North Korean missiles

North Korean missiles
North Korean missiles

Video: North Korean missiles

Video: North Korean missiles
Video: 006 Strategic Studies of China - Lect 20 South Asia and the Koreas 2024, March
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Let's move on to the "great and terrible" North Korean missiles.

North Korean missiles
North Korean missiles

The KPA Rocket Forces, whose command (directly subordinate to Supreme Commander Kim Jong-un) is called the "Artillery Control Bureau", is modeled after the Rocket Forces (Second Artillery) of the People's Liberation Army of China. Like the Chinese, the North Korean missile forces include units armed with tactical, operational-tactical and strategic missile systems. However, taking into account the doctrinal task of inflicting a military defeat on South Korea at a convenient opportunity, all North Korean missile units in the regional and geopolitical terms can be considered de facto strategic, regardless of the launch range of their ballistic missiles (therefore, in Western literature they are called "strategic missile forces "). And if the North Koreans manage to bring to a logical end the program of creating intercontinental ballistic missiles, which they are implementing, then the country will enter the world club of owners of nuclear missile weapons of unlimited range, which now includes the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France (possibly also Israel) and where they seek to penetrate from the "back door", in addition to the DPRK, also India, Iran and Pakistan, and the latter two - with the help of the North Koreans.

In fact, the missile forces are not even a separate branch of the armed forces, but an independent branch of the DPRK's armed forces, which in the foreseeable future, as its nuclear potential grows, should become the basis of the country's military power. The development of the North Korean missile forces poses a threat not only to regional security, but also, in the long term, directly to the United States, facilities on the continental part of which may fall within the reach of their missiles.

The "artillery control bureau" itself was formed in 1999 with the transfer of all army units that were previously part of the ground forces, armed with ground-to-ground ballistic missiles, under its command. Prior to that, they did not have a single separate command and were under the jurisdiction of the KPA artillery command. Now in their arsenal there are at least a thousand deployed and stockpiled unguided and guided tactical, operational-tactical and strategic ballistic missiles.

The production capacity of the North Korean missile industry makes it possible to produce, for example, up to eight long-range ballistic missiles (operational-tactical) "Hwaseong-5" and "Hwaseong-6" per month.

The rocket-building enterprises are represented by the Yakjen Machine Building Plant in the Pyongyang suburb of Mangyongdae (also known as the Mangyongdae Electric Machine Building Plant; the main workshops, which employ approximately 1,500 people, are underground), Defense Plant No. 7 (located about 8 km from the Mangyongdae plant; produces, in particular, medium-range ballistic missiles "Tephodong-1"), plant number 26 in Kang (the largest underground enterprise of the military-industrial complex, the total number of employees is estimated at 20 thousand people; in addition to guided and unguided missiles, torpedoes are also produced here, depth charges and engineering mines), plant no. 118 in Kagamri and Kechenkun, plant no. 125 in Pyongyang (known under the code name "Pyongyang pig-breeding complex") and plant no. 301 in Daegwang-Yp. Yakdzhen Machine-Building Plant and Plant No. 7 are subordinated to the 2nd Research Center of the 4th General Bureau.

North Korea has launched its own space program, which provides for the creation of launch vehicles and artificial earth satellites for dual purposes - communications, meteorological and geomonitoring (possibly in cooperation with Iran and some other countries). The space program in the DPRK is managed by the Korean Space Technology Committee, which is publicly positioned as a civilian agency.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un smokes a cigarette at the Command Center after the launch of the Gwangmensong-3 satellite on the Eunha-3 (Milky Way 3) launch vehicle

True, many experts (and not without reason) believe that this program is to a greater extent a cover for the exclusively military-oriented work on the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The country has created an extensive infrastructure for testing missiles for various purposes, including the Musudan-ri (Musudan-ni) missile ranges (rocket launch sites) - aka the "Tonghai test range" (Hamgen-Puk-do province; this is the main range for testing medium and intercontinental range missiles, as well as space launch vehicles), Kiteryeng (tests of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, Gangwon Province) and the new Pondong-ri missile range (Pondong-ni, or "Sohe test site") on the northwestern coast of the DPRK, 50 km from border with China (Pyeongan Buk-do province). The Musudanri and Pondon-ri polygons are also considered cosmodromes.

