Parts loyal to Assad have to be built from scratch
Over the past week, Syrian government forces have reported on several successful operations, in particular in the northwest of the country in the so-called Salma enclave, where a Russian front-line bomber Su-24M was shot down last November. True, so far it has not been possible to completely clear the area of militants. But thanks to decisive and active actions, the troops loyal to Assad were able to take the city of Salma.
The victory of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) came with great difficulty. And yet it should be noted: in comparison with last year's battles in the same area, in fact, a positional "meat grinder", when at the cost of heavy losses government troops took an insignificant hill in order to be driven out of there in a few hours, the professionalism and training of the armed formations of Damascus are steadily growing.
The CAA owes its successes to the Russian military and not only the special-purpose air brigade, but also to advisers, specialists who train personnel and help them master the latest weapons and military equipment.
Damascus forces
Our military were called by Damascus as advisers and worked in the country long before the start of the civil war. A fairly large number of Syrian military personnel were trained at Russian military universities, in particular at the Combined Arms Academy.
According to a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, familiar with the pre-war situation, the main problems of the CAA were an elementary shortage of trained people, low staffing of units and subunits. “If the officer corps is sufficiently well trained, then with the sergeant, and especially with the rank and file, there were enough problems. In fact, there were no brigades, regiments, etc. deployed in the wartime state. In case of war, it was planned to replenish them with conscripts from the reserve. All specialists - signalmen, artillerymen, engineers, etc. turned out to be such only on paper. In fact, these are just guys with machine guns who really didn’t know how to shoot,”the VPK interlocutor assesses the situation.
The military-political leadership of Syria supported only a few mechanized brigades, the Republican Guard and special forces in a high degree of readiness. But even in these units and subdivisions, the manning level rarely exceeded 70 percent.
“Two Syrian special forces divisions had excellent training before the war. True, in our understanding it is rather an analogue of the Airborne Forces. The Republican Guard is well equipped with both equipment and personnel. In fact, it is an army within an army. The guardsmen have their own artillery, airborne and special forces units. The SAA was mostly recruited by conscripts, while the Republican Guard consisted mostly of professional military personnel,”explains a Defense Ministry spokesman familiar with the pre-war Syrian army.
It is noteworthy that, with the participation of Russian advisers, the SAA, before the start of the civil war, conducted exercises to deploy several divisions, when personnel were called up from the reserve, equipment was removed from storage, etc.
Since the beginning of the first battles in 2011, the number of Russian military advisers and specialists has dropped sharply. In particular, judging by the photographs of the radio technical center on Tal al-Khara mountain near Der'a, seized in 2014 by the militants of the Syrian Free Army, there were no Russian military personnel at the facility for a long time. Although not all of the Russian contingent left Syria. Our specialists continued to provide assistance to the armed forces of Damascus, teaching servicemen to use and operate the weapons and military equipment transferred to them, in particular the Smerch and Uragan MLRS.
Causes of losses
The main problem of the Syrian army in the civil war was the high decline in trained personnel. Soldiers, sergeants and officers not only died in battle. A fairly large percentage went over to the side of various opposition and terrorist groups.
The SAA command tried to compensate for the shortage of military personnel with the massive use of tanks and other armored vehicles. Suffice it to say that, until recently, the government T-72, T-55, BMP-1, fighting in urban areas, which appeared on video and photo chronicles, were the symbols of the Syrian civil war.
The country's leadership tried several times to solve the problem of the shortage of personnel by carrying out partial mobilization. To no avail. As a result, the stake was made on volunteer detachments that were formed in districts and settlements, whose fighters had to defend their homes and families with arms in hand.
But if in the remaining units and subdivisions of the SAA, at least combat training was organized, then the volunteers are ordinary civilians, without the required combat skills, simply armed by the government and fighting terrorists. Although only a small part of the volunteers directly participated in hostilities. The bulk primarily serves at checkpoints and patrols the territory. Another serious problem is that volunteer units only fight on their own land, in the area from which they are recruited, and refuse to obey orders to transfer them to other areas.
With the beginning of the operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, government forces were unable to turn the tide. Despite the massive use of armored vehicles and artillery, there was not enough trained personnel to consolidate the success.
According to the Military-Industrial Courier, along with the deployment of a special-purpose air brigade and the creation of the Khmeimim air base at the Basil Al-Assad International Airport, the Russian leadership in the fall of 2015 increased the number of military advisers and instructors, who now had to solve two important tasks. First, to create more or less trained units from scattered detachments and battalions. Secondly, to establish a system of evacuation and repair of damaged armored vehicles.
