As you know, on February 6, 1922, an international conference on the limitation of naval arms ended in the capital of the United States, which resulted in the conclusion of the "Washington Naval Agreement of 1922". According to one of the provisions of the document, a number of battleships were supposed to be excluded from the composition of the five fleets, including the American one, so that the total tonnage of ships of this class would be within the limits stipulated by the agreement. In particular, the Americans had to immediately disable and send for scrap 13 battleships: six of the "Connecticut" type,
five types of "Virginia"
and two types of "Maine"
In this regard, Senator-Republican from Maryland D. France (Joseph Irwin France) on July 5 of the same year submitted to the US Congress a bill, according to which the President of the country received the right to transfer the Rzeczpospolita II ships intended, in accordance with the Washington Agreement, to write-off.
In Poland, the initiative of the American senator became known on July 13, 1922, when the Second Department of the General Staff (Oddział II Sztabu General¬nego) received from Washington from the Polish military attaché Major K. Mach (KazimierzMach) a telegram with information about the bill and a request for an immediate an answer about the availability of the necessary means for the delivery of ships to Gdynia.
Mach's report caused a commotion in the Ministry of Military Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wojskowych) and the organizationally subordinate Department of Naval Affairs (Departament dla Spraw Morskich). The very next day, a letter (L.2310 / 22 Tjn. Pln.) Was sent to the head of the Ministry of Military Affairs from the head of the fleet headquarters, Commander Czesław Karol Petelenz, who at that time was replacing the head of the Polish navy, vice -Admiral Kazimierz Porębski (Kazimierz Porębski, aka Kazimir Adolfovich Porembsky, the last position in the Russian imperial fleet - the head of the Black Sea cruiser brigade with the rank of Rear Admiral). The letter cited the following arguments in favor of accepting, if received, the American proposal for the free transfer of battleships to Poland.
Firstly, in accordance with the latest proposal of the British members of the Disarmament Commission in Paris, the principle of limiting naval forces should be extended to other member states of the League of Nations in such a way that newly built ships would have the same combat value as previous similar ones. class, while not intended to increase the fleet, but only to replace the disabled. Until 1930, all countries undertake not to sell, donate or build for other countries warships with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons. If this proposal is approved at the next meeting scheduled for September 4, 1922, the young Polish fleet will be deprived of practical opportunities to acquire warships with a displacement of over 10,000 tons.
Secondly, Petelents wrote, referring to the words of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Brigadier General J. Rybak (Józef Rybak, the last post in the Austro-Hungarian army - chief of staff of the 59th Infantry Division with the rank of major), the needs of the state's defense required the construction of a number of fortresses along Pomor corridor to prevent enemy invasion from the sea. Since the American battleships were armed with 152-305 mm guns, when they were introduced to the Polish Navy, there was no need to build expensive coastal fortifications, since the battleships could be used as floating coastal batteries.
At the same time, General Rybak noted that the acquisition of even two such ships will require more than doubling the budget and the personnel of the fleet. In conclusion, Commander Petelents listed several proposals. The Polish government is interested in the proposed bill passed by Congress, and if this happens, a naval officer and engineer should be sent to America in order to establish contact with the Federal Government of the United States and the Department of the Navy for subsequent joint development of a program for the transfer of battleships and an estimate of the estimated costs. Since the adoption and maintenance of six battleships will be organizationally too complicated and financially burdensome for Poland, it makes sense to donate two of them to Yugoslavia and Romania in exchange for any concessions in order to extract political, military and economic benefits.
As an annex to the report, an approximate cost estimate for the delivery of one Rhode Island-class battleship from New York to Gdansk was presented. The calculation was based on the assumption that the ship would cover a distance of about 4,000 miles in 400 sailing hours at an average speed of 10-11 knots. The fuel consumption in this case should be about 5 tons per hour.
Technical expenses (2,500 tons of coal, other consumables, water and similar items, salary for the machine team) - 25,000, 00 USD. Delivery of officers and lower ranks to the USA - 50,000, 00 USD. Maintenance of the ship's crew in America for one month - 96,000, 00 USD. Monthly maintenance of the crew during the passage - 84,000, 00 USD. The total cost of the delivery of one battleship to Poland was tentatively supposed to be at least 255,000.00 USD, which was then equivalent to 1,230,000,000.00 Polish marks. At the same time, according to the "Budget estimate", the usual and extraordinary (new shipbuilding) expenses of the Polish Navy for 1923 were planned in the amount of 22,245,000,000.00 Polish marks, which was equivalent to 4,600,000.00 USD … Thus, just for the delivery of two battleships, without the inevitable subsequent repair work and the installation of additional equipment, it would be necessary to spend more than 11% of the annual budget of the navy.
