The topic of the necessity and expediency of building large series of ships has been raised repeatedly by many authors and experts. The world experience of shipbuilding clearly speaks in favor of this. However, what is happening in our Navy resembles an orgy with a complete lack of adequate military and technical justification (and its substitution with various "advertising tricks" (and other "techniques"), such as "innovation" and "modularity", etc.) …
In the summer of this year, one of the authors (A. T.) published an article “Worse than a crime. Construction of corvettes of project 20386 - error , which caused a significant resonance (including among specialists). Then, on its basis and based on the results of the discussion, an appeal was sent (A. T.) to the presidential administration of the Russian Federation with a request to understand the feasibility of project 20386 and resume production and modernization of a series of project 20380 corvettes already mastered by the industry and the fleet. Briefly, the main theses:
1. The huge price of the project 20386. The construction cost of the head is known - more than 29 billion rubles, which is 70% more expensive than the serial corvette of the project 20380 and is close to the cost of the modern frigate of the project 22350.
2. Weak weapons. Despite a significant increase in displacement (from projects 20380 and 20385), the new "innovative" project 20386 has lost the "Caliber" complex (normally installed on the project 20385). The use of "Caliber" is possible only with a planned "container-modular" launcher, temporarily installed instead of the helicopter (!) And with a reduction in ammunition by half from the 20385 project. "Zarya" and replacing it with an older one with worse performance characteristics of GAS MG-335M). Given the importance of anti-submarine missions, incl. to ensure the deployment of NSNF, such a weakening of the armament of the "promising" corvette of project 20386 has no reasonable explanations (especially given its significantly increased displacement and cost).
3. In view of the new type of the main power plant of the corvette 20386 (gas turbine with partial electric propulsion), not only is the technical de-unification with other ships in the near zone taking place, but also their joint use for their intended purpose is significantly complicated. At the same time, partial electromotion gives little, because the power of the electric motors on the project 20386 is small for an effective search run (about 18 knots), and the inevitable transition to turbines dramatically increases noise, operating costs and reduces the cruising range.
4. For the sake of project 20386, the laying of the industrialized corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 has already been stopped, and this in the coming years will have very grave consequences both for the fleet and industry.
5. "The concept of modularity", which "justified" the project 20386, has failed in a number of countries (including the United States). At the same time, we “for some reason” ignore their successful experience in this area, for example, the MEKO concept, and all “modularity” for us boiled down to stuffing combat systems in 20 and 40 foot containers (with a significant decrease in their performance characteristics). In the end, if this concept needs to be tested, then it can be done on any cheap cargo ship (and not on a special expensive "over-corvette-underfrigate"). So where is the real test of "our modules"?
6. High technical risk of project 20386. Here we can note the problem of stabilization of the radar beam due to significant and accidental deformations of the composite superstructure. The need to mount a radar on a superstructure is highly controversial. After all, these are not only problems with beam stabilization, but also a significant decrease in the detection range of low-flying targets (from project 20385 with the same radar, but on the mast). The reason for the deployment of the AN / SPY-1 radar canvases in the USA is obvious - their mass and problems with the stability of their first carriers of the Ticonderoga missile defense missile system. But after the new radars have already been successfully placed on the mast of the project 22350, "lowering" them (and the detection range of low-flying targets) on the project 20386 is beyond common sense. Here the question already arises about the "unofficial name" of project 20386, - "HBZ" ("I want to be" Zumvolt "), it is too obvious imitation in 20386 of this unsuccessful project of the US Navy (especially considering that version 20386 with a" wave-piercing "nose (as on "Zumvite") existed).
Project 20386 corvette and USS Zumvolt destroyer
(Variant 20386 with a reverse inclination of the stem existed).
The "advantages" of the project 20386 ship in terms of seaworthiness, speed and range have been declared. However, the increase in seaworthiness is insignificant in comparison with the project 20380, and begins to manifest itself clearly only in the excitement, where both projects are on the verge of losing combat effectiveness. Speed 20386 was obtained by gas turbines (on corvettes 20380 diesel). At the same time, taking into account the significant increase in the displacement of 20386, the use of turbines on the original 20380 could give an even more significant cost effect.
