The ideas of revanchism are very fashionable now. They say that everything was fine in tsarist Russia - there was no hunger, there was a high birth rate and an increase in production, etc. And if we add that a bunch of scoundrels stole the victory from Russia in 1917, then big political dividends can be earned on this.
Why does elementary logic never occur to anyone? In 1904-1905, Russian generals and officers miserably lost the war to the Japanese, in 1914-1917 they retreated every month and lost the war to the Germans, in 1918-1920 they completely lost the war to their own people, despite the thousands of guns, tanks and airplanes of the Entente. Finally, finding themselves in exile, tens of thousands of officers climbed all over the world in more and more fights - in Finland, Albania, Spain, South America, China, etc. Yes, thousands of them showed courage and were awarded. But who was given command not only of a division, but at least of a regiment? Or did the villains-Bolsheviks interfere there too?
But in the history of Western Europe, almost a quarter of the famous generals were emigrants. And in Russia, about half of the field marshals were emigrants, remember Minich, Barclay de Tolly, and others.
NO ARMS, NO BREAD, AND BOUGHT FOR GOLD
What was the morale of the soldiers? They simply had nothing to fight for! The tsar and even more so the tsarina are ethnic Germans. Over the past 20 years, they have spent a total of at least two years in Germany with relatives. The Empress's brother, General Ernst of Hesse, is one of the leaders of the German General Staff.
The Russian people are responsive to the pain of others, and the propaganda of aid to the Slav brothers in the first weeks of the war was successful. But in October 1915 Bulgaria declared war on Russia, more precisely, against the "Rasputin clique".
The Russian soldiers understood perfectly well that Wilhelm II had no intention of capturing Ryazan and Vologda, and the fate of the outskirts such as Finland or Poland was of little concern to the workers and peasants. But what can we say about the peasants, if the tsar himself and his ministers did not know what to do with Poland and Galicia even if the war ended successfully.
German airplanes dropped leaflets with caricatures on the Russian trenches - the Kaiser measures a huge 800-kilogram projectile with a centimeter, and Nicholas II, in the same position, measures Rasputin's penis. The entire army knew about the adventures of the "elder". And if the Germans used 42-centimeter mortars only in the most important sectors of the front, then almost all of our soldiers saw craters from 21-centimeter mortars.
The wounded, returning to the ranks, zemgussars and nurses told the soldiers how the gentlemen walked "to the fullest" in the restaurants of Moscow and Petrograd.
In all the books of the heads of GAU Manikovsky and Barsukov, the famous gunsmith Fedorov, it was recognized that the cost of high-explosive shells and shrapnel of the same caliber, produced by private and state-owned factories, differed by one and a half or two times.
The average profit of private industrial enterprises in 1915 compared with 1913 increased by 88%, and in 1916 - by 197%, that is, almost three times.
However, industrial production, including defense plants, began to decline in 1916. For the first 7 months of 1916, the transportation of goods by rail amounted to 48, 1% of the required.
In 1915-1916, the food issue became sharply aggravated. Until 1914, Russia was the second largest exporter of grain after the United States, and Germany was the world's main importer of food. But the German "Michel" until November 1918 regularly fed the army and the country, often giving up to 90% of the agricultural products produced. But the Russian peasant did not want to. Already in 1915, due to the inflation of the ruble and the narrowing of the flow of goods from the city, the peasants began to hide grain "until better times." Indeed, what is the point of giving grain at strictly fixed prices for "wooden" rubles (during the First World War, the ruble lost its gold content), for which there was practically nothing to buy? Meanwhile, if the grain is skillfully stored, then its economic value is preserved for 6 years, and the technological value - 10–20 or more years, that is, within 6 years most of the sown grain will germinate, and it can be eaten in 20 years. …
Finally, the grain can be used for moonshine or for feeding livestock and poultry. On the other hand, neither the army, nor industry, nor the population of large cities can exist without bread. As a result of the fact, as Russian historians point out, that "about a billion poods of grain reserves could not be transferred to consumption areas," the Minister of Agriculture Rittich in the fall of 1916 "even decided on an extreme measure: he announced a compulsory appropriation of grain." However, by 1917, only 4 million poods were practically unlocked. For comparison, the Bolsheviks collected 160-180 million poods a year for the surplus appropriation.