Export-import operations in the field of missile technologies are carried out by trade and procurement companies established under the auspices of the 2nd Economic Committee - Yongaksan Trading Company and Changkwang Trading Company.

The creation of the rocket forces in the DPRK began in the 1960s. with the delivery of the USSR tactical missile systems 2K6 "Luna" with unguided short-range ballistic missiles - namely 3P8 (FROG-3 according to the conventional classification adopted by NATO) and 3P10 (FROG-5) in high-explosive fragmentation equipment.

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Then, in 1969, the delivery of a longer-range tactical missile system 9K52 "Luna-M" with an unguided ballistic missile 9M21 (R-65, R-70, according to NATO classification - FROG-7) with a high-explosive warhead followed.

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In the DPRK, chemical warheads were created for the Luna and Luna-M missiles.

However, already in the 1970s. the range (up to 45 and 65-70 km, respectively) and low firing accuracy of these complexes ceased to suit the command of the KPA.

In this regard, it was decided to purchase an operational-tactical missile system 9K72 with a guided ballistic missile 8K14 (R-17, according to NATO classification - SS-1C or Scud-B), having a launch range of 300 km. However, for some reason, the USSR did not sell it, so the North Koreans bought the 9K72 complexes with ammunition (missiles in high-explosive equipment) from Egypt, which had them, whose president Anwar Sadat began to sell Soviet weapons on the sly …

Acquisition 1976-1981 The North Koreans of the 9K72 complexes were of great importance for them when deploying the production of their own ballistic missiles, which were based on 8K14. Specialists of the DPRK disassembled the 8K14 missile and, after thoroughly studying it, designed their own, slightly increasing the launch range (up to 330 km) by reducing the mass of the warhead. The first North Korean guided ballistic missile for operational-tactical purposes based on the Soviet 8K14, called Hwaseong-5 (Hwaseong - Mars in Korean), was successfully tested in 1984, launched first into an experimental one, and in 1987 into a serial production and adopted by the KPA. For the Hwaseong-5 missile, in addition to the high-explosive, chemical and bacteriological warheads have been developed.

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The DPRK supplied Hwaseong-5 missiles to Iran (where they received the name Shahab-1) and, in addition, provided technological assistance to Egypt in deploying the production of its Scud-B variant.

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Iranian missile Shahab-1 on SPU 9P117M

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The Shahab-1 launcher based on a semi-trailer. I draw your attention to the sliding awning, under which the rocket can be hidden in the stowed position, in this form it will be difficult to distinguish this launcher on the road from ordinary trucks with semi-trailers

Inspired by the success of the "Hwaseong-5", the North Koreans began to create a new, one and a half times longer range (with a range of 500 km by reducing the mass of the warhead and increasing the supply of fuel and oxidizer by lengthening the product) operational-tactical missile "Hwaseong-6" (in the West it was called Scud-C or Scud-PIP, product improvement program - "program of improved production").

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The tests of the Hwaseong-6 were carried out in 1990, and the missile, in addition to entering service with the KPA, was also supplied to Iran and Syria. Moreover, Iran also acquired the technology for their production under the national name "Shahab-2".

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Iranian missile Shahab-2 on SPU 9P117M

According to some experts, by the mid-1990s. The Hwaseong-6 missiles were allegedly completely replaced by the Hwaseong-5 troops and the 8K14 delivered by Egypt, which were sent for storage.

A further development of operational-tactical missiles of the Hwaseong family was the missile, which in the West was given the code name Scud-ER (ER - extended range). The Scud-ER has a launch range of 750-800 km, 1.5-1.6 times longer than that of Hwaseong-6, and 2.5-2.7 times longer than that of the original Soviet 8K14. This was achieved not only by reducing the mass of the warhead compared to the Hwaseong-6, but also by using a slightly lower maximum starting thrust of the rocket engine than that of the 8K14, followed by a gradual throttling of the thrust to the cruising level, which ensured a more economical consumption fuel. The development of the Scud-ER was completed in 2003 with its adoption and launch into the series. A public display of the new missiles took place at the parade in honor of the 75th anniversary of the KPA on April 25, 2007.

