Today, May 13, is the 70th anniversary of the Kapustin Yar training ground. The military historian Vladimir Ivanovich Ivkin told the NVO correspondent how this complex test complex was created, who stood at the origins, what work was carried out on it. Of particular interest are previously unknown facts from the history of the landfill. It is also worth noting that the events of those distant years, when the test site was created, closely overlap with the present. Now Kapustin Yar is part of the structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. On it today, missile weapons are tested for all types and branches of the armed forces. This is the oldest rocket range in Russia, it is not only the cradle of the strategic missile forces, it was where our cosmonautics was born.
MEETING 70th ANNIVERSARY
In this anniversary year for Kapustin Yar, it is planned to test about 160 samples of new weapons, twice as many as in 2015. And last year was marked by the beginning of testing of combat robotic systems for the Strategic Missile Forces. In advance, work was carried out to modernize the data transmission system, a single information field of the landfill was created. The complete modernization of the measuring complex is already being completed, which will soon work in automatic mode. The systems for testing weapons, military and special equipment (AME) are being improved. The landfill is preparing for intensive activities related to the rearmament program.
Research and test work will be carried out both for the needs of the Armed Forces and in the interests of other ministries and departments. The main emphasis is now being placed on improving weapons and military equipment, including reconnaissance and precision weapons control systems.
IN THE FAR 1945
In the days when the Red Army invaded Germany, documents about V-2 missiles (index A-4) fell into the hands of the Soviet command. The military-political leadership of the USSR already knew about the existence of the German "weapon of retaliation" (the German abbreviation "V" (Fau) from the word Vergeltungswaffe, which translates as "weapon of retaliation"), but this time the intelligence was able to obtain detailed documents. The level of development of missile weapons in Nazi Germany was amazing. Serial production of the V-2 was carried out already from the beginning of 1944, the rocket carried a warhead weighing 1 ton over a distance of more than 280 km, and reached the target with acceptable accuracy.
The American and British special services have also been conducting the operational development of these weapons for a long time and intently. At the end of the war, the Allies launched an unprecedented hunt for experts in the field of rocketry in terms of the application of forces and special importance.
US intelligence agents turned upside down all three occupation zones, which were under the control of the Western allies, in search of specialists in the design (construction) and production of missiles. As a result, the chief designer of the V-2 Wernher von Braun and with him from 300 to 400 specialists of the highest level were taken out to the States. The Americans received design and production documentation in full, a large number of components, fuel, materials. In addition, they captured about 130 missiles ready to launch. Research work at the US test sites began immediately after the delivery of materials, equipment, missiles and the arrival of specialists.
Great Britain was also able to seize a number of ready-made missiles, documentation, components and materials for their production, necessary to start developing its own samples of jet technology.
The Soviet side got crumbs from the German "rocket pie". It was fortunate that the V-2 production complex in Peenemünde ended up in the Soviet occupation zone. They managed to find middle and lower-level specialists, mainly engineers and skilled workers, whose experience was used to assemble the V-2 both in East Germany and in the Soviet Union.
In 1945, a commission for the study of rocketry was formed in the USSR. This commission came to the conclusion that the work is of a colossal volume and requires decisions at the highest government level, since the state resources will have to be used to fulfill this task. Beginning in August 1945, the Soviet government urgently adopted four important decrees on the development of rocketry in our country. Before that, a resolution of the State Defense Committee was prepared, it prescribed the organization of work on the design and production of missiles. The People's Commissariat of Ammunition was obliged to establish the production of solid-fuel missiles, and the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry was to manufacture missiles on liquid fuel.
But this resolution was never adopted due to the lack of coordination of the requirements of industrial people's commissariats (hereinafter ministries) on the technical conditions that were put forward by the military. The army wanted a powerful weapon, and the industry in every possible way refused this extremely difficult task that had suddenly arisen. People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin, pointing out that a rocket is not an airplane, tried to relieve himself of this task. He motivated his refusal by the fact that the rocket, although it is an aircraft, is very specific, which is closer in design to rockets for BM13 than to airplanes. And since the shells for the "Katyusha" were produced by the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, Shakhurin suggested that the task of producing missiles be completely entrusted to this department.
