The surplus appropriation system is traditionally associated with the first years of Soviet power and the extraordinary conditions of the Civil War, but in Russia it appeared under the imperial government long before the Bolsheviks.
Wheat and flour crisis
With the outbreak of the First World War, basic necessities rose in price in Russia, the prices of which had increased two to three times by 1916. The ban of governors on the export of food from the provinces, the introduction of fixed prices, the distribution of cards and purchases by local authorities did not improve the situation. The cities suffered severely from food shortages and high prices. The essence of the crisis was clearly presented in the memorandum of the Voronezh Stock Exchange Committee to a meeting at the Moscow Stock Exchange in September 1916. She stated that market relations had penetrated into the village. The peasantry was able to sell less important inputs for a higher price and at the same time hold back bread for a rainy day due to the uncertainty of the outcome of the war and increasing mobilizations. The urban population suffered at the same time. “We consider it necessary to pay special attention to the fact that the wheat and flour crisis would have occurred much earlier if trade and industry did not have at their disposal some untouchable stock of wheat in the form of another cargo lying at railway stations, awaiting loading since 1915. and even since 1914, - wrote the stockbrokers, - and if the Ministry of Agriculture had not released wheat from its stock to the mills in 1916 … and it was intended in a timely manner not for the food of the population, but for other purposes. The note firmly expressed confidence that a solution to the crisis that threatened the entire country could be found only in a complete change in the country's economic policy and mobilization of the national economy. Such plans have been repeatedly expressed by a variety of public and state organizations. The situation required radical economic centralization and the involvement of all public organizations.
Introduction of surplus appropriation
However, at the end of 1916, the authorities, not daring to change, limited themselves to a plan for the mass requisition of grain. Free purchase of grain was replaced by surplus appropriation between producers. The size of the outfit was established by the chairman of a special meeting in accordance with the harvest and the size of the reserves, as well as the norms of consumption of the province. The responsibility for collecting grain was assigned to the provincial and district zemstvo councils. Through local surveys, it was necessary to find out the required amount of grain, subtract it from the general order for the county, and spread the remainder between the volosts, which were supposed to bring the size of the order to each rural society. The districts were to be distributed by the counties by December 14, by December 20 to develop outfits for the volosts, those, by December 24, for rural communities, and, finally, by December 31, every householder should have known about his outfit. The seizure was entrusted to the zemstvo bodies in conjunction with those authorized for the procurement of food.
A peasant during plowing Photo: RIA Novosti
Having received the circular, the Voronezh provincial council convened on December 6-7, 1916, a meeting of the chairmen of the zemstvo councils, at which the allocation scheme was worked out and the orders for the counties were calculated. The council was instructed to work out schemes and volost allocations. At the same time, the question was raised about the impracticability of the outfit. According to a telegram from the Ministry of Agriculture, an allocation of 46.951 thousand rubles was imposed on the province.poods: rye 36.47 thousand, wheat 3.882 thousand, millet 2.43, oats 4.169 thousand moreover, in case of an increase of at least 10%, I undertake not to include your province in the possible additional allocation. This meant that the plan was raised to 51 million poods.
The calculations carried out by the zemstvos showed that the full implementation of the appropriation was associated with the confiscation of almost all grain from the peasants: then there were only 1.79 million poods of rye in the province, and wheat was threatened with a deficit of 5 million. This amount could hardly be enough for consumption and new sowing bread, not to mention feeding livestock, which in the province, according to rough estimates, there were more than 1.3 million heads. The zemstvos noted: "In record years, the province gave 30 million throughout the year, and now it is expected to take 50 million within 8 months, moreover, a year with a harvest below average and provided that the population is not confident in sowing and harvesting the future harvest, cannot but strive to make stocks. " Considering that the railroad lacked 20% of the carriages, and this problem was not solved in any way, the meeting considered: "All these considerations lead to the conclusion that the collection of the above-mentioned amount of grain is in fact impracticable." The zemstvo noted that the ministry calculated the allocation, obviously not based on the statistical data presented to it. Of course, this was not an accidental bad luck of the province - such a rough calculation, which did not take into account the real state of affairs, applied to the entire country. As it was found out from the survey of the Union of Cities in January 1917: "the allocation of grain was made for the provinces, it is not known from what calculation, sometimes it is incongruous, placing on some provinces a burden that is absolutely unbearable for them." This alone indicated that the plan would not be fulfilled. At the December meeting in Kharkov, the head of the provincial council V. N. Tomanovsky tried to prove this to the Minister of Agriculture A. A. Rittich, to which he replied: "Yes, all this may be so, but such an amount of grain is needed for the army and for factories working for the defense, since this allocation covers only these two needs … this must be given and we must give it" …
Also, the meeting informed the ministry that "the administrations have neither material resources, nor means of influencing those who do not want to obey the conditions of the appropriation", therefore the meeting requested to give them the right to open dumping points and requisition premises for them. In addition, in order to preserve fodder for the army, the meeting asked to cancel the provincial orders for cake. These considerations were sent to the authorities, but had no effect. As a result, the Voronezh residents distributed the allocation even with the recommended increase of 10%.