Range? But it is needed primarily by ships in the far zone. At the same time, the frigate of project 22350, with a cost close to that of project 20386, has incomparably higher combat capabilities. At the same time, a significant range on the 20386 project is achieved through a combined installation and the use of electric motors on an economic drive. The problem is that due to the low power of these electric motors, the speed spectrum of the Navy corvette does not correspond to them (for example, the task of searching for submarines), and in most cases the corvette 20386 will have to "get under the turbines" for this, - with a sharp increase in noise and operating costs (and reduced range).
For the near sea zone, as a replacement for the IPC of project 1124, the ships of project 20386 are completely redundant. The main thing is that we need in the near zone a mass carrier of the most effective GAS for us today, the Minotaur (and with a long towed antenna).
To carry out combat missions in this zone, a long cruising range and autonomy of 20386 reserves are not needed. The increased speed does not make sense, due to the limitations of the towed GAS, and in a combat situation the ships will go with them (exposed)! And we need a lower price, and the maximum possible anti-submarine capabilities for the lowest possible price (to ensure mass construction).
In fact, the ship of Project 20386, although it is called the word "corvette", is a "small frigate" in terms of its displacement, seaworthiness and cruising range. And most importantly, it is a frigate (and "full-size") and for the price too, but at the same time it is armed worse than the corvette of Project 20385! Such is the "perekorvet-nedofrigat".
In response to an appeal to the administration of the President of the Russian Federation, a response was received from the Navy, the main provisions of which are given below.
It should be commented on this answer by the Navy
A comment. It is appropriate to compare our "experience" with the corvettes of the line of projects: 20380 - 20380 with the Zaslon radar - 20385 - 20386, with the American - a huge series of Arlie Burke-class destroyers, created a decade and a half earlier than our 20386, and continuously improved (in within several subseries). We, having not completely eliminated the shortcomings of the serial 20380, grab onto new projects!
A comment. This is a well-known fact, and it is connected, first of all, with the installation of the new Zaslon radar complex (RLC) instead of the Fourke and Puma radars. The question arises, why this was done, in the presence of the serial radar "Positive-M" (which meets the technical requirements of the corvette) and has an order of magnitude lower cost (from the radar "Zaslon"). In addition, it is completely incomprehensible why in the Zaslon radar, with a sharp increase in cost (from the Fourke radar), the most critical lack of air defense of corvettes was not eliminated - the absence of a radio correction channel for missiles?
Or is the information correct that the installation of the Zaslon radar on the corvettes took place only “for the sake of the Zaslon radar (more precisely, its manufacturer)?
Screenshot of the advertising brochure of the Zaslon RLC. The solution to the problem of the absence of a radio correction line for the missile defense system, which is critical for project 20380 and 20385 corvettes, has not even been announced and is not planned!
A comment. However, they are being completed (two buildings of project 20385) with a domestic Kolomna diesel power plant. At the same time, there is a prospect of increasing its capacity, however, in the current announced plans of the Navy, the plant is left without an order (diesel engines for surface ships of the Navy). If the problem for the Navy is to reduce the speed of corvettes 20385 (with the Caliber complex), then a possible solution to the placement of the Caliber was indicated - its placement on inclined launchers (similar to the Uranium complex) based on the original project 20380.
A comment. These are senseless, "advertising" phrases, I could not give a sane answer to any specific tactical or technical question on the obvious problems of the Navy project 20386. With project 20386, a strong regression of the level of development is obvious: with a significant increase in displacement and cost, in terms of armament and combat qualities, project 20386 is significantly inferior to the previous project 20385.
A comment. Above, the obvious critical shortcomings of the weapons of the 20386 project were noted. The Navy could only give general phrases as an answer. Apparently, for reasonable objections to criticism of the 20386 project, the Navy simply does not have arguments and facts.
A comment. The indicated cost of the project 20386 corvette is taken from the annual report of Severnaya Verf JSC. Taking into account the fact that the ROC on project 20386 is being conducted by Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, it is obvious that the real cost of the head corvette of project 20386 is much higher than the figure of 29 billion rubles indicated in the report of Severnaya Verf.
A comment. The question arises: why is the Navy in general defective ships (project 20386), and at a price close to the price of multiples of more powerful frigates of project 22350? What mass series can we talk about at all? And where are the guarantees of "price reduction" if the cost of the previous corvettes (project 20380) during the construction process only grew earlier?
The main problem with project 20386 is that, with weak combat capabilities, it disrupts the replacement of worn-out and outdated ships of the Navy in the near zone. It was the understanding of this fact that brought to life the original appeal (A. T.)
