It is believed that opening the archives can help unravel many of the mysteries of history. This is true. But there is another consequence of the publication of new historical sources: they give rise to new mysteries. This was the fate of one document that became known to the world in the early 90s. We are talking about a proposal that was received in the middle of May 1941 by I. V. Stalin from the highest military leadership of the USSR. The riddles began with the fact that the document had no date. There are no signatures under it either, although there are two people designated who were supposed to sign it: this is the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal S. K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov. Stalin's resolution is not on the document either.
An additional sensationalism to the archival find was given by a special circumstance: in the 90s, there was a heated discussion in Russia around the allegations that in 1941 it was not Germany that committed aggression against the USSR, but Stalin allegedly planned to attack Germany, but did not have time. At the same time, in the heat of polemics, they often forgot that the authors of this version, designed to justify the Nazi aggression against the USSR, were the leaders of the "Third Reich" - the German Chancellor and Nazi Fuhrer A. Hitler, Reich Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop and Reich propaganda minister J. Goebbels.
The debate about "preventive war" began with the appearance of works by V. B. Rezun, a former Soviet military intelligence officer who fled to the West in 1978 and assumed the pseudonym V. Suvorov. His books, published in the late 80s - early 90s in Germany and England [1], caused an ambiguous reaction: the majority of Western researchers reacted to V. Suvorov very critically or simply did not consider his work scientific, and therefore worthy attention. However, a small group of historians from Germany and Austria - E. Topich, V. Maser, J. Hoffmann, V. Post [2] with the support of the publicist of the influential West German newspaper "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" G. Gillessen [3] immediately took Suvorov's works for weapons. But, paradoxically, Suvorov found the widest audience in Russia, where the book [4] was published later than in the West, and for many people, especially young people, became one of the main sources of knowledge about the war: in the conditions of liberation society from the "state monopoly on truth" any point of view that differed from the official one caused a strong public resonance.
For a long time, the official Russian science considered it beneath its dignity to seriously argue with Rezun. Nevertheless, the dispute about the "preventive war" also embraced Russian historians [5], among whom a small group of Suvorov's supporters emerged [6]. At scientific conferences and on the pages of academic journals inaccessible to the general reader, a discussion of "preventive war" [7] reflecting different points of view began, which helped to attract public attention to the works of Suvorov and his associates. The first book in Russian, scientifically critically analyzing and fully exposing Suvorov's version, was the monograph by the Israeli researcher G. Gorodetsky [8].
And here in the archive a genuine document is discovered, in which it is written in black and white that Timoshenko and Zhukov proposed to strike at the German troops standing on the border!
Note that several pages from this document were published back in 1992 by V. N. Kiselev in the "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal" [9], however, parts of the text that are very important for a correct understanding of the content were omitted. The following year, the document was published in full in the journal "New and Contemporary History" in the appendix to the article by Yu. A. Gorkov [10], and then in his book [11], as well as in the collection "1941" [12]. The document in question is also used in the fictional work of the military writer V. V. Karpov [13]. A German translation of the document was published in Austria [14] and in the Federal Republic of Germany [15].
What is the source we are considering? This is a 15-page memo [16]. It is handwritten on the letterhead of the People's Commissar of Defense. It is not difficult to determine who wrote the note: the peculiar beaded handwriting with which it was written is well known to specialists - this is A. M. Vasilevsky, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, then Major General and Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. Indeed, there are no signatures, they are only, as the bureaucrats say, "sealed", but not put. However, this happened in practice, since such classified materials were compiled in a single copy and only the compilers and the addressee knew about them. The addressee was also the only one - Stalin. However, as already noted, his visa or resolution is not on the document. Attached are maps, one of which bears the date "May 15, 1941". This allows the note to be dated no later than that day. There was no official title for the document. The text began as follows: "To the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade Stalin. I am submitting for your consideration considerations on a plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" [17].