In March 1946, the upper echelon of state power in the USSR underwent a transformation. The people's commissariats became ministries, the names of which were changed. Thus, the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons was transformed into the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering. It was to this structure that all the developments and production facilities associated with the Katyushas were transferred, and it continued the development of multiple launch rocket systems.
The commission at the very top personally informed Stalin of all the urgent decisions needed. The memo, signed by Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Ustinov, Yakovlev, handed over to the Generalissimo in April 1946, spoke of the need to make urgent fundamental decisions on the Soviet missile project. It explained what had been done on missile issues in the pre-war period, during the war, and what materials and information had been obtained about the German V-2 (A-4) missiles. The commission proposed to speed up the project to concentrate all research, design, design work and production of missiles in one hand. Everything related to liquid-fueled missiles was transferred to the Ministry of Armaments, and powder rockets were transferred to the Ministry of SH-Machine Building. In the same regime, work was carried out on the Soviet atomic program. Minaviaprom was left with the task of creating jet propulsion systems.
It is worth taking into account the situation in which rocketry began in the USSR. In December 1945, the "aviation business" began, which was associated with a serious lag in Soviet jet and long-range aviation from the United States. Air Marshal Khudyakov was the first to be arrested on him, he was shot in 1950. In February 1946, this business received a powerful development. Many top leaders of the military aviation industry and the Air Force were repressed, among them were: Minister Shakhurin, Commander of the Air Force Novikov, his deputy Repin, member of the military council Shimanov, head of the Main Directorate of Orders Seleznev and others.
In one of the notes of the commission, which arrived at Stalin's secretariat on April 20, it was proposed that a meeting on rocketry in the USSR be held in Stalin's office as soon as possible, namely on April 25. It brought together all the responsible persons at the highest level, as a result of which a resolution was adopted that gave impetus to the development of jet weapons and missile programs in the country.
In 1946, on May 4, an absentee plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was held, at which it was decided to release Malenkov from the post of secretary of the Central Committee in connection with a failure in the leadership of the aviation industry. Stalin appointed him chairman of the commission in charge of rocketry and gave him a chance to rehabilitate himself.
Further, in the resolution of this plenum, it was said about the need to create in the structure of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR (which, combining other positions, Stalin personally supervised), a rocket armament directorate as part of the GAU, it was entrusted with the functions of a customer and controller of work on the production of the A-4 rocket (Fau- 2). Within the framework of the same ministry, it was ordered to form a research institute of jet weapons (now it is the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), a central state test site for jet weapons, which was supposed to become a platform for testing all types of missiles in the interests of all departments that were involved in this program, and a separate a special-purpose military unit, whose task was to service missiles, test them and practice issues of combat use. At the end of this decree, it was indicated that the missile program is a paramount task, mandatory for all bodies of party and state administration, in fact, it was a stern warning for those officials who were not imbued with the seriousness of the missile program for the country's defense. Following this decree, an order was issued by the Minister of the Armed Forces on the formation of new structures within the military department, as prescribed by the plenum of the Central Committee.
WHY MAY 13
Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1017-419ss was signed by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Stalin on May 13, 1946. For the implementation of the decisions of the Soviet government, a special committee was created, which was entrusted with all responsibility for the implementation of rocketry plans. Stalin, with his own hand, entered into the list the name of the chairman of this committee, as usual, with a blue pencil, as we already know, the honor was shown to Malenkov.
Major General Lev Gaidukov headed the interdepartmental commission involved in the missile program of the USSR People's Commissariats and GAU for the study and generalization of combat experience in the use of jet technology. This was also a personal decision of Stalin, and it was legally enshrined in GKO decree No. 9475ss.
Decree No. 1017-419 also ordered to create a commission to select the site for the construction of the landfill. She was instructed to conduct a survey of possible areas for the location of the test site, she had to do this work in a short time: from June 1 to August 25 - and by August 30, report the results to the Generalissimo. The fact that this commission was headed by First Deputy Minister of the USSR Armed Forces Bulganin speaks of the superimportance of this matter. Within the specified time frame, the commission examined eight districts, none of which was suitable for the construction of the landfill. It was decided to continue work on the search for the necessary territory, as a result, the commission chose three possible options for further research - one in the South Ural Military District (near the city of Uralsk) and two in the North Caucasian Military District (the first near Stalingrad, the other - near the city of Grozny in Chechnya).
