The Bundeswehr special forces in Afghanistan were not allowed to work at first, and then they were not allowed to shoot. And he learned to take the opponent with his bare hands.
Night of October 19, 2012. North of Afghanistan. In the village of Gundai, in the Chakhardara district, a Taliban party activist gathers as usual. The gathering is being led by the "shadow governor" of Kunduz province, Mullah Abdul Rahman. The peaceful course of discussions "by candlelight" about what else to blow up and who to kill is suddenly interrupted by the hum of helicopters with crosses on their sides. Germans. Everyone who dares to shoot is carefully extinguished from the onboard machine guns, the rest are herded into a heap and politely checked the passport regime. With the documents, of course, almost everyone is wrong. But the "governor", whose operational nickname is "Farrington", will be recognized even without a passport. Together with the deputies, he is offered a free helicopter tour over the places of former battles and a hygiene package for his head. Everything.
The details of this raid were not disclosed by either the ISAF command or the Bundeswehr leadership. But the capture of Abdul Rahman is not only the result of a successful operational development, but also a fair ending to one long, difficult and extremely unpleasant history for German intelligence officers.
Colonel Klein's case
… Three years before his arrest, the future "governor" Abdul Rahman is an ambitious, but far from the most important, field commander of the Taliban in Kunduz. His finest hour comes on September 4, 2009, when the command orders him to organize ambushes in three villages along the Kabul-Kunduz highway and seize vehicles carrying flammable substances. It's difficult. But he is lucky - two fuel tankers belonging to the German ISAF contingent fall into one of the ambushes in the afternoon. As luck would have it, in the evening of the same day, while crossing the Kunduz River, the bandits manage to drive fuel trucks onto a sandbank, where 50-ton monsters get stuck. In a nearby village, the Farrington fighters find two tractors. But with such a weight they cannot do anything. And then Abdul Rahman makes a fateful decision - with the help of the local population, to drain some of the fuel and try to pull the lightweight fuel trucks again. An hour before midnight, about a hundred lovers of freebies gather at the fuel trucks. NATO warplanes fly over their heads several times. At first the people scatter, but then they cease to pay attention to the "Satan-birds". But in vain. For those who did not manage to get away with free gasoline, this night was the last.
At 1.49 am on September 4, 2009, the commander of the German base in Kunduz, Colonel Klein, gives the order to bomb the fuel trucks. Between 50 and 70 Taliban and 30 civilians are killed. Unfortunately, including children.
Colonel Klein had very little time left before receiving the rank of brigadier general. The night of September 4, 2009 changed everything. From that night on, Klein is a symbol, the face of war, which is not called war in his homeland. That night, he gained what he never wanted: worldwide fame.
There was a long scandal and a noisy trial at home. The colonel suffered, but was silent. When, over time, the real reasons that prompted him to give the order for the bombing were revealed, many became thoughtful - maybe he had no other choice?
Not for print version
At the end of August 2009, agents of the BND (German Federal Intelligence Service) bring bad news to Colonel Klein. On August 25, on the orders of Maulawi Shamsuddin, the commander of the Taliban group in the south-west of the German camp, the militants hijacked a truck. There is information that it may be stuffed with explosives and used to strike a German base. The details of the attack plan are also known. Shamsuddin plans to attack the German camp in three stages. First, two consecutive truck bombs break through the main gate, then suicide bombers break through the gap into the camp and are blown up. Finally, the location is attacked by the main Taliban forces. The BND warns that the camp can be attacked at any moment.
But so far the Taliban have only one truck in their hands. So there is still time to ward off the blow. The plan for Operation Joker is quickly approved. The goal is Shamsuddin. They have already found him and are following his every step. But it was at this moment that Abdul Rahman steals those very fuel trucks. "Two consecutive bomb trucks" are no longer part of an abstract plan, but real cars in the hands of real militants. However, when fuel trucks get stuck in the ferry, there is hope that the situation will resolve itself. But the Farrington is persistently pulling huge bombs on wheels from the swamp. But they could be brought down on the German base on the same night. The decision must be made urgently.
