US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)

US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)
US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)

Video: US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)

Video: US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)
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In the second half of the 70s, it became quite obvious that neither side was capable of winning the global nuclear conflict. In this regard, the United States began to actively promote the concept of "limited nuclear war". American strategists considered possible the scenario of the local use of nuclear weapons in a limited geographic area of the territory. First of all, it was about Western Europe, where the USSR and the ATS countries had a significant superiority over NATO forces in conventional weapons. In parallel with this, the strategic nuclear forces were being improved.

As you know, at the beginning of the 70s, the naval component of the American strategic nuclear forces, in terms of the number of deployed strategic carriers, practically equaled the number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers. A big advantage of missile submarines on combat patrol is their invulnerability to a sudden disarming nuclear missile strike. However, when comparing the American Minuteman ICBMs with a range of 9300-13000 km and the Polaris A-3 and Poseidon SLBMs with a range of 4600-5600 km, it is clear that missile boats must approach the enemy coast to successfully complete a combat mission … In this regard, the command of the US Navy pushed the development of the strategic weapons system ULMS (English Undersea Long-range Missile System). The basis of the system was to be SSBN with new extended-range missiles that could be launched immediately after leaving the base.

At the first stage, in order to minimize the costs associated with the conversion of existing strategic missile carriers, within the framework of the EXPO program (Expanded Poseidon), it was decided to create a new SLBM in the dimensions of the UGM-73 Poseidon C-3. Quite predictably, the tender for the development of a promising rocket in 1974 was won by the Lockheed corporation, the creator and manufacturer of the Polaris and Poseidons.

US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)
US Navy nuclear baton (part of 7)

Flight tests of the missile, designated UGM-96A Trident I (also used Trident I C-4), began at Cape Canaveral in January 1977. And the first launch from the USS Francis Scott Key (SSBN-657) of the Benjamin Franklin class took place in July 1979. In October of the same year, this SSBN became the first nuclear submarine to go on combat patrols with the UGM-96A Trident I SLBM.

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To increase the launch range, the Trident-1 rocket was made in three stages. In this case, the third stage is located in the central opening of the instrument compartment. For the manufacture of casings for solid-fuel engines, a well-developed technology of winding the fiber with its sizing with epoxy resin was used. At the same time, unlike the Polaris A-3 and Poseidon missiles, which used fiberglass and carbon fiber, the Trident used Kevlar thread to reduce the mass of the engines. The substance "nitrolane" mixed with polyurethane was used as a solid fuel. Pitch and yaw control on each engine was controlled by a swinging nozzle made of graphite-based material. Achievements in the field of microelectronics have reduced the mass of the electronic equipment block in the guidance and control system, in comparison with a similar block of the Poseidon rocket, by more than half. The use of lighter and stronger materials for the manufacture of engine casings, nozzles and thrust vector controls, as well as the use of rocket fuel with a high specific impulse and the introduction of the third stage made it possible to increase the firing range of the Trident-1 missile in comparison with the Poseidon by about 2300 km - that is, at a distance equal to the firing range of the first American SLBM Polaris A-1.

The three-stage UGM-96A Trident I SLBM with a length of 10, 36 m and a diameter of 1, 8 m had a launch mass, depending on the equipment option: 32, 3 - 33, 145 tons. individual guidance equipped with W76 thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of 100 kt each.

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The W76 thermonuclear warhead was developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and was in production from 1978 to 1987. Rockwell International has assembled 3,400 warheads at the Rockyflatt Nuclear Plant in Golden, Colorado.

To aim warheads at the target, the so-called "bus principle" was used. Its essence is as follows: the head part of the rocket, having carried out astro-correction of its position, aims at the first target and fires the warhead, which flies to the target along the ballistic trajectory, after which the position of the propulsion system of the warheads breeding system is re-corrected, and the targeting takes place at the second target and shoot the next warhead. A similar procedure is repeated for each warhead. If all warheads are aiming at one target, then a program is put into the guidance system that allows you to strike with a separation in time. The maximum firing range is 7400 km. Thanks to the use of astrocorrection, for which there was an optical telescope and a star sensor on the vidicon on board the rocket, the KVO was within 350 m. If the astrocorrection equipment failed, guidance was provided with the help of an inertial system, in this case the KVO was increased to 800 m.