The meaning of this document, prepared at the General Staff, is as follows: Zhukov (the document, of course, should be called Zhukov's plan, because it was Zhukov's function that included military planning) reported that Germany had already deployed "about 230 infantry, 22 tank, 20 motorized, 8 air and 4 cavalry divisions, and a total of about 284 divisions. Of these, on the borders of the Soviet Union, as of 15.5.41, concentrated up to 86 infantry, 13 tank, 12 motorized and 1 cavalry divisions, and a total of 120 divisions "[eighteen]. Describing the combat deployment of the Wehrmacht, Zhukov considered it possible that the German troops could deliver a surprise attack on the Red Army. "In order to prevent this and defeat the German army (the italicized words in the original are deleted from the text - LB)," Zhukov suggested, two lines - LB) the enemy in deployment and attack and defeat (the words in italics are deleted from the text - LB} the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and does not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the clans troops "[19].
Despite the fact that Zhukov prudently decided to delete the word "crush" from the text, the meaning of the plan is clear: according to Zhukov's plan, the main preemptive strike was to be delivered by the Southwestern Front (former Kiev Special Military District - OVO) and part of the Western Front (formerly Western OVO) with the following task: "The defeat of the main forces of the German army, deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line and the exit by the 30th day of the operation to the Ostrolenka front, the Narew, Lowicz, Lodz, Kreuzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc" [20].
It was explained that a strike in the direction of Krakow - Katowice would cut Germany off from her southern allies, i.e. Romania and Hungary. This blow will mean the defeat of the German army west of the Vistula River and in the direction of Krakow, access to the Narew River and the capture of the Katowice region, that is, industrially developed Silesia. By itself, this plan is already grandiose, for it involved the elimination of the entire offensive group assembled by Hitler. The Red Army was supposed to pass all of Poland from east to southwest and reach the borders of Germany. At the same time, German troops would be cut off from the Balkans, and above all from Romanian oil. But that was only the first goal. The draft plan read: "The subsequent strategic goal is to have: by an offensive from the Katowice area in the northern or northwestern direction to defeat the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia" [21].
This phrase was added with his own hand by Zhukov to the text written by Vasilevsky [22]. 150-160 Soviet divisions had to complete with battles not only a victorious march from east to south-west across Poland, but also to reach the border of East Prussia - to go a good 500 kilometers! But the offensive of the Red Army did not end there either: it had to end with the defeat of the East Prussian bastion of the German Reich.
To achieve these goals, Zhukov proposed sending 152 rifle divisions into battle. True, this figure was later crossed out by him - apparently, he did not want to limit the size of the offensive group. All in all, the Northern, Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Fronts were supposed to have 210 divisions: 136 rifle divisions, 44 tank divisions, 23 motorized and 7 cavalry divisions. As part of the reserve of the High Command, 48 divisions remained behind the Western and Southwestern Fronts. Aviation also brought the main forces to the south-western direction - 144 out of 216 air regiments.
It is believed that the draft plan was drawn up for no more than two weeks. Was it a hasty improvisation? No, Zhukov's plan was not born out of nowhere. To understand its origin, it must be borne in mind that since 1938, and then in August-October 1940, the General Staff developed and approved the main documents of Soviet strategic planning. They actually incorporated Zhukov's idea [23]. The plan, adopted in March 1938, provided that after repelling the military invasion of the enemy, Soviet troops, namely the formations and units of the Western OVO and Kiev OVO, acting according to one of the plan options (southern), should inflict a crushing counterstrike and reach the Kovel area -Lvov-Grodno-Dubno and further develop the success in the direction of Lublin [24]. In 1940, it was the southern option of the offensive that was confirmed on March 11, 1941 [25].
Thus, Zhukov's idea of heading southwest was not an improvisation. Changed only the sequence of tasks: to strike in order to "cut off Germany from the southern allies" was proposed not as a response to the attack of the Reich, but in a preemptive manner.
Why did Zhukov decide on this bold proposal? Of course, he was prompted to such a decision by Stalin's speech to graduates of military academies, delivered on May 5, 1941 [26]: Stalin directed the commanders of the Red Army to prepare not only defensive, but also offensive operations. General of the Army N. Lyashchenko told the author of the article about the direct connection of "Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan" with this speech of Stalin, referring to the words of Timoshenko, said to him in the 60s [27].