The layout will be completed!
The Voronezh provincial zemstvo assembly was postponed from January 15, 1917 to February 5, and then to February 26, due to the busyness of the chairmen of the district councils, who were engaged in collecting bread in the villages. But even on this number, the quorum did not take place - instead of 30 people. gathered 18.10 people sent a telegram that they could not come to the congress. Chairman of the Zemsky Assembly A. I. Alekhine was forced to ask those who had appeared not to leave Voronezh, hoping that a quorum would be gathered. It was only at the meeting on March 1 that it was decided "immediately" to begin the collection. This meeting also behaved ambiguously. After an exchange of views at the suggestion of S. A. Blinov's meeting worked out a resolution for communication to the government, in which it actually recognized his demands as impracticable: remainder ". The meeting again pointed out the lack of fuel for grinding bread, bread bags, and the collapse of the railway. However, references to all these obstacles ended in the fact that the assembly, submitting to the supreme authority, promised that "by the common friendly efforts of the population and its representatives - in the person of zemstvo leaders" the appropriation would be carried out. So, contrary to the facts, those "extremely decisive, optimistic statements of the official and semi-official press" were supported, which, according to contemporaries, accompanied the campaign.
Chairman of the Voronezh zemstvo district assembly A. I. Alekhine. Photo: Homeland / courtesy of the author
However, it is difficult to say how real were the assurances of the zemstvos about the confiscation of "all grain without a remainder" in the event of the complete fulfillment of the appropriation. It was no secret to anyone that there was bread in the province. But its exact amount was unknown - as a result of the zemstvo they were forced to derive figures from the data of the agricultural census, consumption and sowing rates, farm yields, etc. At the same time, the bread of previous harvests was not taken into account, since, in the opinion of the councils, it had already been consumed. Although this opinion seems controversial, given that many contemporaries mention the grain reserves of the peasants and the markedly increased level of their well-being during the war, other facts confirm that there was clearly a shortage of grain in the countryside. Voronezh city shops were regularly besieged by poor peasants from the suburbs and even other volosts. In Korotoyaksky uyezd, according to reports, the peasants said: "We ourselves can barely get bread, but the landowners have a lot of bread and a lot of cattle, but they have little cattle requisitioned, and therefore more bread and cattle should be requisitioned." Even the most prosperous Valuisky district supported itself largely by bringing in grain from the Kharkov and Kursk provinces. When supplies from there were prohibited, the situation of the county deteriorated markedly. Obviously, the matter is in the social stratification of the village, in which the poor in the village suffered no less than the poor in the city. In any case, the fulfillment of the government's plan of appropriation was impossible: there was no organized apparatus for collecting and accounting for grain, the appropriation was arbitrary, there was not enough material base for collecting and storing grain, the railway crisis was not resolved. Moreover, the surplus appropriation system aimed at supplying the army and factories did not in any way solve the problem of supplying cities, which, with a decrease in grain reserves in the province, should only have become aggravated.
According to the plan, in January 1917 the province had to hand over 13, 45 million poods of grain: of which 10 million poods of rye, 1, 25 - wheat, 1, 4 - oats, 0, 8 - millet; the same amount was supposed to be prepared in February. To collect grain, the provincial zemstvo organized 120 dumping points, 10 per district, located 50-60 versts from each other, and most of them were supposed to open in February. Already with the appropriation, difficulties began: the Zadonsk district took over only part of the order (instead of 2.5 million poods of rye - 0.7 million, and instead of 422 thousand poods of millet - 188), In February, only 0.5 million were allocated. The layout of the order by the volosts was released from the control of the councils due to the lack of reliable communication with the villages, so the case there dragged on.
"A number of volosts completely refuse … appropriation"
Already in the period of procurement, the Zemstvo people were skeptical about their results: “At least, the messages already received from some counties are convincing of this, firstly, that a number of volosts completely refuse any appropriation whatsoever, and, secondly, that and in those volosts where the allotment was carried out by volost gatherings completely - in the future, with the settlement and household allotment, the impossibility of its implementation is revealed. " The sale was not going well. Even in Valuisky uyezd, on which the least appropriation was imposed, and the population was in the best position, things were going badly - many peasants assured that they did not have so much grain. Where the bread was, the laws were dictated by speculation. In one village, peasants agreed to sell wheat at a price of 1.9 rubles.for a pood, but soon they secretly refused it: “It then happened that those who responded to the offer of the authorities did not have time to receive money for the delivered bread, when they heard that the firm price of wheat had risen from 1 ruble 40 kopecks to 2 rubles 50 kopecks Thus, the more patriotic peasants will receive less for bread than those who kept it at home. believe, because they are only deceiving the people."