Mikhail Pokrovsky, in the collection of articles "Imperialist War", published in 1934, cited the following data: "In the winter season, Moscow needs 475 thousand poods of firewood, 100 thousand poods of coal, 100 thousand poods of oil residues and 15 thousand poods every day. peat. Meanwhile, in January, before the frost began, an average of 430,000 poods of firewood, 60,000 poods of coal and 75,000 poods of oil were brought to Moscow every day, so that the shortage, in terms of firewood, amounted to 220,000 poods daily; Since January 17, the arrival of firewood in Moscow has dropped to 300-400 wagons per day, that is, to half of the norm set by the regional committee, and almost no oil and coal have been received at all. Fuel supplies for the winter at factories and plants in Moscow were prepared for about a 2-month need, but due to the shortage, which began in November, these supplies were reduced to nothing. Due to the lack of fuel, many enterprises, even those working for defense, have already stopped or will soon stop. Centrally heated houses have only 50% of fuel, and the wood-burning storages are empty … the street gas lighting has completely stopped."
And here is what is indicated in the multivolume History of the Civil War in the USSR, published in the 1930s: “Two years after the start of the war, coal mining in Donbass was struggling to maintain its pre-war level, despite the increase in workers from 168 thousand in 1913. up to 235 thousand in 1916. Before the war, the monthly production per worker in the Donbass was 12, 2 tons, in 1915/16 - 11, 3, and in the winter of 1916 - 9, 26 tons”.
With the outbreak of war, Russian military agents (as military attachés were called then), generals and admirals rushed around the world to buy weapons. Of the purchased equipment, about 70% of the artillery systems were outdated and were suitable only for museums, but only England and Japan, Russia paid 505.3 tons of gold for this trash, that is, about 646 million rubles. In total, 1051 million gold rubles worth of gold was exported. After the February Revolution, the Provisional Government also made its contribution to the export of gold abroad: literally on the eve of the October Revolution, it sent a consignment of gold to Sweden for the purchase of weapons in the amount of 4.85 million gold rubles, that is, about 3.8 tons of metal.
DISPUTE ABOUT THE WINNERS
Could Russia have won the war in such a state? Let's fantasize and remove Masons, liberals and Bolsheviks from the political scene. So what would have happened to Russia in 1917-1918? Instead of a Masonic coup in 1917 or 1918, there would have been a terrible Russian revolt (which we will talk about later).
Ah, these are the author's assumptions! So let's look at the data on the armament of Russia, Germany and France at the end of 1917 - early 1918:
- divisional guns the French had 10 thousand, the Germans - 15 thousand, and Russia - only 7265 units;
- hull guns of large and special power, respectively - 7, 5 thousand, 10 thousand and 2560 units;
- tanks - 4 thousand.from France, about 100 from Germany and none from Russia;
- trucks - about 80 thousand from the French, 55 thousand - from the Germans, 7 thousand - from the Russians;
- combat aircraft - 7 thousand from France, 14 thousand from Germany and only a thousand - from Russia.
Heavy artillery played a significant role in the trench warfare of 1914-1918. Here is a brief summary of the presence of Russian heavy artillery at the front by June 15, 1917.
Long-range guns: 152-mm Kane system - 31, 152-mm Schneider system - 24, 120-mm Vickers system - 67. Heavy mounted combat weapons: 203-mm Vickers system howitzers - 24, 280-mm mortars of the Schneider system - 16, 305-mm howitzers mod. 1915 Obukhovsky plant - 12. The Russian army had two 254-mm railway installations, but they were out of order, and after 1917 the guns on both transporters were replaced with 203-mm ship guns.
And now let us compare these data with the armament of the French artillery of large and special power of the main artillery reserve: 10 regiments of 155-mm cannons from the main artillery reserve, three battalions of three batteries and one platoon of vehicles (360 guns in total) and 5 regiments of 105-mm cannons the main artillery reserve, three battalions of three batteries and one automobile ammunition platoon (180 guns).
