Supplies from Great Britain and the United States supplemented Soviet industry in those industries that lacked their own capacities.
The US Lend-Lease Bill (lend - to lend, lease - to lease) was approved on March 11, 1941 and authorized the president to transfer military equipment and equipment to any country whose protection is recognized as vital to the security of America. The law was extended to the USSR on November 7, 1941. A little earlier, on September 6, a similar decision was made by the British government.
In our country, the issue of Lend-Lease is still extremely politicized and causes completely opposite judgments: from "it meant little" to "without it there would be no victory." Let's not try to grasp the immensity and suggest focusing on a relatively local topic: the value of foreign aid in equipping armored forces and the tank industry of the USSR.
Allied armored vehicles
There are no generally accepted figures about the tanks supplied by the allies in our literature, so we propose to use the data of one of the most respected publications, namely the encyclopedia “Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. T. 2. 1941-1945. (authors - A. G. Solyankin, M. V. Pavlov, I. V. Pavlov, I. G. Zheltov, Eksprint Publishing House, 2005). It is reported here that 11,598 Anglo-American tanks entered the active army during 1941-1945, which amounted to 14.8 percent of those produced by the domestic industry. About 1.5 thousand more died during transportation by sea. In general, not so much, although the value of 3472 vehicles delivered in 1942 is obviously higher than 3951 in 1944.
As for the quality of tanks, it is usually said that the Allies supplied us with what they fought on themselves. But this is not entirely true, at least with regard to Great Britain, which sent to Russia exclusively the Matilda, Valentine and Churchill infantry support tanks (20 airborne Tetrarchs did not make the difference). For the conditions of a highly mobile war, imposed in 1941-1942 by the Germans and carried out by Soviet troops in 1943-1945, these unimportant walkers did not fit at all. And cruising machines ("Krusiders", "Cromveli", "Komets") were not sent to the USSR.
Another thing is the US tanks, which turned out to be very hardy on long marches. The outwardly awkward M3 medium tank at the Cuban test site passed 1,672 kilometers in winter conditions without breakdowns, except for a few destroyed track-link ridges. The M4A2 Sherman tank was tested in the USSR in the winter and summer of 1943. Already having a mileage of 1285 kilometers, he successfully covered another 1765 kilometers with minimal repairs, again, tracks and rollers with peeled rubber tires. During operation in the Soviet troops, tankers unanimously noted the ease of maintenance and ease of control of the M4A2 tank. Of course, the "Sherman" had its weak points: because of the high specific pressure, it had worse cross-country ability compared to the "thirty-four", the drive wheel and final drive were out of order under strong impacts, the rise of 30 degrees was difficult to overcome. And yet it was a very reliable car. The Americans themselves were well aware of the merits of their technology. In the test report of the thirty-four at the Aberdeen Proving Ground there is the following phrase: “There is reason to believe that he (T-34) has higher operating speeds, lower rolling resistance and better maneuverability than the American M4 tank, but inferior to him in the thoroughness of manufacturing and reliability in work”.
However, tanks were not the only armored vehicle supplied by the Allies. In 1944, 1,100 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (ZSU) based on half-track armored personnel carriers arrived from the United States. Such machines were not mass-produced in the USSR during wartime, and the first 12 domestic ZSU-37 appeared after the end of hostilities in Europe. But without the support of the ZSU, armored and mechanized units on the march were almost helpless in front of air strikes, the fire of 7, 62-mm machine guns did not help much. And the single 12, 7-mm machine guns, which appeared on the heavy self-propelled guns "ISU" in October 1944, were not full-fledged protection. So it was the American ZSU on the ground, together with the fighter aircraft in the air (where there were also many aircraft from the United States), that ensured the safety of the tankers in the last period of the war.
The next fact. Even the experience of the war in Spain and the battles on Khalkhin Gol showed that tanks, no matter how perfect they are, without the support of the infantry are vulnerable both in defense and in the offensive. The infantry, on the other hand, could not accompany the tanks operating on rough terrain either in cars, much less on foot. A special armored vehicle was required, comparable in cross-country ability to tanks, that is, a tracked or half-tracked armored personnel carrier.