In addition, the crew of the battleship consisted of 40 officers and 772 non-commissioned officers and sailors, while in September 1921 the existing composition of the Polish fleet consisted of 175 officers and 2,508 non-commissioned officers and sailors. Consequently, the adoption by the fleet of only two dreadnoughts would inevitably entail an increase in the number of officers by 45% and by 62% non-commissioned officers and sailors. The ordinary budget of the fleet, according to some estimates, should have increased by 100%.
The solution of practical issues related to the inclusion of American battleships in the fleet depended on the Polish Council of Ministers. On July 14, 1922, the Minister of Military Affairs, Divisional General K. Sosnkowski (Kazimierz Sosnkowski - a former colonel of the Austro-Hungarian army, the commander of the 1st brigade of the "Polish Legions", organizationally part of the imperial and royal armies) informed the Council of Ministers about the draft law of donating to Poland five, as he mistakenly stated, cruisers. Despite the resistance of the Minister of Finance Zygmunt Jastrzębski, it was decided to accept the gift from the United States, and to recommend to the Polish Embassy in Washington, if the Senate passed a positive decision, that the members of the Polish diaspora take measures to collect part of the funds needed to deliver the ships to Poland.
The next day, in a reply telegram to the military attaché, Major K. Mach, it was informed that the country's council of ministers would agree, if received, to the American proposal.
However, four days later, secret report No.1014 / T sent by the adviser of the Polish Embassy in Washington M. Kwapiszewski dispelled all illusions. As clarified by Kwapiszewski, Senator France's request concerned the authorization of the president to transfer ships of the line, if this does not conflict with the provisions of the Washington Agreement. However, Article XVIII of the Agreement prohibited the donation, sale or any other form of transfer of warships to third countries. Thus, the transfer of pre-dreadnoughts to Poland would be illegal, so the France bill, for legal reasons, initially had no chance of adoption.
According to confidential information obtained by Kwapiszewski, the prospects for re-election of Senator France, Maryland, are dim. Hence, it can be assumed that Senator France, who through unofficial channels received information about the upcoming sale for scrapping of battleships, in view of the uncertain prospects of his re-election in the upcoming elections, decided to win additional votes from the Poles living in Maryland to his side.
According to the US Historical Cen¬sus Browser for 1920, the population of Maryland, according to the census conducted in the same 1920, was 1,449,661 people. Moreover, about 11% of the more than 862,000 white citizens eligible to vote belonged to national minorities. The largest group of immigrants were immigrants from Russia (24,791 people), followed by Germans (22,032 people), Poles (12,061, including 11,109 people in Baltimore) and Italians (9,543 people). Thus, the seemingly noble gesture of Senator France was actually a political game that had no chance of success.
However, the story of the transfer of American battleships to Poland, despite the explanation of the adviser to the Polish embassy, took on a life of its own.
A month later, on August 18, 1922, the deputy chief of the General Military Control (Wojskowa Kontrola Generalna), Lieutenant Colonel Jan Kuciel (former lieutenant of the 30th Infantry Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army), in a secret letter (L.1710 / 22 WBT) requested the chief The Administration of the Army (Administracja Armii - an institution dealing with the material needs of the army), should not the quartermaster service, in order to minimize the cost of delivering battleships to Poland, consider placing associated commercial cargo on board ships. In a reply letter dated 24 August (L. 11944), Division General A. Osinsky (Aleksander Osiński, aka Osinsky Alexander Antonovich, the last position in the Russian Imperial Army - the commander of an infantry division with the rank of Major General) replied that, due to the impossibility of transferring battleships, case closed.
It became possible to get acquainted with the case of the possible donation of six (according to other sources, five) battleships to Poland thanks to the recollections of Captain V. Kosianowski, who served in the period described in the Pinsk flotilla (Flotylla Pińska) as the commander of the ORP Toruń monitor
As well as documents stored in the Central Military Archives in Rembertow (Centralny Archiwum Wojskowy w Rembertowie) and the Central State Archives in Warsaw (Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie).