Heavy tractor artillery was in the period of reorganization (regiments of 6 two-battery divisions were brought together into regiments of 4 three-battery divisions). This artillery included: 10 cannon regiments (480 guns), 10 howitzer regiments (480 guns), and 10 companies of tracked tractors. Each regiment had two platoons of ammunition transport.
The heavy artillery of high power consisted of 8 regiments of various composition:
- one working regiment and a park for the construction of a normal gauge railway (C. V. N.) of 34 batteries;
- one regiment of 240 mm cannons (75 guns);
- one regiment of mortars and howitzers (88 guns);
- one regiment of heavy railroad artillery with circular fire guns (42 guns);
- four regiments of heavy railroad artillery with guns firing from arc branches (506 guns).
In total, the heavy artillery of high power consisted of 711 guns.
Naval artillery (ship and coastal installations, occupied on the land front. - A. Sh.) consisted of four battalions of mobile 16-cm cannons, 4 two-gun batteries in each, two separate batteries and one battalion of river monitors (1-24 cm and 2 - 19 cm cannon). A total of 39 guns.
By February 1917, the front line ran from Riga along the Northern Dvina to Dvinsk (now Daugavpils), then 80 km west of Minsk and further to Kamenets Podolsky. Rhetorical question: how could the Russian army with such a state of artillery, aviation and vehicles reach Berlin? Let us recall that in 1944-1945 the Red Army, having a superiority of two to three or more times over the Germans in personnel, artillery, tanks, aviation, having thousands of M-13, M-30 multiple launch rocket launchers, etc., lost several million killed before reaching Berlin.
STRIKE IN THE BACK, BUT NOT
After leaving the Crimea, the Russian fleet was locked in Bizerte for many years. Photo of 1921
It is curious that the overwhelming majority of the German population believed in the theory of “stolen victory” and “stab in the back of the army” in the 1920s – 1930s. Note that the Germans just had the basis for such theories. Judge for yourself.
In the summer of 1918, American units arrived on the Western Front, and the Allies went on the offensive. In September, the Entente troops in the Western European theater had 211 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions against 190 German infantry divisions. By the end of August, the number of American troops in France was about 1.5 million people, and by the beginning of November it exceeded 2 million people.
At the cost of huge losses, the Allied forces in three months managed to advance on a front about 275 km wide to a depth of 50 to 80 km. By November 1, 1918, the front line began on the coast of the North Sea, a few kilometers west of Antwerp, then went through Mons, Sedan and further to the Swiss border, that is, until the last day, the war was exclusively in the Belgian and French territories.
During the Allied offensive in July-November 1918, the Germans lost 785, 7 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, the French - 531 thousand people, the British - 414 thousand people, in addition, the Americans lost 148 thousand people. Thus, the losses of the allies exceeded the losses of the Germans by 1, 4 times. So in order to reach Berlin, the Allies would lose all their ground forces, including the Americans.
In 1915-1916, the Germans had no tanks, but then the German command was preparing a big tank pogrom in late 1918 - early 1919. In 1918, German industry produced 800 tanks, but most of them did not manage to reach the front. The troops began to receive anti-tank rifles and large-caliber machine guns, which easily pierced the armor of British and French tanks. Mass production of 37 mm anti-tank guns began.
During the First World War, not a single German dreadnought (battleship of the latest type) was killed. In November 1918, in terms of the number of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, Germany was 1, 7 times inferior to England, but the German battleships were superior to the allied ones in the quality of artillery, fire control systems, unsinkable ships, etc. All this is well demonstrated in the famous Jutland battle on May 31 - June 1, 1916. Let me remind you that the battle had a draw, but the British losses significantly exceeded the German ones.
In 1917, the Germans built 87 submarines, and excluded 72 submarines from the lists (due to losses, technical reasons, navigational accidents, etc.). In 1918, 86 boats were built, and 81 were excluded from the lists. There were 141 boats in service. At the time of the signing of the surrender, 64 boats were under construction.
Why did the German command ask the allies for a truce, but in fact agreed to surrender? Germany was killed by a stab in the back. The essence of what happened was expressed in one phrase by Vladimir Mayakovsky: "… and if only Hohenzollern knew then that this was a bomb for their empire as well." Yes, indeed, the German government transferred rather large sums to the revolutionary parties of Russia, including the Bolsheviks. However, the October Revolution led to the gradual demoralization of the German army.
