Who will prevail in a real fight
For a comparative assessment of the Moskva missile cruiser, one could take the Orly Burke-type URO destroyer, but this is still a ship of a different class, although it is close in terms of armament and displacement.
A simple comparison of the tactical and technical characteristics of weapons samples gives little. The reasons are simple: each state creates weapons in accordance with requirements, which are determined primarily by the content of military threats, the chosen methods and methods of neutralizing them, the general level of industry, and the specific features of military-technical schools. Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the conditions of combat use of the compared samples and the nature of the tasks they solve. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to compare performance characteristics, but the resulting combat capabilities. To do this, you must follow a specific analysis methodology.
First of all, the correct choice of candidates for comparison is important. The foreign analogue must belong to the same class as the Russian model. It is advisable that they be from about the same generation of military equipment. Although this requirement is not mandatory, since often new weapons systems, winning in one, lose to their predecessors in another. As a result, in specific conditions, when solving specific problems, a more modern model may turn out to be less effective.
The correct conditions of comparison are also important, that is, in what conflict, against which opponent, in what ways the compared samples are used. One-on-one actions are often considered. However, there are examples of military equipment that do not imply direct confrontation. As an example, anti-submarine aircraft can be cited - they simply have nothing to fight with each other. If the effectiveness of the compared samples is asymmetric in terms of combat use, it is necessary to consider various options taking into account the expected probability of their implementation.
Only after this work does it make sense to move on to the analysis of tactical and technical characteristics. At the same time, it is necessary to focus on those data that are significant in relation to the selected combat missions and the conditions of the situation. On this basis, estimates of the expected performance can be made, including in a one-on-one scheme. The calculation is made for each compared sample for all combat missions under consideration and under possible options for application conditions. Then the integral indicator of efficiency is calculated. It summarizes the results of solving all typical combat missions in predicted scenarios. This is a more or less objective characteristic of the compared tactical units. This indicator provides a comprehensive assessment of the compared samples. We can say which of them will be more effective in a real combat situation.
The economic appraisal of products is also important. But it happens that it cannot be reduced to a general equivalent.
Are called to the ring
With this in mind, let us evaluate the Russian Project 1164-class cruiser Moskva. First of all, we will find a suitable opponent for it. Without going into the details of the technology of choice, we state that the American cruiser of the Ticonderoga type is the most suitable. Representatives of this series, in fact, the only ones in foreign fleets, belonging to the class of URO cruisers, have weapons comparable to those of the "Moscow". To a certain extent, the tasks for the solution of which the compared ships were created are also similar. Their design and construction were carried out in the 70s and 80s, that is, this is one generation.
Cruiser "Moscow" project 1164
Full displacement - 11,500 tons
Length - 186.5 meters
Crew - 510 people
Full speed - 32 knots
Cruising range - 6000 miles
Photo: blackseanews.net
Belonging to a very versatile class, the ships are designed for use in all types of military conflicts. And have already shown themselves. The Russian cruiser - in repelling the aggression of Georgia in 2008 and in the Syrian events, however, in both cases without the use of weapons. American cruisers have fully operated in all armed conflicts and regional wars, from Desert Storm in 1991 to the operation against Libya in 2011.
Accordingly, we will consider two options for conditions: the actions of the compared ships in a local collision with a weak naval enemy in the interests of the Air Force and Ground Force, in a large-scale Russia-NATO war. In addition, it makes sense to consider the option: our cruiser versus the American one as part of a naval strike group (KUG). This option is quite possible, since both can act as the core of the KUG, guarded by ships of lighter classes. Here, for the sake of purity of comparison, it is advisable to accept that the striking potential of air defense systems of escort ships for the Russian and American groups is approximately the same.
In conflicts, both ships solve the following main tasks, for which a comparison is to be made: the destruction of aircraft carrier strike and multipurpose enemy groups, the destruction of KUG and KPUG, the destruction of submarines, repelling enemy air attacks, and striking ground targets.