The launch procedure for the UGM-96A Trident I was no different from the SLBMs already in service. Approximately 15 minutes after receiving the appropriate order, the first rocket could be launched from the submarine in a submerged position. After the pressure in the launch shaft is equalized with the outboard pressure and the strong cover of the shaft is opened, the rocket in the launch cup is isolated from water only by a thin destructible dome-shaped membrane made of phenolic resin reinforced with asbestos fiber. In the process of launching the rocket, the membrane is destroyed with the help of profiled explosive charges installed on its inner side, which allows the rocket to freely exit the mine. The rocket is ejected by a gas-vapor mixture produced by a powder pressure generator. The resulting propellant gases pass through the water chamber, are cooled and diluted with condensed steam. After leaving the water, the engine of the first stage is started at an altitude of 10-20 m. Together with the rocket, elements of the launch cup are thrown overboard.

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As mentioned in the previous parts of the review, the first American SSBNs of the "George Washington" type, created on the basis of torpedo nuclear submarines of the "Skipjack" type, experienced serious difficulties maintaining a given depth during missile launches. This drawback was largely eliminated on the Aten Allen-class boats, but it was finally possible to get rid of the unstable horizontal position during missile launches on the Lafayette-class SSBNs, the modernized Benjamin Franklin and James Madison types. It was possible to solve the problem of stable maintenance of a given depth after the creation of special automata that control the operation of gyroscopic stabilizing devices and pumping water ballast, keeping the boat from sinking into depth or abrupt ascent.

As already mentioned, the new missile was created mainly to increase the strike capabilities of nuclear missile boats already in service. It must be said that the fundamental difference in the design of American SSBNs from the approach adopted in the USSR was the standardization in the creation of the SLBM-launch silo complex. In the Soviet design bureaus, a boat was designed for each new rocket. Initially, three sizes of missile silo diameters for SLBMs were established in the United States:

"A" - with a diameter of 1.37 m.

"C" - with a diameter of 1.88 m.

"D" - with a diameter of 2, 11 m.

At the same time, initially the mines on SSBNs were designed and manufactured at a slightly higher height than SLBMs, which are in service, so to speak, "for growth." Initially, it was planned to re-equip 31 SSBNs with 16 Poseidon SLBMs with extended-range missiles. Also, 8 boats of the new generation of the "Ohio" type with 24 missiles were to enter service. However, due to financial constraints, these plans have undergone significant adjustments. During the overhaul of the UGM-96A Trident I SLBM, six James Madison-class submarines and six Benjamin Franklin-class submarines were re-equipped.

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The first eight boats of the new generation of the Ohio type were armed with Trident-1 missiles as planned. At the time of their creation, all the achievements of American submarine shipbuilding were concentrated in these strategic missile carriers. Based on the experience of operating SSBNs of the first and second generation, the engineers of Electric Boat not only increased stealth and striking power, but also tried to provide maximum comfort for the crew. Particular attention was also paid to extending the life of the reactor. According to data published by the developer of the S8G reactor, General Electric Corporation, its resource without replacing the core is about 100 thousand hours of active operation, which is equivalent to about 10 years of reactor operation. On boats of the Lafayette type this figure is about 2 times less. Increasing the operating time of the reactor without replacing nuclear fuel made it possible to extend the overhaul interval, which in turn had a positive effect on the number of boats in combat service and made it possible to reduce operating costs.

The entry of the lead boat USS Ohio (SSBN-726) into the combat strength of the fleet took place in November 1981. The boats of this type have a record number of missile silos - 24. However, the submarine displacement of the Ohio SSBN inspires respect - 18,750 tons. The length of the submarine is 170.7 m, the width of the hull is 12.8 m. Thus, with a significant increase geometrical dimensions, the underwater displacement of the Ohio SSBN in comparison with the Lafayette-class SSBN has increased by almost 2, 3 times. The use of special grades of steel: HY-80/100 - with a yield point of 60-84 kgf / mm made it possible to increase the maximum immersion depth up to 500 m. Working depth - up to 360 m. The maximum underwater speed - up to 25 knots.