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Together with single-stage operational-tactical missiles of the Scud type, the DPRK mastered the production of self-propelled launchers for them, copying the standard 9P117M launcher of the Soviet 9K72 operational-tactical missile system (on the chassis of the MAZ-543 four-axle heavy cross-country vehicle).

In addition to operational and tactical missiles, the DPRK has begun developing its own tactical ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. It was based on the 9M79 Soviet guided ballistic missile of the 9K79 Tochka tactical missile system. With the delivery of the complex to the North Koreans in 1996, Syria helped, which received such missiles from the USSR in 1983. Syria also sent military personnel to the DPRK to help the North Koreans study the Tochka. The purpose of creating a new missile system was to replace the outdated Luna and Luna-M complexes with unguided rockets. The North Koreans managed to create their own version of the KN-02 on the basis of the 9M79, with a firing range of 110-120 km (some experts cite an indicator of 140), which corresponds to the Soviet 9M79M1 tactical missile of the improved Tochka-U complex. Tests of the KN-02 took place in 2004-2007, and in 2007 a new missile system was adopted by the KPA. The self-propelled KN-02 launcher on the chassis of a three-axle cross-country vehicle was created independently, based on a chassis similar to the Romanian truck (6X6) DAC, but, unlike the launchers of the Tochka and Tochka-U tactical missile systems, it is not floating …

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The total number of KPA non-strategic missile systems by 2010 was estimated as follows: 24 launchers for Luna and Luna-M tactical missile systems, 30 for KN-02 and more than 30 for operational-tactical Scud type (9K72, Hwason-5 "," Hwaseong-6 "and Scud-ER with a total ammunition of over 200 missiles; some sources cite 400 missiles, there is also information about about 180" Hwaseong-5 "and more than 700" Hwaseong-6 ").

The next stage in the development of long-range ballistic missiles was the development by the DPRK of the production of the Tephodong and Nodong strategic ballistic missiles.

The first in the Tephodon family was the two-stage Tephodon-1 (also known in Western sources as TD-1, Scud Mod. E and Scud-X), designed for an average range of 2000-2200 km, which is comparable to the performance characteristics of the Soviet ballistic medium-range missiles R-12 and its Chinese counterpart Dongfeng-3, which entered service in 1958 and 1971, respectively.

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The second missile of this family, "Tephodong-2" (also known as TD-2, possible North Korean "Hwaseong-2" and "Moxon-2"; Moxon - in Korean Jupiter) is already intercontinental. Its range in a two-stage version is estimated at 6400-7000 km, in a three-stage version (sometimes called "Tephodon-3") - 8000-15000 km.

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A significant drawback of the Tephodong-1 and Tephodong-2 missiles, which determines their vulnerability to preemptive enemy strikes, is that they are launched from stationary ground-based launch complexes, including a launch pad and a maintenance mast. Refueling of these missiles with fuel and oxidizer is carried out immediately before launch and takes a long time.

Single-stage liquid-propellant medium-range ballistic missiles "Nodon-A" and "Nodon-B" are deployed on self-propelled ground launchers, the first of which is modeled on the 9P117M launcher of the 9K72 operational-tactical missile system on the chassis of a four-axle heavy cross-country vehicle MAZ-543, but with lengthening due to an additional fifth axle (the result is a 10x10 wheel arrangement), and the second is modeled on the launcher of the Soviet strategic medium-range missile system RSD-10 "Pioneer" on the chassis of a six-axle heavy cross-country vehicle MAZ-547. Perhaps the technology for the production of these launchers or sets of parts and assemblies for their assembly (which is most likely) was supplied by the DPRK to Belarus.

For the first time, American reconnaissance artificial earth satellites detected the Tephodong-1 and Tephodong-2 missiles in 1994. There is no reliable data on their operational deployment in the troops. Some experts believe that by 2010 the KPA had 10 to 25-30 Tephodong-1 missiles at its disposal.