In a local war against a naval weak enemy, taking into account the likelihood of a particular task, the weight coefficients are distributed as follows: the destruction of groups of surface ships and boats - 0, 1, the destruction of submarines - 0, 05, the reflection of the SVN - 0, 3, strikes against ground targets - 0, 55. This alignment applies to both Russian and American ships. The task of destroying the enemy aircraft carrier forces in this case, obviously, will not stand.
In a large-scale war, the weighting factors are distributed differently and differ for Russian and American ships. Their importance for "Moscow" can be assessed as follows: the destruction of aircraft carrier strike and multipurpose enemy groups - 0, 4 (including 0, 1 - from the position of tracking with weapons and 0, 3 - in an oncoming battle), the destruction of KUG and KPUG - 0, 25, submarines - 0, 1, reflection of air attack - 0, 2, strikes against ground targets - 0.05 - 0, 3, strikes against ground targets - 0, 2. Taking into account the fact that Russia has one aircraft carrier, which will operate as part of a grouping of strike forces, solving mainly the air defense tasks of this formation or in the air defense system of the sea area, the task of its destruction for American missile cruiser will be of little value.
In the red corner
The project 1164 missile cruiser with a total displacement of more than 11,000 tons has the Vulkan complex with an ammunition capacity of 16 anti-ship missiles as its main armament. The maximum firing range is up to 700 kilometers. The main anti-aircraft armament is represented by the "Fort" multichannel complex (S-300F). Ammunition - 64 missiles. The firing range is up to 90 kilometers. Anti-aircraft fire means of self-defense: two single-channel Osa-MA complexes and three batteries of two 30-mm AK-630 assault rifles. Anti-submarine armament includes two five-tube torpedo tubes and two RBU-6000. Universal artillery is represented by a double-barreled AK-130 gun of 130 mm caliber. The ship has effective electronic warfare equipment for disrupting the operation of aircraft radio electronic equipment and anti-ship missiles of anti-ship missiles. The cruiser provides for the basing of the Ka-27 helicopter. According to Western experts, the destruction or incapacitation of such ships requires a hit from four to six Harpoon anti-ship missiles or two or three Tomahawks.
In the blue corner
The Ticonderoga-class cruisers with a displacement of about 9600 tons have various types of missile weapons located in two universal vertical Mk-41 underdeck launchers with a total capacity of 122 cells. Typical load - 24-26 KR "Tomahawk", 16 PLUR ASROC and 80 SAM "Standard-2". In addition, the ship has 16 Harpoon missiles in deck launchers. The ships are equipped with an Aegis-type combat information and control system. The universal artillery is represented by two Mk-45 guns of 127 mm caliber. Anti-submarine armament includes two three-pipe torpedo tubes for small-sized anti-submarine torpedoes Mk-46. The ships have powerful sonar search tools for submarines and anti-submarine helicopters. The required number of hits from heavy Russian anti-ship missiles to disable or sink a cruiser can be estimated at one to three, for the destruction of an American aircraft carrier - at three to seven.
Meeting engagement
The most favorable situation for solving the problem of destroying an aircraft carrier by a cruiser of the "Moscow" type is firing from a tracking position with a weapon. In this case, the ship, all other conditions being equal to the AUG, is guaranteed to strike the warrant of the main forces (aircraft carrier and three or four escort ships). A volley of 16 missiles will meet opposition from multi-channel air defense systems, combat air patrol fighters and electronic warfare equipment. Up to two missiles can be shot down by fighters. The total potential of the warrant's air defense systems, ranging from 7-8 to 10-12 units, will make it possible to destroy up to 70-80 percent of the remaining salvo missiles. Electronic warfare means reduce the probability of hitting the target by another 50-60 percent. As a result, a maximum of one or two missiles will reach the aircraft carrier under the most favorable conditions. That is, the probability of an aircraft carrier being knocked out of action by such a salvo is no more than 0.2.