Thanks to the use of a number of original design solutions, the Ohio-class submarines, in comparison with the Lafayette-class SSBNs, reduced their noise from 134 to 102 dB. Among the technical innovations that made it possible to achieve this: a single-shaft propulsion system, flexible couplings, various connecting devices and shock absorbers to isolate the propeller shaft and pipelines, a lot of noise-absorbing inserts and sound insulation inside the hull, the use of a low-noise mode of minimum stroke with the exclusion of circulating pumps from the operation and the use of low-speed low-noise screws of a special shape.

Despite the impressive characteristics of the boat, the cost was also impressive. Without a missile system, the lead boat cost the US military budget $ 1.5 billion. However, the admirals were able to convince legislators of the need to build two series with a total of 18 submarines. The construction of the boats lasted from 1976 to 1997.

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For the sake of fairness, it must be said that the Ohio-class nuclear submarine missile carriers are indeed very good. Thanks to their high technical perfection, large margin of safety and significant modernization potential, all built boats are still in service. Initially, all Ohio-class SSBNs were stationed at the Bangor Naval Base, Washington, on the Pacific coast. They became part of the 17th squadron and replaced the decommissioned missile boats of the George Washington and Aten Allen type with Polaris A-3 missiles. SSBNs like "James Madison" and "Benjamin Franklin" based mainly on the Atlantic base Kings Bay (Georgia), and operated until the mid-90s. It must be said that the intensity of the use of boats armed with Trident-1 missiles was high. Each boat, on average, went on three combat patrols a year, lasting up to 60 days. The last UGM-96A Trident I missiles were decommissioned in 2007. Dismantled W76 warheads have been used to equip Trident II D-5 missiles or have been deposited.

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For medium repairs, resupply and ammunition, the naval base on the island of Guam could be used. Here, in addition to the repair infrastructure, there were supply ships on an ongoing basis, in whose holds were also stored ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. It was understood that in the event of an aggravation of the international situation and an increase in the threat of the outbreak of a global conflict, the supply ships, accompanied by an escort, would leave the base in Guam. After using up the ammunition, the American SSBNs were supposed to meet at sea or in ports of friendly states with floating arsenals and replenish supplies. In this case, the boats at sea retained their combat capability, even when the main American naval bases were destroyed.

The purchase of the last batch of "Trident - 1" took place in 1984. In total, Lockheed has delivered 570 missiles. The maximum number of deployed UGM-96A Trident I SLBMs on 20 boats was 384 units. Initially, each missile could carry eight 100-kiloton warheads. However, in accordance with the provisions of the START I Treaty, the number of warheads on each missile was limited to six. Thus, on the American SSBNs, carriers of the Trident-1 SLBMs, more than 2300 units with individual guidance could be deployed. However, the boats on combat patrol and capable of launching their missiles 15 minutes after receiving the appropriate order had little more than 1,000 warheads.

The creation and deployment of the UGM-96A Trident I well demonstrates the strategy adopted in the US Navy for the construction of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces. As a result of an integrated approach and a radical modernization of existing boats and the construction of new ones, and by increasing the firing range, it was possible to dramatically reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet anti-submarine forces. The decrease in the CEP of warheads made it possible to achieve a fairly high probability of hitting fortified point targets. According to information published in the American media, military experts in the field of nuclear planning, when several warheads of different Trident-1 missiles were "cross-guided" at one target such as an ICBM silo, assessed the possibility of achieving its destruction with a probability of 0.9. the preliminary disabling of the Soviet early warning missile system (EWS) and the deployment of space and ground components of antimissile defense, already made it possible to hope for victory in a nuclear war and minimize damage from a retaliatory strike. In addition, intercontinental-range submarine ballistic missiles had important advantages over ICBMs deployed on American soil. The launch of the Trident-1 SLBM could be carried out from areas of the World Ocean and along trajectories that made it difficult for Soviet early warning radars to detect in time. When conducting patrols in areas that were traditional for American SSBNs with Polaris and Poseidon missiles, the flight time of Trident-1 SLBMs to targets located deep in Soviet territory was 10-15 minutes, versus 30 minutes for ICBMs Minuteman.