According to the mandate of the German contingent, "the use of force to prevent attacks can only be carried out at the command of the military leader on the spot." The leader here is Colonel Klein. The fact that he commanded the operation from the moment the fuel trucks were discovered until they were bombed not from his command post, German military intelligence officers were next to him, and the information came from an Afghan agent does not count. Officially, all actions are Colonel Klein's operation. He will answer for her. For some reason, the question of whether the difficult decision saved the lives of hundreds of German soldiers was not asked in Germany.
But the seizure of the Taliban "Joker" Shamsuddin, interrupted by the story with the fuel trucks of Abdul Rahman, was never completed. And by an absolutely fantastic coincidence.
The headquarters knew for sure that on the night of September 7, 2009, Shamsuddin, accompanied by about 25 militants, would be in a certain "estate" near Kunduz. Shortly after midnight, two or three helicopters were to deliver a group of German and Afghan special forces there. But then the British asked to postpone the capture of the villain. By pure coincidence, British special forces in the same place carried out an operation to free the kidnapped journalist of the Times newspaper Stephen Farrell. The prisoner was kept literally 50 meters from Shamsuddin's lair. Farrell was rescued, and the Joker was gone. True, out of harm's way, he went far - they say, to the south of Afghanistan or even to Pakistan. And he never returned.
But the case of Colonel Klein turned out to be sideways for German intelligence. Undesirable testimonies and absurd rumors were leaked to the press. The media wrote that a sinister organization, Task Force 47, was operating at the base in Kunduz.
Task force 47
There is indeed a "special facility" at the German base in Kunduz. Area - 500 sq. meters.
Around - a two-meter concrete wall. Nearby there is a helipad and a German osnaz station - a listening system for the KSA team (KdoStratAufkl). By all indications, there should be a spetsnaz lair here. This is true.
Since October 2007, the same mysterious "Task Force 47" is based here. In fact, this is the operational name of the consolidated German special forces unit Einsatzverband. In German army jargon, it is often referred to as "reinforcement forces" (VerstKr). It was from here, from a separate command post of the detachment (Tactical Operations Center (TOC)), that Colonel Klein led the operation with the fuel trucks. In his own words, because "the equipment is better."
According to the official scheme, TF47 is the only link in the Bundeswehr's special forces in Afghanistan. From the moment of its formation, the TF47 combat mission zone has been defined in the ISAF "North" sector. The main regions of work are the provinces of Badakhshan, Baghlan and Kunduz.
According to the German Ministry of Defense, "the main task of TF47 is to monitor and control the situation in the area of responsibility of the German contingent, in particular, regarding the structures and intentions of the enemy to prepare and conduct attacks on ISAF personnel and Afghan state authorities." The primary intelligence for TF47 comes from military intelligence and BND operatives. On their basis, TF47 conducts additional exploration and "active actions". TF47 is commanded really "their own", from the headquarters of the German special forces in Potsdam.
TF47 works mainly at night. But when it is necessary to help out their "brothers", the scouts are ready to come out into the light. So, on June 15, 2009, the detachment groups fought heavy battles, covering the withdrawal of a joint Belgian-Afghan patrol, which was ambushed near the town of Zar Haride-Soufla.
The detachment is also engaged in the capture of "large" Taliban. The German Ministry of Defense is vaguely hinting that within the framework of the tasks performed, "special forces can also carry out active measures against certain enemy persons."
It is necessary to make a reservation right away - despite the aura of mystery, the fighters of this detachment do not have a "license to kill". In general, compared to other units of the German contingent, TF47 does not officially have any special rights. It operates on the basis of the United Nations mandate for the ISAF and the mandate of the Bundestag.
The German Ministry of Defense gave the first figures on the performance of TF47 in August 2010. At that time, the unit had conducted more than 50 planned reconnaissance operations and, together with Afghan security forces, participated in the 21st "offensive operation". At the same time, "thanks to the soldiers of the special groups," all the operations were bloodless. In total, 59 people were detained. A little later, the German federal government clarified that the arrests themselves were carried out exclusively by the Afghan security forces, which dealt with the prisoners "in accordance with the national legislation of Afghanistan."
As for notable persons, as part of a joint operation with Afghan security forces on September 21, 2010, TF47 managed to capture a high-ranking member of the Taliban leadership in Kunduz province, Maulawi Roshan. Since mid-2009, he was considered, among other things, the organizer of numerous attacks against ISAF troops and the Afghan army in the region.