Zhukov told military historians about the connection between the note dated May 15, 1941 and Stalin's speech delivered 10 days earlier when he met them in the last years of his life. As Marshal said in 1965 to the historian V. A. Anfilov, the idea to prevent Hitler's attack came from Zhukov and Timoshenko in connection with Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies, which spoke of the possibility of acting in an offensive manner. A specific task was given to Vasilevsky. On May 15, he reported to Timoshenko and Zhukov the draft directive [28].
The actions of both commanders were logical. Indeed, much in Zhukov's plan might have pleased Stalin. First, a bold turn in military planning. Secondly, the prospect of successful long-range action. This, of course, was the difference between the plan. No wonder Zhukov added a phrase about a turn to the north in order to seize the territory of Poland and East Prussia. Stalin could not help remembering that in the previous versions of the strategic plans it was proposed to respond with "blow for blow" either in the northern or southern sectors. And here - both that and another: and access to the Czechoslovak border, and the capture of East Prussia! It seemed that Stalin's quick assimilation by the General Staff of the new instructions on "offensive military policy" given by him on May 5, 1941, could not cause a negative reaction from Stalin.
The formulation of the question "what would have happened if" is considered unacceptable in historical research: history does not know the subjunctive mood. But, nevertheless, going beyond the limits determined for the researcher by the real course of historical events, let us ask ourselves: what would have happened if Stalin had approved Zhukov's plan, and the Red Army at the beginning of the summer of 1941 went on the offensive?
This approach immediately reveals the first and rather unusual aspect of the problem: a Soviet offensive would have been completely unexpected for Germany. Hitler at one time expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that "the Soviet Union cannot be provoked to attack" [29]. The High Command of the German Ground Forces (OKH) not only did not take into account the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike, but even regretted that “the Russians would not do us the service of an offensive” [30]. In a directive dated January 22, 1941, the General Staff of the OKH predicted the defensive tactics of the Red Army on the border [31]. On June 13, 1941, the Department of Foreign Armies in the East of the General Staff of the OKH repeated that "on the whole, defensive behavior should be expected from the Russians" [32]. So, the German high command of the Soviet preemptive offensive did not expect. Zhukov knew about this. But here is what Zhukov did not know: assuming that with a blow to the southwest he would pierce the "core" of the future German offensive and, agreeing with Stalin in this assessment, Zhukov did not know that he was wrong, and in a fundamental way. In reality, the Wehrmacht grouping was different: its "core" was not in the south, but in the center. According to the OKH directive of January 31, 1941, the main blow to the Red Army was delivered by Army Group Center, Field Marshal F. von Bock, which consisted of 47 German divisions (including 10 tank, 5 motorized and 1 cavalry division of the Wehrmacht, as well as division SS "Death's Head"), while Army Group "South" Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt had only 38 German divisions (of which 5 tank and 2 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht, as well as the SS division "Germany"). This distribution of manpower and equipment basically remained until June 22, 1941 [33].
Thus, the Soviet South-Western Front, rushing to Krakow, Lublin and further south-west, would automatically "substitute" its northern flank under the attack of the German Army Group Center. At the same time, the Soviet Western Front could not have opposed anything to the main attack of the enemy, delivered in the direction of Minsk and further to Moscow. The Soviet high command and the troops of the North-Western Front (Baltic District) could not successfully resist the German Army Group North of General-Field Marshal V. von Leeb, aimed at the Baltics and Leningrad, which, excluding the OKH reserve, included 26 German divisions, of which 3 armored, 2 motorized and the SS division "Reich" [34]. In addition, there were Finnish, Hungarian, Romanian divisions in the grouping prepared for the offensive against the USSR.
Of course, today, armed with the sad experience of 1941 and knowledge of the real history of the entire war, we can only speculate about the prospects for the implementation of Zhukov's plan. Only one detail: for the march from Oppeln to Konigsberg, the Red Army had to cover hundreds of kilometers. This march was not logistically secured. The plan of May 15, 1941 even contained a hint: "the fuel reserves intended for the western districts were echeloned in significant quantities (due to the lack of capacity on their territory) in the inner districts" [35]. What does this mean? The Western OVO was released, as its commander reported, "the required amount of fuel", but it was stored in Maikop - several thousand kilometers from the theater of operations. The mechanized corps of the Red Army were provided with equipment only by 30 percent, and the equipment was outdated. In the Kiev OVO, only 2 mechanized corps had new T-34 and KB tanks, and even then in insufficient numbers [36].
