The news about the GPV 2018-2027 program leaves a very ambiguous impression. On the one hand, there is a feeling that the state armaments program for the next 10 years has become much more realistic than the GPV 2011-2020. On the other hand, significantly less funds have been allocated for it than it was planned to spend on the state armaments program in 2011-2020, and this, of course, is very upsetting.
So, in the article "The new state armament program gives an idea of Russia's military priorities" (rsnews.ru):
“Initially, it was planned that this program will operate until 2025. However, it was quite unexpectedly extended until 2027, with 19 trillion rubles allocated for its implementation. (That's roughly £ 244 billion.) Adjusted for inflation, this figure is close to the amounts allocated under the current program for 2012-2020."
The following is surprising in this statement: there is not a word of lie, but at the same time it gives the reader the wrong impression about the financing of the new state armaments program. One gets the feeling that we have smoothly transferred one program to another and, without reducing the amount of funding, are moving into a bright and well-protected future. But is it?
In fact, the numbers are 20 trillion. rub. GPV 2011-2020 and 19 trillion. rub. completely incomparable with each other. This is due to inflation - every year it depreciates money, because one and the same product, due to rising prices, begins to cost more. Accordingly, and 20 trillion. rubles, which were planned to be spent in 2011-2020, are much "more expensive" than 19 trillion. rubles, planned for 2018-2027
In order to understand what is happening with the financing of our military programs, let us first try to find out how much we have already spent on the implementation of GPV 2011-2020 and will spend before the beginning of 2018. Unfortunately, it is not so easy to find out in open sources the size of the actual financing of the SAP 2011-2020 during 2011-2017. It was possible to find data from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, which indicated the planned figures for procurement and R&D expenditures in 2011-2015. They look like this:
2011 - 585 billion rubles.
2012 - 727 billion rubles.
2013 - 1,166 billion rubles.
2014 - 1,400 billion rubles.
2015 - 1,650 billion rubles.
And in total, in the period 2011-2015, they were going to spend 5 528 billion rubles. The rest $ 14.5 trillion. rub. planned to spend in 2016-2020.
In fact, such a distribution of funding was one of the reasons for criticism of the 2011-2020 GPV: it was reproached for impracticability precisely because the bulk of the funds was planned to be spent at the end of the program. Indeed, if we assume that in the future, in 2016-2020, it was planned to maintain approximately the same proportion of cost growth, then in 2016-2017. the implementation of the SAP should have been allocated already 2.5 billion rubles. annually, but even in this case, almost half of all planned expenditures (about 9.5 trillion rubles) fell on the last three years, 2018-2020. In order for the state to be able to afford it, it was necessary either to increase the revenue side of the budget (which was already planned too optimistically), or to cut some other expenses.
Have the plans for spending on the state armaments program been fulfilled in the period 2011-2016? Rather no than yes, and the reason is not a lack of money at all, but the fact that the domestic defense industry, after two decades of collapse (1991-2010), could not demonstrate the expected rates. Of course, the reasons for the failure to comply with the SAP 2011-2020.a lot: here and the failure of the terms of readiness of "Polyment-Reduta", which is largely associated with the decisions of the management of the developer company, and the conflict with Ukraine, as a result of which the Russian Federation ceased to receive power plants for its frigates, and sanctions, as a result of which the commissioning of formation of small warships. But in any case, to ensure the production of military products in the volumes that were expected during the development of the GPV-2011-2020. we failed.
At the same time, it should be understood that even what our industry was able to give to the armed forces breathed new life into them. From the outside, this was especially noticeable in the example of our Air Force, which by 2010 came close to the "point of no return". With practically no new aircraft, the pilots were forced to be content with old, unmodernized aircraft, with a running out resource, obsolete equipment and weapons. The average annual flight time was very low, and could not be compared with what the "sworn friends" provided to their pilots. To date, the Aerospace Forces and naval aviation have already replenished not even dozens, but hundreds of modern combat aircraft, and the level of combat training has become completely different, although, of course, we still have a lot to develop.
But how much was spent on GPV 2011-2020? Probably the lowest possible level of costs for its implementation is contained in the data that the Russian Federation reports to the UN.