In the Wehrmacht, vehicles of this type were used from the very beginning of the war and were highly valued. The opinion of E. Middeldorf, an assistant on the study of the tactical experience of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, is known: “Motorized infantry battalions armed with armored personnel carriers played an exceptional role. With the increased firepower of the enemy, the motorized infantry, naked by the armor, could not successfully interact with the tanks. On the contrary, it slowed down the offensive of tanks and could not quickly build on the success or gain a foothold on the achieved lines. But on the other hand, tanks, as the means of anti-tank defense improved, more and more needed cover from the motorized infantry. In one of the reports summarizing the experience of military operations in 1943, it was noted: “The absence of real motorized infantry in tank formations had a very strong effect, although the tank formation was brought into battle in full strength, with up to 300 tanks, its offensive often ended in failure, and the subunits carried large losses.
The Soviet industry was able to offer the infantry accompanying the tanks only handrails that helped to stay on the hull and turret of combat vehicles. On serial "thirty-fours" of the Ural Tank Plant, those appeared in September 1942. There was nowhere to produce armored personnel carriers. Therefore, many thanks must be said to the British and American allies who handed over to the Red Army a total of 6242 armored personnel carriers of various types. This, of course, is much less than 20 thousand cars of this class built by the Germans in 1941-1944, but so much is better than nothing.
By the way, E. Middeldorf in relation to the battles of the last period of the war considered it necessary to note: "The Russians have learned to conduct joint combat operations of tanks with infantry, planted on armored personnel carriers."
Military vehicles
With all due respect to Lend-Lease tanks, ZSU and armored personnel carriers, there is an area where the help of the allies was of incomparably greater and even colossal importance. This is road transport.
What has the armored forces to do with it? The answer is obvious: tanks cannot fight without stable supply and technical support. And such services can only be provided by cars with a desirable high lifting force and decent maneuverability. Cartage transport did not meet the needs of tankers either in speed or in carrying capacity.
In the 1930s, the USSR achieved outstanding success in the creation of the automobile industry. The total annual capacity of the country's auto plants was increased to 200 thousand cars, the car fleet in 1940 exceeded one million units. But we were still far from the possibilities of the Western European auto industry united by the Germans. The productivity of factories controlled by Germany reached 600 thousand vehicles per year.
All this could not but affect the equipment of the army. According to the official publication of the Main Armored Directorate of the RF Armed Forces "Fire, Armor, Maneuver" (Moscow, 1999), the Red Army entered the war with 272.6 thousand vehicles of all types in service. This did not correspond at all to the needs of the most mobile mechanized troops, first of all. The new hulls averaged 38 percent of the vehicles initially understated.
For comparison: the German armed forces with a much smaller number of armored vehicles on the eve of the war had 500 thousand vehicles. Taking into account the fleets of Italy, Hungary, Finland and Romania, the enemy had a double superiority in vehicles. In addition, for the needs of the infantry, the Wehrmacht alone had a million horses.
The critical shortage of vehicles became one of the most important reasons for the defeat of Soviet tank corps in the summer of 1941. Many thousands of tanks and armored vehicles did not die in battle, but were abandoned (at best, blown up by the crew) due to lack of fuel, ammunition, or just a spare part of a penny cost.
With the outbreak of the war, the capacity of the Soviet automobile industry was sharply reduced - partly due to the evacuation of Moscow groups of enterprises, but mainly due to the transition to the production of defense products. In fairness, we note that the same thing happened in Germany. The most powerful automobile plant in the USSR, Gorkovsky, in wartime produced not only cars, but also light tanks, self-propelled guns and armored vehicles. As a result, for the entire period of the war with the Germans, the Soviet auto industry produced only 205 thousand cars, of which 150, 4 thousand entered the Red Army.
Meanwhile, the book "Fire, Armor, Maneuver" states that the army received 744, 4 thousand vehicles during the same time. Including: 204, 9 thousand - in the war period of 1941, 152, 9 thousand, 158, 5 thousand and 157, 9 thousand, respectively - in 1942, 1943 and 1945, as well as 70, 9 thousand - by May 10 1945th. As a result, despite heavy losses, the number of the army vehicle fleet was 318.5 thousand on January 1, 1942, 404.5 thousand in 1943, 496 thousand in 1944 and 621.3 thousand in 1945. The latest figures explain, among other things, the growth in the mobility of our armored units in 1943 and the magnificent tank breakthroughs of 1944-1945.