The formation of the polygon structure began even before the choice of its location. By order No. 0347 of June 10, 1946, signed by Bulganin, Lieutenant General Vasily Voznyuk, who had previously held the post of deputy artillery commander of the southern group of forces (Austria), was appointed head of the range. Colonel Leonid Polyakov became his deputy for testing ground forces' rocketry, and Colonel Ivan Romanov was appointed deputy for missile testing for the naval forces. Colonel Nikolai Mitryakov became the deputy for testing jet weapons for the army aviation, and Major General Stepan Shcherbakov headed the air force test group. All newly appointed persons took an active part in the search for the location of the landfill.
In the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR No. 0019 of September 2, 1946, the organizational staff schedule of the landfill and its technical equipment were finally approved.
The commission, with a delay of one year from the target date, was able to present the result. Only on July 26, 1947, the Council of Ministers issued a decree on the preparation of the first launch of the A-4 (V-2) rocket and on the placement of a test site near the village of Kapustin Yar (not far from Stalingrad, within the Astrakhan region). Among the archival documents there are maps, personally endorsed by Stalin, on which the results of reconnaissance of the territories selected for the construction of the landfill are plotted.
Moreover, there is information that the original site for the landfill was chosen in the area of the village of Naurskaya (Chechnya), but this option was rejected as a result. We took into account the high density of settlements in the area of the proposed location of the landfill. In addition, the minister of animal husbandry, Aleksey Kozlov, was categorically against this option, since it threatened to destroy sheep breeding in the Kalmyk steppes, where it was supposed to create a flight field for missiles.
The decision on the date of the celebration of the formation of the Kapustin Yar landfill was made in 1950 and it was determined to celebrate its "birthday" on May 13, according to the date of the issue of Resolution No. 1017-419ss. The formation of a "special artillery unit for the development, preparation and launch of V-2 missiles" is connected with the same document. A special brigade of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (BON RVGK) was created. The command of this unit was entrusted to Major General Alexander Tveretsky. The official date of its formation "June 12, 1946" was determined only in 1952. Subsequently, the brigade was reorganized several times and finally, on the basis of the formations into which it moved organizationally, the 24th division of the Strategic Missile Forces was created, which fell under the reduction in 1990 in connection with the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the reduction of the INF Treaty.
THE BEGINNING OF A LONG AND HARD WAY
The German V-2 was used by the winners as the basis for their own ballistic missiles. Photo from the Federal Archives of Germany. 1943
The memorandum, which was received by Stalin's secretariat in December 1946, signed by Malenkov, Yakovlev, Bulganin, Ustinov and others, spoke of the completion of work on the collection and synthesis of the entire spectrum of information and materials for the preparation of missile production.
Of the part of the assembly materials inherited by the USSR, it was possible to fully equip 23 missiles, and another 17 remained understaffed. The transportation of parts, materials, laboratory testing and production equipment to the Soviet Union was organized. At the same time, to continue the work begun in Germany, 308 German specialists arrived in the USSR, who were distributed among the relevant ministries and began to work. About 100 of them were sent to the 88th plant (NII-88). Later they were transported to the Gorodomlya Island, which is on Lake Seliger, where branch No. 1 of NII-88 was located. In total, about 350 German specialists were exported to the Union from Germany to organize design work, production and testing of missiles. Of these, 13 people participated in the first launch of the A-4 at the Kapustin Yar range. By that time, work on rocketry was already being carried out on the territory of the USSR in the corresponding design bureaus and research institutes. Most of the then existing line ministries and the concerned departments and institutions of the Ministry of the Armed Forces participated in the program.
By the beginning of tests in Germany, the first batch of 10 A-4 missiles was assembled with the involvement of German specialists. Another batch of 13 missiles was assembled in Podlipki near Moscow at the 88th plant of the Ministry of Armaments.
The organization of missile production in the USSR was slipping. For example, in Germany in 1944, an average of 345 missiles were produced per month (4140 per year). In 1945: in January - 700, in February - 616, March - 490. Our industry did not manage to reach the production capacity of the Third Reich missiles.
Even the Yuzhmash plant, the largest in the post-war period (located in the city of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukrainian SSR, in 1951, by order of the Minister of the USSR Armed Forces, the plant was assigned number 586 and the open name PO Box 186), at the planning level had the task of producing only 2 thousand missiles per year, but this task was not completed.
