin really had something to do with the grand catastrophe of our troops near Kharkov in 1942. Formally, Tymoshenko and the notorious Khrushchev brought Timoshenko and the notorious Khrushchev to the defeat near Kharkov strikingly reminiscent of the June 22 tragedy. But the point is that Timoshenko and Khrushchev knew in advance, back in March 1942, that the Nazis would strike on the southern flank. And the source of their knowledge of this was Samokhin! Here the whole "squiggle" is that in March 1942 g.in Moscow from the front flew Samokhin's classmate at the academy, the head of the operational group of the South-West direction, Lieutenant General Ivan Khristoforovich Baghramyan (later Marshal of the Soviet Union). Bagramyan, of course, visited the GRU and from his acquaintance, Alexander Georgievich Samokhin, who was the head of the 2nd Directorate of the GRU, he learned intelligence / 495 / about the plans of the Nazis for the summer of 1942. Returning to the front, Baghramyan shared this information with Timoshenko and Khrushchev - after all, they were his direct superiors. Timoshenko and Khrushchev immediately cheerfully promised Stalin that they would crush the Nazis in the South, begging for the promised success huge forces. But, alas, in the words of a bald maize, they were so embarrassed that, having ruined a lot of people and equipment, they suffered a crushing defeat, the blame for which was later blamed on Stalin.
Now is the time to compare. The investigation into the Samokhin case lasted seven years. Although others were dealt with quickly enough and 25 generals were rehabilitated under Stalin within six months. But as soon as the leader was gone, Samokhin was immediately torn out of the Gulag, the sentence was canceled, rehabilitated, but pushed out into civilian life, and after two years Samokhin was no longer there. The speed of these events was simply inconceivable for that time, because then there was a fierce squabble at the top for the vacated throne and, in principle, few people could care about the rehabilitation of one of the many.
Well, that's not all. In the case falsified by Khrushchev against Beria back on June 26, 1953, without trial or investigation, the illegally murdered Lavrentiy Pavlovich was retrospectively tried to "sew on" the accusation that he was allegedly preparing the defeat of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. But the Nazis broke through to the approaches to the Caucasus largely thanks to the "valiant" command of Timoshenko and Khrushchev in the Kharkov operation. But who is always the loudest yelling: "Stop the thief!"? Right…
And what, in this case and in this light, should mean the facts of an unprecedented speedy cancellation of the harsh sentence of Samokhin, his rehabilitation, but pushing him out into civilian life along with the incredibly accelerated death for a 53-year-old man on the eve of an unbridled orgy of vile and vile accusations against Stalin? ! Should this mean that Samokhin, who was in the Gulag, was an extremely dangerous witness for someone at the very top, and that is why he was urgently pulled out of there, and then, having rehabilitated, he was sent to civilian life. Where, only two years later, he died. At 53 years old ?! If we go further along the path of this logic, it turns out that someone at the top was extremely afraid that Beria, who returned to the Lubyanka - he left there at the end of 1945 due to being overloaded with work on the atomic / 496 / project - would quickly establish that the investigation was unable or unwilling to establish for almost seven years. And then, in accordance with the law, use this data to punish the true culprits of military defeats.
So, isn't all this connected with the emergence of the just analyzed myth ?! Especially in its general form - about Stalin's alleged attempts to enter into separate negotiations with Germany on terms of concessions. Moreover, a couple more myths have been generated on this topic. After all, it turns out - some kind of deeply layered slander on the same issue. And this, as a rule, is not accidental …