Where did these hundreds of thousands of cars come from? Since 1941, everything is clear - transport was mobilized in the national economy. But already in 1942 this source was exhausted, further seizures threatened to stop the defense industry. Own production covered less than a third of the needs. Captured vehicles were used, but even in May 1945 they accounted for only 9.1 percent of the army's vehicle fleet.
The answer is obvious - the mobility of our tank armies was provided by vehicles obtained under Lend-Lease. In Soviet times, it was not accepted to talk about this, and even in the official publication of the GABTU in 1999 there are no general figures for deliveries. In the western literature, it is said about 430 thousand vehicles, including 152 thousand powerful Studebakers. Some of them died in the course of transportation, some went to the industry (at the end of the war, a batch of Studebakers also came to the Ural Tank Plant No. 183). But the Red Army received most of it.
Materials and equipment for NKTP
Coverage in the domestic literature of foreign aid for the development of the Soviet tank industry during the war years is as skewed as the assessment of the role of finished armored vehicles. The importance of one-time and insignificant deliveries is emphasized and at the same time the really important ones are forgotten.
Someone Y. Felshtinsky, an ardent admirer of the notorious Rezun-Suvorov, already in the 2000s made a sensational statement that Soviet "thirty-fours" were made of British armor!
He did not provide any documentary evidence, nevertheless we will try to figure it out. Let's start with the fact that the calculations made by Russian historians (made, in particular, by A. Ermolov) show that the production volumes of rolled armor at Soviet metallurgical plants more than covered its real consumption at tank enterprises.
However, there was one period of acute armor deficit. We are talking about the end of 1941 - the first half of 1942, when, after the evacuation, production in the east of the country was just getting better. Therefore, the USSR actually ordered armor hire abroad, but mainly not in England, but in the United States.
Deliveries began towards the middle of the year. Control over armor materials - both domestic and imported - was carried out by TsNII-48. In the middle of 1942, American products also fell into the Armored Institute - sheets with a thickness of 10, 15 and 35 millimeters.
Analysis of the metal showed that, in terms of their chemical composition, the former approximately corresponded to the domestic grade 2P, and the latter to grade 8C, but the carbon content exceeded Soviet standards.
Immediately, we note that the specified American armor could not initially be used for the manufacture of T-34 tanks, since since January 1942, only two thicknesses of sheet metal have been approved for them: 45 millimeters for anti-projectile protection and 20 millimeters for the roof and bottom. But this is not even the point: Soviet specialists came to the conclusion that, given the high geometric accuracy of rolled products, the American 35-mm sheet does not correspond to the modest "… wartime technical conditions, both in chemical composition and in fragile damage. The material of American steel has slate and lamination in the plane of the rolled product. " In general, further supplies of anti-cannon armor had to be abandoned, and the metal already received was used for various secondary purposes.
As for the American analogue of our 2P bulletproof armor steel, it was recognized as corresponding to Soviet technical conditions, so the deliveries continued for some time (approximately until the end of 1942). Therefore, we can assume that some light tanks were made in USA protection. On "thirty-fours" such material could only be used for the manufacture of the bottom.
Let's not gloat over the quality of American anti-cannon armor - in 1942, US factories were just mastering its production. In the course of a subsequent study of American tanks, it turned out that the initial problems were quickly overcome. But even theoretically, the use of American (and British, too) steel for the manufacture of T-34 tanks was impossible without a significant deterioration in their combat qualities. The fact is that overseas armored products with a thickness of 35–51 millimeters were originally calculated for hardening to medium hardness. Therefore, it was technologically advanced in processing and welding, it withstood well the impacts of field artillery shells with a moderate initial speed, did not give secondary fragments during non-penetrating action. But at the same time, in equal thicknesses, the products of the United States and England were noticeably inferior to Soviet steel of high hardness 8C when fired by German high-speed armor-piercing "sharp-headed" shells of 20-50 mm caliber. Therefore, the 51-mm frontal armor of the early M4A2 tank was not actually equal to the 45-mm plate of the thirty-four. Tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade after the battles in the summer of 1943 in American vehicles came to the conclusion that the Allies had given us defective equipment! People accustomed to their native "thirty-fours" did not fit in their heads that an ordinary anti-tank rifle could penetrate a benign frontal hull sheet from 80 meters, and a 20-mm automatic cannon of the Ju-87 attack aircraft could successfully shoot tanks not only into a thin roof, but also in the side of the hull and turret.