M. D. Ershov, in 1915-1917. and about. Governor of the Voronezh province. Photo: Homeland / courtesy of the author
The procurement campaign was not supported by real means of implementation. The government tried to overcome this with threats. On February 24, Rittich sent a telegram to Voronezh, which ordered, first of all, to proceed with the requisition of grain in the villages that most stubbornly did not want to carry out the requisitioning. At the same time, it was necessary to leave on the farm one pood of grain per capita until the new harvest, but no later than September 1, as well as for the spring seeding of fields according to the norms established by the zemstvo council and for feeding livestock - according to the norms established by the authorized mismatch of actions). Governor M. D. Ershov, fulfilling the demands of the authorities, on the same day sent out telegrams to the district zemstvo councils, in which he demanded to immediately start delivering bread. If the delivery does not begin within three days, the authorities were instructed to proceed with requisitions "with a decrease in the fixed price by 15 percent and, in case of non-delivery by the owners of bread to the receiving point, with deduction in addition to the cost of transportation." The government did not provide any specific directives for the implementation of these instructions. Meanwhile, such actions demanded that they be provided with an extensive network of the executive apparatus, which the zemstvos did not have. It is not surprising that they, for their part, did not try to be zealous in the execution of a deliberately hopeless endeavor. Ershov's order of December 6 to provide the police with "all possible assistance" in collecting bread did not help much. V. N. Tomanovsky, who was usually very strict about state interests, at the meeting on March 1, took a moderate tone: “From my point of view, we need to collect bread as much as possible, without resorting to any drastic measures, this will be some plus to the amount of reserves, It is possible that the railroad traffic will improve, there will be more wagons … to take drastic measures in the sense that "let's take it, by all means," it would seem inappropriate."
"The development plan undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed."
M. V. Before the revolution, Rodzianko wrote to the emperor: “The land allocation undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed. These are the figures characterizing the course of the latter. It was supposed to open up 772 million poods. That is, 129 million poods less than expected, 2) the county zemstvos 228 million poods, and, finally, 3) volosts only 4 million poods. These figures indicate the complete collapse of the appropriation ….
Chairman of the State Duma M. V. Rodzianko was forced to admit that the food appropriation system initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture had failed. Photo: Bibliothèque nationale de France
By the end of February 1917, the province not only failed to fulfill the plan, but also lacked 20 million poods of grain. The collected bread, as it was obvious from the very beginning, could not be taken out. As a result, 5, 5 million poods of grain accumulated on the railway, which the regional committee undertook to take out not earlier than in two and a half months. Neither wagons for unloading nor fuel for locomotives were registered. It was not even possible to transport flour to dryers or grain for grinding, since the committee did not deal with domestic flights. And there was no fuel for the mills either, which is why many of them stood idle or were preparing to stop working. The last attempt of the autocracy to solve the food problem failed because of the inability and unwillingness to solve the complex of real economic problems in the country and the absence of the state centralization of economic management necessary in war conditions.
This problem was inherited by the Provisional Government, which followed the old path. Already after the revolution, at a meeting of the Voronezh Food Committee on May 12, the Minister of Agriculture A. I. Shingarev said that the province did not supply 17 out of 30 million poods of grain: "It is necessary to decide: how right is the central administration … and how successful the order will be, and can there be a significant excess of the order?" This time, the members of the council, clearly falling into the optimism of the first revolutionary months, assured the minister that "the mood of the population has already been determined in terms of the supply of bread" and "with the active participation" of the prodorgan that the order will be fulfilled. In July 1917, orders were completed by 47%, in August - by 17%. There is no reason to suspect that local leaders loyal to the revolution lack zeal. But the future has shown that this time the Zemstvo promise was not fulfilled. The objectively developed situation in the country - the economy is getting out of control of the state and the inability to regulate the processes in the countryside - put an end to the well-meaning efforts of local authorities.
Notes (edit)
1. Voronezh Telegraph. 1916. N 221. October 11.
2. Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemsky Assembly of the regular session of 1916 (February 28 - March 4, 1917). Voronezh, 1917. L. 34-34ob.
3. State Archives of the Voronezh Region (GAVO). F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 23ob.-25.
4. Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemsky Assembly. L. 43ob.
5. Sidorov A. L. The economic situation in Russia during the First World War. M., 1973. S. 489.
6. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2225. L. 14ob.
7. Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemsky Assembly. L. 35, 44-44ob.
8. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 46.28 February.
9. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 49.3 March.
10. Sidorov A. L. Decree. Op. P. 493.
11. Popov P. A. Voronezh city government. 1870-1918. Voronezh, 2006. S. 315.
12. GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 1. D. 1249. L.7
13. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 39.19 February.
14. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 8. January 11.
15. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 28.4 February.
16. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 23ob.-25.
17. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 17. January 21.
18. GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 2. D. 1138. L. 419.
19. GAVO. F. I-6. Op. 1. D. 2084. L. 95-97.
20. GAVO. F. I-6. Op. 1. D. 2084. L. 9.
21. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 15ob.
22. Note by M. V. Rodzianki // Red Archive. 1925. Vol. 3. P. 69.
23. Bulletin of the Voronezh district zemstvo. 1917. N 8. February 24.
24. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 15.
25. Bulletin of the Voronezh Provincial Food Committee. 1917. No. 1. June 16.
26. Voronezh Telegraph. 1917. N 197.13 September.