It should be noted that the problem of returning to service out of order combat vehicles by 2015 faced the Syrian command is very acute. As the terrorist detachments were saturated with relatively modern anti-tank weapons, the losses of weapons and military equipment of government troops also grew, which were often not compensated by deliveries by the "Syrian express" (the informal name for military assistance to the Russian Federation - AR). According to sources of the "Military-Industrial Courier" familiar with the situation, the main material losses of the Syrian government forces are knocked-out armored vehicles abandoned on the battlefield, which can not only be evacuated, but also restored and returned to service.
It is clear that with such an attitude towards evacuation and repair, the situation will not be saved even by continuous military assistance, including the supply of the latest T-90 tanks, heavy flamethrower and artillery systems.
Return to duty
The Russian military department is trying not to advertise the presence of our military advisers and specialists, but it also does not deny it. As already noted, at the present time, in various social networks and on video hosting sites, there are a lot of stories about the work of the Russian military in Syria ("MIC", №№ 1-2, 2016 - "Trace of our infantryman"). The field of activity for them is huge. So, in the video, which shows the instruction of the Syrian volunteer snipers, mastering the handling of the SVD, the very low training of the fighters is striking.
According to the "Military-Industrial Courier", in general, work with volunteer formations turned out to be the most difficult. Despite the fact that many militias have several years of war behind them, few know how to shoot accurately, move competently on the battlefield, not to mention poor physical training. Volunteer commanders, mostly chosen by the fighters themselves from among the most authoritative, in their opinion, colleagues, are often unable to make correct decisions in a difficult situation, competently lead personnel not only in battle, but also in everyday life.
A big problem remains the discipline of personnel who stood throughout the war at various checkpoints and were unwilling to engage in normal combat training. Also, according to available data, the problem of ex-territoriality remained unresolved. The militias are ready to defend only their homes and are not willing to move to other areas.
In fact, volunteers have to be trained from scratch. First, individual training, only then coordination in the composition of squads, platoons, companies, only after that - the entire battalion.
Government regular troops not only have richer combat experience, but are also much more disciplined. But in the units and subdivisions of the SAA, there is still a shortage of competent officers and sergeants, because over almost five years of the civil war, the regular army, as already mentioned, suffered very serious losses.
But if the individual training of its fighters is at a sufficiently high level, then it is necessary to teach servicemen, even from special forces regiments, to act as part of a squad, platoon, company and battalion, like militias, in fact from scratch.
Another problem of the Syrian regular units and subunits is the low staffing level. According to available data, in platoons from 20 to 30 people on the staff of "live" fighters sometimes not recruited even a dozen, including the commander.
An equally difficult task for Russian military advisers and instructors was the organization of interaction between the commanders of brigades, divisions and military command and control bodies. Until recently, hostilities in Syria actually represented the chaotic movements of militia units, individual companies and battalions of the regular Syrian army in different directions, often without even a single plan.
According to an interlocutor of the "Military-Industrial Courier" familiar with the situation, the disunity of the pro-government forces was the biggest problem. In particular, the gunners and pilots in most cases acted independently, without looking back at the ground forces.
The exact data on how long the training cycle of one SSA battalion or militia detachment lasts has not been disclosed. It can be assumed that we are talking about a period of at least six months. In particular, if the first units and subdivisions of the pro-government forces under the leadership of Russian instructors began to prepare in September 2015, then their debut was just the battles in the "Salma enclave", which became the indisputable success of the offensive.
Syrian units and subunits undergoing training receive not only a new field uniform, but also body armor, protective helmets, in particular Russian 6 B43, 6 B45 and 6 B27, both directly from the factory and from the reserves of the Russian army. For example, the 6 B45 bulletproof vest removed from the deceased Syrian, previously transferred from the warehouses of the RF Armed Forces, with the unwritten surname of the former owner, was used by the militants of the IS banned in our country as proof that they allegedly killed a Russian serviceman. Judging by the photo and video chronicles, the Russian military is also handing over small arms to their Syrian colleagues: machine guns, machine guns, sniper rifles.
As vehicles, the pro-government troops receive two-axle GAZ-3308 Sadko trucks, which were previously replaced in the Russian army during the transition to a new look by Mustangs and transferred to storage bases. Unfortunately, some of the GAZ vehicles, according to the photographs circulated by IS, fell into the hands of the fighting units of this terrorist organization as trophies during the recent battles in eastern Syria.