By the way, the special committee (or committee number 2), as a result of its work, came to the conclusion that it would be necessary to copy the entire complex German structure of production, otherwise nothing would work out. In the Third Reich, factories located not only in Germany, but also in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and other countries took part in it, by cooperation. In 1946, the task was set to establish the production of V-2 completely from domestic components (a kind of import substitution program), but this task was not completed either by 1949 or by 1950. Back in 1947, Stalin removed Malenkov from overseeing the missile program due to his inability to manage this complex problem, Bulganin took his place.
In 1948, the first test of the R-1 rocket was carried out, which was not fully assembled, but mainly from domestic components. The main problem was that the domestic chemical industry could not produce rubber products: pipes, gaskets, cuffs and other components of the required strength. This snag was solved only in 1950. The next rocket R-2 was already produced entirely from their materials.
POLYGON
For the first time, personnel began arriving at Kapustin Yar only in August 1947. In September, two echelons arrived. One came from Germany (with special rocket and telemetry equipment), the other from Podlipki with materials and equipment for setting up a landfill.
The construction of the landfill started on August 20, 1947. We worked tirelessly. The “founding father” and permanent head of the landfill for the next 27 years, Vasily Voznyuk, said: “We have an 8-hour working day at the landfill: eight hours before lunch and eight hours after”. First of all, the following were erected: a test complex, launch sites. A system for monitoring the trajectory of missiles was hastily created.
At first, people lived in tents, trailers and dugouts. In two months by the end of September, the necessary facilities were built to start testing: a starting position with a bunker, an assembly and testing building, a fuel warehouse, a bridge, a highway, 20 km of railway tracks (from Stalingrad to Kapustin Yar), headquarters and other service buildings. At the same time, the missile fall fields were marked and fenced off, measuring points were installed to monitor the flight trajectory, the amount of work was enormous. When the facilities of the first stage of the landfill were erected, the construction of residential prefabricated panel houses began.
Lieutenant General Voznyuk reported to Moscow on the readiness of the test site for the start of tests on October 1, 1947. Two weeks later (October 14), a group of designers headed by Korolev arrived at Kapustin Yar (to lead the first launch) and the first batch of A-4 missiles was delivered.
And already on October 18, 1947, at 10:47 am Moscow time, the first ballistic missile was launched in the Soviet Union. The parameters of her flight were as follows: the highest elevation - 86 km, flight range - 274 km, evasion from the flight direction - 30 km (to the left). According to the conclusion of the special commission, the first launch was successful.
The first Soviet ballistic missile R-1 was launched on October 10, 1948. This launch opened the rocket and space era of our fatherland. Subsequently, Soviet designers, having received significantly less materials and documents about German missiles than the Americans, in the shortest possible time managed to overtake their overseas colleagues both in rocketry and in the exploration of near-earth space.
In the period from 1947 to 1957, Kapustin Yar was the only test site in the USSR where ballistic missiles were tested. It tested most types of missiles from R-1 to R-14, Tempest, RSD-10, Scud, many other short and medium-range missiles, cruise missiles and air defense systems.
The system for testing and preparing missiles for launch, which was developed at that time, is still in use. At the same time, it was determined that conducting separate tests by the industry and the military was inappropriate, they decided to combine these processes.
COSMODROM
At the end of 1949, at the Kapustin Yar training ground, a joint group of the Academy of Artillery Sciences of the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Institute of Aviation Medicine, under the general leadership of Lieutenant General Blagonravov, began preparations for conducting promising research projects, in the plan of which experiments were provided that determine the possibility of launching into space and returning animals back. At the first stage, it was decided to conduct eight missile launches with biological materials on board. The experiments were carried out on dogs, rats, fruit flies and later on monkeys. Thus, preparations began for manned space flights.
On September 4, 1951, the chairman of the missile launch commission, Anatoly Blagonravov, reported to Moscow that in the period from July 22 to September 3, six vertical launches of R-1V missiles were made to an altitude of 100 km. The preparation and implementation of these tests took place with the participation of the physical and geophysical institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the State Optical Institute of the Ministry of Arms, the Ministry of Light Industry and the Research Institute of Aviation Materials. Rockets and complexes of spacecraft launched into space have fulfilled their purpose. A number of data on the state of primary cosmic radiation and on the processes of interaction of primary cosmic particles were obtained, atmospheric pressure was measured at altitudes up to 100 km, the composition of air at altitudes of 70–80 km was determined, data on the speed and direction of movement of atmospheric layers at altitudes up to 80 km, the wing model was tested at high altitudes and the friction force at supersonic speed was determined there.