LOST CHANCE
So, the Russian Empire did not have a single chance to win the war in 1917-1918. I repeat once again, without the Masonic revolution in February 1917, a widespread spontaneous rebellion would have flared up in Russia in 6-12 months. However, I will console our "leavened patriots" with the fact that Russia could twice become the winner in the Great War - at the beginning and at the end.
In the first version, Nicholas II was only required to follow the strategy of his great-grandfather, grandfather and father. Nicholas I and both Alexander built three lines of the world's finest fortresses on Russia's western border. “The best in the world” is not my assessment, but Friedrich Engels, a good specialist in military strategy and a big Russophobe.
However, Nicholas II and his generals, by decree from Paris, were preparing for a field war - a march on Berlin. For 20 years, during the exercises of the Russian army, horse lavas were carried as part of several cavalry divisions, infantry corps advanced in dense formations. Russian generals took seriously the French "misinformation" - the theory of trinity. They say that a war can be won with only field guns, only one caliber - 76 mm, and only one shell - shrapnel. Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, who was in charge of Russian artillery, in 1911 abolished heavy (siege) artillery altogether and promised the tsar to recreate it after 1917. And the aforementioned prince planned to re-equip the serf artillery from the systems of 1867 and 1877 to modern ones by … 1930!
The western fortresses were abandoned. During the reign of Nicholas II, not a single modern weapon of large and medium caliber was manufactured for land fortresses. Moreover, the old guns of the samples of 1838, 1867 and 1877 were removed from the forts and placed in the center of the citadel in open positions.
In 1894-1914, Russia was able to re-equip the western fortresses with modern guns installed in concrete casemates and armored towers. And in the intervals between the fortresses to build continuous fortified areas. Note that the lines of the URs on the western border (the Stalin line and the Molotov line) were created only under Soviet rule. Moreover, in the URs of the Soviet era, no new technologies were used, compared to the beginning of the twentieth century, unless, of course, chemical protection is considered. And a significant part of the guns in the URs were from the tsarist time.
And these are not my fantasies. Since the beginning of the 1880s, many Russian generals and officers have raised the issue of building fortified areas on the western border. Viktor Yakovlev in his work History of Fortresses, published in 2000, points out that in 1887 “the old question, raised in 1873, arose about the creation of the Warsaw fortified region, which was to include Warsaw as one of the strongholds; the other two strong points should be Novogeorgievsk, expanded by that time forts, and the newly proposed small fortress Zegrzh (instead of Serotsk, which had been meant in 1873)”. And in 1892, the Minister of War, General Kuropatkin, proposed creating a large fortified area in the Privislensky Territory, the rear of which would extend to Brest. According to the highest approved order for the creation of a fortified area in 1902, 4.2 million rubles were allocated. (It is curious where this money went.) Needless to say, the construction of fortified areas was not started until August 1914 …
The most interesting thing is that there were unmeasured weapons for fortresses and fortified areas in 1906-1914! This is where the reader will be indignant, they say, the author has long and tediously asserted that there were no weapons for the fortresses, and now he says that they were before … Everything is correct. There were not enough of them in the land fortresses, but there were many thousands of guns in the coastal fortresses, on the ships and warehouses of the Naval Department. Moreover, weapons that were absolutely not needed there.
So, by July 1, 1914 in Kronstadt consisted of absolutely useless for the fight against the Kaiser's dreadnoughts, cruisers and even destroyers: 11-inch guns mod. 1877 - 41, 11-inch guns mod. 1867 - 54, 9-inch guns mod. 1877 - 8, 9-inch guns mod. 1867 - 18.6-inch guns 190 pounds - 38.3-inch guns mod. 1900 - 82, 11-inch mortars arr. 1877 - 18, 9-inch mortars arr. 1877 - 32.
Note that the German admirals did not even plan a breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland until 1914 or in 1914-1916. And our wise generals began to take out old guns from Kronstadt only after the start of the war.