In late December 2010, in the village of Halazai in the same troubled Chahardar region, TF47 tied up six Taliban and a Pakistani demolition instructor. The prisoners were even shown to journalists at that time.
On June 1, 2011, a close associate of Osama bin Laden and other senior al-Qaeda leaders was captured without resistance in a night raid with Afghan security forces in the Nakhri Shahi district of Balkh province. According to information from the British media, it was mainly a German team that cooperated with Afghan special forces and American officers.
And, of course, we must not forget about our glorious "governor".
Unnamed heroes
Even ministers and generals do not know their names - TF47 operatives work only under pseudonyms. However, they do not write them on the form either. Within the camp in Kunduz, they can be recognized by the absence of this particular detail on the field uniform and by their "non-statutory" beards and hairstyles.
The detachment includes servicemen from various types of intelligence units of the Bundeswehr Special Operations Division (DSO). The number is from 120 people in December 2009 to 200 in February 2010. About half are operatives Kommando Spezialkräfte. Or simply KSK. "Helmet" can be told in more detail.
Difficult start
It's no secret that KSK fought in Afghanistan long before TF47 was created. In general, Afghanistan is one of the most impressive episodes in the history of the struggle of the German special forces against strangers and … their own.
… When in November 2001, just ten weeks after September 11, 2001, the Bundestag approved the dispatch of combat units of the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan, the combined detachment KSK flew first to the south. It was a landmark event - for the first time since 1945, the boot of a German soldier stepped on a foreign land.
Like special forces from other countries, their journey to Afghanistan began from the American Camp Justice base off the coast of Oman, on the deserted island of Masira. It could have ended here. The white sun of the desert baked wild heads and evoked the shadows of the heroes of past battles. Someone frivolously painted a small palm tree on the door of the jeep, similar to the emblem of Rommel's Afrika Korps during World War II, and someone vigilant took a picture of this door. Then, however, the same palms were found in their English colleagues … And then everyone was lucky. By the time the scandal erupted over this, the detachment had already fought in Afghanistan.
First impressions - Tora-Bora and "Q-Town"
And he fought well. On December 12, 2001, KSK operators take part in the assault on the Taliban base area of Tora Bora - they conduct reconnaissance and cover the flanks on the mountain slopes.
And from mid-December 2001 to January 2002, the KSK groups are transferred one after another to the American base near the Kandahar airport. In the army environment, this bad place was then nicknamed "Q-Town". And here it began …
On the edge of their compound, the Americans gave their colleagues a clearing the size of half a football field with several non-residential buildings. Most of the fighters settled in two-person tents, the leadership - in damp huts without electricity and heat. It turned out that there is winter in Kandahar. And the winter that year in Afghanistan turned out to be harsh - about two hundred local residents froze to death. But the suppliers, apparently, had their own opinion about the weather, and they did not bother to plant any warm underpants or hygiene items for the soldiers. So KSK's second battle in Afghanistan was the battle for survival.
In addition, the homeland, apparently, did not want its sons to risk their lives further and prudently did not send them any means of communication, no planes, no helicopters, no equipment for moving in the desert. It became obvious that the decision to send them was not based on the real needs of the situation. No one just could explain what KSK was to do in Kandahar. The operatives were outraged - give the job!
And the Americans began to look for something for them - they were instructed to guard the prison at the base and sometimes they were allowed to go to perform minor tasks. And everything would continue so ingloriously if the German special forces did not find an original way out of the seemingly completely hopeless situation.
Beer putsch
As you know, Germany has always had a "secret weapon". During the Second World War, these were Fau rockets, in the damp tents of Kandahar they became … beer.
It is known that all the bases of the Western coalition in Afghanistan are "dry" - bringing and drinking beer and wine, not to mention stronger drinks, is strictly prohibited here. And the German special forces realized that it was possible to break through to the war only by striking at the weakest point of the unfriendly allies. The headquarters in Potsdam was asked about the need to observe age-old traditions in terms of the mandatory consumption of the national drink. The homeland fell for the trick of seasoned saboteurs. Two thousand cans of beer and fifty bottles of wine were sent to Kandahar. On January 12, 2002, the command of the German contingent established four "beer days" a week - Saturday, Monday, Wednesday and Friday. The norm was also set - two cans of beer a day.