However, even for the most ardent American "hawks" by the mid-1980s, it was obvious that with more than 10,000 deployed nuclear warheads in the USSR on strategic carriers, the hopes of winning a global conflict were unrealistic. Even with the most successful development of events for the United States and the elimination as a result of a sudden dagger strike, 90% of Soviet silos of ICBMs, SSBNs, long-range bombers, all strategic forces control centers and the top military-political leadership of the surviving Soviet strategic nuclear forces were more than enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy.

Thus, according to the calculations of American military analysts, a salvo of one Soviet strategic missile submarine, project 667BDR "Kalmar" with 16 R-29R intercontinental liquid-propellant ballistic missiles, could hit up to 112 targets, killing more than 6 million Americans. Also in the Soviet Union, they successfully developed and put on alert ground and railway strategic missile systems, which, thanks to their mobility, were able to avoid destruction.

To prevent a sudden decapitating and disarming strike, in the USSR in the early 80s, along with the construction of new early warning radars and the deployment of a network of artificial earth satellites designed to timely fix missile launches, the Perimeter system was created and tested (known in the West as English. Dead Hand - "Dead hand") - a complex of automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike. The basis of the complex is a computer system that automatically analyzes such factors as: the presence of communication with command centers, the fixation of powerful seismic shocks, accompanied by electromagnetic pulses and ionizing radiation. Based on these data, command missiles, created on the basis of the UR-100U ICBM, were to be launched. Instead of a standard warhead, a radio technical system was installed on the missiles, which broadcast signals of combat use to the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, which are on combat duty with SSBNs and strategic bombers with cruise missiles. Apparently, in the mid-1980s, the USSR organized a deliberate leak to the West of information concerning the Perimeter system. An indirect confirmation of this is how sharply the Americans reacted to the presence of the “Doomsday” system in the USSR and how persistently they sought its elimination during negotiations on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.

Another Soviet response to the increase in the strike power of the American component of the strategic nuclear forces was the strengthening of the anti-submarine forces of the USSR Navy. In December 1980, the first BOD Project 1155 entered service, whose anti-submarine capabilities were significantly expanded compared to the ships of Project 1134A and 1134B. Also in the 80s, the Soviet submarine forces had unique Project 705 fighter boats with a titanium hull and a liquid-metal coolant reactor. The high speed and maneuverability of these submarines allowed them to quickly take an advantageous position for attack and successfully evade anti-submarine torpedoes. As part of the concept of increasing the country's anti-submarine defense capabilities, special attention was paid to increasing the search capabilities of the third generation multipurpose submarines of pr. 945 and 971. The boats of these projects were to replace the nuclear multipurpose submarines of pr. 671. The submarines of pr. 945 and 971 were close. But in view of the fact that the boat hull pr.945 (945A) was built of titanium, they had a great immersion depth and a minimum level of such unmasking features as noise and magnetic fields. As a result, these nuclear submarines were the most unobtrusive in the Soviet Navy. At the same time, the high cost of titanium boats prevented their mass construction. Nuclear submarines of project 971 became much more numerous, which, in terms of visibility characteristics, were actually equal to the American submarines of the 3rd generation.

Since the Be-12 and Il-38 aircraft could not control remote areas of the World Ocean, in the mid-70s, the pilots of the Soviet naval aviation mastered the long-range anti-submarine Tu-142. This vehicle was created on the basis of the Tu-95RTs long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft. However, due to the imperfection and unreliability of anti-submarine equipment, the first Tu-142 were used mainly as long-range reconnaissance aircraft, patrol and search and rescue aircraft. The anti-submarine potential was brought to an acceptable level on the Tu-142M, which was put into service in 1980.

From all of the above, it follows that the development and adoption of the Trident-1 SLBM, despite the significant qualitative strengthening of the American strategic nuclear forces, did not allow achieving superiority over the USSR. But at the same time, the new round of the "arms race" imposed by the United States had an extremely negative effect on the state of the Soviet economy, overburdened with military spending, which in turn led to the growth of negative socio-political processes.

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