The Americans themselves, before the invasion of Europe, engaged in shielding the previously released Shermans and increasing the thickness of the vertical projections of their medium tanks. With the introduction of American rolled steel on T-34 tanks, it would also have to increase the thickness of the frontal and side parts by 10-15 percent, with all the consequences in the form of an increase in weight, a decrease in the mobility and reliability of the vehicle.
If we talk about other materials and components of foreign production, it is known that in 1943–1944, a certain amount of sheet metal made of especially ductile steel was used for the manufacture of tank tanks in the USSR. Onboard transmissions of some "thirty-fours" in 1944 were equipped with bearings of the firms "SKF" and "Timken". With the latter, everything is clear - this is an American manufacturer. Much more interesting is the case of the Swedish company SKF. The fact is that its bearings worked on most of the German tanks. Truly - money does not smell!
There is also reliable information about the installation of American radio stations on parts of 1943 tanks. In addition, the shortage of tool steels at tank factories in 1944-1945 was largely covered by supplies from the countries - allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.
However, the most important help of the allies for the NKTP factories was not armor, not bearings, and not even tool steel, but a modest gray rubber.
In the USSR, as is known, it is impossible to obtain natural rubber. And with the artificial in wartime, things were not the best way. Therefore, already in January 1942, factories began to install road wheels with steel rims and internal depreciation on T-34 tanks. A small rubber bushing has replaced the thick rubber on the entire surface of the roller. The fact that in terms of service properties the rollers with internal depreciation were inferior to the old ones with external rubber, it became immediately obvious to everyone, but there was no way out. Negative consequences were assumed, but there was nothing to measure and evaluate them, the enterprises did not have the necessary instruments. Only after the end of the war did it become clear that large-diameter rollers with internal depreciation of T-34 tanks simply had a destructive effect on the entire chassis and transmission.
The Americans, who began deliveries of rubber at the end of 1942, saved the case. Since May 1943, all "thirty-fours" of the Ural Tank Plant No. 183 again rolled off the assembly line on rollers with external depreciation. It is necessary to express special gratitude to the allies, since at this time there was a shortage of rubber at the US tank-building enterprises.
A few words about lend-lease equipment. In quantitative terms, it was not much - for example, we will give data on the newly received metal-cutting machines of the Ural Tank Plant No. 183:
For reference: by the end of 1945, the enterprise had approximately 3700 pieces of metal-cutting equipment at its disposal.
At the same time, it should be noted that almost all the machines received from the USA and Great Britain belonged to the number of modular, special and high-performance machines and were intended for clearing "bottlenecks" at tank factories. Among them there were 6- and 8-spindle automatic machines of the Bullard company, modular machines and automatic machines Kon, New-Britan, multi-cutter lathes Reed, Fey, Lodge, Spire, milling machines Cincinnati ", gear shaping" Sykes ", grinding" Heald "and" Landis ", revolving" Werner-Sweeze ", nut-cutting" Machinery ". Honing machines for machining gearbox parts were manufactured by Barnel-Drill. Along with the equipment, there was also a certain amount of cutting tools.
The staff of adjusters and machine operators for work on imported multi-spindle and multi-cutter machines in the spring of 1942 was trained by specialists from the ENIMS Institute.
In the previous article, we have already mentioned the introduction of heat treatment of mass parts with high-frequency currents at tank factories. The main equipment of the HDTV section of plant No. 183 in the form of a high-frequency unit LCh-170/90 was manufactured by the American company "Krenkshaft".
At the end of the article, let us summarize some of the results. According to the author, Lend-Lease really played a big role in equipping our tank forces and helped the tank industry of the USSR a lot. But this also happened because the process was properly organized by the Soviet side.
How was this expressed?
Lend-Lease did not replace, but supplemented the Soviet industry in those industries where its own capacities were not enough.
At tank factories, lend-lease equipment served to increase the efficiency of existing technologies and self-created production processes. The lengthy processes of borrowing and adapting new technologies are not an occupation for wartime.