The Nodong-A missile (also known as Nodon-1, Rodon-1 and Scud-D), like the Hwaseong and Tephodong series missiles, is based on the same 8K14. The firing range of "Nodon-A" is 1350-1600 km, which is enough to defeat targets in the Far Eastern states allied to the United States - from Tokyo to Taipei. The increase in the launch range, which required an increase in the fuel reserve, was achieved by increasing the length and diameter of the hull. Placing "Nodon-A" on a highly mobile chassis (highway speed up to 70 km / h, cruising range of 550 km) made it possible to ensure stealth and survivability of this missile system, however, lengthy preparation for launch (60 minutes), due, among other things, to the need to refuel the rocket fuel components should be considered a significant drawback of this strategic weapon system.

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In addition to the multi-axle self-propelled launcher for the Nodon-A ballistic missile, a launcher has been created for it on a three-axle semi-trailer with a semitrailer (6X6) on a chassis similar to the Romanian DAC truck.

Unlike the Nodon-A, the Nodon-B missile was developed not on the basis of the 8K14, but on another Soviet prototype - the single-stage ballistic missile of the R-27 submarines, which was adopted by the USSR Navy in 1968 as part of the D- complex. 5 for Project 667A strategic nuclear missile submarines. The DPRK managed to obtain the relevant technical documentation between 1992 and 1998. The public display of the new rocket took place on October 10, 2010, when the 65th anniversary of the TPK was celebrated.

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The firing range of "Nodon-B" (estimated at 2750-4000 km) exceeds that of the R-27 (2500 km), which was achieved by increasing the length and diameter of the hull in comparison with the prototype - this made it possible to use more capacious fuel tanks on the rocket and oxidizer, although it worsened its flight characteristics."Nodon-B" can hit US military targets in Okinawa and even (if the estimate of the 4,000 km range is correct) in Guam, that is, already on American territory itself. If the DPRK places the Nodong-B aboard camouflaged merchant ships, it would allow the North Koreans to threaten cities on the US west coast.

The North Koreans have also developed a silo version of the Nodong-B missile, which received the name BM25 (BM - ballistic missile, "ballistic missile", 25 - firing range of 2500 km) and Musudan-1 in a number of sources.

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The eight-axle chassis for self-propelled launchers for new missiles was provided by the DPRK, although China itself is not enthusiastic about Pyongyang's missile plans. This new chassis - WS51200, the largest of those produced in the PRC with a total weight (apparently referring to the mass of the machine and maximum carrying capacity) of 122 tons - was made by the North Korean order of the famous Chinese manufacturer of such machines Wanshan Special Vehicle, which in 2011 transferred them to the North Koreans …

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The total number of "Nodon-A" and "Nodon-B" missiles is estimated by different sources in highly divergent figures. Thus, the well-known English reference book Military Balance in the 2010 edition gives for both types the number of launchers "about 10" and the number of missiles - "more than 90". The Americans assume that more than 200 "Nodon-A" were produced, and "Nodon-B" - about 50.

In addition, missiles are one of the main export items of the DPRK. The DPRK "missile clients" company includes:

- Vietnam (in 1998 acquired 25 Hwaseong-5 OTR);

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Vietnamese OTR "Hwaseong-5"

- Egypt (received technological documentation for setting up production of OTP "Hwaseong-5" and "Hwaseong-6");

- Iran (in addition to the already mentioned deployment under the national names "Shahab-1" and "Shahab-2" missiles "Hwason-5" and "Hwason-6", it has established the production of the medium-range missile "Nodon-A" under the name " -3 "and allegedly acquired 18 even longer-range North Korean ballistic missiles BM25 silos);

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Iranian medium-range missile "Shahab-3"

- Yemen (in the 1990s purchased Scud missiles from North Korea);

- both African states of the Congo (the Republic of the Congo acquired the Hwaseong-5 missiles, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo acquired the Hwaseong-6);

- Libya, (which assembled the Nodon-A missiles from the supplied units, but destroyed them under pressure from the West in 2004);

- United Arab Emirates (purchased 25 Hwaseong-5 missiles, but due to the most likely insufficient qualifications of their personnel, they did not deploy them and stockpiled them);

- Syria (has Hwaseong-6 and Nodong-A missiles), Sudan (possibly received North Korean Scud missiles through Syria);

- finally, Ethiopia (possibly received "Hwaseong-5").

Meanwhile, in the DPRK …

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Yes, I don't need your "Kalash". Give back the rice, bad man, puppet of the South, I will forgive everything …

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