No, then everything went quite differently than someone, perhaps, thought. The first stage of the ominous German plan was the formation of a "beer market" - KSK operatives exchanged warm socks, thermal underwear, T-shirts, calls to their homeland on satellite phones and other conveniences previously inaccessible to them for beer. But that's not all. Having dressed up and revived, the insidious Teutons began to use the "foam currency" in the interests of the service. Throwing joint parties with colleagues, celebrating replacements and awards, they gained confidence in their American intelligence colleagues and began to gain access to situation reports, satellite photographs and intelligence reports. Even helicopter flights were bought for beer.
I found echoes of the "beer putsch" already in 2010 in another place - at the old airbase in Kabul. There, in the bar near the waiting room, an anachronism, the "German hour", has been preserved since the German soldiers stayed here. In the evening, beer was displayed on the counter. The queue, I remember, was taken from lunch …
Kunduz
Things went well. Germany has allocated its site in the north of Afghanistan. KSK has had significant results. They worked closely with the American USAFSOC and from time to time with SEAL. They say that the period from the summer of 2002 to the summer of 2003 was successful. Since 2005, they have no longer been recruited for general activities under Operation Enduring Freedom, and they have begun to work productively on their own. For example, in the fall of 2006, the shelter of suicide bombers in Kabul was covered, for which they received official recognition from the German parliament for their “valuable contribution” to ensuring the safety of the German contingent.
Moving from the reckless American freeman "Enduring Freedom" to NATO, KSK found itself in a completely different world. Here the German leadership went further than all its allies in the coalition - the parliament did not recognize that there was a war in Afghanistan. In this regard, the Germans in Afghanistan were not allowed to shoot at the enemy. Everyone. Without exception.
Features of the national war
Wandering the fields of the sluggish Afghan war with the American Marines, I was always amazed at their extreme caution in situations involving any active action. There is nothing to be done - modern "rules of engagement" (ROE) can often be interpreted as "rules of giving a head start to the enemy." But it turns out that the Germans have an even more surprising in their humanity version of the rules for communicating with the enemy. This is how it was described in July 2009 in an article in the British newspaper Times:
“In the breast pocket of every German soldier there is a seven-page instruction on how to fight in Afghanistan. It says the following: “Before you open fire, you must loudly declare in English:“UN - stop, or I will shoot!”. Then the same thing should be shouted in the Pashto language, and then repeated in the Dari language. " The authors of the brochure from the distant European headquarters do not stop there and clarify: "If the situation permits, the warning should be repeated." In this regard, there is a cruel joke among Germany's NATO allies: “How can you identify the corpse of a German soldier? The body clutches the instruction in its hand."
And here's the result. year 2009. Governor of Kunduz Mohammad Omar: “The last operation against the Taliban in Chahardar (Operation Adler) was unsuccessful … They (the Germans) were super careful and did not even get out of their cars. They had to be recalled and replaced by the Americans. Why go out if you can't shoot?
To the problem with shooting was added the trouble with coordination. Any combat use of the German contingent had to be approved at the level of the German government. And here's the result. Operation Karez is planned jointly with the ANA and the Norwegian special forces in northern Afghanistan. Against the coalition forces, there are one and a half hundred "regular" Taliban, plus about 500 attracted "shooting lovers". You need to act quickly. The command of the German contingent promises to send KSK to the operation, provide reconnaissance and supply. But the German government is hesitant. When the Minister of Defense nevertheless makes a decision to participate in the operation, the Allies have been fighting fierce battles in the area of operation for a week.
To what absurdity the situation can be brought, the following episode clearly demonstrates.
Baghlansky bomber
"Cabbage" (Krauts - the nickname of German soldiers) allows the most dangerous criminals to escape, thereby increasing the danger in their area of responsibility for Afghans and all coalition forces, "said a British officer at the ISAF headquarters in Kabul. This is it about the story with the "Baghlan bomber".
November 6, 2007. Explosion at the opening ceremony of the restored sugar factory in Baghlan. 79 people were killed, including dozens of children and six members of the Afghan parliament. The organizer is known under the nickname "Baghlan Bomber". He is responsible not only for the sugar factory, but also for mines on the roads of the province and harboring suicide bombers before their actions.
KSK is charged with finding the villain. They, of course, find him and, as expected, monitor all his actions for several weeks. They know exactly when and with whom he leaves his house, the make of the car, how many people and with what weapons he has. They even know the color of his turban.