Bottom line: if the plan of May 15, 1941 was implemented, the Red Army could suffer an even greater failure than after the German attack on the USSR, which began on June 22, 1941. The unreality of the plan of the Soviet command would have been multiplied by the real superiority of the quality of weapons and combat experience of the enemy. Having burst into "foreign territory" in order to win with "little blood", Soviet troops would have left their territory open, for which they would have paid with "big blood" of soldiers and civilians.
Frankly, it was not easy for the author of the article to write these lines. Should he, a humble front-line soldier, a retired captain, criticize the famous Soviet military leaders? Isn't he taking on a lot, predicting the catastrophic consequences of the May 15 plan if adopted and implemented? [37] But the author was unexpectedly helped by his colleague, front-line historian V. A. Anfilov. It turns out that when V. A. Anfilov talked with Zhukov, the marshal said the following about Stalin's reaction to the proposed plan: "It's good that Stalin did not agree with us. Otherwise, we would have got something like Kharkov in 1942" [38].
The certificate of V. A. Anfilova is confirmed by the military historian N. A. Svetlishin, who, on behalf of the Institute of Military History, repeatedly talked with Zhukov in 1965-1966. and wrote down the words of the marshal that the next day after the delivery of the note of May 15 to Stalin, the latter ordered his secretary A. N. Poskrebyshev to call Zhukov. Poskrebyshev said (hereinafter Zhukov's words follow) that “Stalin was very angry with my report and instructed to convey to me so that I would no longer write such notes“for the prosecutor”; that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars is more aware of the prospects of our relationship with Germany than the chief of the General Staff that the Soviet Union still has enough time to prepare for the decisive battle with fascism. And the implementation of my proposals would only play into the hands of the enemies of Soviet power "[39].
Preparing his memoirs, the marshal described the essence of the disputes between him and Stalin as follows: "I remember well the words of Stalin when we reported to him about the suspicious actions of the German troops:" Hitler and his generals are not such fools as to fight simultaneously on two fronts, on which the Germans broke his neck in the First World War … Hitler will not have enough strength to fight on two fronts, and Hitler will not go on an adventure "" [40].
To break through the blank wall of Stalin's mistrust, Zhukov literally racked his brains, how to make Stalin understand the danger of the situation? That is why one can see in this plan another desperate attempt to draw Stalin's attention to the real threat of German aggression, to convince him of the need to prepare to repel it. At the risk of incurring the highest anger, Zhukov wanted only one thing: to get Stalin's approval of active actions in the face of the threat that was already on the threshold. This is the only way to understand all the incongruities and internal contradictions of the proposed plan.
To this day, there is a battle among Russian military historians over the fate of the proposal of Timoshenko and Zhukov. It continues, in particular, because although there are no signatures under the document, no formal rejection of the "Zhukov plan" has been recorded.
Criticism of the source that we call "Zhukov's plan" cannot ignore the fact that Vasilevsky's handwritten text "Considerations for the Strategic Deployment Plan" contains several important insertions and deletions. It is difficult to imagine that Vasilevsky, a neat man, distinguished by a high culture of staff work, could present a "dirty" document to Stalin. However, the archives did not find another text that was completely rewritten. As V. D. Danilov, the revised text was kept in Vasilevsky's personal safe and was returned by him to the archives of the General Staff only in 1948, when Vasilevsky was chief of the General Staff.
Researchers who believe that the "Zhukov plan" was nevertheless adopted by Stalin, cite as an argument in their favor the data that after May 15, 1941, the transfer of troops, including to the Kiev OVO, was accelerated, and other measures were taken strengthening the border grouping. These facts are especially "pedaled" by the supporters of Suvorov's concept, without the slightest reason declaring that the Red Army was preparing to cross the western border of the USSR and the beginning of a "gigantic liberation campaign" to Europe on July 6, 1941 [41].