According to our calculations, over the past six months, with the help of Russian advisers, at least one FSA brigade and several battalions (detachments) of militias have been re-equipped and received new equipment. Our military experts and advisers have achieved significant success in training Syrian military personnel. Units and subunits loyal to Damascus are already beginning to organize interaction not only with each other, but also with aviation, artillery, etc. True, so far we see an increased professional level only among the troops operating mainly in the Salma region, where, most likely, according to the decision taken, the main efforts are concentrated.
But the enemy should not be underestimated either. While the successful offensive of the Syrian troops near the Turkish border was underway, in the east of the country in the Deir Ez-Zor region, ISIS counterattacked troops loyal to President Assad, not only pushing them out, but also taking a large number of trophies.
One of the most pressing problems of the Syrian Arab Army is the traditionally low culture of maintenance and repair of military equipment. The low general level of training of personnel did not allow to properly operate a fairly variegated fleet of weapons and military equipment.
From the technical illiteracy of the operators suffered not only such complex models as anti-aircraft missile systems, but also much simpler ones - tanks, towed artillery pieces, infantry fighting vehicles. According to a representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, familiar with the pre-war situation, due to improper storage and operation of artillery systems, most of them were constantly leaking anti-recoil fluid, weapon stabilizers and radio stations did not work on armored vehicles. Batteries were constantly plundered, and those that remained in stock practically did not hold a charge. Not only the crews of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, ACS crews, but also the commanders of units and subunits, as well as their deputies for the technical part, did not monitor the oil level in the engines, refilling was carried out at the wrong time. Despite the high dustiness, the filters were not changed; at best, they were cleaned by hand.
In the late 1990s - early 2000s, Syria upgraded about two hundred T-72 tanks, installing on them the Italian TURMS-T fire control systems with a laser rangefinder and a ballistic computer.
Such "seventy-second" were armed with the elite units of the Republican Guard, which differed from the Syrian Arab army in more trained and technically competent personnel, and nevertheless, no more than two dozen vehicles survived until the start of the civil war. Moreover, the Italian LMS TURMS-T, due to improper operation and poor maintenance, were the first to fail.
One-time approach
With the beginning of full-scale battles between formations loyal to the Assad government and anti-government groups, our specialists continued to carry out their tasks, although a significant part returned to their homeland. The number of military experts has slightly increased since the Syrian Express was actively launched in 2012. We are talking about large-scale supplies of Russian weapons and military equipment to government forces. The name is given by analogy with the famous "Tokyo Express" (the delivery by the imperial fleet of aid to the troops fighting on the Guadalcanal in 1942), since large landing ships were used to transport various goods to Syria, making transitions from our Black Sea ports to Latakia and Tartus. T-72, BMP-1, armored personnel carriers, GAZ-3308 "Sadko" cars, MLRS "Grad" and other samples were transferred to Damascus.
According to information from the military-industrial complex, after the transfer of the Smerch and Uragan multiple launch rocket systems to the pro-government forces, Russian specialists trained the military not only to use these complex systems, but also to maintain them and carry out routine repairs. True, the low level of technical training of the SAA personnel, as well as the often unjustified use of vehicles in battle, with which the commanders compensated for the shortage of infantry, led to large losses.
In most cases, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, which received minimal damage, simply rushed onto the battlefield without trying to evacuate them. At the same time, in the reserve of the SAA, there was still a huge number of pieces of equipment that were out of order since pre-war times, which, after restoration, could be directed against terrorists. According to the well-known "MIC" estimates of observers, the Syrian servicemen have developed a kind of stereotype: why should they spare arms and military equipment if new ones are sent anyway.
Inflated from the north
At the end of the summer of 2015, the newest Russian BTR-82 armed with a 30-mm automatic cannon appeared at the pro-government formations. It is not entirely clear who drove the armored personnel carriers - the Syrian military personnel or the Russian instructors. On the videos common on the Web, Russian speech is sometimes clearly audible.
If the use of the BTR-82 was nevertheless episodic, then the appearance of the T-90 tanks in the SAA attracted close attention of domestic and foreign media. The exact number of the "nineties" transferred to Damascus is unknown, but according to the "MIC", there are not more than two dozen of them so far. The newest tanks came from the presence of the Russian defense department, as evidenced, in particular, by the characteristic three-color deforming paint scheme for combat vehicles.