The same document reported: "The survival rate of animals at altitudes up to 100 km, without disturbing physiological functions, has been proven, in four cases out of six the experimental animals were delivered to the ground without any damage." The first astronaut dogs to return alive from space were Dezik and Gypsy. Subsequently, Sergei Korolev distributed their offspring to his friends.
A decade later, in 1962, they decided to use the R-12 rocket as a carrier for spacecraft launched into low orbits. On March 16, 1962, the first small research satellite Kosmos-1 was launched into Earth orbit. The Interkosmos-1 satellite was launched on October 14, 1969. Kapustin Yar was used as a launch site for satellites under the Interkosmos international program until 1988. In parallel, spacecraft for military and national economic purposes were launched from it. But in press reports and in official documents, Kapustin Yar was never called a cosmodrome. Also, the purpose of the satellites was never highlighted. It was simply informed that another satellite "space" with such and such a serial number had been launched. Only specialists distinguished meteorological, television or radio broadcasting from reconnaissance spacecraft.
FIELD ACADEMY OF ROCKET FORCES
Kapustin Yar has been used from its earliest days to the present not only as a training ground, but also as a training center. It is rightfully called the field academy for rocket scientists. You can get admission for military service only there. The subdivision comes to Kapustin Yar, receives equipment from industry, carries out comprehensive checks of this equipment, and passes the test for admission to independent work with it. And at the end of the process, it conducts a combat training launch and only after that is it entered into the combat composition of the missile forces. All graduates of military schools underwent military training and training at Kapustin Yar. Much attention was paid to the development of regulatory documents based on the generalized experience gained at the test site. Instructions on how to launch missiles, instructions on marches, on the operation of equipment in difficult climatic conditions of winter and summer - all this was practiced at Kapustin Yar. The whole unique complex contributes to the excellent results of such work: Kapustin Yar - Balkhash.
CHRONICLES OF KAPUSTIN YAR
By the mid-1950s, the infrastructure of Kapustina Yar satisfied the tasks assigned to it. In the future, with the expansion of the scope of these tasks, the landfill itself was improved. In 1959, on December 12, the first launch of the R-17 rocket was made. The R-12 and R-14 missiles tested on it in those years played a role in the Cuban missile crisis. In 1962, by decision of the Soviet leadership, during Operation Anadyr, 36 R-12 missiles and 24 R14 missiles were delivered to Cuba. After these events, the Americans tempered their arrogance and moved from aggressive actions against the USSR to dialogue. Moreover, a telephone cable was laid from the White House to the Kremlin for emergency communications.
In the 60s, RT-1, RT-2, RT-15 missiles, and the TEMP complex were tested there. Target missiles were launched for testing the A-35 missile defense system at the Sary Shagan training ground.
In the 70s, the RSD-10 was tested. But the main focus was on tactical missiles: Luna, Tochka, Vulcan. Individual elements of ICBMs were also tested, primarily to determine their aerodynamic and ballistic characteristics.
In 1988, the elimination of the RSD-10 solid-propellant missiles was carried out at the test site in accordance with the INF Treaty signed a year earlier between the USSR and the United States. The work was carried out under the supervision of American inspectors. The starting and technical positions were mothballed, although they were left in working order. They were not used for the next 10 years.
In the 90s, there was a dramatic reduction in funding for all items of rocket construction. The leadership of the landfill fought for each of its units, trying to save them from reduction. The trials continued in a truncated form, but they were of a purely research nature, a kind of reserve for the future. Thanks to them, the Topol-M missile system was subsequently created.
In October 1998, Kapustin Yar received the name "4th State Central Interspecies Range of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation" (4 GTSMP). In the same year, for the first time after a long hiatus, rocket launches were resumed from it to launch satellites into low orbits. Since the beginning of the new century, the following tests have been carried out on it: S-400 air defense systems, RT-2PM missiles of the Topol complex, RS-12M Topol ICBMs, RS-26 Rubezh, Iskander-M OTRK.
Now Kapustin Yar works in the interests of the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Forces, the Navy and the Strategic Missile Forces.