There is such a logical principle: "after this - but not because of this." It also applies to the situation in May-June 1941. Of course, new military units were hastily deployed to the west from the rear areas. But their combat missions did not contain any instructions about the forthcoming "preventive" offensive battles. The directives issued for the Red Army troops strictly prohibited crossing the state border "without a special order" [42]. Even at dawn on June 22, 1941, no special order followed …
The only real trace left by Zhukov's plan can be seen - and the chief of staff could be pleased with this - that the situation on the border was removed from the category of "taboo." They began to talk about the impending possible German attack in military circles and write in the directives of the command.
What was actually done after Timoshenko and Zhukov presented the project of May 15, 1941? To answer this question, it is not enough just to know the formal side of the matter: whether the project was approved by Stalin or not.
First of all, the considerations of the high command of the Red Army should not be taken out of the general military-political context in which Stalin acted, and with him Timoshenko and Zhukov. From January to June 1941, the strategic deployment of the Red Army went through three stages.
The first stage (January-March) - repeated decisions on the reorganization and modernization of the army, the adoption, under pressure from Timoshenko and Zhukov, of the decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of March 8, 1941 on the call for large training camps of 900 thousand servicemen from the reserve. Measures were taken to reorganize the air defense and armored forces. Mechanized corps were formed, the industry received orders for new weapons, in particular for the production of KB and T-34 tanks. However, all these measures have not yet affected the troops of the first echelon of cover, the second strategic echelon and the reserve of the High Command. Stalin's demand "not to give the Germans a reason" to aggravate relations was sacredly observed.
The second stage (April - early June) is the open mobilization and advance of the armies of the second strategic echelon of cover to the border areas. In April, three corps were transferred from the Far East to the West, and on May 13, four armies of the second echelon (19th, 16th, 22nd and 21st) began to move into the Western and Kiev OVO. Preparations began for the advancement of the command of four more armies, which included 28 divisions.
The third stage (early June - June 22) - under great pressure from the military leadership, Stalin agreed to open mobilization and advancement of the second echelon armies of the Western and Kiev OVOs, as well as to increase the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border [43].
What has changed since the appearance of the Strategic Deployment Plan Considerations project on May 15, 1941? Not so much. Directives for the advancement of four armies began to enter the troops even earlier - from May 13, the Far Eastern divisions moved westward from April. Consequently, those who see in the advancement of troops proof of Stalin's actual acceptance of Zhukov's plan are wrong. Moreover: after May 15, 1941all border military districts - Leningrad, Baltic, Odessa, Kiev OVO and Western OVO received important directives from the People's Commissar of Defense on the preparation of plans for defense and border cover [44]. All of them (with minor differences) proposed to urgently develop and from 25 to 30 May submit to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff plans for the defense of the state border and air defense in order to:
1. Prevent the invasion of both ground and air enemies into the territory of the district.
2. To firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the district troops by stubborn defense of fortifications along the state border.
3. By air defense and aviation operations to ensure the normal operation of railways and the concentration of troops …
II. Organize the defense of the state border, guided by the following basic guidelines:
1. The defense is based on the stubborn defense of fortified areas and field fortifications created along the state border, using all the forces and opportunities for their further development. To give the defense the character of active action. Any attempts of the enemy to break through the defenses are immediately eliminated by counterattacks by corps and army reserves.
2. Pay special attention to anti-tank defense. In the event of a breakthrough of the defense front with large enemy motorized units, the fight against them and the elimination of the breakthrough should be carried out by the direct order of the District Command, for which massive use of most of the anti-tank artillery brigades, mechanized corps and aviation "[45].