Total for 2011-2016 it turns out 3,216 billion rubles, including 2,918.4 billion rubles for the first five years. or 52, 8% of the planned. However, the figures above raise huge doubts, and here's why.
Somehow it turns out that the data on military expenditures that the Russian Federation submits to the UN is almost always little, and sometimes very much lower than the expenditures under the National Defense budget item. In this regard, 2016 was a phenomenal year: they reported to the UN on military expenditures of 2.06 billion rubles. while under the item "National Defense" there was an almost twice as large amount - 3.78 billion rubles. And even if we subtract 975 billion rubles. one-time payments for early repayment of loans by enterprises of the defense industry, still 2, 8 billion rubles remain. but not 2.06 billion rubles.
In general, the first option is to believe the data submitted by the Russian Federation to the UN, then the total cost of implementing the GPV 2011-2020 for the first seven years through 2017 inclusive is approximately from 3,700 to 4,400 billion rubles. and that's probably the bottom line for spending. Or, by analogy with the plan, one can simply assume that the Russian Federation spent about 50% of its military expenditures in 2011-2017, and in this case, the total expenditures on the implementation of the SAP for this period will amount to 8,368 billion rubles.
It is possible that the truth, as often happens to her, is somewhere in between.
On the one hand, it seems that even 8, 37 trillion. rub. over seven years, significantly less than 19 trillion. rubles for ten, but only if we forget about inflation. After all, the ruble in 2011 had a completely different purchasing power than it will have in 2018, when the financing of the new state armaments program begins. If we recalculate the sums of funds spent over 7 years for the implementation of the SAP (according to official inflation data and assuming inflation in 2017 at 4%) into 2018 prices, we will see the figure of 10,940 billion rubles, or on average RUB 1,562 billion in year. At the same time, it should be understood that 19 billion of the new state program will not be issued at one time in 2018, but will be issued throughout the entire program execution line. And here again we are faced with the influence of inflation, because even with an annual price increase of only 4%, one trillion in 2027 is equivalent to 702 billion in 2018. If we assume that all 10 years of the new SAP, funds will be spent evenly (with adjusted for inflation), the new GPV will cost about 15 825 billion rubles. in prices of 2018 (i.e. annual costs of 1,582.5 billion per year in prices of 2018).
Isn't that so, 1,562 billion rubles. the average annual spending of the previous program is very similar to 1,582.5 billion rubles.average annual spending of the new program? Apparently, this is exactly what was meant when it was said that "Adjusted for inflation, this figure is close to the amounts allocated under the current program for 2012-2020." But then why are they talking about a reduction in the financing of the GPV?
Yes, because according to the old GPV 2011-2020 in the period 2018-2020. it was supposed to spend about 9, 5 trillion. rub. then according to the new - no more than 4, 5-4, 9 trillion. rub., but rather, even less.
Thus, we come to the conclusion that the GPV 2011-2020. failed. We planned an annual increase in expenditures for the purchase of weapons, but at about the turn of 2015-2016 we realized that there was no money for further growth in expenditures in the budget, and (there is such a guess) even if they were, it is not a fact that the industry would make military orders in such volumes. And now we are reducing the cost of acquiring new weapons and R&D from what was planned. Although not from what we actually allocated for rearmament in recent years.
Will the funds included in the new program be sufficient for the rearmament of our armed forces? On the one hand, the period 2011-2017 can be called a breakthrough in the modern history of Russia in terms of financing the state armaments program, but on the other hand, along with obvious successes, such as massive deliveries of modern combat aircraft, Ratnik equipment, intercontinental ballistic missiles "Yars", qualitative growth in combat training and much, much more, there are also obvious gaps, such as the disruption of the Navy rearmament program, refusal to supply modern tanks in favor of modernizing the T-72, and so on.
From all of the above, one thing follows: realizing that we are in fairly tight financial circumstances, the country's leadership should devote to planning the GPV 2018-2027. closest attention. In order to ensure the high combat effectiveness of the domestic armed forces, we must be guided by the cost-effectiveness criteria and exclude ineffective and duplicating developments and weapons.
However, the few information that leaks into the open press regarding the 2018-2027 GPV raises reasonable doubts about the validity of a number of planned programs.