So, there are simple technical and tactical "awkward questions" for the 20386 project:
1. Why does the new project 20386 have extremely weak weapons with a significant increase in its displacement and cost?
2. What is the “logic of choice” based on: or “Caliber in a container” “or a helicopter” for this project, if the ship needs them together and practically simultaneously (especially considering its significant displacement)?
3. What is the “expediency” of building project 20386 at a cost close to the serial frigate of project 22350 (which has incomparably great combat capabilities)?
4. "Feasibility" of the introduction of a hybrid power plant, taking into account the fact that the installed low-power electric motors are not able to provide even a search run of 16-18 knots?
5. Is it “expedient” to use an extremely expensive radar system on a near-field ship (moreover, it does not have a missile defense channel) and is it “gold” at the cost of a missile defense system?
6. What prevented you from working out the “modular concept” on any experimental vessel, in advance and at minimal cost (and, if it was supposedly “successful”, to convincingly present it to specialists and society)?
7. How can the near zone be ensured (primarily in anti-submarine warfare) if, due to the very high cost of new corvettes, their series is deliberately insufficient for solving the tasks of the Navy? Moreover, the chief designer of the 20386 project himself (!) Directly writes about this in his latest book (link below)!
8. Why, given the extreme importance of the task of anti-submarine defense (including in order to ensure the NSNF), and the installation of an extremely expensive (and dubious justification) radar, the hydroacoustics on the 20386 project was “slaughtered” to “save money”?
The Navy actually evaded answering them (for it is obvious that there is nothing to answer). In response to the unsubscribe, the author sent another appeal. With the text of this appeal, you can read here … I must say that for almost four months of waiting, no response to this repeated appeal was received. A little later, the Navy drew up a new reply, signed by the Chief of Naval Shipbuilding V. Tryapichnikov, even more meaningless, but more on it below.
A question arises both to the author and chief designer of this project - I. G. Zakharov. In his previous publication on topic 20386, the above-mentioned acute issues of the project were carefully bypassed. At the same time, he understands everything, but does the exact opposite! Zakharov I. G.:
The need to create and maintain small corvettes in the fleet is a result of the growth in cost and the increase in the capabilities of multipurpose corvettes. … the number of naval personnel of the Navy could be reduced by more than 60% … The current situation can only be reversed by focusing efforts on solving more clearly defined priority tasks, one of which is the creation of a lower-class corvette and, therefore, less cost. Due to these ships, it will be possible to maintain the required number of surface ships in the fleet.
Perhaps this time he will find civil courage and give explanations on project 20386. At the same time, not forgetting about the problems with project 20380:
• "substantiation" of the use of the "Fourke" radar (with its capabilities to issue target designation obviously not meeting the requirements of the "Redut" air defense missile system);
• absence (until now!) Of a radio correction channel for missiles on corvettes and sense in using missiles with a 40 km range without a radio correction channel (!);
• here: what is the range of capture of the missile defense system, he personally hopes to get on the inconspicuous newest American anti-ship missile system LRASM, and in general is the Redoubt air defense system (in the configuration adopted for the corvette - with autonomous missiles with ARGSN) capable of effectively repelling the raid of such targets (especially taking into account the fact that in all tests he worked only on targets with an EPR one or two orders of magnitude more than LRASM)?
• Justification of the use of the extremely expensive Zaslon radar (with an obvious "reduction" in the project 20386 for the "economy" of hydroacoustics).
Obviously, the real reasons for the "decisions on the project 20386" have nothing to do with technology and "military considerations." Among specialists in the field of shipbuilding and the creation of naval weapons, information has been circulating for a long time, which can be summarized as follows: early 2013, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet reports to the Chief Navy V. V. about the complete incapacity of the project 20380 corvettes, and at the same time I. V. Zakharov, agrees with V. V. Chirkov. TTZ for a new corvette of project 20386 (and bypassing the Navy specialists).
Navy specialist, 2015-03-01:
The fact of the passage of the TTZ at 20386 is known, when Mr. Zakharov, the main enemy of our fleet, on behalf of Almaz brought the TTZ to the Central Research Institute of VK, signed with the head and then immediately with the Commander-in-Chief. Naturally, no one from the institute read anything inside. Then. We read it later and …
Navy specialist on November 16, 2006:
Criticism of project 20380 … no one is interested in how these undoubtedly excellent missiles will actually fly, in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from "Fourke" … So to speak, according to the "fire and forget" scheme. About what!!!!!!! About the goal? or about a rocket? … the developers of the air defense system diligently bypass all sharp corners, such as:
And how will your missile defense system see the target in case of target designation errors in the region of 1 degree? … Answer - He will see … and so on.