Cruiser USS Port Royal (CG-73) of the Ticonderoga class
Full displacement - 9800 tons
Length - 172.8 meters
Crew - 387 people
Full speed - 32 knots
Cruising range - 6000 miles
Photo: warday.info
In a meeting engagement, the chances of hitting an aircraft carrier will be significantly lower, if not zero - it will not allow our cruiser to approach at a salvo range (therefore, by the way, submarines and naval missile-carrying aircraft will play a key role in the battle with the AUG).
Our cruiser looks much better in the battle with the formations of surface ships. When operating against a KUG consisting of two or four destroyers and URO frigates, it is capable of incapacitating or sinking up to two enemy ships, while remaining invulnerable to them (due to superiority in the range of missile weapons). A strike on an amphibious squad or convoy will destroy three or four ships from their composition. That is, the combat effectiveness of our cruiser in this confrontation can be estimated at 0, 3–0, 5.
The effectiveness of a ship's air defense system in repelling a strike from a squadron of tactical aircraft or a missile salvo of 12-16 Tomahawk / Harpoon missiles is determined (based on open data) at 0.3-0.6 depending on the type of air attack.
Options are possible
In strikes against ground targets, our cruiser will use the Vulcan anti-ship missile system. In this case, the possibility of hitting targets should be assessed in two or three point objects to a depth of 600-650 kilometers from the coast. Considering that the purpose of such strikes is to disrupt the functioning of any system, in particular air defense or command and control in a certain area, the effectiveness of actions must be compared with the total number of targets that need to be hit. If we are talking about the aforementioned complex systems, then there may be 20 or more point objects even in a separate limited area. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the impact is estimated at 0, 1 and less.
The capabilities of our cruiser to combat submarines are calculated according to the criterion of the probability of destroying a submarine before it reaches the position of a torpedo salvo. This indicator depends on many factors, but the most important is the energy detection range of the target of the ship's SAC. Taking into account the whole complex of factors, I estimate this probability for our cruiser at 0, 3–0, 6, depending on the hydro-acoustic conditions and the type of submarine.
Similar figures for the cruiser "Ticonderoga" are as follows. The destruction of groups of surface ships (KUG, KPUG, landing squads and convoys) is roughly equivalent: three or four surface ships or 0.3-0.5. The effectiveness of the fight against submarines, taking into account a more powerful SAC, can be 0.5-0.9 Solution of air defense problems - 0, 4–0, 7 depending on the type of air defense systems. The defeat of ground targets "Tomahawks" - six to eight point targets to a depth of up to a thousand kilometers, that is, 0, 2–0, 4.
In a duel situation, all other things being equal, Moscow, due to its significant superiority in firing range, has the ability to disable or sink an American cruiser with a probability of up to 0.5–0.7, without itself entering the enemy's engagement zone.
In conditions of mutual detection at the range of the Ticonderoga missiles, the chances of the latter are higher. However, the likelihood of such an event is extremely small. To reach the salvo position, the "American" will have to approach our ship, being in the range of his weapons for several hours.
Win by points
The analysis carried out makes it possible to derive an integral indicator of compliance with the designation of two ships. For a Russian cruiser, it is: for local wars - 0, 23, and for large-scale - 0, 28. For the "American" these figures are 0, 39 and 0, 52, respectively. That is, in terms of the degree of compliance of the ship's combat effectiveness with its purpose, our cruiser is inferior to the "American" by about 40 percent. However, in a duel situation, the Russian ship beats the opponent due to its significant superiority in the range of weapon use.
The main reason is that our cruiser is more specialized as an attack cruiser, designed to deal with large groups of enemy surface ships. At the same time, its capabilities to solve the main task - the defeat of the AUG are relatively small, while the cruiser "Ticonderoga" is more versatile and focused on solving a wide range of tasks that are relevant in a wider range of possible situations.