By December 1907, there were guns in Vladivostok: 11-inch arr. 1867 - 10.10 / 45-inch - 10.9-inch arr. 1867 - 15.6 / 45-inch - 40, 6-inch 190 pounds - 37, 6-inch 120 pounds - 96, 42-linear arr. 1877 - 46; mortars: 11-inch mod. 1877 - 8.9-inch arr. 1877 - 20.9-inch arr. 1867 - 16, 6-inch serfs - 20, 6-inch field - 18. Out of state: 8-inch light mortars - 8, 120-mm Vickers guns - 16.
The Japanese attack on Russia after 1907, that is, after the conclusion of an alliance with England, was ruled out, and there was no particular need for these weapons in Vladivostok. It was possible to leave two dozen 10-inch and 6/45-inch guns, and take the rest to the West. By the way, this was done, but only in 1915-1916. Everything was taken out of Vladivostok cleaned up, but only after all the western Russian fortresses had fallen.
Finally, in 1906-1914, several Russian coastal fortresses were abolished and disarmed - Libava, Kerch, Batum, Ochakov. In one Libau, by December 1907, there were guns: 11-inch - 19, 10-inch - 10, 9-inch arr. 1867 - 14.6 / 45-inch - 30, 6-inch 190 pounds - 24, 6-inch 120 pounds - 34, 42-line arr. 1877 - 11; mortars: 11-inch - 20, 9-inch - 30, 8-inch arr. 1867 - 24, 6-inch serfs - 22, 6-inch field - 18. Add here the arsenals of Kerch, Batum and Ochakov. All the guns removed there were stuffed somewhere in the rear warehouses and coastal fortresses, but until August 1, 1914, none of them got into the western fortresses.
Once again, I note that all these naval and coastal guns are hopelessly outdated for fighting the fleet, but they could become a formidable weapon of fortresses and fortified areas. The same French delivered several hundred large-caliber coastal and naval guns, manufactured from 1874 to 1904, in their fortresses and fortified areas (some of them were installed on railway platforms). The result is obvious: by 1917, when our Germans were on the Riga-Dvinsk-Baranovichi-Pinsk line, they had not penetrated more than 150 km into French territory anywhere.
The same famous French fortress of Verdun defended the entire war, being less than 50 km from the German border. South of Verdun, up to the Swiss border, the front line by 1917 passed approximately along the Franco-German border. Although, of course, the fate of Verdun was decided not so much by the power of the French artillery as by the presence of fortified areas to the right and left of it, thanks to which the Germans were unable to surround the fortress.
UNTIL THE LAST RUSSIAN SOLDIER
The pre-war plans of the German General Staff did not include an offensive deep into Russia. On the contrary, the main blow was dealt in Belgium and France. And on the Russian front, cover units remained.
Some armchair theorist will be indignant - Germany, having defeated France, would have struck a blow at Russia! Sorry, in 1914 the Germans, unlike 1940, had no tanks or motorized divisions. Either way, the battles for Verdun and other French fortresses would have dragged on for weeks, if not months. Needless to say, the Anglo-Saxons under no circumstances would have allowed the capture of France by the Kaiser. There would be a total mobilization in England. From the French and British colonies 20-40 "colored" divisions would be sent. The United States would have entered the war not in 1917, but in 1914, etc. In any case, the war on the Western Front would have lasted for several years.
But Russia would find itself in the position of a monkey sitting on a mountain and watching with interest the fight of tigers in the valley. After the exhaustion of both sides on the Western Front, the Russian government could dictate its terms of peace and even become an arbitrator. Naturally, for a fee in the form of the Black Sea straits, the return of the original Armenian territories in Asia Minor, etc. Unfortunately, everything happened exactly the opposite. The French sat in Verdun and other fortresses and were ready to fight to the last soldier, of course, German and Russian.
But the second chance to become a winner in the Great War was missed by Russia … in the summer of 1920. And again, through the fault of the Russian generals.
At dawn on April 25, 1920, Polish troops launched a decisive offensive along the entire front - from Pripyat to the Dnieper. Two weeks later, the Poles took Kiev. General Aleksey Brusilov, who was living in Moscow at that time, wrote: “It was incomprehensible to me how the Russians, the white generals lead their troops along with the Poles, how they did not understand that the Poles, having taken possession of our western provinces, would not give them back without a new war and bloodshed. […] I thought that while the Bolsheviks were guarding our former borders, while the Red Army did not let Poles into former Russia, I was on my way with them. They will perish, but Russia will remain. I thought they would understand me there, in the south. But no, they didn't understand!.."