Why the choice was made in favor of the T-90, and not currently actively supplied to the Ground Forces of the RF Armed Forces of the modernized T-72B3, there is no unambiguous explanation. According to a source of "VPK" familiar with the situation, preference was given to the "ninetieth" due to its better protection in urban combat conditions, as well as when the enemy uses anti-tank weapons. The elements of the Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armor installed on the T-90, combined with the thickness and shape of the armor, make it possible to secure the turret more effectively than the T-72B3 against damage from hand-held grenade launchers. At the same time, the Shtora complex can not only warn the tank's crew about laser targeting and place a smoke screen, but also hit the radiation source by deploying the turret in the “Transfer” mode at high speed in the desired direction.
True, according to the interlocutor of the "VPK", in a city battle, a tank is not always hit by RPG fire at the turret, often at the sides. In this case, the side protection of both the T-90 and T-72B3 is equally weak. But as the experience of urban battles in Syria shows, with relatively narrow streets and multi-storey buildings, terrorists mainly fire from the upper floors, trying to hit the tank in the least protected, from their point of view, part - the top sheet, a place just reliably covered on T -90 elements of dynamic protection.
Interestingly, some of the "nineties" transferred to Syria are older machines with a so-called cast turret, although there are modern models with welded armor. If we compare all the facts, we can assume that the 20th motorized rifle brigade from Volgograd most likely said goodbye to a part of their "nineties". She was the only one where "cast" T-90s still remained. Videos have already appeared on the Internet, where one of the opposition detachments allegedly destroys the "ninetieth" anti-tank complex "Tou-2". The representatives of the Ministry of Defense interviewed by "MIC", familiar with the situation, did not refute, but did not confirm this fact either. And yet, with a high degree of certainty, it can be argued that the old Syrian T-72 is being hit in the video.
The training of tankers on the T-90 by Russian military specialists, in particular the development of the MSA and the Shtora complex, took several months. In addition to using onboard equipment, Syrian crews were trained in the maintenance and repair of all elements of the vehicle. As the interlocutor of the "MIC" said: "In the volumes established by the regulatory documents."
In addition to the T-90, the SAA also received the TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems, also from the reserves of the Russian army. The training of the Syrian crews of "Solntsepek" took much less time than the crews on the T-90, due to the fact that it was decided to use the TOS only for firing from closed positions. Accordingly, the course of combat training was significantly reduced. In addition, the situation prevailing at the time of delivery to Syria of the TOS required to enter the "Solntsepeki" into battle as soon as possible, so the crews were staffed from experienced artillerymen, which was not difficult to train.
With the beginning of the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces, another major task for our military specialists was the organization of a system for the restoration of weapons and military equipment, including those that had been in storage for a long time. According to calculations known to the "military-industrial complex", the pre-war stocks in combination with the earlier delivered "Syrian express" cars are more than enough to fight the terrorists. But if the government troops continue to be guided by the principle "Do not regret, they will still give more," then no supplies, especially now, when the intensity of the fighting has increased many times over, will not save the situation.
Repairs on an industrial scale
According to some reports, several factories have already been restored in Syria, where they repair not only tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but also artillery and even air defense systems. Evacuation units have been created and trained to take out damaged and out-of-order equipment from the battlefield. There were also maneuvering groups sent to the Syrian units for the repair and maintenance of weapons and military equipment.
In the process of restoring Syrian armored vehicles, its modernization is also being carried out, in particular to increase security. Earlier in the course of the war, government forces had built up it by handicraft methods, attaching additional sandbags to tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and even self-propelled artillery and anti-aircraft installations, welded on various elements, including the anti-cumulative "bed" grilles so beloved by the Ukrainian military.
At present, additional booking has ceased to be chaotic and has moved into the category of centralized work, when standard protective elements are installed on military equipment. But proactive fighters of government units often self-defend their tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and self-propelled guns in such a way that they turn them into true works of art.
The technical support system created with the help of Russian military experts does not always work effectively, although the situation with damaged and evacuated vehicles is improving. A common problem remains the poor technical literacy of personnel, especially former militias, who, like before the war, do not always want to do difficult and sometimes tedious work.
The complexity of the tasks facing the military experts can hardly be overestimated - this is the restoration of equipment, and the retraining of wards for new models of weapons and military equipment. It is a pity that, against the background of large-scale battles, such work is often practically invisible. But without it, victory in the ongoing civil war is unattainable.