Noteworthy is the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense for the Kiev OVO - it was to this district that Zhukov's plan determined the decisive role in delivering a preemptive strike. In the new directive, everything looks different - the troops of the Kiev OVO were given a purely defensive task of organizing four cover areas in the border zone of the district:
1. Covering area No. 1. The head of the cover area - the commander of the 5th Army … The task is to defend the state border at the front, excluding Wlodawa, Ustmilug, Krustynopol, preventing the enemy from invading our territory …
2. Covering area No. 2. The head of the cover area - the commander of the 6th army … The task is to defend the state border at the front, excluding Krustynopol, Makhnov, Senyava, Radymno, preventing the enemy from breaking through into our territory …
3. Covering area No. 3. The head of the cover area - commander of the 26th Army … The task is to defend the state border at the front, excluding Radymno, Przemysl, excluding Lyutovisk, preventing the enemy from invading our territory.
4. Covering area No. 4. The head of the cover area - commander of the 12th army … The task is to defend the state border at the front of Lyutoviska, Uzhok, Vorokhta, Volchinets, Lipkany, preventing the enemy from invading our territory … [46].
But this did not exhaust the new, purely defensive tasks. The troops of the Kiev OVO were ordered:
"To doom and prepare the rear defensive lines for the entire depth of defense up to the Dnieper River, inclusive. Develop a plan to put Korostensky, Novgorod-Volynsky, Letichevsky and Kievsky fortified regions on alert, as well as all fortified areas of construction in 1939. In case of a forced withdrawal, develop a plan for creating anti-tank obstacles to the entire depth and a plan for mining bridges, railway junctions and points of possible concentration of the enemy (troops, headquarters, hospitals, etc.) "[47].
So, the directive does not even talk about preparing or delivering a preemptive strike. It was only allowed "under favorable conditions, to be ready, at the direction of the High Command, to deliver swift strikes to defeat enemy groupings, transfer hostilities to its territory and capture advantageous lines." Only aviation was tasked with "destroying railway bridges and junctions in Katowice, Kielce, Czestochowa, Krakow, as well as actions against enemy groupings to disrupt and delay the concentration and deployment of his troops," while the troops of the 5th, 6th, 12th 1st, 26th armies of the Kiev OVO would organize defensive lines from the western border to the Dnieper [48].
The fact that Zhukov's plan was not adopted added to the confusion and inconsistency in the actions of the Soviet high command. The situation was very serious: in late spring - early summer 1941 Germany was completing the last preparations for the Barbarossa plan, as reported by Soviet intelligence [49]. At the same time, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, on the one hand, pushed large military formations from the eastern regions of the country to the western border of the USSR and regrouped the forces of the border districts, but at the same time did not prepare to forestall the enemy and thereby put their troops under his first blow, and on the other hand, ordered to take measures to equip defensive lines in the rear - which they did not manage to do at all. On the one hand, the headquarters of the Kiev OVO put forward its command post in Tarnopol, closer to the western border, on the other hand, "braking" orders were received from Moscow to the district headquarters. So, on June 11, 1941, the chief of staff handed over to the commander of the Kiev OVO, Colonel-General I. P. To Kirponos, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense: "1). The field and Urovsky [50] units should not occupy the strip of the foreground without special orders. Organize the guarding of the structures by sentries and patrols. 2). and convey to Zhukov by June 16, 1941 "[51].
On May 24, 1941, Stalin held an important meeting of the high command of the Red Army. Was Zhukov's plan discussed there? Unfortunately, archival documents on the results of this meeting have not yet been found, and there is no information in the memoirs of the military leaders who took part in it. However, the logic of the events that followed testifies: it was not discussed. After all, if a Soviet attack was being prepared, then the commanders and staffs of the border districts should at least know about this! In reality, the command, headquarters and troops of the Red Army did not receive any assignments for preparing a local preemptive strike, and even more so for a general attack on the armed forces of Germany.
The preemptive strike did not take place. This was the real state of affairs. All assumptions about Stalin's "preventive war" against Hitler can be classified as - at best - fictional exercises
Notes (edit).
[1] Suworow W. Der Eisbrecher. Stuttgart. 1989; Suvorov V. Ice-breaker. London, 1990.
[2] Topitsch E. Stalins Krieg. Munchen, 1985. Maser W. Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Munchen 1994; Hoffmans J. Stalins Vernichtungskrieg. 1941-1945. Munchen 1995; Post W. Unternehmen "Barbarossa". Deutsche und sowjetische Angriffsplane 1940/1941. Munchen, 1995.