On a March night in 2008, together with the Afghan special forces, they go out to capture. The Taliban detect them just a few hundred meters from the target.
For SAS or Delta Force fighters in Afghanistan, this is not a problem. Their principle is simple: "Kill or kill you." Targets are identified, tracked and destroyed. But the German parliament considers this allied approach "not in line with international law." Accordingly, the order: "Fire to kill is prohibited until the attack takes place or is inevitable." Berlin continues to adhere to the "proportionality principle" obsessively. Moreover, as you can see, they even condemn the allies for violating it. NATO defines this oddity as "national exclusion."
And the KSK snipers are letting go of the "bomber" who is already being held at gunpoint. They simply have no right to kill him. The villain leaves, and his network begins to operate again. The allies are outraged - in the area of responsibility of the "cabbage" at that time - two and a half thousand German soldiers, plus Hungarians, Norwegians and Swedes. Who is to blame for the deteriorating security situation? Believe it or not, from the point of view of the German Defense Ministry, no one, including the terrorist himself. A high rank from the ministry calmly explains that the "Baghlan bomber" did not behave aggressively and could not be killed unless absolutely necessary. " Like this.
But according to KSK there is information that in the second half of 2009 in the north of Afghanistan out of 50 liquidated Taliban field commanders at least 40 were “reassured” by the Germans, although they mainly performed the role of “accompanying persons” and in all cases the Afghan allies outnumbered their number. How did the deputies allow this?
The memorable General Stanley McChrystal, commander-in-chief of all coalition forces in Afghanistan, once said: “Find the middle of the web. Attack and grab. And kill. I allowed this in Iraq. And we also work in Afghanistan. “C” and “Kay” - grab and kill!”. What are these "C" and "K"? A mandate that even the most inveterate German pacifist cannot challenge.
Book of the Dead
This document is officially called the "Joint Priority Effects List" (JPEL). It is a list with six columns. Number, photo, name, functions, information about the coverage area. The most important is the last column. It contains either "S" or "S / K". "C" (capture) means "to grab", "K" (kill) - "kill". Incorrigible villains fall into this list, and then, after careful selection. Any country participating in the coalition forces can nominate candidates.
The list is available to units of special forces of all countries participating in the ISAF coalition. The final decision on the fate of its "nominees" is made at the headquarters of the coalition forces, but the commandos of not all countries consider it their duty to act strictly "according to the letter." And the leadership, as we can see, supports them in this. And the Americans, Australians and British are willing to shoot. Based on the data above, KSK also relaxes sometimes. But officially it still specializes in characters under the letter "C". As one of the squad's veterans wrote sarcastically: “I myself have served in KSK for ten years, have seen and experienced a lot, and I assure you: this is a very interesting job. We are required not to kill, but to take alive …”And here is a curious example.
Runner
A certain Abdul Razzak has been interested in the competent authorities for a long time. As a Taliban field commander in Badakhshan province, he was suspected of a series of attacks on German and Afghan soldiers. They watched him for a whole year, but they could not do anything - having close ties with both the Taliban and the drug mafia, for some reason he was simultaneously a member of the election commission for the presidential elections in Afghanistan and had temporary immunity.
But all immunity ends at some point. One quiet evening, 80 KSK operators and 20 Afghan commandos landed in his garden from five helicopters. Abdul was warned and fled. I hoped that they would be left behind. He attacked the wrong ones. The chase lasted six hours and ended with the capture of the "runner" in the mountains at an altitude of 2 thousand meters. They caught up with the "goods" and, as promised to their homeland, did not damage it at all.
Epilogue
January 17, 2013. Calw is a small town in the state of Baden-Württemberg in the very south-west of Germany. Here, at the edge of the famous Black Forest - the Black Forest, in the barracks of Count Zeppelin - the KSK base, in the presence of four hundred guests, the detachment commander, Brigadier General Heinz Josef Feldmann, makes his last holiday speech. On March 1, he will leave office and speak with satisfaction of his achievements. In 2012, 612 KSK operatives traveled to 11 countries around the world. For him as a commander, the most important thing was that during his leadership, not a single KSK soldier was killed. “It doesn't go without saying,” the general stresses: “We seem to have enough guardian angels. Colleagues from the special forces of other countries were not given such happiness."
Maybe he's right.