On May 5, 1920, the Pravda newspaper published Brusilov's appeal to the officers of the former tsarist army with an appeal to support the Red Army in the fight against the Poles: you with an urgent request to forget all insults, whoever and wherever inflicted them on you, and voluntarily go with complete selflessness and desire to the Red Army, to the front or to the rear, wherever the government of Soviet Workers 'and Peasants' Russia appoints you, and serve there, not for fear, but for conscience, so that with our honest service, not sparing life, to defend by all means dear to us Russia and not to allow her to be plundered, for in the latter case it can be irrevocably lost, and then our descendants will justly us to curse and rightly blame for the fact that because of the selfish feelings of the class struggle we did not use our military knowledge and experience, forgot our native Russian people and ruined our mother Russia …
I will note that in Moscow no one put pressure on Brusilov, and he acted solely out of conviction. Well, in distant Paris, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich felt the same feelings for the Poles: “When in the early spring of 1920 I saw the headlines of French newspapers announcing the triumphal procession of Pilsudski through the wheat fields of Little Russia, something inside me could not stand it, and I forgot about the fact that not even a year has passed since the execution of my brothers. I just thought: “The Poles are about to take Kiev! The eternal enemies of Russia are about to cut off the empire from its western borders! " I did not dare to express myself openly, but listening to the absurd chatter of the refugees and looking at their faces, I wished the Red Army victory with all my heart."
Could Wrangel in May 1920 conclude at least an armistice with Soviet Russia? Of course he could. Let us recall how at the end of 1919 the Bolsheviks made peace with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Red Army could easily occupy their territory. But Moscow needed a respite from the war and a "window to Europe." As a result, peace was concluded on the terms of the Baltic nationalists, and after a couple of weeks, dozens of trains with goods from Russia went to Riga and Revel.
But instead, Wrangel escaped from the Crimea and started a war on the territory of Soviet Russia. The rest is well known.
But suppose there was a coup in Crimea. For example, Lieutenant General Yakov Slashchev would come to power. By the way, in the spring of 1920 he proposed plans to conclude peace with the Bolsheviks. In this case, units of the Red Army would be removed from the Southern Front and sent to beat the lords.
Immediately after the attack of Pilsudski's army on Soviet Russia, the left-wing deputies of the Reichstag and a number of generals led by the commander-in-chief of the Reichswehr, Colonel-General Hans von Seeckt, demanded to conclude a defensive-offensive alliance with Soviet Russia. The purpose of such an alliance was the elimination of the shameful articles of the Versailles Treaty and the restoration of the common border between Germany and Russia "as long as possible" (quote from von Seeckt's statement).
After the capture of Warsaw by the Red Army, German troops were to occupy Pomorie and Upper Silesia. In addition to the German troops, the army of Prince Avalov (Bermont) was to participate in the attack on the Poles. This army consisted of Russian and Baltic Germans and in 1919 fought intensively against Latvian nationalists. Despite the insistent demands of General Yudenich to join his troops advancing on Petrograd, Avalov on principle refused to fight against the Bolsheviks. At the end of 1919, at the request of the Entente, Avalov's army was withdrawn from the Baltic States and redeployed to Germany. But she was not dismissed, but kept under arms "just in case."
As you know, in 1920, the Red Army just barely had enough strength to take Warsaw. This "little bit" could be 80 thousand bayonets and sabers of the Southern Front, especially if Slashchev reinforced them with British tanks and high-speed De Havilland bombers.
The "ugly brainchild of the Versailles Pact" (Molotov's phrase, said in 1939) would have been done away with 19 years earlier. The borders of 1914 would have been restored, and Soviet Russia would have become the victor in the Great War.
Alas, there was no coup in Crimea, and the white baron, possessed by the maniacal idea of entering Moscow on a white horse, staged a massacre in Northern Tavria, then fled to Crimea, and from there to Constantinople. For the massacre in Northern Tavria in May-December 1920, at least 70 thousand white officers paid with their lives, and Russia lost Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.