[3] Gillessen G. Der Krieg der Diktatoren. // Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 1986-20-08; idem. Krieg zwischen zwei Angeifern. // FAZ, 4.3.1993.
[4] Suvorov V. Icebreaker. Who started World War II? M., 1992.
[5] Bobylev P. N. What kind of war was the General Staff of the Red Army preparing for in 1941? // Domestic history, 1995, no. 5, p. 3-20; Wischlew O. Am Vorabend des 22.6.1941. // Deutsch-russische Zeitenwende. Krieg und Frieden 1941-1995. Baden-Baden, 1995, S. 91-152.
[6] Mertsalov L. N. Another Zhukov. M., 1994; Nevezhin V. A. Metamorphoses of Soviet propaganda in 1939-1941. // Teaching history at school, 1994, no. 5, p. 54-69; its the same. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and an apology for an offensive war. // Domestic history, 1995, no. 2, p. 54-69; its the same. Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 and a turn in propaganda. Analysis of directive materials. // Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? Unplanned discussion. Collection of materials. Compiled by V. A. Nevezhin. M., 1995, p. 147-167; Meltyukhov M. I. Ideological documents of May-June 1941 about the events of the Second World War. // Domestic history, 1995, no. 2, p. 70-85: Danilov V. D. Stalin's strategy of the beginning of the war; plans and reality. // Domestic history, 1995, no. 3, p. 33-38: Nikitin M. Assessment of the events of the Second World War by the Soviet leadership. (According to ideological documents of May-June 1941). Was Stalin Preparing an Offensive War against Hitler, p. 122-146.
[7] For the version of the preparation of a "preventive war" see: Hoffman J. Preparing the Soviet Union for an offensive war. 1941 year. // Domestic history, 1993, no. 4, p. 19-31. For the opposite point of view, see: Yu. A. Gorkov. Was Stalin preparing a preemptive strike against Hitler in 1941 // New and Modern History, 1993. No. 3; Gareev M. A. Once again to the question: was Stalin preparing a preemptive strike in 1941 // New and Newest History, 1994, No. 2.
[8] Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker". M., 1995.
[9] Kiselev V. N. Stubborn facts of the beginning of the war. // Military History Journal, 1992. No. 2.
[10] Gorkov Yu. A. Decree. Op.
[11] Gorkov Yu. A. Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff. Tver, 1995.
[12] 1941. The documents. Collection of documents in 2 volumes, ed. V. P. Naumova, vol. 2, Moscow. 1998. p. 215-220.
[13] Karpov V. V. Marshal Zhukov. M., 1994, p. 223.
[14] Danilow W. Hat der Generalstab der Roten Armee einen Praventivkrieg gegen Deulschland vorbereitet? // Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift, 1993. No. 1. S. 41-51.
[15] Maser W. Op. cit, S. 406-422; Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Hrsg. von G. Uberschar und L. Bezymenskij. Darmstadt 1998 S. 186-193.
[16] Central archive of the RF Ministry of Defense (hereinafter - TsAMO RF), f. 16 A, op. 2951, d.237, l. 1-15; 1941 year. Documents, v. 2, p. 215-220.
[17] TSAMORPH, f. 16A, op. 2951, d.237, l. 1.
[18] In the original, the figure was first indicated as 112 divisions. - Ibid, l. 6. Compare: Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of Soviet forces in the event of a war with Germany and its allies. // New and Contemporary History, 1993, no. 3, p. 40.
[19] TsAMO RF, f. 16 A. on. 2951, d.237, l. 3. Compare: Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of Soviet forces in the event of a war with Germany and its allies. // New and Contemporary History, 1993, no. 3, p. 41; Praventivkriegsplan der Fuhrung der Roten Armee vom 15. Mai 1941. // Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. S. 187.
[20] Modern and recent history. 1993. No. 3, p. 41, 60.
[21] Ibid.
[22] According to Yu. A. Gorkov, these words were written into the text by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin. - Ibid, p. 41, approx. 2. In the collection "1941. Documents" G. K. Zhukov. - 1941. Documents, v. 2, p. 215-220.