… if we take the statement of I. G. Zakharova: We will not fight with anyone. Corvette is needed in order to demonstrate the flag of the point, then of course all the way.
And if tomorrow is a war …
Hex? However, by these same persons, all the problems of the 20380 project that the fleet faced in the future (and which have not been completely resolved until now!) Were named not just before they occurred, but even before they began to be embodied in hardware! Those. at the time of the adoption of "controversial decisions" on corvettes in the late 2000s, their fallacy and catastrophic consequences were immediately clear to specialists.
Navy specialist 2011-10-10:
From my point of view, which has been repeatedly expressed here, (and how many times you can already repeat it): there are no real possibilities to bring to mind the Redoubt air defense system on the corvette 20380 N ET
The reasons have already been pointed out many times and there is no point in listing them again.
Okay … basic
1. This is not an air defense system. Not a complex. it is a launcher + command module + rocket. There is no information subsystem.
2. Fourke has no chance of providing Redoubt with the information it needs in terms of accuracy.
3. The only chance of work - according to the "Puma" through "Sigma".
Especially these estimates correlate with the information published in the article by K. Chulkov ("Version on the Neva", 2017-01-06):
Apparently, "Tower" in the document is the name of the integrated antenna-tower mast complex (IBMK), which connects all navigation, weapons control, electronic warfare and reconnaissance of a battleship into a single unit …. Corvettes "Thundering" and "Provorny" series 20385 were built at "Severnaya Verf", the lead developer was TsMKB "Almaz", which decided to order "towers" for corvettes of this series from "Leninets", despite the fact that the enterprise was previously in the maritime theme was not present and had no relevant experience … But let us return to the document "Scheme of special relations in the Tower". According to the agreements with "Almaz" and "Severnaya Verf", the document says, payments from the value of the contract excluding VAT are followed by Lysenko - 1%,…. As you know, Eduard Lysenko is the deputy head of the Almaz Central Design Bureau
Note: as of today, E. Lysenko, former Deputy Director of the Almaz Central Design Bureau for Armaments, has been dismissed, leaving behind a long "train" of extremely strange decisions and "preferences." This applied not only to the armament of corvettes (although he bears personal responsibility for them, especially for problems with their air defense), but also for other ships. For example, it was he who "substantiated" (in quotation marks) the alleged "inexpediency" of modernizing the massive minesweepers of the Navy of Project 1265 for the "Mayevka" complex ("Mayevka" did not get up with the trawls, Lysenko preferred ancient and useless trawls).
Today, however, the situation with the 20380 corvettes has changed.
According to information from the Pacific Fleet, the corvettes of the 20380 project significantly "added" in combat capability. The Uranus missile system perfectly hits targets at a distance, the former A-190 cannon accurately and reliably hits targets, both sea and air, and ground, the Furke radar also showed itself well when observing air goals. The hydroacoustic complex is working well, and the electronic warfare systems have shown themselves to be excellent.
Summarize. Despite the sharp aggravation of the military-political situation since 2014, the corvettes of the 20380 project are still of limited combat capability (and the main questions remain about the Redut air defense system)! However, the industry has done a lot of hard, but effective work to fine-tune the project and eliminate many of its shortcomings. Currently, the prospects for quickly bringing the corvettes to a combat-ready state are quite real. Obviously, the key issue for the air defense system is the introduction of a radio correction channel for the air defense missile system (including on all previously built ships with the Redut air defense system).
However, instead, a scam was started with a new project (and with the transfer of the key disadvantages of 20380 to it, for example, the lack of radio correction of missiles), which is also many times more expensive.
The question arises: is it possible to "completely" eliminate the shortcomings of 20380, or are its modernization reserves allegedly "exhausted"? Yes, project 20385 has obviously completely selected the reserves of project 20380 in terms of loads. However, there are "internal reserves":
• the use of simple and light inclined launchers for the Caliber complex, structurally similar to the launchers previously used on the Nakat small rocket ship;
• replacement of heavy launchers of the "Packet" complex with light launchers of the Western Mk32 type, ensuring the storage of spare ammunition in a common cellar with an aviation one;
• for the use of boats (including unmanned boats) in difficult conditions - to reduce the installation height of boats to the level of the upper deck (with the installation of modern launching devices), which is possible on newly built ships, provided they are equipped with light torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber and transferring them to a place more convenient for recharging.