[23] Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, f. 73, op. I, d. 46, l. 59; 1941 year. Documents, vol. I, p. 181-193, 236-253, 288-290.
[24] 1941. Documents, v. 2, p. 557.
[25] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 741.
[26] See L. A. Bezymensky. What did Stalin say on May 5, 1941? // New time, 1991, no. 19, p. 36-40; Besymenski L. Die Rede Stalins am 5. Mai 1941. Dokumentiert und inlerpretiert. // Osteuropa; Zeitschrift fur Gegenwartsfragen des Ostens, 1992, No. 3. S. 242-264. Vishlev O. V. I. V. Stalin on May 5, 1941 (Russian documents). // New and Contemporary History, 1998, no. 4; its the same. Western versions of the statements of I. V. Stalin May 5, 1941 Based on materials from the German archives. // Ibid, 1999, no. 1.
[27] According to the recollections of General of the Army Lyashchenko, who talked with Timoshenko in the 60s, the Marshal recalled that Stalin "approached Zhukov and started yelling at him:" Do you come to frighten us with war or do you want war, you have few awards, or titles? "Zhukov lost his composure, and he was taken to another room. Stalin returned to the table and rudely said:" This is all Tymoshenko is doing, he is setting everyone up for war, we should shoot him, but I know him as a good warrior since civil war. "I told him," continued Tymoshenko, "you told everyone that war is inevitable at a meeting with graduates of academies. You see," Stalin said, addressing the Politburo, "Tymoshenko is healthy and his head is big, and his brains are apparently small … I said this for the people, you need to raise their vigilance, but you need to understand that Germany will never go to war with Russia alone. You must understand that, "and left. Then he opened the door, stuck out his pockmarked head and said: "If you tease the Germans at the border, move the troops without our permission, then the heads will fly, keep in mind," - and slammed the door. " - From the archive of the author.
[28] Anfilov V. A. The road to the forty-first tragedy. M., 1997, p. 166.
[29] Gareev M. A. Decree, op., P. 201.
[30] Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941, S. 223.
[31] Ibid. S. 253.
[32] Ibid., S. 280.
[33] Draft OKH directive of January 31, 1941 on the Barbarossa plan with an approximate calculation of forces attached. - See: Ibid., S. 254-269.
[34] Ibid. S. 267-269.
[35] TsAMO RF, f. 16 A, op. 2591, d.237, l. 15. See also: New and Contemporary History, 1993, No. 3, p. 45.
[36] Gorkov Yu. A. Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff, p. 85.
[37] Biographer of Marshal Zhukov V. V. Karpov believes that Zhukov's plan was to bring success to the Red Army. - Karpov V. V. Decree, op., P. 223.
[38] Anfilov V. A. New version and reality. // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7. IV. 1999.
[39] Svetlishin N. A. Steep steps of fate. Khabarovsk. 1992, p. 57-58.
[40] Year 1941. Documents, vol. 2, p. 500.
[41] Suvorov V. Day-M. When did the second world war start? M., 1994.
[42] TsAMO RF, f. 48, op. 3408, d. 14, l. 432.
[43] Gorkov Yu. A. Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff, p. 70-72.
[44] TsAMO RF, f. 16 A. op. 2591, d. 242. l. 46-70; op. 2956, d.262, l. 22-49; on. 2551. d. 227. l. 1-35; see also: Gorkov Yu. A., Semin Yu. N. On the nature of the military-operational plans of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. // New and Contemporary History, 1997, No. 5.
[45] 1941. Documents, v. 2, p. 227.
[46] Ibid., 234-235.
[47] Ibid, 236.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Hitler's secrets are on Stalin's desk. March-June 1941 M., 1995; New documents from the archives of the SVR and the FSB of Russia on the preparation by Germany of the war with the USSR in 1940-1941. // "New and Contemporary History", 1997, No. 4; Bezymenskij L. Der sowjetische Nachrichtendienst und der Kriegsbeginn von 1941. // Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941, S. 103-115.
[50] Military units of fortified areas (UR).
[51] 1941. Documents, v. 2, p. 346.