Of course, it is necessary to solve the "problem of air defense missile systems", with the provision of radio correction of missiles. Taking into account the short range of capture of the ARL of the seeker of the SAM of the stealthy targets of the LRASM type, it is obviously necessary to install a second radar of the Puma type, giving it control functions of the air defense missile system. Perhaps there is a sense in a series of missiles with a reduced cost due to the abandonment of the expensive ARLGSN, - using them as radio command ones. When repelling a "dense", with a small time interval of a raid of inconspicuous means of destruction, a radio command air defense system with a good multi-channel radar has a decisive advantage over an air defense system with autonomous air defense missile systems with an ARLGSN, - clearly controlling the situation, the actual shelling and destruction of all targets. Formally, there are such, - "Pantsir-M" and "Tor-2M", but their placement on the corvette means a complete revision of its project, and the possibility of using simple radio command modifications of the 9M96 and 9M100 missiles with a standard launcher from under the "Puma" is probably easier and more expedient.
In order to reduce the cost of the corvette, it is advisable to unify the "new" 20380 radar with the first two hulls of the project 22800 MRK (ie, the installation of the "Positive-M" radar). The successful creation of the Project 22800 MRK by the Pella plant and the Almaz Central Design Bureau has shown that ships can be built here quickly and at a reasonable cost. The capabilities of the radar of the project 22800 are quite enough for solving problems in the near zone (including for the corvette of the project 20380).
To summarize:
1. Project 20386 does not have any serious military and technical justification. The Navy, which received it, "to put it mildly," from the "back door", does not have and is unable to give any serious and noteworthy arguments in its favor. Its serial construction is impractical.
2. The industry has carried out a large, difficult and largely successful work on the finalization of the project 20380, mastered its serial construction (even at the "problem" Amur shipyard).
3. Ships of the project 20380 began to navigate reliably (including to the distant and ocean zones).
4. It is necessary to continue the series of corvettes of project 20380 (5), with the unconditional complete elimination of their shortcomings (including the completion of the first ships of the series).
5. In order to reduce the cost, it is advisable to unify the radar systems of projects 20380 (new buildings) and 22800 (the first two buildings of the series) and use (in the future) unified control racks for various weapon systems.
6. The use of products of the "Caliber" complex should be provided from inclined launchers of all corvettes (including the first hulls). First of all, this concerns anti-submarine missiles (the OVR corvette should not be a “game” for submarines, but a “hunter” for them!), As is done, for example, on the Chinese OVR corvettes of Project 056.
7. It is necessary to place promising robotic systems and modern boats on board the project 20380 corvettes.
8. The search for "internal reserves" to reduce the displacement of ships of the project 20380 for its revision (with the elimination of shortcomings), for example, replacing the heavy launching complex "Package" with light pneumatic torpedo tubes.
The construction of ships of project 20386 must be stopped and no money will be spent on such technical adventures in the future.
Afterword 2019
This article was supposed to come out on New Year's Eve in one large edition and was written especially for him. However, taking into account the significant resonance of the previous series of articles by the authors, measures were taken to prevent it from appearing in the media.
The negative consequences of the termination of the construction of a series of corvettes of the project 20380 (20385) are beginning to be realized by the leaders. In August 2018 A. V. Shlyakhtenko, General Director of the Almaz Central Design Bureau, gave an interview to TASS, in which he stated:
This year, the laying of corvettes 20380 and 20385 at the Severnaya Verf shipyard and the Amur shipyard is not planned. However, the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau is convinced that these combat surface ships, due to their limited cost and powerful enough weapons, allowing them to solve a wide range of combat missions, including in a remote sea and ocean zone, are the basis for the formation of a surface fleet ship structure … Therefore, their construction should be carried out continuously and at the highest possible pace. We hope that the decision to lay down new ships of this class will be made by the state customer in the near future.
And what about the Navy? "Answer" (more precisely, its complete absence), - in the formal letter of the head of the Navy's shipbuilding V. Tryapichinkov …
Three years later, "Daring" will remain on the slipway alone for an indefinitely long time, as a monument to how such adventures end.
